SIDNEY HERBERT
A MEMOIR

LORD STANMORE

Cornell University Library

BOUGHT WITH THE INCOME
FROM THE
SAGE ENDOWMENT FUND
THE GIFT OF
Henry W. Sage
1891

A 22 8589 20/11/08

3513-1

CORNELL UNIVERSITY LIBRARY
3 1924 088 008 465

The original of this book is in
the Cornell University Library.

There are no known copyright restrictions in
the United States on the use of the text.

http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924088008465

SIDNEY HERBERT

LORD HERBERT OF LEA

VOL. I

Lord Herbert of Lea

From drawing by George Richmond, R.A.

SIDNEY HERBERT

LORD HERBERT OF LEA

A MEMOIR

BY

LORD STANMORE

WITH PORTRAITS AND ILLUSTRATIONS

A sweeter and a lovelier Gentleman,
Trained in the prodigality of Nature,
The spacious world cannot again afford.
Richard III., Act I., Scene 2.

VOL. I

LONDON
JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET, W.
1906

A. 228589

PRINTED BY
HAZELL, WATSON AND VINEY, LD.,
LONDON AND AYLESBURY.

TO

ELIZABETH

LADY HERBERT OF LEA

THIS MEMOIR

WRITTEN BY HER DESIRE

IS

WITH RESPECT AND AFFECTION

DEDICATED

PREFACE

THE publication of this Memoir has been long retarded by a variety of causes on which it is unnecessary now to dwell. More than fifteen years have elapsed since Lady Herbert asked me to write her husband's Life, and the first draft of many of its chapters was written not much later. That draft has been largely altered, and its *lacunæ* have been filled up at various subsequent dates,—a fact which will explain, though hardly excuse, a certain unevenness in the narrative of which no one can be more sensible than myself. It is hard to give an appearance of unity to a succession of paragraphs written at far distant intervals.

I regret that the work should not have been undertaken by some one whose closer intimacy with Lord Herbert would have enabled him to write with more knowledge and authority as to his private life and personal character than I can claim. I knew Lord Herbert fairly well as a young man knows one twenty years his senior, but I was never on the same footing of familiar intercourse with him as with some of his colleagues and contemporaries. Lord Pembroke and

Lady Herbert have indeed given me every assistance in their power, allowing me the freest access to the letters and papers in their possession; but though invaluable for the elucidation of Sidney Herbert's public career, these papers throw less light on his personal and inner life than perhaps might have been expected.

From other quarters besides the Herbert family I have received assistance which I am bound gratefully to acknowledge.

In the first place it is my duty humbly to express my thanks for the gracious permission granted me by H.M. THE KING to make use of the letters of H.R.H. the late PRINCE CONSORT printed in the second volume.

The hesitation I felt to undertake a theme to which I doubted my ability to do justice gave way before the wishes—I may say the urgency—of the late Right Hon. W. E. Gladstone, who not only placed in my hands all Lord Herbert's letters to him, but also allowed me a much freer use of his own share of the correspondence than during the later years of his life it was usual with him in such cases to permit. The greater part of the letters of Mr. Gladstone published in these volumes are so with his express sanction. For permission to use the remainder, I am indebted to the kindness of Mr. Gladstone's trustees and the Right Hon. John Morley.

The Secretary of State for War has most obligingly afforded me access to original official documents, of

which I should not otherwise have been able to avail myself.

On a previous occasion I have had to recognise the kindness of Mrs. Charles Baring in permitting me to use, in my Life of Lord Aberdeen, many letters written by her father, Sir James Graham. She has shown a similar generosity in the present instance, and thereby increased obligations which it affords me the sincerest pleasure gratefully to acknowledge.

To Miss Nightingale I am indebted for leave to publish the letters to Mr. Herbert contained in Chapter X. of the first volume.

My thanks are also due to others who have granted me similar favours, and among whom I may be permitted to make special mention of the Duchess Dowager of Argyll, the Marquess of Lansdowne, and the Earl of Clarendon.

S.

August, 1906.

CONTENTS

VOL. I

CHAPTER I

EARLY YEARS (1810–32) . . . . . PAGE 1

CHAPTER II

IN PARLIAMENT (1833–45) 18

CHAPTER III

IN THE CABINET (1845–46) 39

CHAPTER IV

PRIVATE LIFE (1846–48) 77

CHAPTER V

PEELITE NEUTRALITY (1848–50) 91

CHAPTER VI

VIA MEDIA (1850–52) 130

CHAPTER VII

THE EVE OF WAR (1853–54) 170

CHAPTER VIII

PAGE

FIRST YEAR OF WAR (1854–55) 223

CHAPTER IX

THE CRIMEAN WINTER (1854–55) 270

CHAPTER X

SCUTARI (1854–55) 331

CHAPTER XI

SESSION OF 1855 422

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

VOL. I

SIDNEY HERBERT . . . . . *Frontispiece*

From the crayon drawing by G. Richmond, R.A., in the possession of Lady Herbert of Lea

FACING PAGE

WILTON HOUSE 91

THE CHALLENGE. THE STRUGGLE. VICTORY. CHAGRIN AND TRIUMPH. 460

SIDNEY HERBERT

LORD HERBERT OF LEA

CHAPTER I

EARLY YEARS

1810–32

SOME years ago Lady Herbert of Lea did me the honour to request that I would write a memoir of her husband, and that request was supported by the strong persuasion of Mr. Gladstone. I agreed to do so, subject to the condition of previously finishing a Life of my father, on which I was then engaged. I knew, from the first, that the task which I had—perhaps somewhat rashly—consented to undertake was not an easy one; but it was only when I had fairly entered upon it that I became thoroughly aware how great were the difficulties with which that task was attended—some of them inherent in its nature, whilst others, though not less real, were of a more accidental character.

There was a singular personal charm about Sidney Herbert, which it is as difficult to define or describe as it was easy to feel. This charm, to which much of his influence was undoubtedly due, cannot pervade my narrative, nor can its delicate aroma be preserved in the pages of a biography. Yet, unless a consciousness of its existence is always present during the perusal

of this book, no adequate impression of the position Sidney Herbert occupied, or of his relations to his environment, can be obtained by the reader.

Again, although his influence over the events of his time was considerable, it was for the most part indirectly exercised through others; nor is his name primarily connected with any great and striking act, either of domestic or foreign policy. His life was short, and, as regards its external incidents, uneventful. It cannot be doubted that, had he lived a few years longer, he would have been Prime Minister of England. As it was, the only great measures which he can be said to have effected were improvements in the education, comfort, and sanitary condition of the Army,—important matters, indeed, but not furnishing materials for a specially interesting biography.

Nor are the difficulties of writing his life diminished by the fact that, although a great number of the letters addressed to him have been preserved, comparatively few of those written by him have been accessible to his biographer. Moreover, though his letters are characteristic, clearly expressed, high-toned, and not wanting in humour, letter-writing was an occupation which he disliked, and in which he cannot be said to have specially excelled. In such conditions a biography must almost inevitably consist either of a bare recital of the outer events of a man's life—in this case not specially striking—or of a sketch of the times in which he lived, and of the measures which he directly or indirectly influenced: a work which may be more or less valuable according to the capacity and information of the writer, but which can hardly be classed among true biographies. Nevertheless, the promise I have given must be redeemed; and though I fear the result will be as unsatisfactory

to my readers as it is to myself, I proceed to the best of my power to fulfil it.

On January 25th, 1808, George Augustus, eleventh Earl of Pembroke, then a widower, and the father of one son and one daughter, married Catherine, only daughter of Simon, Count Woronzow, for many years Russian Ambassador in England.

Of this marriage the second child, and only son, is the subject of the present memoir. He was born at Pembroke Lodge, Richmond, on September 16th, 1810. It had been intended that Lady Pembroke's confinement should take place in London, and no preparation for that event had been made at Richmond. Until the baby's outfit, already prepared, could be fetched from Lord Pembroke's house in town, clothes for the infant were borrowed from the neighbouring workhouse; and when in later years her son's generous liberality threatened, as it often did, to cripple his fortune, his mother was accustomed to say that workhouse clothes were the first he had worn after his birth, and were also clearly those in which he would die.

He was named Sidney, in memory of that descent from the sister of Sir Philip Sidney, of which the Herberts of the Pembroke line are justly proud.

That he was an engaging and beautiful child, the pet and idol of his parents and sisters, is manifest from letters which have been preserved in the family. One of these describes his appearance as Cupid at some fête, when between three and four years old. "I never did see anything half so like an angel," writes Lady Pembroke; "I must say so, although it was my own performance. He had on a garland of roses and green leaves mixed; a pair of wild duck's

wings, put on wire to make them set well; a bow and arrow, and a quiver with arrows in it, tied on with a broad blue ribbon that went across his sweet neck." In another of her letters we are told of a visit paid, about this time, to Queen Charlotte, and how the child "Boysey" climbed into the Queen's lap, drew up and pulled down window-blinds, romped at hide-and-seek with the Duke of Cambridge, and showed himself to be not in the slightest degree abashed by the presence of royalty.

His beauty as a child was of a somewhat peculiar character, presenting the unusual combination of light golden hair with dark eyes shaded by long thick eyelashes. The beauty of his face and figure were, from his infancy, set off by the high-bred courteousness of manner which distinguished him throughout life, and which in a child must have been specially attractive. The winning aspect of the boy may, indeed, have had a not unimportant influence on his subsequent fortunes. The last Viscount Fitzwilliam was an intimate friend and distant relative of Lord Pembroke, and used to be a frequent visitor at Pembroke Lodge, and at Wilton. He was childless, and on his death in 1816 it was found that, after leaving to the University of Cambridge his fine collection of pictures and marbles, and his library, rich in precious manuscripts, the old man had bequeathed the bulk of his property to Lord Pembroke, with remainder to his second son, Sidney, who thus eventually became the proprietor of extensive estates in Ireland and Shropshire.

In 1820 Sidney was sent to Mr. Bradfield's school at Hall Place, Beaconsfield, and thence passed on to Harrow in April, 1824. A few days after his entrance there he wrote thus to his mother:

"I am not this time going to write any confidential letter, as Papa calls it, because I have not seen enough yet. However, I must tell you where I am placed; not in the second remove of the fourth form, but in the first or head one, which is a whole remove higher than I, or indeed any one else, thought I should be put into. Mind, I will put it in every way possible that you may not think I am mistaken—now f-i-r-s-t, first, or in figures 1st. Pray be so good, my dear Mama, as to send me a little black prayer-book, which I got out to pack it up, but entirely forgot it."

A fortnight later, in writing to his father, he says:

"I think I am most fortunate in being in this house; all the boys seem so very gentlemanlike, which is all I can say yet. Jocelyn[1] has been particularly kind to me, and lets me always sit in his study, which is a great comfort, for at first it was very unpleasant, not having any place where I could read or write without interruption; but what I am still more obliged to him for is warning me against a boy whom I had very near closed with. I have been rather in a strait about it, not liking to break off from him all of a sudden, but by avoiding him I think he avoids me, so that I shall soon get quite clear of him. I have taken as a point by which I could know them, those boys who never swear, and I find that they are always those who are spoken of in the highest terms. I am convinced that many swear out of thoughtlessness and hearing others do the same. I have found a boy in the house of whom, if you remember, Mr. Batten spoke very highly. His name is Holland, and for a few days we have always walked out together, and his conversation is so rational and so untainted with anything low that I am quite delighted with him. He has particularly pleased me with what he has said about swearing, and also about running in debt, which he did the first year he was here, but has since quite paid it off. He has promised to introduce me to a boy of the name of Jackson, who is at present ill with the measles. He says I shall like him very much. And I am also very well off in regard to my room fellows, Digby and

[1] Lord Roden's eldest son, died of cholera 1854.

Beresford, who are both nice boys. I like young Robinson, Lord Grantham's son,[1] very much. Upon the whole I like this amazingly, but as the bell is ringing for school I must leave you."

Mr. Batten, Sidney's house master, a man skilled in discernment of character, wrote of him a year later, that he had "never seen a boy of so pure a mind, so perfectly uncorrupted by bad example, so open and ingenuous in temper and disposition."

During his whole career at Harrow, Sidney Herbert maintained the same character. I have now before me a set of "Resolutions" for his own self-government, written when he had been about two years at Harrow, and was in his sixteenth year. They are not very different from those which most boys of that age, if well disposed, and brought up with the fear of God before their eyes, are in the habit of forming, and, to the great benefit of our country and themselves, are in the habit of substantially keeping, to a far greater extent, and in far greater numbers, than those of a less pious disposition, or with a lower sense of truth and purity, are wont to believe. Then and throughout his life Sidney Herbert's prominent characteristic was high-bred and thorough gentlemanliness, evinced in his high standard of truth and honour, his instinctive distaste for all that was low, immoral, or degrading, and his unvarying courtesy. On his leaving Harrow in 1827, Mr. Batten wrote of him: "I have the unspeakable satisfaction of restoring him from the dangers of such a place as this, not only untainted, but I hope and believe confirmed and strengthened in principle." For the rest of Mr. Batten's life he and his pupil remained close friends. He died in 1830, and the monument to his memory in the

[1] Hon. Philip Robinson; died 1834.

north transept of Harrow Church owes its existence to Sidney Herbert.

It is perhaps worth noticing that, even as a schoolboy, his interest in politics was keen, and his letters to his sisters speak of his "reading every paper he could get hold of," and in consequence "boring some of the boys who do not care for the subject."

Lord Pembroke, whose health had been for some time declining, died on October 25th, 1827.

He had married early in life, and on the premature death of his wife, Elizabeth Beauclerk, in 1793, he sought distraction from his grief, which was profound, by going on active service with the Army in Flanders as a volunteer. His letters from thence convey a highly curious, and by no means pleasant, picture of the state of the British Army at the close of the last century. They are those of a shrewd observer fully alive to the abuses around him, and I wish they could be given to the world. The death of his father in 1794 called him to other duties. He returned to England and took an active part in public affairs and social life. In 1807 he was entrusted with a mission to Austria, then supposed to be ready to act in concert with England against the French. He started for Vienna, and reached it by a circuitous route; but on arriving there found himself in a hopeless and even somewhat ludicrous position. Sent to effect an alliance with Austria against France, he found Austria overawed by the alliance of Russia and France at Tilsit. All that he could do was to return home with as little loss of dignity as was in the circumstances possible. This he effected in such a manner as to obtain the warm approval of his own Government and the respect of the Court to which he had been accredited.

After his return from his embassy he filled a distinguished position, and exercised the influence which his illustrious descent, his great possessions, and his patronage of three boroughs gave him—an influence which, even in the hands of an inferior man, would have been considerable. In his case it was enhanced by the possession of considerable attainments and an unfailing courtesy. He took no inconspicuous part in public life, and had weight also in the House of Lords, but he never took political office. Men of his type in those days but seldom did so, and, indeed, were accustomed to consider it somewhat of a sacrifice when they consented to become servants of the Crown. They preferred to exercise through their own borough influence a power over the Ministers rather than to join their councils.

Knight of the Garter, Lord-Lieutenant of his county, owner of some thirty towns and villages, Lord Pembroke was a great magnate in Wiltshire, in the local business of which he largely interested himself. He lived chiefly at Wilton, which he did much to improve. He was fond of all rural pursuits, and it was remarked of him that he largely shared the hereditary fondness for dogs which had distinguished so many of his predecessors. He usually had several with him, who not only accompanied him in his walks, but were accustomed to attend his table, where each of them had his own separate chair and plate.

A warm and faithful friend, he was very widely respected and beloved. In his own family he showed himself an affectionate husband and father. More than ten years before Lord Pembroke's death his eldest son had made an early and romantic marriage with a Sicilian lady, and the results of this ill-starred

connection had led Lord Herbert to live wholly abroad. Sidney was thus practically Lord Pembroke's only son. Between them the fullest confidence and affection existed, and Sidney long and deeply felt the loss of his father's counsel and intimacy.

After leaving Harrow, Sidney passed some time with a private tutor, the Rev. F. Lear (afterwards Dean of Salisbury), at Chilmark, of which village, not far from Wilton, Mr. Lear was Rector. Mr. Lear's brother-in-law and curate, Mr. Majendie, also took part in the boy's tuition.

Sidney's life at Chilmark was thus described by him, soon after going there, in a letter to his mother:

"You cannot think how comfortable it is to be in a nice little country church after that great noisy chapel. Everything is so quiet and the people all so attentive that you might hear a pin fall while Mr. Lear is preaching. I like, too, being so near Wilton, so many things here ever bringing to mind all *he* said and did—all the places where I have ridden with him, and the home where we used to be so happy. In short, there is not a spot about Wilton now which I do not love as if it were a person. I hope you will be coming there soon and get it over, for seeing that place again will be a dreadful trial to you."

This love of every spot about Wilton "as if it were a person" only grew with his growth, and was testified by the circumstances of his death.

Sidney's stay at Chilmark seems to have been a happy one, nor does it appear to have been overburdened by study, if we may judge from Mr. Majendie's account of it. Writing to Lady Pembroke, he says, in November, 1828, that "the morning is employed in classical studies, in riding, and occasionally shooting; the evenings in English reading and the

recreations of music and drawing." In this latter accomplishment Sidney became no mean proficient. One of his drawings, "The Chess-Players," representing four different stages of a game at chess between his grandfather, Count Woronzow, and the Count's private secretary, was subsequently engraved. It displays much observant humour and some artistic power.

From Chilmark he proceeded to Oriel College, Oxford, where he began to reside early in 1829. His first entrance into University life is thus described by Mr. Majendie in a letter to Lady Pembroke:

"He has fallen sooner than expected into the habits of study and discipline required of him, and evidently sees his way and feels his ground better than a freshman usually does. Mr. Froude is his college tutor, and there is every reason to be satisfied with this appointment. . . . . He has got into a small set of very respectable and reading young men in his own college, and he appears to delight in their company, while he complains of the insipidity and want of mind which he has observed in the conversation at most of the wine parties to which he has been invited elsewhere. These wine parties, by the by, of which I know your Ladyship has some dread, are really quite harmless and free from all intemperance."

Another friend, George Moberly, afterwards Bishop of Salisbury, then a college tutor, wrote thus:

"We all form our opinion pretty quickly of freshmen, and generally very correctly, as experience proves, by the set into which they place themselves, the selection a freshman makes of his companions and associates being that which stamps his character. I am happy to say that Sidney is in the very best set possible—all young men of character, who all avoid all contact with the low idlers and blackguards, of which there are plenty at all the colleges."

Even in that early period of the nineteenth century, the interviewer seems to have been abroad, and some extracts from an account of a visit to Sidney Herbert as an undergraduate, given in a periodical of the day, may be worth reprinting:

"The massive outer door, 'the oak,' is open: knocking at the inner door, a mild, clear voice bids us 'come in.' Entering, we cast a rapid glance around: the room is of the first class; on one side the deep and somewhat narrow round-headed windows look into the quadrangle—on the other across the street, towards the back of Christ Church. There is a quiet propriety about the room—a few good prints, and a small collection of handsomely bound books. The occupant rises; his features and complexion are almost of feminine delicacy, and he is tall and slender almost to fragility, yet his movements are easy and graceful; and while balancing an ivory paper-knife, he looks a kindly interrogation and speaks with that easy courtesy which almost uniformly marks the really well-born. We ask of his studies, as one who almost of necessity must bear a part, more or less influential, in the public affairs of this great commercial country. He points to Herodotus, to the Nicomachean ethics, to the Greek poets, and smilingly to Mr. Newman's earliest sermons, and to a new edition of Wordsworth under his paper-knife: Adam Smith and James Watt, trade, colonies, and commerce, have no place in that room—Oxford knows them not."

In the long vacation of 1830, immediately after the revolution which placed Louis Philippe on the throne of France, Sidney Herbert went abroad for the first time, and in company with George Moberly and another friend made a short riding-tour in Normandy. The friends rode short stages, sleeping at night and baiting at midday in little country inns, of which Sidney wrote enthusiastically to his mother:

"Foucarmont is a little village, where the inn is so small that our horses went into their stable through

the kitchen, where also we dined. At all the little pot-houses where we dine and bait we have the nicest dinners imaginable, and very good coffee. We find some bouilli and vegetable all stewing in a pot ready for the first comer, and they give us that and a salad and a little Neufchâtel cheese and fruit and a bottle of wine for three or four francs. In a house infinitely more shabby and small than the Pembroke Arms they lay out the things in the most beautifully clean manner, with a white cloth and napkins and immense china cups."

This trip belonged to that charming class of expeditions which railways, hurry, and pretentious hotels have now banished from the world. Those who are old enough to have taken part in them recall with a sigh the remembrance of pleasant exercise in the fresh air, the equally pleasant leisure, and the delicious sense of independence given by a consciousness that the traveller's goods were carried with him, that he might turn in any direction at his pleasure, and stop where and when he would—never forgetting (as Sidney Herbert in these letters impresses on us) to see to his horse's dinner before his own, and to watch with care whilst it was being eaten.

The great churches of Rouen, Abbeville, and Beauvais made a deep impression on the young man, who dwells with enthusiasm on the beauty of Rouen—"every street so picturesque, with bits of Gothic carving and fountains at every corner"; and on the impressiveness of "the magnificent cathedral, faintly lit by a few lamps, and the arches and windows just glimmering through the darkness, beautiful to a degree I cannot describe." He was also much struck by the richness and smiling fertility of the country through which he passed.

At Oxford, Sidney Herbert, like most other men,

formed friendships which affected the whole course of his subsequent life. Among his contemporaries and intimates were Cardinal Manning; Lord Lincoln, afterwards (as Duke of Newcastle) Colonial Secretary and Minister of War; Lord Elgin, Lord Dalhousie, and Lord Canning, all three Viceroys of India. At Oxford, too, he first met Mr. Gladstone.

Mr. Gladstone, who was somewhat Herbert's senior, told me, a year or two before his death, that one day, when attending, as an undergraduate spectator, some of the proceedings of a University Convocation with reference to a petition against the Roman Catholic Relief Bill, he noticed among the throng of undergraduates who crowded the vestibule of the Convocation House a tall and graceful figure, surmounted by a face of such singular sweetness and refinement that his attention was at once riveted by it, and with such force that the picture he then saw rose again as vividly before him while talking to me as when first seen sixty-eight years before. Mr. Gladstone inquired the name of this attractive freshman. "Herbert of Oriel," was the answer. They became friends; but in those days friendships between men of different colleges and different ages were not always easily kept up; and though a certain degree of intimacy existed between them, Mr. Gladstone informed me that, whilst at Oxford, he was not on the same terms of close friendship with Herbert as with Lord Lincoln and Lord Canning, who, like himself, were Christ Church men. The more intimate relations between himself and Herbert date only from a later time.

In the light of subsequent events it excites a smile to know that the earliest letters of their correspondence which have been preserved relate to the preparation of a petition to the King and both Houses of

Parliament from the undergraduates of Oxford against the first Reform Bill. In the preparation of this petition and the arrangements for its presentation to the two Houses of Parliament the friends seem to have engaged with equal eagerness. That to the House of Commons was presented by Lord Mahon at the suggestion of Sir Robert Peel, who declined to present it himself, Sidney wrote, "on account of the '*peculiar nature*' of his connection with Oxford, which means its non-existence now." Lord Mansfield undertook to present it to the King and to the Lords.

There are also traces in their early correspondence of more properly academic pursuits, and I find Mr. Gladstone asking what number of orations of Cicero were necessary to make a "book" for a degree, and whether they must be consecutive ones.

Sidney Herbert had originally intended to take honours, and had read for them; but he was induced, as his University course drew on, to desist from their pursuit, and took an ordinary degree in 1832. His health was at no time of his life strong, and it proved unequal to the strain imposed on it by severe study.

He had attained his majority in October, 1831, and in the following spring for the first time visited the Irish estates left to him by Lord Fitzwilliam, which had now passed into his own control. This expedition is described as follows, in two short letters to his mother:

"LLANGOLLEN, *April 22nd*, 1832.

". . . To-day we came through all the horrible country from Birmingham to Wolverhampton, which is a continuation of furnaces and steam-engines, which suffocated us with smoke, all Sunday though it was. The people, too, looked more miserable and squalid

and villainous than anything I ever saw before, and did not raise my opinion of the £10 householders and intellectual political unionists, whom Brougham so much lauded in his first speech on Reform. . . ."

"DUBLIN, *April 26th*, 1832.

". . . I have only yet driven through Mount Merrion, for I keep the regular going over it for Sunday, when I shall spend the day and go to church there. The view is something more lovely than I know anywhere as a sea view. With a different house in a different situation, it would be one of the most beautiful things in Ireland. The first day we went over the city part of the estate, yesterday over Ringsend, Irishtown, and Sandymount. To-day we go to Kingstown; to-morrow, Bray. The mountain part of the estate I shall see on Monday, as it is a matter of pleasure, not business. I dined yesterday at the Beefsteak Club, which comprises a hundred and fifty of the principal people here—all Tories, or nearly so. They drank my health, and I had to make a speech, in which I lied like a pig. Two or three people spoke to me about the representation of the county, where they say one or perhaps two Tories might be brought in at the next election. This I do not believe a word of."

Another step of much importance was taken by Sidney Herbert about this time. His elder brother, though he had succeeded to the Pembroke title and estates, lived permanently abroad, and up to the time of his death in 1862 seldom, if ever, set foot in England, and never established himself at Wilton. Sidney, to whom Wilton was dear, and who was well aware of the evils which attend absentee proprietorship, made, after coming of age, an arrangement with his brother in virtue of which he, to the end of his life, inhabited and kept it up, though he never became its real owner, as, had he lived a few months longer, he would have been.

After the passage of the Reform Bill in 1832, Parlia-

ment was dissolved for the third time within two years, and shortly after leaving Oxford Sidney Herbert became a candidate for the representation of South Wiltshire in the first Reformed House of Commons. The purely agricultural constituency of South Wilts was not one animated by any ardent enthusiasm for Parliamentary Reform, and Herbert and his colleague, Mr. Bennet, were returned without opposition.

"I am member for Wilts," he wrote to his mother on December 17th, 1832, on his return from the hustings. "We had a capital procession from Wilton of four or five hundred horsemen, and a very fine day; Mr. Casey on foot as drum-major. Grove and Poulet proposed me; Wyndham and Long, Bennet. When I had done speaking, Mallet asked me a question on the Irish Poor Laws, which I answered. Mr. Mayne[1] then got up, and was received with roars and hisses. He spoke for an hour, not one word heard; dead rabbits thrown at him. I am just come from the hustings, and am going to the freeholders' dinner."

Little more than a boy in years, he had now entered on that stage where, for the remainder of his life, he was to play a conspicuous part. Young though he was, he was probably far better prepared to enter upon public life than many who do so at a much more advanced age. The period in which his youth was passed was full of the highest political interest. The events which marked the end of the contest for Roman Catholic Emancipation, the hopes and fears excited by the French Revolution of 1830, and the fierce two years' struggle over Parliamentary Reform, had raised men's passions as they have rarely since been stirred in this country by any political question. He had been brought up from his earliest childhood in close association with the leaders

[1] A local Radical agitator.

of political parties, and had been accustomed to hear public questions discussed with the keenest interest and by the highest authorities. Lady Pembroke, very much for Sidney's sake, had not secluded herself since her widowhood, but still gathered round her at her house in Grafton Street those who had been her husband's friends and her own—that is to say, all the most eminent members of London society, more especially those of the Tory party. Such training and such surroundings develop a capacity for affairs and an instinctive ease in dealing with them which are not otherwise so readily attained. An almost unconscious perception of the limits of what is possible, and of the restrictions imposed by the general proportion of affairs, is acquired by early association with practical statesmen, and early familiarity with the course of public events. Such an instinct is rarely possessed by the theorist to whom political life is strange, or by the man of one special subject who comes late in life to urge the adoption of his favourite nostrum upon the House of Commons.

CHAPTER II

IN PARLIAMENT

1833–45

IN 1833 the word Conservative had not yet been appropriated to the service of a party, and it was as a Tory and as a follower of the Duke of Wellington that Sidney Herbert took his seat in the House of Commons. His maiden speech was made on June 20th, 1834. That speech, although not affording any marked indications of future oratorical distinction, was certainly a more creditable performance than those of most young aspirants for Parliamentary fame. It was an argument in opposition to a motion made by Mr. Wood for the withdrawal of all existing restrictions on the admission of Dissenters to the Universities. In those days arguments were used with confidence, and indeed assumed as postulates, which would now, if used at all, be advanced with far greater hesitation. "Let Dissenters found such institutions," urged the young speaker, "if they desire to enjoy their benefits; but let them not be permitted to tamper with the religious character of the great academic foundations, or seek to undermine the influence of the Church in them." After saying that, if Dissenters were admitted to the Universities, it would be tyranny to compel their attendance at chapel or at divinity lectures,

he treated it as an impossibility that religion should be thus set aside, and asked if it were meant to treat all creeds impartially—"that is, with studious insincerity"—or to place before students the Bible without note or comment; reminding his hearers that "the cloak of silence under which the Dissenter steals within your college walls may conceal under its folds the Atheist and the Jew." Such a measure as that proposed would, he held, exclude those intended for Holy Orders from the Universities, and the great advantages derived from the fact that the future clergy and laity of England were brought up together would thus be lost.

In the course of the summer of 1834 the Whig Government was weakened by the retirement of the Prime Minister, Earl Grey, and some other prominent members of the Cabinet; and on the death of Earl Spencer in November—an event which removed Lord Althorp, the Whig leader, from the House of Commons—the King practically dismissed his Ministers. On their enforced resignation he sent for the Duke of Wellington, by whose recommendation Sir Robert Peel was summoned from Italy to take the post of Prime Minister. Sir Robert accepted the responsibility, formed his famous short administration, and endeavoured to draw moderate Liberals to his side by abandoning old party names, and announcing his adoption of a "Conservative" policy, by which designation the party he headed has been from that time known.

On the first formation of the Government, in December, 1834, Sidney Herbert refused a Lordship of the Treasury, then placed at his disposal; but when, on January 1st, 1835, Sir Robert Peel wrote to him as follows, he could not but accept the offer made:

"WHITEHALL, *January 1st*, 1835.

"MY DEAR SIDNEY,

"I have still vacant, and kept it vacant till I could hear from you, one of the most important and interesting (I fear I must add laborious) offices connected with the Government. It is one of the secretaryships to the Board of Control. Mr. Praed is one of the secretaries, and would no doubt relieve his colleague from the main part of the legal business that might come under review; the other secretary would have the financial department and a share of the political. This office would afford great opportunities of acquiring political knowledge, and an insight into the complex machine of government. It is easy to find a Lord of the Admiralty, but not easy to find one capable of discharging such duties as those I now propose to you to undertake, and believe me, my very dear Sidney, that neither for your sake nor my own would I propose them, if I did not feel satisfied that you are capable of undertaking them with every prospect of satisfaction to yourself and those with whom you will be brought into constant intercourse."

Sidney Herbert's official training was not, however, on this occasion of any long duration. Sir Robert Peel fought with consummate skill what was from the first a losing battle; but the issue was never doubtful, and he was compelled to resign in April, 1835. From that time forth Herbert became a regular member of the Conservative Opposition. He did not take at first any prominent part in debate. Soon after leaving office he said a few words censuring the cancellation by the new Government of the appointment of his neighbour and friend, Lord Heytesbury, as Governor-General of India, but during the next two sessions he never opened his mouth in the House of Commons.

During his short tenure of office Herbert's position had been necessarily almost entirely that of an observer and learner; but among the memoranda

written by him while Secretary to the Board of Control there is one which is perhaps worthy of mention, both as showing that a steamship mail service to India was contemplated so early as 1834, and also how widely astray were the conclusions then arrived at with respect to it.

Three routes were considered. That by the Cape of Good Hope was set aside as impracticable on three grounds: the space required for the storage of coals for such a voyage was supposed to render it impossible to accommodate any considerable number of passengers or amount of goods; the small saving in point of time was not thought sufficient to induce merchants to incur the greater cost of freight; and the fact that the ship would have to depart dangerously low in the water, and would before the voyage was ended have become as dangerously lightened through the consumption of her coal, was held to render steam navigation by that route highly perilous. The Red Sea route was admitted to possess some recommendations, but it was held that for four months in the year the voyage, "though not absolutely impracticable," would be performed with such difficulty and risk, and would be attended with so little profit, that all thought of it must be abandoned. It is curious to note that, while the idea of a railway from Alexandria to Suez was pronounced "visionary and impracticable," the "reopening and completion of the ancient canal" was even then spoken of as "more plausible." The Euphrates Valley route was finally selected as that affording the best chances of success.

It is worthy of remark that the employment of only *one* steamer plying in each direction between Southampton and Alexandria and Suez and Bombay seems to have been contemplated!

The death of the King in 1837 dissolved the Parliament of 1834, and at the election which ensued Sidney Herbert was again returned for South Wilts. From that time forward he took a more prominent part in debate, and rapidly acquired reputation as a speaker. On February 15th, 1838, he spoke, and spoke well, against Mr. Grote's motion for the adoption of the ballot at Parliamentary elections. He admitted the necessity for more stringent measures to prevent bribery; but the ballot, he maintained, would be no check on bribery, and would not materially diminish intimidation. The intimidation really to be feared was not that of individuals, but of trade unions and combinations. The tyranny of clubs was far worse and far more formidable than that of landlords or employers, and unless a voter rigidly concealed not only his vote but his opinions, that tyranny would be as powerful as ever. That the ballot would not check bribery, but increase facilities for it, the experience of the United States of America, in his opinion, abundantly showed. Vote by ballot, he insisted, was a practice alien to our habits and inconsistent with the spirit of English institutions, in which a vote was regarded rather as a trust than as a right, and electors and non-electors alike were entitled to know how that trust was exercised.

About a month later, on March 27th, he again spoke, and at considerable length, in support of Lord Eliot's motion for the recall of the British Legion from Spain.

On the death of Ferdinand VII., in 1833, the succession of his daughter Isabella II. to the throne of Spain was disputed by her uncle, Don Carlos. The rights of the young Queen were acknowledged and warmly maintained by the British Government, and in 1835 the provisions of the Foreign Enlistment Act

were temporarily suspended in order to permit the formation in Great Britain of a Legion of Englishmen to take service under the Queen of Spain in the civil war then raging in the northern provinces of the Peninsula. This force was ill-composed, and, as most men thought, ill-commanded. It was successful neither in its strategy nor on the field of battle, and it was an object of unconcealed dislike to the Spanish troops with which it acted.

In these circumstances, when a further suspension of the Act was moved, it was opposed by the eldest son of the Earl of St. Germans, Lord Eliot, who had himself seen something of the contending parties in the north of Spain. He was supported by Sidney Herbert, who had little difficulty in demolishing the argument used by a previous speaker, that the establishment of a Liberal Government in Spain would ensure the abolition of slavery and the slave trade in the Spanish dominions. This contention was disposed of by pointing to the great American Republic, in which slavery was an institution, and where an internal, though not a foreign, slave trade flourished.

"What advantage," asked Herbert, "had this country or the English people derived from Sir De Lacy Evans's expedition, and what advantage had it conferred on Spain? It had brought into power men who had plundered the Church, abolished the law of entail, and broken down the barrier which an aristocracy opposed to both democracy and despotism. . . . Had the British Legion," he inquired, "really done good service to the Queen of Spain herself? The Spanish troops who acted with the Legion were so jealous of it that they would rather see it defeated than victorious. We had incurred all the odium of interference with the ridicule of failure. No pressure had been placed on Lord Palmerston; he had not been holloaed on to adopt this policy of

interference by any national feeling. He had pursued it of his own free will, and on him rested the responsibility. If this country interfered at all, it should interfere effectually, and not by such half-measures as had in this case been taken."

He therefore supported Lord Eliot's motion that the suspension of the Foreign Enlistment Act should not be renewed—a motion which, on a division, was only negatived by a majority of eight.

The next year Sidney Herbert spoke but once—on an Irish question; but the speeches which he delivered in 1840—one on January 30th, in support of a vote of want of confidence in Lord Melbourne's Government, and the other on April 8th, upon the war with China,—placed him in the front rank of speakers among the younger men on the Conservative side of the House. Almost all the points touched upon in the former of these two speeches were of purely temporary interest, but they were handled with vigour and telling effect, even when his censures were misdirected, as they certainly were in denouncing the new system of penny postage. His strictures on the Irish administration of Lord Melbourne are still not without some interest, as being far from inapplicable to transactions of a much later date. He shrewdly remarked that Lord Normanby, then Lord-Lieutenant, though he had changed the instruments employed, had not abandoned the practices of those Viceroys who had governed through the Orange organisation; that he was, equally with them, governed by, and governing for, a party—the opposite one, no doubt, to that with which his predecessors had worked, but with as little of Imperial impartiality as the Lords-Lieutenant of an earlier period, and with even less power of resisting the demands,

or commands, of those on whose votes the official existence of the Government depended. The Ministers, he said, showed themselves squeezable, and were supported for what could be squeezed out of them, whilst on their side they appealed to various factions with the cry, "Don't desert us, and we will, in turn, assist you." A more recent generation has seen a not very different spectacle.

In opening his speech on the Chinese War, Herbert was helped by an indiscretion of Macaulay, who had preceded him in the debate, and who had complained that the censure it was proposed to inflict was "retrospective." What else, asked Herbert, could censure on any course of conduct be? Passing on to the main subject, he argued that peace, not war, was the way to improve our commercial intercourse with China, and while he did not say that, in the circumstances, hostilities could have been avoided, he firmly denounced the course of previous conduct which had rendered them necessary. He concluded by saying that in our dealings with China we had shown ourselves the less civilised nation of the two, and that he could not shut his eyes to the facts that we had engaged in a war without just cause, that we were endeavouring to maintain a trade resting upon unsound principles, and were attempting to justify proceedings which were a disgrace to the British flag.

In the next session, on May 12th, 1841, Sidney Herbert's speech on the Sugar Duties was one of those which largely contributed to the defeat of Lord Melbourne's Government. He began by a defence of Mr. Gladstone, whose speech had been assailed, and the attack on which he considered a just tribute to the pungency of the remarks it contained.

He would not enter, he said, into the free-trade question, nor discuss free-trade principles—a question and principles not first discovered by the Whigs. These principles had been practically enunciated many years before by a Cabinet of which Mr. Huskisson and Sir Robert Peel were prominent members. Nobody could dispute the theory of free trade; the only difference that existed was as to the mode of its application. So simple was the theory of free trade that a child might understand it, provided its principles were to be applied according to an inflexible mathematical rule. It might be easy to apply those principles, if they were not bound to consider the particular circumstances under which they were to be applied. . . . But if those principles could be applied without wisdom and without caution, what was the use of the statesmanship, the knowledge of history, and of the Parliamentary history of this country, which was possessed by gentlemen on both sides of the House? If those principles were to be applied as a simple rule, requiring no knowledge for its application, there was not an accountant in the City who would not make as good a Chancellor of the Exchequer as the right honourable gentleman opposite.

If slave-grown sugar were allowed to be introduced into this country, it would stultify the exertions made for the suppression of the slave trade. If the small degree of protection now enjoyed by the West Indies were abolished, it would altogether destroy production of sugar there. "Well," it might be asked, "why not? If it does not pay to grow sugar there, why grow it?" Because we had persistently contended that sugar could be grown by free labour, and if we abandoned its cultivation should have to acknowledge that it could not. "Instead of a warning we should become an example, and rivet the chains of slavery in all other sugar-growing countries. If we were told we must not mix humanity with trade, how then were we to defend abolition itself? The noble lord (Lord John Russell) seemed to forget the principles he had then advocated, and to have less regard to the exigencies of the people than to those of party."

The Government, though defeated, still clung to office, and even when again defeated on a direct

motion of want of confidence, moved by Sir Robert Peel himself, they determined not to resign, but to dissolve, though well aware from the first that the issue of the elections would prove unfavourable to them. From the moment of the dissolution in July, 1841, it was clear that Sir Robert Peel must be brought into power by a large majority, and it was foreseen that Sidney Herbert would be included in any new arrangements which might be made. The post to which he was appointed, when, in August, the change of Government took place, was that of Secretary to the Admiralty.

The First Lord of the Admiralty in Sir Robert Peel's administration was the Earl of Haddington. When the First Lord is a member of the House of Lords, the post of Secretary to the Board becomes a highly important one, for on him devolves the duty of moving the Naval Estimates and of conducting them through the House of Commons. Sixty years ago the annual Estimates were not hurried over, with the aid of the closure and almost without discussion, nor supplies by millions voted in silence at the fag end of the session. They were then usually discussed with great minuteness of detail, and considered with much thought and care. The tact and persuasive powers of Sidney Herbert rendered him eminently successful in this work, and the papers extant show the persevering energy with which he sought to remedy defects and deficiencies which, when detected, he unsparingly exposed.

Herbert's memoranda on the Navy Estimates are all valuable papers, but the last of them, written shortly before leaving the Admiralty, deserves a more particular notice. It was written towards the close of the year 1844.

"During the negotiations with France last summer, consequent upon the proceedings at Tahiti, the attention of the Admiralty (and let me add of the public) was forcibly turned to the means we may have at hand for the defence of the country in the event of sudden hostility. In this particular instance the danger was averted by the good sense of the two Governments, but the friendliness, or rather the power to be friendly, of a popular Government representing a hostile nation cannot permanently be relied on. . . . During the period of the *alerte* last summer our means of defence—I say nothing of offence—were far from efficient.

"The main points to be remedied I conceive to be these:

"1. The insufficiency of our steam force.

"2. The inadequacy of our dockyards for the maintenance and reproduction even of the steam Navy we already possess.

"3. The absence of efficient defences for our dockyards.

"4. The want of a reserve squadron at home to act as a squadron of exercise during peace.

"5. The absence on our flag list of a sufficient number of Admirals possessing youth, vigour, and practice to take command of our fleets.

"6. The want of refuge harbours as a security to our commerce both from an enemy in war time and from shipwreck in time of peace."

The paper of which these sentences are the commencement is a very long one. In it is pointed out, under the first head, that our steam Navy consisted of thirty-nine ships, "many of them weak, old, and inefficient," and twenty-nine others in the course of building. As a remedy Mr. Herbert recommended that fifteen steamers annually should be built by or for the Government for some years to come, and means provided in the Estimates for so doing. On the second point he referred to a memorandum of his colleague, Mr. Corry, the recommendations of

which he understood were adopted and would be sufficient.

The protection of the dockyards, the present defencelessness of which formed a third point of weakness, would not, he observed, be under the direction or control of the Admiralty, nor would its cost form part of the Naval Estimates. He therefore passed by that subject, with the expression of a hope that adequate measures would be taken, and with the remark that, when the King of the French was in England a few months previously,

"M. de la Roncière, a very intelligent French officer who attended Admiral de la Susse, told Mr. Corry that what astonished him most in Portsmouth Harbour was our extraordinary indifference to the defences, there being nothing that he could see in the state of the batteries to prevent an enterprising officer coming suddenly in with four or five steamers and destroying the whole place."

Mr. Herbert characterised this opinion as "a very exaggerated one," but as nevertheless not unworthy of attention.

As regarded a Reserve Squadron, he pointed out that the number of men and of ships employed had been largely increased owing to the creation of three new stations: (1) China, the waters of which were "formerly only occasionally visited by a single small frigate which received orders not to stay a sufficient time to excite alarm or jealousy"; (2) the Pacific, where only seven hundred men had been employed in 1841; and (3) the coast of Africa, on which a yet smaller number had then served. These three stations represented an increase of six thousand men, but on no station could the number of cruisers be diminished, and there was not "any reserve force at

home beyond the three flag-ships." He therefore recommended provision for commissioning, building, and manning four line-of-battle ships and steamers, making with the flag-ships a squadron of fifteen or sixteen sail.

"This would be a respectable force in case of emergency, and in peace would be invaluable as a squadron of exercise both to test the comparative qualities of our ships and, what is of immense importance, to instruct our officers in manœuvres and naval tactics—a matter which has been very much neglected of late."

These remarks led to the formation of the splendid "Experimental Squadron" of line-of-battle ships which sailed from Spithead in the following July.

Mr. Herbert then turns to his fifth head—the state of the Flag List—to the discussion of which the greater part of the letter is devoted. He points out that at the beginning of the century the average age at which a man attained flag rank was 37; in 1845 it was 61. He shows that on the so-called "effective" list—

"there is no full Admiral at all, nor half-a-dozen Vice-Admirals, nor more than a score of Rear-Admirals, whose physical state would allow them to go to sea at all; and as promotion has been by seniority without regard to other qualifications, the field of selection is so narrow that it is almost impossible to find men to fill even one command in time of peace."

Ninety-four of the "*effective*" Admirals were over 65 years of age. Of these, seventy-six were over 70, and fifteen between 80 and 90, more than half of whom were nearer the latter than the former age. He states forcibly some of the evils arising from the age of the Admirals:

"The defects of some of our new line-of-battle ships would have been known to us three years ago, had we had in the Mediterranean an Admiral with youth and energy to have properly practised and tried his

ships. An Admiral just returned from a three years' station is again (most properly) selected, for want of others fit to take their turn of service, to take command in the Mediterranean. An Admiral of 71 years of age, who has not been to sea for thirty years, is selected, for want of a younger, for the West India station. Admiral Bowles, from a sense of duty, left his business here, and volunteered to take command of the trial squadron this autumn, because on the whole flag list there was not a single flag officer to whom the Admiralty could propose to spend a few weeks in October and November in the Bay of Biscay. In the meanwhile naval tactics and the manœuvring of a fleet are things unknown; and as there are no officers in the upper ranks young enough to teach, so there are none in the lower ranks who have had the opportunity of learning."

To remedy this state of things, Mr. Herbert proposed an elaborate scheme of retirement, into the details of which it is unnecessary now to enter. With this he would have coupled the grant of power to the Admiralty to reward brilliant service in the upper as well as the lower ranks of the service by promotion, and to confer brevet rank for local and temporary purposes.

On the subject of harbours of refuge he does not touch in this letter, having discussed it elsewhere. He concludes by recommending an increase of £780,000 in the Naval Estimates:

"The evils to be remedied and the deficiencies to be made good are enormous, and the temporary effort will produce permanent results. . . . I apprehend no difficulty in obtaining the necessary votes, but great alarm and great discredit if the Government neglect the opportunity to make a thorough revision of the Navy, and adopt vigorous measures to render it on all points thoroughly efficient for the defence of the country."

In sending this scheme to Sir Robert Peel, which

he did on December 16th, he spoke very modestly of his own work. "I do not offer it to you," he wrote, "as a perfect plan, but I am sure it is right in principle, and with improvement and modification may be made to work." What was thought of it by his colleagues is shown by the expressions used by Lord Stanley in a letter to Sir Robert Peel, written a few days later: "Herbert's plan seems to me a very able one, and his scheme for the retirement of three hundred captains equally bold and judicious. The present system cannot go on without some change."

But Sidney Herbert was not destined to remain long at the Admiralty, useful though he was there. He became every year better known as a speaker, and every year the quality of his speeches improved, nor were they by any means confined exclusively to the business of his own office. The charm of his winning manner was widely felt, and was indeed wellnigh irresistible; while his position in society as the heir presumptive and representative of his brother, who never appeared in England, increased his prestige, which was not diminished by the knowledge that he stood high in Sir Robert's Peel's favour. His promotion to the Cabinet at an early date was regarded as certain. It soon came.

At the beginning of 1845 Mr. Gladstone quitted the Government on account of his unwillingness to support, in office, a measure for the increased endowment of the Roman Catholic College at Maynooth. The propriety and expediency of the measure were recognised by him, but it was one of which he had on former occasions expressed public and strong disapproval. In these circumstances, while quite prepared to support the proposals of the Government, he thought he could do so with greater usefulness and

effect out of office than as a member of the Cabinet. He was sensitive as to the reproaches which might otherwise be addressed to him, and sensible that, however little the imputation might be deserved, his retention of office would expose him to the charge of having changed his opinion for the sake of remaining a member of the Government. In the course of the changes rendered necessary by Mr. Gladstone's retirement, Sidney Herbert, after having been offered and declined the Irish Secretaryship, for which Sir Robert Peel had pronounced him the "best possible" man, was appointed Secretary at War, with a seat in the Cabinet, in succession to Sir Thomas Fremantle, who then became Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant.

Of his new appointment Sidney wrote thus to Lady Pembroke:

"ADMIRALTY, *February 1st*, 1845.

"I was hurried yesterday, so that I could not write: indeed, between winding up here and beginning my new work I have enough to do. My new office is dry and dull; but the Cabinet is, of course, a great step, and gives one at once a view of the whole system of government. With the new responsibility of course comes new labour; for though I shall have much less to do at the War Office than I have here, yet I must now work up other general questions for debate.

"I have felt a sort of depression about the whole matter, which will not surprise you, as the step I am taking is one which renders escape from politics at any future time more impossible than before. But as we are not born to ease, but to labour in our different conditions, none of us may refuse our burdens, least of all those who are high enough in position to set an example. I wrote Mary a homily the other day about the dangers incurred by an indolent aristocracy, so I will not repeat it now; but I have always felt that exertion is a duty, though it goes sometimes sorely against my own bent, which is naturally indolent."

The "homily" here referred to, and which breathes the same spirit as the letter to his mother, is as follows:

To the Countess Bruce.

"Wilton, *January 22nd*, 1845.

"My dear Mary,

"I have not the slightest intention of going to Ireland, and should refuse were it offered to me, which I happen to know it will not be,[1] so set your mind at ease on that score. Now, as a matter of duty, the duties devolving on station are various; and though I do not pretend to fulfil them better than my neighbours, or to do half what I ought, there is no one who is more sensible of the responsibility, and places the standard at which one ought to aim higher. But I count among them the duty of exertion, and exertion in the conduct of public affairs, as being the legitimate sphere of men of station and leisure. If one had nothing to do but to consult one's own taste and one's own ease, I should be too glad to live down here a domestic life, looking after the people and doing what good I could, in a field which, though narrow, has plenty to be done in it. But my conscience would tell me that it was a love of ease and of my own tastes, and not a sense of duty, that induced me to do so. I am not in love with politics. I have thought for myself too much to hold opinions as a partisan does, and I have outgrown personal ambition. I have seen how much vexation and disappointment are inseparable from public life; but though it cannot be a source of pleasure, it is not the less a duty. An aristocracy that does nothing, that takes no part, that will not enter the lists, an aristocracy of ease and quiet and retirement, would be soon upset in this country—and, what is more, it would deserve to be upset. One has no business to sit idle and let others take one's place. You may think all this very odd, coming from me, and doubt the reality of my indifference to the pursuit of politics, not to use a stronger word for it. But so it is, and it was only this morning that I was saying these very things

[1] He knew it "*would not be* offered," because it already had been offered and refused.

to Richard,[1] and talking of the weariness and yet the necessity of the life.

"So here is my homily in return for yours. I dare say you will agree much less with mine than I with yours, since I feel two duties where you see only one. Upon these subjects I have thought much these last three years—more than in all my past life together. I have made a sort of system for myself, which I try to keep constantly in view, though I fall very short in the execution. Now you will have had enough of that."

Although it was not without misgivings, and indeed with some reluctance, that he thus irrevocably committed himself to a life of political strife, Mr. Herbert had no disquieting doubts as to the policy of his leader. "I go heart and soul with the spirit of the projected measures," he wrote to Sir James Graham, in answer to his congratulations; "they are in complete accordance with the opinions which I have formed for myself."

I have thus far sketched the Parliamentary career of Sidney Herbert as I should that of any man whose life had been a purely Parliamentary one. As a member of the Cabinet, or as a member of Parliament who had held Cabinet office, public affairs henceforth naturally engrossed a far larger share of his time and thoughts than they hitherto had done. But it would be a great mistake to suppose that Herbert's life up to this time, or at any time, was one the thoughts of which were wholly, or even chiefly, given to Parliamentary contests and distinction. He attended assiduously, indeed, to all his Parliamentary duties, sat out dull debates, worked on committees, made speeches from time to time, and accepted subordinate office; but his truer and fuller life was that of a man of the world, a brilliant member of society, and a model country gentleman. He held already an

[1] Lord Clanwilliam.

assured position, and one so high as to place him above those temptations which must inevitably beset men who are struggling for social recognition, for a more conspicuous place in the world's eye, or for an increase of their personal influence. It is hard for men having such aims to separate the service of the country from their own personal ambition, for their personal interests are so closely interwoven with the interests of a party as to lead them unconsciously to give more than its due weight to the importance of mere party success.

Few of those who in mature life for the first time enter the habitual society of those of the highest rank, or greatest intellectual or social distinction, do so without some self-conscious feeling: one of elation if they be men of vulgar minds, one of timidity if they be shy and modest, but in any case with a sensation of strangeness and unfamiliarity;—feelings from which those to whom such society has been habitual from childhood are, of course, wholly free, and the absence or existence of which, however unavowed, must materially affect the subtle influences of that familiar intercourse itself.

The Parliamentary life of Sidney Herbert, was that of a man who enters the House of Commons partly from a sense of duty, partly as a not unworthy occupation of his time, but without any personal object to gain or selfish ambition to gratify. Having grown up from infancy in habits of close intimacy with all the leaders of society, he, as a matter of course, found himself a member of its most select circles, in which indeed, as his brother's heir, and as perhaps the handsomest and altogether the most winning of the young men of the day, he was one of the most conspicuous and popular figures.

London society, during the first ten years of the late Queen's reign, was a very different thing from what it now is. It was, of course, much smaller—entrance into it was in some ways more difficult than at present, and in others less so; but a distinction, felt, though unexpressed, between those who belonged to it as of right, and those who were admitted to it by favour, was maintained to a degree which to the present generation is, perhaps happily, almost unknown. Society was possibly not less frivolous; but it was more tinged by literary influences, if not really more intellectual, than it is at present. Money did not receive the open worship now paid to it, and the introduction of Mr. Hudson (the "Railway King") and his wife to London society by Lady de Grey called forth generally, sixty years ago, comments which would now excite surprise. The society of that time, too, was much quieter in manner than that of our day. The contrast is very great between the well-bred ease, the low-voiced, tranquil tone of conversation, the general air of repose, which marked assemblies at Lansdowne House, Devonshire House, Stafford House, Holland House, and many another resort of good society in those days, and the noisy din and rapid utterances of a large party at the present time—a contrast less perceptible, no doubt, to those who year after year have been unconscious witnesses of a gradual change than to those who from time to time revisit England, and see fully developed in all their startling novelty the alterations which during their absence have been gradually effected.

Into the society of the day, with all its attractions and all its drawbacks, Sidney Herbert entered to the full. Into that whirlpool none can plunge without some loss of singleness of heart and simplicity of character, but probably few have ever been less injured

by its seductive influences than Sidney Herbert. His love for his beautiful home at Wilton amounted to a passion, as was shown much later, when, knowing that he had but a few hours to live, he had himself removed thither, that he might see it yet once more. His taste for the occupations of a rural life was scarcely less keen than his love of home, while his position as administrator and virtual master of the Pembroke estates, where he was ever labouring, and labouring successfully, to do good to those around him, saved him from devoting exclusively to amusement and society, as too many have done, the hours which he could spare from political business.

CHAPTER III

IN THE CABINET

1845–46

WHEN Sidney Herbert entered the Cabinet, the Government of Sir Robert Peel had been about four years in office. To all outward seeming it promised a duration equal to that of Lord Liverpool's administration. There existed no doubt that the dissolution which must take place in 1846 or 1847 would result in the election of a Parliament which would continue to Sir Robert Peel a strong working majority, though probably a smaller one than that by which he was placed in power in 1841. Nor could it with any confidence be predicted that a similar result might not in like manner follow the dissolution which would again become necessary in 1852 or 1853. That date was, indeed, too distant a one for prophecy, but there was little to disturb the serenity of those who confidently anticipated a long and unbroken period of Conservative rule. Vigorous and unassailable, however, as Sir Robert Peel's Cabinet appeared, that appearance was to some extent delusive. It was perfectly secure against hostile attacks from Whigs and Radicals, but the growing discontent of many of its own supporters threatened to assume a formidable aspect. Two great agencies were here at work: Protestant bigotry was shocked by the conciliatory attitude assumed towards the Roman Catholics in

Ireland; and the interests of agriculture were supposed to be imperilled by the free-trade tendencies of the Government. The increasingly liberal attitude of the Cabinet might have brought about its downfall, even independently of the catastrophe which rendered it inevitable. Nevertheless, it is more probable that, so long as the process of change continued to be a gradual one, a majority of the Conservative party would, however reluctantly, have continued to support Sir Robert Peel rather than bring Lord John Russell and his following again into office.

However this may be, no anticipations or apprehensions of coming disaster were entertained in the spring of 1845. The proposals of the Anti-Corn Law League were still resisted by Sir Robert Peel, and the question which at that moment created the most animated discussion, and which was regarded as that most likely to involve serious contests in the House of Commons during the session of 1845, was that of a proposed increase in the grant to Maynooth. While few would have hesitated to admit that the Corn Law question was one of far graver and more lasting importance than that of the number of students to be maintained at a Roman Catholic college, or the precise amount of the subvention to be allotted to it, more immediate interest was felt in debates envenomed by passion and bigotry, and which it was thought might possibly lead to a defeat of the Government in Parliament.

On this subject, Sidney Herbert, both as an Irish proprietor and a liberal-minded man, felt very strongly. It seemed to him, as it must nowadays to most men, that if the Roman Catholic priests of Ireland were to be in any degree educated at the expense of Government, the grant should be adequate to effect its object, and should secure a good education, instead

of a bad one, for men destined to exercise so vast an influence over their fellow-countrymen. The principle of the grant was already accepted, and it was annually voted. Its amount could in these circumstances be only a question of expediency.

On the second reading of the Bill for the increase of the grant to Maynooth, on April 14th, Sidney Herbert made an admirable debating speech, in which the arguments of those who had spoken before him on the other side of the question were adroitly met and skilfully answered. Mr. Sheil, he said, admitted that a mere arithmetical increase in the number of students or in the amount of the grant involved no alteration of principle. But this and this only was all that the Bill effected. How, then, came he to taunt the Government with a violation of principle in introducing it? Was it from chagrin at seeing others do what he wished to do himself? Sir Robert Inglis had expressed his fears that the whole country of Ireland would be covered with priests. Covered with priests he hoped it might be, and in any case certainly would be, but with what sort of priests? What an improvement priests educated as the Government now proposed would be on the uneducated, narrow-minded hedge priests of the past! Not that the effect would be immediate. A new generation must first spring up. "Bad laws long leave their effects behind them; good laws do not immediately produce their fruit." Mr. Shaw, he said, had complained that the present Government had destroyed the independence of the Irish. What was meant by this he did not know, unless it referred to the vigorous and independent spirit in which each party in Ireland lived in perpetual hostility to the other. If the encouragement of that feeling had been sacrificed, as Mr. Shaw said it had, to an

imperial policy, he asked for no more flattering admission. And so he went on, in terms all the more effective from their being manifestly unprepared. He called attention to the altered and more liberal feeling towards Roman Catholics which had grown up both in the House and in the country, and in eloquent terms insisted on the duty of the State to see that the teachers of the people, whom we had made their leaders by depriving the people of Ireland of their natural defenders and protectors, should receive a training which would qualify them for the task.

The Bill passed its second reading by a majority of 147.

The first speech, however, of any importance which Sidney Herbert delivered as a member of the Cabinet was not on this topic, but one made at an earlier day on the question of the Corn Laws, in opposition to a motion made for the appointment of a committee to report on the effects of their operation. In this debate neither Sir Robert Peel nor Sir James Graham, then Home Secretary, took part, and the objections of the Cabinet to the proposal were left to be advanced by its youngest member.

He stated, concisely and fairly, Cobden's arguments against Protection, but thought them inapplicable when urged in support of a motion for the appointment of a committee. Committees on agricultural distress, he maintained, had seldom effected any good. The committees of 1812 and 1822 had come to conclusions not adopted by Parliament, and the adoption of which it was difficult to suppose could have been seriously contemplated by the members of those committees themselves. Other committees had met and not reported, and those which had done so had laid before the House "contradictory theories, con-

tradictory arguments, and contradictory facts." The committee of 1833, the last of these, had come to the conclusion that Protection was needed, and that a great improvement had taken place in the cultivation of land in England, and an even greater improvement in Ireland, and he cleverly argued that, while a fresh committee would be of no practical use, (for though professing to desire information, the abolitionists would certainly not consent to wait for it, or pause a moment in their efforts to effect the entire removal of Protection,) it would inevitably work mischief, as there would be a total suspension of improvement during the consideration of the Report; hopes would be created which would end in disappointment, whilst alarm and possible panic would spring up among the friends of the protective system. He begged the House to abide by its own decision already arrived at after careful consideration.

It was pretty clear from this speech that, though opposed to the motion for a committee, the speaker was not averse to a gradual relaxation of the protective system, and the most significant passage of his speech was that in which he called attention to the greater freedom of trade already introduced, and to the fact that Government had "promised no prices," whilst at the same time he declared that "he would never himself have joined the Government, in however subordinate a capacity, if his right honourable friend at the head of affairs (Sir R. Peel) had not at the time of the dissolution declared his intention to revise the existing Corn Law."

As the summer of 1845 went on, it became more and more evident that the potato crop of the year would be an almost total failure, and that, despite all exertions to avert it, a famine of unprecedented

severity would take place in Ireland. In these circumstances Sir Robert Peel, on November 1st, proposed to his Cabinet the suspension by Order in Council of the existing Corn Laws. Three only of his colleagues expressed a willingness to support him, one of these being Sidney Herbert himself. The other two were Lord Aberdeen and Sir James Graham. The remainder of the Cabinet considered that no necessity for so decided a step had yet been shown, and after a few days' discussion it was determined to defer a final decision until further information had been received, which it was hoped would convince the recalcitrant members. Before this postponement was agreed to, Sidney Herbert in vain urged that the necessity was already clear, and the time for action already come. He wrote as follows:

"CARLTON GARDENS,
"*November 2nd*, 1845.

"We have now sufficient information upon which to form an accurate estimate of the extent and probable effects of the failure of the potato crop in Ireland. We have this information from unexceptionable sources: neither from corn dealers who want to raise prices, nor from agriculturists who wish them to appear low, but from the Constabulary, who have no interest in the matter, and who can see and judge for themselves. This evidence again comes to us filtrated through three clear-headed men, who, being used to argue and deduce from facts, are accustomed to test the accuracy of their premises rigidly, and who are treating the question submitted to them calmly, as a scientific problem to be solved. The opinion they entertain as to the actual state of the disease is broadly stated in their reports. Their expectation of its progress is, though less broadly stated, obvious from the tone of their private letters. In their opinion the worst is to come.

"When pits are opened, potatoes harvested as sound are now found to be diseased: in some cases they are no better than masses of putrid slime. The

disease has broken out in Scotland, where of late years the use of the potato has much increased; and in England, though it has visited us more lightly, and the potato is used by the labouring class more as an auxiliary than as the staple food, yet a sufficient loss has been experienced to pinch the labourer considerably and force him to consume a much larger quantity of bread than usual, while the price, of course, is already very much risen.

"The effects of this murrain must be felt for a very long period. We cannot yet tell how far the seed may be affected; at any rate, the quantity available for seed, supposing all that is sown to be good, must be very limited, partly by the high price it will cost, and partly by the necessities of the people forcing them to consume the whole remnant of their crops. One-eighth of the whole crop is required for seed, *i.e.* one-fourth of the sound half of the crop in Ireland, leaving only *three*-eighths for consumption.

"I believe, therefore, that we are entering in Ireland on one year's famine, and through the United Kingdom on two years' scarcity, if not more.

"I need not here call attention to the peculiar evils attending the use of the potato as the principal article of food. It is obvious that, being the cheapest kind of food, a population entirely dependent upon it are forced, when it fails, to look, when most incapable of purchasing, to the dearer kinds of food which, in their more prosperous days are, from their cost, beyond their reach. The Irish must, therefore, to a great degree, pass from a potato to a grain diet. The demand thus created will be enormous, for it will greatly exceed the precautions in the way of sowing additional grain.

"In Ireland the small farmer grows oats as well as potatoes; the labourer trusts to potatoes alone, grown on one acre. The failure of the crop, therefore, deprives him not only of his stock of food for the year, but of his income; in fact, of everything. He can, therefore, neither feed himself nor purchase food, and as he cannot pay his rent, his landlord, being deprived of his income, cannot help him.

"Employment, though greatly increased of late years, is confined to districts through which railway lines are forming, or where there are a wealthy and better class of landlords; but vast portions of them

have neither railways nor wealth nor gentry, and thus the failure of the potato crop is starvation. But the people must not starve, and the Government must feed them.

"It is difficult to estimate the numbers that must be so supported, but two millions is not a high estimate. These persons must be fed till next harvest time. Millions of quarters of grain of some kind, whether rice, Indian corn, oats, or wheat, must be procured by the Government for this purpose.

"The million of quarters of grain of all sorts in bond now in England, or double or treble that, had we got it, in the ordinary course of things, at existing prices, and with the inferior nature of the produce of the last harvest, and great demand for good bread corn in England from the immense employment of labour, would be absorbed without a perceptible effect upon prices. From no part of Europe is there much to come. From America considerable supplies may possibly be got. Russia, Turkey, Egypt, have forbidden exportation, stopping old sources of supply. Russia, Belgium, Holland, Turkey, have opened their ports, establishing new drains for corn. The high prices of the English market, if free access were given to it, will, however, always draw to that country the supplies of the rest of the world.

"There is no sign that in a short time the operation of the sliding scale, with rising prices, would of itself open the ports: if it does, it is a work of time. The average to affect duty must be on six weeks, and the prices of the present moment will for some time operate against a sufficient rise. In the meanwhile, the Baltic and the St. Lawrence are closed, and our supply from these is cut off for the winter. Even should it rise to the point which opens the ports, distant speculators have no guarantee against a fall which would close them again.

"But the fact is, the present law has failed. With low prices, the duty being lower than under the old law, it was less stringent, and let in corn; but with high prices it turns out to be more stringent than the old law. Under the former law, the averages were taken only in certain large towns. There the best wheat only is used—wheat fit for bread. Added to this, the markets in which the averages were taken

being limited, it was possible to force up the averages by sudden and forced, and sometimes simulated, purchases. But it would not be so now. We take in markets where inferior corn is sold, and they are too numerous to be possibly affected by operations such as I have described.

"In short, the sliding scale will not slide. We find ourselves with scarcity impending and a fixed duty of 14*s*. With corn by the average at 59*s*., we have the quartern loaf at 10*d*., the same price which existed in 1841, with the averages at 72*s*. We fix the duty on bread by the price of fodder; on corn to be eaten by man, by corn to be eaten by beasts.

"The 'Spectator' states prices and averages of corn in 1839 and 1845, thus:

	1839	1845
Highest price	82*s*.	79*s*.
Average	67*s*.	58*s*.
Lowest price	54*s*.	54*s*.

"This, I think, is the main defect of the law, and will be a permanent defect; but this year it is more felt than usual, for harvest was ample in quantity, but more inferior in quality. A vast amount of inferior wheat is now depressing the averages at the very moment when we are guarding in every way against a scarcity, the extent and duration of which are the only things doubtful.

"We have the paradox of a bad harvest producing low prices in wheat, just as we have low prices in potatoes produced by the murrain; every one wishing to get rid of what may not keep. We have had in the last hundred years six or seven instances of similar pressure, and with modifications more or less extensive, and with Corn Laws more or less stringent. There has been but one unfailing course pursued, namely, to open the ports. We have the example at this moment of four other nations. Shall we be the only exception to our own precedents, and to theirs?"

These were strong reasons for coming to an immediate decision, but, on the whole, it was agreed to defer a final resolution till the end of the month.

Nor were those members of the Cabinet who doubted whether the exigency were really grave enough to warrant so momentous a step as that contemplated altogether without excuse, for I find Sidney Herbert himself about a fortnight later (November 18th) writing to Sir James Graham in a strain which shows that he thought the magnitude of the calamity had been to some extent exaggerated:

"While at Wilton I had the opportunity of seeing constant reports of the state of the potato crops in the Queen's county from an extensive land agent, and also from one or two men engaged on a large scale as corn factors and millers. They all speak of the loss by the disease as being greatly exaggerated, and consider that there is a fair amount of provision, taking potatoes and oats together, in their respective districts.

"I have seen similar accounts from Tyrone. In Wiltshire the disease has affected the potatoes very capriciously. I hear in some places of a fifth being injured. In my own parish the labourers having allotments estimate the loss at one-tenth. I dug a field of my own a fortnight ago and found but 18 sacks tainted out of 360, being one-twentieth. We have a great deal of good old wheat and of bad new.

"Lord Pembroke's land agent, an acute man, and an excellent agriculturist, has been through Shropshire, Worcestershire, and Gloucestershire, and states the loss at a fourth of the crops, and still increasing in the pits. He has received a letter, which I enclose, from the agent of a large alkali company. The writer has already communicated his system for preserving potatoes to the Irish Commissioners, and they will best judge what it is worth. The reduction of the bulk and weight of the potatoes by baking is curious, and fully bears out the statement of the Commissioners as to the proportion of water in the potato."

The delay was, however, unfortunate, for though at the end of the month no doubt remained as to the magnitude of the impending calamity, what might

have been done successfully, and with general approval at its commencement, could no longer be effected without difficulty if not discredit. On hearing that a Cabinet was summoned, Sir James Graham wrote, November 19th, 1845:

"This Cabinet, I suspect, will be conclusive for good or for evil. The moment, once lost, returns not again, either in Love or in Council, but still it is possible to patch up some tinkering Accommodation."

Such a "tinkering" was indeed attempted, but unsuccessfully. When the Cabinet reassembled, on November 24th, many of its members, though not all, were far less positive in their opposition to the proposition of the Prime Minister, and there was a moment at which Sir Robert Peel, as he has told us himself,[1] anticipated the consent of all his colleagues to the proposals made by him in his memorandum of December 2nd. This anticipation, however, was not realised. Two members of the Cabinet[2] refused to concur in the proposed measure, and though the remainder were willing to acquiesce in the course suggested by their leader, the majority of them retained their own original opinion as to its impolicy. Moreover, the position was not the same. During the few days which had elapsed between the date of Sir James Graham's letter, quoted above, and that of the meeting of the Cabinet, an event occurred which rendered any such "tinkering," as was suggested, infinitely more difficult. On November 22nd Lord John Russell had published a letter advocating a measure very similar to that of Sir Robert Peel. It became a question whether, now that it would have the appearance of being not a spontaneous decision, but one extorted by Lord

[1] "Memoirs," vol. ii p. 221.
[2] Lord Stanley and the Duke of Buccleuch.

John Russell's action, it was any longer desirable that the Cabinet should bring forward a measure to which the majority of its members had unwillingly consented, and to which two would not consent at all. There were those who thought it would be better that they should all resign. Sidney Herbert was himself in favour of that course, and in a memorandum, written shortly before the final Cabinet on December 4th, thus reviewed the position:

"On November 1st the head of the Government proposed to the Cabinet, upon evidence of impending scarcity, to suspend the operation of the Corn Laws. He showed that all precedent in our own country is in favour of such a course; that the example of other European Governments at this moment similarly situated with ourselves would make the non-adoption of such a course on our part still more exceptional. He pointed out that though the averages show no extreme price of corn, bread is as high as in 1841, and wheat fit for bread as high as in 1839. He warned the Cabinet of the possibility of turbulence, should our fears be verified, among a lawless population in Ireland, and the certainty of a violent agitation among large masses of population in this country, headed by energetic men who have already made a deep and wide impression upon public opinion against all protective laws; under the pressure of which turbulence and agitation the Government would be forced to concede to intimidation what may now be granted freely and without suspicion, to the necessities of the case. But he stated, at the same time, that if suspension be adopted it will be impossible to revert to the present law; that to re-enact will be difficult, and that nothing can be proposed which shall not involve an extensive reduction of the present amount of protection. He showed that suspension, if adopted, should take place immediately, while the Baltic and the St. Lawrence were still open, and by Order in Council, as our friends would prefer ratifying our Act when done, by a bill of indemnity, rather than be made to share the responsibility by becoming themselves parties by legislation to a measure which would

endanger them with their constituencies, and to which their opinions and prejudices are opposed.

"The majority of the Cabinet refused their consent to these proposals, on the ground that there was no evidence of impending scarcity sufficient to justify such immediate and extreme measures. Under these circumstances the meeting of the Cabinet was postponed to allow time for further evidence to be collected, on the receipt of which this difference of opinion might in one way or other be reconciled.

"In the interval a Commission was by general consent appointed in Ireland to direct whatever operations may become necessary on the part of the Government for the relief of scarcity, should it occur. Sir James Graham drew up instructions for this Commission.

"The Cabinet met to hear the instructions read on the 24th.

"In the meanwhile the opportunity for immediate action was gone, the case of emergency was weakened by a delay which is incompatible with emergency, and public expectation, which was ready for vigorous action, died away. The iron had cooled, and the blow would lose half its effect.

"As the opportunity passed, however, and the position of the Government became better appreciated, some of the dissentients began to waver, but still their reluctance either to adopt the course or to break up the Government induced them to seek further delay and to put off the evil day when a decision must be taken involving such large differences.

"The instructions, recording as they did the magnitude of our apprehensions and that imminence of scarcity which alone could justify such exceptional measures as those proposed by the Commission, produced further discussion.

"In the interval a new embarrassment arose, and the position of the Government was still more complicated by the appearance of Lord John Russell's letter. For the right understanding of the intentions conveyed by this letter I must quote two sentences. He says: 'But the imposition of *any* duty at present *without a provision for its extinction within a short period* would but prolong a contest already sufficiently fruitful of animosity and discontent.' Again, he says: 'Let the Ministry propose such a revision of the

taxes as in their opinion may render the public burdens more just and equal. *Let them add any other provisions* which caution, and even scrupulous forbearance, may suggest.'

"It is difficult from a general statement to infer with any accuracy what would be the details of the measure which Lord John Russell would propose; but the first sentence I have quoted and the latter part of the second appear to me to point strongly to a low duty, as suggested by Mr. Ricardo, diminishing annually until it be extinguished. Mr. Cobden's speech at Bradford shows, I think, that he has drawn some such inference from Lord John Russell's expressions. He has suggested a similar course before—though he has never embodied it in the form of a Resolution. Lord John Russell, therefore, is for a total, not for an immediate, repeal. He contemplates only ultimate abolition within a short period balanced by a readjustment of local burdens.

"It is impossible to deny that this letter complicates the position of the Government very much. Lord John Russell has seized the moment of inaction on the part of the Government to seize on the very position which we ought to have occupied, because it was the obvious one, and appropriate it to himself.

"My first impression on reading his letter was that he embraced fully the doctrines of the League, and was prepared for immediate abolition, and that we could, therefore, produce a counter-plan of safe and gradual, as against sudden and violent, change. This, however, is not so. The only real difference between his course and ours would be the maintenance of a slight party distinction, viz., that his evanescent process would start from a fixed duty, ours from a sliding scale—a distinction of little importance to the country, since either duty would be a low one, and useful only to maintain a decent, though very transparent, appearance of difference. That some such course is the best for the country and for the agricultural classes themselves I am convinced.

"It is not necessary now to argue the question of the Corn Laws, but, entertaining as I do the opinion that their continuance is incompatible with the ultimate interests of the agriculturists themselves, and that the struggle for their maintenance is danger-

ous to the character and, therefore, to the influence of the aristocracy, to whom selfish motives may be imputed for their maintenance, I can imagine no possible opportunity more favourable for effecting the alteration than the present. I do not underrate the shock which a change so great would at first produce, and which probably will be aggravated by unreasonable panic, but the extensive failure of the present potato crop involves a considerable diminution of that which will follow, and a vast population in Ireland must pass to some other, and that a grain diet. In England the diminished supply of what is an auxiliary rather than the staple of the diet of the labouring classes must create a great additional demand for wheaten bread. Great employment for some years to come on railroads and consequent high wages will maintain this demand, and we are, as far as it can be foreseen, at the commencement of a long period of great demand and high prices for corn, and with the certainty of no great supply from abroad till another harvest shall be gathered. At no time, therefore, could the change be effected with less probable disturbance of existing interests.

"These opinions, however, are entertained but by four members of the Cabinet. Those who are members of the House of Lords, with one exception [Lord Aberdeen], are opposed to it. Legislating in a House representing one class, where commercial questions are seldom agitated and little understood, and where they hear no arguments but such as coincide with their own opinions, removed from the action of popular influences and unacquainted with the phases the question has assumed, they are scarcely aware of the unsoundness of the system to which they have been so long accustomed, of the extent to which it is condemned, and the difficulty and danger of maintaining it. With their leanings, and scarcely aware of the extent to which the head of the Government has gone in the admission of free trade opinions in the House of Commons, the proposed change is so sudden and extensive that they do not consider it compatible with our party engagements, as men of honour, to propose such measures to the country.

"I do not agree in this opinion. I think Sir Robert Peel had so clearly indicated such a course in speeches

made last session, and the course would be in such strict accordance with the system of commercial reforms which the Government has steadily promised from the commencement, that public expectation looks that way, and the non-adoption of the course would have the appearance of a halt, rather than its adoption that of an inconsistency. The adoption of strong measures at the right time for the advantage of the country, irrespective of party, has been both the strength and the weakness, and, at any rate, the characteristic of Sir Robert Peel's policy. This was especially true in November. Then was the right moment to strike the blow. The course was open; but the majority of the Cabinet destroyed the opportunity. The appearance of prompt and resolute action —so necessary to secure assent among timid men to bold measures—was lost by delay.

"The appearance of voluntary and spontaneous action has been since taken from us by Lord John Russell's letter. He has anticipated the only measure we could take, and we can never give to the public any impression but that the course, if adopted, was a timid plagiarism by bewildered men who jumped at the first proposal which another man showed to be feasible. It is impossible not to feel, therefore, that the circumstances have most materially damaged this course, but, at the same time, I know of no other which, as a Government, we can pursue.

"To maintain the present Corn Law, either with or without suspension, I hold to be impossible. To deal with portions of the Corn Law, leaving the most odious part of it the more exposed, is equally impossible; and to produce small tinkerings of the law would be ridiculous, and we should fail, having at the same time shown ourselves unequal to the occasion.

"The first course, therefore, is the only one which we can adopt; and in proportion to the degree to which it has been damaged by circumstances during the last month is the difficulty and hazard of the undertaking increased—though I do not think it an impossible one.

"For that reason I deprecate the forced acquiescence of the dissentients. A hazardous enterprise should not be undertaken except by men whose heart is in it —a good oar should be pulled by every man in the boat.

But for a Cabinet to commence such an enterprise with ten out of fourteen of its members opposed to it in opinion seems hopeless. If that be so, I am inclined to think that the best course for the country, and for the Government, is to break up on the question of suspension."

This was the decision ultimately arrived at, and on December 8th the Queen commissioned Lord John Russell to form a new Cabinet.

For more than a week no doubt was entertained of his success, and on December 17th Sidney Herbert had a chance conversation with Lord Grey, of which he has left the following interesting record:

"On Wednesday night, December 17th, the following conversation took place between Lord Grey and myself, in the library of the Travellers' Club. We were alone, he writing and I reading in the further part of the room, which is divided by columns into three compartments. Lord Grey drew an armchair close to mine and began speaking in a whisper:

"'Well, a pretty mess you have thrown us into. We can do nothing. How *are* we to do it?'

"I said, 'There are obvious reasons why you can do it better than we can.'

"*Lord G.* 'Not at all. Why don't you go and do it yourselves?'

"*S. H.* 'That's out of the question. We have resigned, and there's an end of it. The resignation would be childish if we thought we could undertake it.'

"*Lord G.* 'Well, but can *we* carry it?'

"*S. H.* 'There will be a great confusion of parties in the House of Commons, and it is difficult to foresee, but I think you will.'

"*Lord G.* 'And in the Lords?'

"*S. H.* 'Yes, in the Lords.'

"*Lord G.* 'And in the present Parliament?'

"*S. H.* 'Yes, I am speaking only of the present Parliament.'

"*Lord G.* 'I am strongly against a dissolution, but after all, success must depend on the measure. Did

you intend to suspend and then re-enact? Why, that would have been insanity.'

"*S. H.* 'I can say nothing about our measure.'

"*Lord G.* 'No, but Peel says in his letter—suspension, gradual abolition, etc.'

"I said, 'If you look carefully at Sir Robert Peel's letter, you will see that in offering his support he, in every case, uses the very words of Lord John Russell's manifesto. It was fair to suppose that Lord John's measure would be the one sketched in his letter, and to that, as by him described, we offered our support.'

"*Lord G.* 'Oh, no! You are quite wrong. Lord John never meant gradual abolition.'

"*S. H.* 'Didn't he? Then what is the meaning of this sentence, "But the imposition of any duty at present without a provision for its extinction within a short period would be, etc."? Besides, it is not the first time he has said so. He proposed the same thing in his Resolutions this year. It is Ricardo's plan of an evanescent duty. His letter could mean nothing else.'

"*Lord G.* 'Well, to tell you the truth, he did mean that—and up to two o'clock on Tuesday he meant it, and so they all did, and when I arrived they were all full of it; but I knocked all that over. I told them it was insanity, that you could not suspend and then re-enact; that is why we want to know what you will do?'

"*S. H.* 'How do you mean, what we will do?'

"*Lord G.* 'Why, how far you will support us.'

"*S. H.* 'Why, you cannot suppose that our offer of support is not a *bonâ fide* one.'

"*Lord G.* 'Why, you could trip us up if you liked.'

"*S. H.* 'Now, really, do you conceive such a thing possible? Just look at what has happened. Sir Robert Peel with a large majority in both Houses throws down a great position, breaks up his party, incurs every kind of odium for the public good. Men don't throw away brilliant positions for the purpose of playing practical jokes on their opponents. Can you conceive that men of honour, who have made the sacrifices we have for the settlement of this question, are not prepared honestly to do their utmost to carry it through? The supposition is an absurdity.'

"*Lord G.* 'No, I don't say that. I can assure you I never thought it was a trick. When I saw the letter they had written to Sir Robert Peel, I said at once, you must be born fools to expect him to give in to such a proposal as this. He gave the only answer he ought to give. Peel was quite right there.'

"I showed the effect that any appearance of concert would have upon Parliament.

"Lord G. quite agreed, and said, 'No, it was not a fair proposal, but as to what we have asked now, you must admit that we have a right to ask that.'

"*S.H.* 'Suppose we answered you by asking, who are you? We should like to know who we are dealing with. Are you all agreed as to your measure? Are you all parties to that letter?'

"*Lord G.* 'Yes, all; we are all agreed.'

"*S. H.* 'What, without exception? Without reference to two o'clock on Monday?'

"*Lord G.* 'Yes. Lord Lansdowne is agreed. But we have a right to ask the question contained in our second letter.'

"*S. H.* 'I don't see the difference between the first proposal and the second. You first ask us to pledge ourselves to a series of measures covering the whole question. This we decline, and you think our reasons sound. Then you pick out one particular measure, and ask us to pledge ourselves to that, though we don't know, and you admit we ought not to know, what the others are by which it is to be accompanied.'

"*Lord G.* 'No, no; that is not it. We conceive from your letter, coupled with Graham's conversation, that you can support gradual abolition, and that only. Sir Robert Peel described his measure in that way.'

"*S. H.* 'Sir Robert Peel has described nobody's measure but Lord John Russell's. We took it for granted his measure would agree with his manifesto.'

"*Lord G.* 'Well, but you say you won't pledge yourselves *for* any measure. We want to know whether you are pledged *against* any measure. We don't ask you to pledge yourself *for* one, but are you free both ways?'

"*S. H.* 'We seemed to read your letter differently.'

"*Lord G.* 'I did not see the letter. I left the House before it was written; but the words I suggested were these, "Are you precluded from voting for immediate

repeal if accompanied by other and sufficient measures of relief and compensation," or words like that. And now *are* you?'

"*S. H.* 'I had rather not answer that question; for this reason: I am one of four or five men who are taking the same course; you will see to-morrow a letter to which all of us are parties. I might give you a wrong impression of their opinions. You will see the letter. I had rather you judged from that. Look at the course we have taken; look at the state of public affairs; and judge for yourself what we are likely to do. Bring forward what you honestly think to be the best measure for the country, and most likely to satisfy all interests. That is the course for you.'

"*Lord G.* 'Oh! I am willing to do that. Mind you, I think it is not only policy but justice that every relief should be given to the land, and would not look too closely as to what constitutes burdens; but still I don't like our undertaking it. Why should there not be a coalition?'

"*S. H.* 'Now, Howick, can you seriously wish that? With your acuteness and your knowledge of the effect coalitions have always had on public opinion in this country. You, who admit that even concert is dangerous.'

"*Lord G.* 'Well, I admit I stand alone there: nobody has wished it but me; but at any rate I wish we could keep Lord Aberdeen.'

"*S. H.* 'Why so?'

"*Lord G.* 'I prefer him to Palmerston. He is a much safer and better Foreign Minister.'

"I laughed, and said, 'I agree with you there, and so do many others beside myself.'

"Lord Grey then said Palmerston was a dangerous man at this moment; that in his father's time he was an excellent Foreign Minister, for he was new to his office, and his despatches always came to Lord Grey to be corrected, and Lord Grey used often to score out more than he left, but Melbourne let everybody do what he liked. He then said, 'I always wondered that you did not attack that Syrian policy.'

"*S. H.* 'It is a dangerous thing for an Opposition to embarrass an executive when a Government is so completely embarked in a course as Palmerston was then.'

"*Lord G.* 'That is exactly what always happened in our Cabinet. Before we even knew what was doing, we were irretrievably engaged. If I had been in the Government at the time of that Syrian business, I should have resigned.'

"I laughed, and said, 'I have no doubt you would!'

"Lord G. laughed too, and said, 'What, you mean I am impracticable?'

"*S. H.* 'Well, perhaps so; very honest and very able, but rather impracticable.'

"*Lord G.* 'Well, I can assure you, you are quite wrong. I was always in a minority in the Cabinet.'

"*S. H.* 'Well, that seems rather an odd way of proving it.'

"*Lord G.* 'I mean I didn't resign. I gave way. Had you a minute of Cabinet?'

"I asked what he meant, and he said that in their Cabinet they always drew up a minute of what passed, and, I think he said, that when they differed in some cases they had signed it, but I am not clear upon that. I told him we had no such practice.

"He then asked, 'Who had you against you? You had Stanley against you, I know.'

"*S. H.* 'I cannot answer for others: they must tell their own story.'

"He then said, 'There is one point on which I should like to have your opinion.'

"*S. H.* 'Tell me what it is before I undertake to answer.'

"*Lord G.* 'Well, do you think we ought to take Cobden into the Government?'

"*S. H.* 'I had rather not give an opinion upon that. I don't know how you are situated or whom you want to conciliate; the country gentlemen, for instance.'

"*Lord G.* 'But after all it is he who has carried the question, and after him, among the Whigs, myself, for I am the only one who ever spoke out.'

"He then asked a few questions about the amount of the potato crop in Ireland, and again repeated, 'I don't like forming a Cabinet which won't deal with all questions. The Irish Church, for example. Are we to allow that evil to go on in Ireland, just to please the bigotry of the people of England and Scotland? No. The Irish Church must be dealt with comprehensively, and that done, then measures of the utmost

rigour to put down agitation, and that spirit in Ireland.'

"*S. H.* 'Do your new colleagues share your opinions on this head?'

"*Lord G.* 'No, but I think they could be brought to them. Then, again, where your Government, and ours too, was wrong, you should Christianise the people.'

"*S. H.* 'I agree with you, but how is it to be done? Governments can only deal with religion through churches.'

"*Lord G.* 'Yes, but multiply churches. Pay the Dissenters. There are large masses of population where the Church of England has no hold, are these people to be heathens on that account? If you paid both Church and Dissenters on the same principle as the education vote, the Church would always get the lion's share.'

"*S. H.* 'And are the Cabinet agreed to that too?'

"*Lord G.* 'No, no. I am only stating my own views. However, if they undertake this matter now, I shall join them, but I don't like it.'

"We then got up, the conversation being over, and I said: 'Be assured of one thing: there never was a human transaction more *bonâ fide* than our resignation. We are acting on public grounds, and we mean fairly and honestly by you.' Lord Grey made some observation in assent, and I left the room."

It would appear from this conversation that Lord Grey, though hardly approving—indeed, disapproving—Lord John's acceptance of office, had then made up his mind to join him if he undertook to deal with the Corn Law question in the manner Lord Grey wished. It was Lord Grey, however, who, the next day, rendered Lord John's task impossible. He had formed an independent and just appreciation of the mischief done by the meddlesome and irritating action of Lord Palmerston at the Foreign Office, and of the peril which attended it, and consequently refused to serve in the new Government if that nobleman were again

entrusted with the seals of the Foreign Department. Lord Palmerston declined to enter the Government in any other capacity, and unable to compose the strife, Lord John, who professed the help of both to be essential to enable him to face Parliament, relinquished the attempt to form an administration.

The Cabinet of Sir Robert Peel returned to office with the loss of two members only: Lord Stanley, who would not take part in the free trade legislation proposed, and Lord Wharncliffe, who had died during the crisis. The Duke of Buccleuch, Lord Privy Seal, who had been Lord Stanley's companion in resignation, became Lord President of the Council in Lord Wharncliffe's place. Lord Haddington, whose health was indifferent, was, at his own wish, transferred to the sinecure office of the Privy Seal, and was himself succeeded at the Admiralty by Lord Ellenborough, while Mr. Gladstone was invited to rejoin the Cabinet which he had quitted nearly twelve months previously. He accepted the proposal, and replaced Lord Stanley at the Colonial office. Mr. Gladstone's acceptance of office vacated his seat in Parliament for Newark, a borough then completely under the influence of the Duke of Newcastle, a staunch Protectionist, who naturally refused to return Mr. Gladstone again to Parliament, which he did not re-enter till the general election of 1847. This instance of a Secretary of State holding office for six months without a seat in either House of Parliament will probably never again find a parallel in English history.

I had not originally intended to have made any reference to a scandal of the day, which I had assumed to be forgotten, and which connected Sidney Herbert's name with the premature disclosure by *The Times* of the contemplated establishment of free trade in corn.

But the subject has been revived and discussed too lately to be now altogether passed over in silence, and a few words must therefore be devoted to it. The subject is one on which the possession of knowledge that I cannot use renders it difficult for me to write. For the present purpose, it is sufficient to say that Sir Robert Peel and Lord Aberdeen were anxious to secure the support of *The Times*, and thought the task before them would be made easier if that journal, then far more powerful than at the present day, were to prepare the way by gradually directing men's minds in favour of the change. Peel never saw Mr. Delane. Lord Aberdeen frequently did so, and was in this case, as usual, the organ of communication between the Government and *The Times*. But this was not (as is supposed by Mr. Greville) on December 4th, but on an earlier day. Mr. Delane subsequently furnished Lord Aberdeen with explanations, which, if accurate, excused a publication by him that had not been contemplated or desired by Sir R. Peel or Lord Aberdeen. That Lord Aberdeen accepted these explanations as satisfactory is clear from his having continued without interruption his relations with Mr. Delane. That Sir Robert Peel was also satisfied, and that he was a party to the communication of Lord Aberdeen, is equally manifest from the fact that not only was there not the slightest ruffle in their confidential intercourse, but that, close and intimate as that confidence for many years had been, it became from that time even closer and more intimate than it had been before. But whatever the full history of this curious transaction, no one who knew Sidney Herbert could suppose (even without the evidence lately supplied by Lord Dufferin and Sir R. Meade) that he was capable of betraying

any secret entrusted to him, whilst it is equally repugnant to all probability that the gifted lady whose name has been connected with his as the direct medium of communication to *The Times*, should have sold such a secret for money. Injudicious and impulsive her conduct may at times have been, but selfish or mercenary she certainly was not. To attribute such qualities to her can only, among those who knew her, excite derision. The origin of the report was, I believe, an ambiguous utterance of Mr. Delane himself, not meant to bear any such interpretation as that given to it.

As Sidney Herbert had been one of those who had from the first supported the repeal of the Corn Laws in the Cabinet, he was of course expected to advocate it in the House of Commons. He did so on February 9th. He avowed that, after much doubt, he had reluctantly and slowly changed his opinion on the subject of the Corn Laws. The agitation of the Anti-Corn Law League was not one of force but of reason. To the appeal of reason he implored the opponents of the measure to listen. "If you do not now yield to reason, some day force will be added to that agitation, and then you will yield, not as now, with honour, but with loss of station, influence, and character." He argued that protection to the British corn-grower was no part of the Constitution, and was not essential to Conservatism. The manufacturing interest must henceforth have no less voice than the agricultural interest in the government of the country, and the proposals of the Government had a tendency to cement the two together. He was less happy when he assumed the part of a prophet, and maintained that the supplies of grain from the Baltic were likely to be but small, that the exports of wheat and

flour from the United States were yearly diminishing, and that the home agriculturist who anticipated a diminution of production and a total loss of profit had been "scared by alarms founded on delusions."

He was mistaken, but he erred in good company. It is clear that neither Sir Robert Peel nor his friends anticipated any diminution in the cultivation of wheat in England. They assumed that the acreage of land under wheat would be fully maintained, if not extended; and that while in times of scarcity the entry of foreign corn would prevent distress, an abundant harvest would not be materially supplemented by importation from abroad. Three years later Sir Robert wrote to Lord Aberdeen of the probable effects of the Bill as follows:

". . . A very abundant harvest will produce now the same effect which it did in 1834 and 1835. The free import of foreign wheat will prevent, or at least control, *high* prices: when the price of wheat is depressed by the causes that were in operation in 1834 and 1835, namely, productive harvests, I doubt whether free import will add to the depression."

But though, with the help of the Liberals, Sir Robert Peel carried his free-trade measures triumphantly, it was of course clear that their help would not be permanently afforded him, and that the moment the Repeal of the Corn Law was effected would be the moment of his fall. This prevision was justified with dramatic completeness, for on the same day that the Corn Law Repeal Act was read a third time and passed in the House of Lords, the House of Commons by a majority of 73 rejected, on its second reading, the Bill which the Government had introduced to regulate the carrying of arms in Ireland, and thus

overthrew Sir Robert Peel's second and last administration.

The majority which for purely party objects combined to reject this Bill was one strangely composed. That the Bill should be opposed by the extreme Irish party was only to be expected. That Lord John Russell and his friends should hesitate to accept measures of coercion, more especially when their objection opened to the objectors the road to power, was natural, though it entailed on them the humiliation of having themselves to propose a similar measure in the following year. But the opposition of Lord George Bentinck and his band of sturdy Protectionists, who had voted for the first reading of the Bill, and declared that on the heads of those who opposed it would rest the blood of innocent persons shed in Ireland, can only be described as factious. The sole excuse offered was that the Government was not in earnest in pressing the Bill. The first reading of the Bill had been advocated by Herbert in a calm and reasoned speech in which he set forth the terribly disturbed state of Ireland, which rendered the seizure of concealed arms an imperative necessity. On the second reading he spoke in a very different strain, and denounced, as it deserved, the line adopted by Lord George Bentinck. He said Lord George had made—

"charges which are couched in language seldom heard in this House—in language which it would be well for the character of this House should not be heard there—in language which I will not repeat, in terms in which I will not retaliate, so long as I have any self-respect or regard for my own character. As long as I have that respect for the character and the reputation of this House which becomes its members, I will neither impute to others motives by which I scorn to be influ-

enced myself, nor will I consent to import into this House, into the Senate of this country, terms and language and expressions which are better suited to some other arena than to one where gentlemen are met together gravely, seriously, and deliberately to discuss measures vitally affecting the great interests of the country. The noble Lord says that we cannot be in earnest in pressing this Bill; and he founds that suspicion upon the fact, that now in June, when he has discovered that the days are long, we are only pressing the second reading of the Bill before the House. I should like to know from what quarter, with a face of decency, can be brought the charge of delaying the measure before the House—a charge brought to-night not for the purpose of argument, but for a purpose very different. Because, night after night, as sure as an argument had been met, as sure as a fact had been contradicted, the same fact, the same argument, was reproduced. (Interruption.) It may be to the distaste of the hon. member that I should speak my mind on that matter; but I say, that granting to you for argument, granting to you that never for one moment, in the whole tactics of your resistance to the Corn Bill, you dreamt of delay—granting that it was nothing but the exuberance of eloquence—granting all this, I say the noble Lord may at the same time recollect that, such was the length of the discussion, it was not possible for the Government to bring this Bill earlier under the notice of the House. The noble Lord says we should have brought this Bill on before the Corn Bill; that may be the opinion of the noble Lord, but it was not the opinion of the country. The noble Lord, whose powers of incredulity are so great that he told us there never was a necessity for any interference whatever in Ireland on the subject of the food of the poor, now tells us—not on three years' experience, but on three weeks' experience—that the course he took a few days back was utterly unsound. . . ." "Well, I say, the noble Lord, who says there has been no cause whatever for any interference in Ireland as regards the food of the people, has now found out, after three weeks' reflection, that there is no cause for interference to protect life and property in that country. But a short time ago, so keen was he on this head, that he could not

even wait for the discussion to begin on the first reading of the Bill, but he anticipated it by introducing cases horrible to him, of women attacked, of fire-arms discharged into poor men's cottages, of old ladies attacked as they came home from church in broad day. There was no stint to the noble Lord's indignation against the perpetrators of these attacks on women and defenceless persons. Where has all his indignation gone now? The noble Lord said, that the blood of murdered men must rest upon the head of any man who delayed the passing of this Bill but one day; that the blood of the man who was murdered was upon the head of Her Majesty's Government, aye, and upon the head of every man who supported them, if they delayed for a single day. Upon whose head is the blood of murdered men to be now? Suddenly, upon no fresh information, upon no change of circumstances at three weeks' notice, you turn round and say, that 'what we told you was a crime before God and man, is a course we can now adopt, and is for the benefit of the country! Not because there are other reasons; not that we love Ireland less, but that we hate more the men who at present hold the reins of Government.' . . ." "After the exhibitions I have seen; after the willingness I have seen in the noble Lord to sacrifice his opinions at three weeks' notice, and ally himself with political parties with whom he cannot have any political sympathy, with a party whose proceedings would tend, in my belief, to a dismemberment of the Empire, I say, that after these things, of all the losses with which we are threatened, the loss for which I should care the least would be that of the confidence of the noble Lord."

The difficulties which had proved fatal to Lord John Russell's attempt to form a Government six months previously had in the meantime been smoothed away, and did not again present themselves. Lord Grey consented, not only to sit in the Cabinet with Lord Palmerston, but also to accept him as Foreign Secretary, and Lord John at once undertook the commission entrusted to him by Her Majesty.

In doing so, Lord John was desirous of enlisting some of the younger members of Sir Robert Peel's Government under his own banner, and among them Sidney Herbert, to whom he wrote that he had received the Queen's permission to propose to him to join the new Cabinet. To this letter Mr. Herbert returned the following answer:

"CARLTON GARDENS, *July 2nd*, 1846.

"My Lord,

"I beg to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, informing me that you had obtained the permission of Her Majesty to propose to me, as also to Lord Dalhousie and Lord Lincoln, to become a member of the administration which you have been authorised to form.

"I regret that it is not in my power to accede to that proposal.

"Considering the nature of the circumstances which led to the displacement of the late Government, I do not think that my continuance in office with their successors would be in any way an advantage to Her Majesty's service or the country.

"Were I of a different opinion, I can assure your Lordship that I should not allow any private or personal reasons to weigh with me in deciding upon the course which in that case it would be my duty to take, but I do not feel that, consistently with my public duty or with advantage to your Lordship's administration or to the country, I could re-enter Her Majesty's service as a member of your Cabinet."

Sidney Herbert left office in a very different position from that in which he had entered it. Though in age the youngest of the Cabinet, his place as one of its leading members was firmly established and generally acknowledged. Henceforward he was one of the chief among those who followed the lead of Sir R. Peel, and this distinction was obtained without exciting the jealousy of his seniors or the envy of his contemporaries. When

Sir R. Peel resigned in December, 1845, Herbert requested Sir James Graham, then Home Secretary, with whom as Secretary at War he had much official communication, to return him a letter of which he had kept no copy. In reply Sir James asked:

"Is this the letter? If it be, you must take a copy of it and return it to me, for I cannot part with any memorial of our official alliance, which has given me such unmixed pleasure, and which I shall remember always with cordial satisfaction."

—A graceful compliment from an old and experienced Minister to his youngest colleague. The friendship thus commenced continued, not only unimpaired but with ever-growing affection, until dissolved by death.

At the time of his resignation Sidney Herbert had held the post of Secretary at War for only about sixteen months. He had, however, soon gone beyond the fulfilment of the mere routine duties of his office, and had in that short space of time conceived and carried through more than one important reform. Among the chief of these were the measures adopted by him for the improvement and extension of military schools. Already, whilst at the Admiralty, Mr. Herbert had completely reorganised the Royal Naval School at Greenwich, and enlarged its sphere of usefulness. As Secretary at War he did similar work by effecting a thorough and much-needed reform of the Duke of York's School for soldiers' children, and by converting into realities the regimental schools which had long existed in name, but in a condition of total inefficiency. These were, however, only the first of many steps taken by him for the promotion of education in the Army, a subject which will be more fully dealt with in a subsequent chapter.

Another matter which occupied much of his time and thoughts was the revival and reorganisation of the Militia.

The duty binding on every Englishman of suitable age to take part in the defence of the country from invasion has, from the earliest times, been as fully recognised as the despatch of any one on foreign service, except with his own consent, has been steadily and successfully contested.

At the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth centuries the laws relating to the Militia underwent a good deal of alteration, and during the progress of the great war with France the force became very fairly efficient. After the restoration of peace, interest in it naturally diminished. Early in the reign of George IV. the force ceased to be generally called out for annual training, and the ballot for enrolment in its ranks was last enforced in the second year of William IV. Since then, though an annual ballot is still directed by law, the operation of the Act has been, and still is, annually suspended. In 1845, the force might be said to have practically ceased to exist. Mr. Herbert considered its abeyance a matter for grave regret. On his initiative, the Cabinet of Sir Robert Peel determined to restore its efficiency, and Mr. Herbert, in concert with the Home Secretary, Sir James Graham, set to work to prepare the measures necessary to give effect to that determination. In Mr. Herbert's opinion, the first question for consideration was—

"whether the beat of drum or the ballot be the preferable mode of raising the Militia. The beat of drum in the years 1808-13 raised men at an expense of £12. 12s. per head, so that it would cost at that rate nearly £800,000 to raise 50,000 men. At the Army rate of the present day it would cost between £250,000

to £300,000. By the ballot it would cost £1 per man—*i.e.* £50,000 at the outside for 50,000 men. In 1831 it cost £35,000, but all the men were not trained in that year. A ballot raised 50,000 men in three months. How many months or even years would it take to raise them by beat of drum, now that wages are high and labour scarce?"

The preference thus indicated for a system of ballot rather than voluntary enlistment for the Militia continued to be felt by Sidney Herbert to the end of his life, and, as will be shown later, he endeavoured to give effect to it when Secretary of State for War.

A little later we find him enumerating[1] the steps he had quietly taken to restore the machinery needed for a Militia Ballot, and the communications which had passed between him and the Master-General of the Ordnance as to the provision of clothing and arms for a Militia force of 30,000 men.

"All this, however," he says, "has been done without any formal announcement from the Secretary of State of the intentions of the Government with respect to the Militia. I would suggest, therefore, that you should write me a public letter, informing me of the intentions of the Government, and desiring me to take the necessary steps to enable the Government to call out the Militia next spring."

A suggestion was made by one of his colleagues[2] that instead of calling out the rank and file of the Militia in time of peace, the regimental staff of sergeants should be made up to its full number, so as to be ready for any emergency. Of this proposal Herbert made short work.[3]

"To increase the number of the permanent Militia staff with a view to have a force ready to act in main-

[1] In a letter to Sir Jas. Graham, November 4th, 1845.
[2] The Duke of Buccleuch.
[3] Mr. Herbert to Sir Jas. Graham, November 29th, 1845.

tenance of the public peace would," he wrote, "be to incur the greatest expense with the least efficiency; for the force would consist entirely of non-commissioned officers in receipt of the pay of that rank for the whole year, in return for services which might not extend longer than a few days.

"I have read the Duke of Buccleuch's letter. We contemplate no such augmentation of the staff as he recommends, but merely the filling up of vacancies, and the substitution of efficient for inefficient men on the present establishment, which is a reduced establishment, fixed in 1835 by Act of Parliament, and which gives but one sergeant to a company of 80 in lieu of one to 30, which was the previous complement. But even to render this reduced establishment effective, we shall have first to fill up 109 vacancies, and then to supply the places of no less a number than 620 reported unfit on the late inspection."

And on December 4th we find him writing again to Sir James Graham in reply to apprehensions which had been expressed as to the danger which might arise from giving a military training to the masses:

"No doubt there *is* risk attending the arming of the manufacturing population, or rather the giving them military knowledge, (for so long as they wear a red coat and have the Mutiny Act over their heads I am not much afraid of their carrying a musquet). Our danger will begin when their time of service shall be out, and they retain their military knowledge, but lose military control. But the advantages of security against foreign attack must be weighed against the evil of the increased organisation of domestic disturbance.

"When danger is apprehended from abroad, you want masses of men. Our standing army abroad is little more than a police force. An increase to it of ten or twenty thousand men in case of invasion would be as nothing. A greater number you could not procure; we have no compulsory enlistment, and to raise ten or twelve thousand recruits per annum to keep up the supply for our Army as it now stands is as much as we can do. Even if we could raise fifty

thousand or more men, the jealousy would be great and the expense enormous.

"Our Militia gives you at once, and at one-fourth of the cost of recruiting in the Line, a force of any amount, which can, if not wanted for immediate use, be maintained by annual training in a state next to efficiency, at one-twelfth of the cost of regular troops.

"When embodied, the Militia becomes a regular army. In discipline, in drill, in pay, in arms, they are identical. The officers are drawn from the same classes, so are the men; whatever difference there may be is in favour of the Militia."

All preliminary steps were taken for the enforcement of the ballot. A Bill was drafted, rearranging the Militia districts and quotas, and conferring powers on the Crown to employ the force in any part of Great Britain, instead of in its own county only. Up to the resignation of Sir Robert Peel in December, 1845, the preparations necessary for calling out the Militia were continued with eagerness. After his return to office, however, the Corn Law Repeal measures occupied the whole attention of the Cabinet, nor was it thought prudent to make any proposals on other matters of importance which might provoke opposition or alienate support in the great Parliamentary contest in which the Government was engaged. Accordingly the Bill which had been drafted was never introduced, and the intention to call out the Militia by ballot in the spring of 1846 under the existing law was quietly abandoned. For another six years no step was taken to restore efficiency to the Militia force.

The intentions of the Government had been so well concealed that it will, I believe, be a surprise to many to learn that Sir Robert Peel had resolved on so great a change in the English rural life of that day as the resuscitation of the Militia, or on

so unpopular a step as resort to ballot for enlistment in its ranks.

At the Council summoned in December, 1845, for the swearing-in of Lord John Russell's Cabinet, but which in fact witnessed Sir Robert Peel's resumption of office, a Royal Warrant prepared by Sidney Herbert was passed—he had supposed it would be his last official act—which improved the position of sergeants in the Army, and greatly extended the system under which rewards for good service were granted to non-commissioned officers and men. On the details of that Warrant it is unnecessary now to dwell. They were explained in detail by Sidney Herbert in a very long letter to Lord Fitzroy Somerset, and are only referred to here because they elicited the following characteristic criticism from the Duke of Wellington in a letter also addressed to Lord Fitzroy:

"STRATHFIELDSAYE, *December 8th*, 1845.

"I have returned Mr. Herbert's paper; and you will see that I concur in all his propositions, excepting in that which has for its object to grant to non-commissioned officers a pension or annuity of £25 a year, besides their usual pension on receiving their discharges respectively. I think that there would be great difficulty in selecting the non-commissioned officers actually serving to whom this gratuity should be granted.

"I give up the whole of my patronage, as Constable of the Tower, to the deserving non-commissioned officers of the Army actually serving.

"Whenever I hear of a non-commissioned officer behaving well—and in some instances even private soldiers—I give him a Warrant of Warder of the Tower. But in the vast majority of the cases these warrants are matters of patronage by colonels, or by commanding officers of regiments, who, being aware of this disposition made by me of this patronage, each endeavour to obtain a warrant for a sergeant-major, quartermaster-sergeant, or some favourite sergeant,

forgetting altogether the object which I have in view in making this sacrifice of the patronage—viz. to reward the meritorious service of the moment; in order to do which I sacrifice my own inclinations to reward the old non-commissioned officers of the Army!

"It is true that the grant of a warrant to one occasionally out of so many thousands still alive would be nothing, and I therefore invariably grant the warrants, when vacancies occur, to the deserving among those who are serving. But it is very difficult to find them—to a certainty.

"Then, I think that the sum granted, however small, is too much.

"I don't recollect—and I have no means here of ascertaining—what is the half-pay of the ensign or lieutenant, who, observe, may have purchased his commission! It does not amount to the sum which the retired sergeant would receive between his gratuity and his pension upon receiving his discharge. Yet observe, that these two individuals may, after retiring from the service, live each with his wife and family in the same row in a village.

"I have great respect for the non-commissioned officers, the sergeants of the British Army, and upon different occasions during the late war in the Peninsula, I suggested and urged the adoption of measures to improve their condition, which I considered would have rendered them more useful. But in my opinion it is a great mistake to suppose that the conduct or character of the British Army is to be attributed to the non-commissioned officers! It is to the officer exclusively! the man of education, manners, honour, and other qualities acquired by the education which English gentlemen receive.

"This is *the man* to whom all look in moments of difficulty and danger—more particularly if his conduct in general should be such as that of a gentleman ought to be! It is quite astonishing what they do, not only in presence of an enemy in the field, but in every situation in which their duty places them. In their insulated cantonments, in South Wales or in Ireland, accident or mistake is never heard of. Then look at a youth from 16 to 18 years of age, just from school possibly, embarked in a transport with a non-commissioned officer, and from fifteen to twenty men in

charge of hundreds of felons to convey them in safety to the Antipodes—a voyage which takes months; and I cannot say that I recollect an instance of an accident of any description, or of blame imputed to any officer.

"Then observe, that these are not the officers of one or two regiments, but those of all. Each regiment in its turn has this duty to perform.

"I know them well; their faults as well as their merits! But I declare that there is no greater mistake than to suppose that the service performed by the British Army could be carried on by any other description of man excepting one educated as is an English gentleman!

"Ever yours most affectionately,

"WELLINGTON.

"I will add to this, that our soldiers, they look to their officers—the men of education, manners, honour, qualifications of a superior class.

"The same sentiments prevail in all the services that I have known. What was the cause of the falling off of the armies of Spain and Portugal, as we found them, compared with their reputation of former times? Nothing but the want of education of their officers."

Some modifications to meet the Duke's objections were made, and the Royal Warrant itself was issued at a Council held on December 19th, 1845.

CHAPTER IV

PRIVATE LIFE

1846–48

THE Cabinet of Sir Robert Peel went out of office on June 29th, 1846. Release from official drudgery was probably for a time not unwelcome to Sidney Herbert, who must have rejoiced in the opportunity thus given him of throwing himself wholly into the new life on which he was about to enter. For, on August 12th, 1846, little more than a month after Sir Robert Peel's resignation, he married Elizabeth à Court, daughter of General Charles Ashe à Court, brother of the first Lord Heytesbury.

The young people had long been intimately acquainted. Lord Heytesbury was a distinguished diplomatist, and up to 1832, Ambassador at St. Petersburg. During his absence on the Continent, General à Court and his family occupied his brother's house at Heytesbury in Wiltshire, at no great distance from Wilton. There was much intimacy between the two families, and General à Court (who himself sat in the House of Commons for the pocket borough of Wilton) worked with the utmost energy to secure Sidney's first election for the county. Elizabeth was, as a mere child, fascinated by Sidney's beauty and charm, and announced to her family, as children do, that when she grew up she would marry that boy, and no other.

After a time, General à Court succeeded to a property in Warwickshire, to which he removed his residence, but the intimacy between the families continued. Sidney Herbert often met the à Courts when at Drayton, and it was on one of his visits there that he rode over to Amington and asked Elizabeth à Court to become his wife. She had by that time grown up as one among the most striking beauties of a period more than commonly remarkable for the number of beautiful women who adorned society. During the whole of the fifteen years of their married life she was the most devoted of wives, ever eager to serve her husband, and to sacrifice herself for him. Of this devotion he was fully sensible, and for it he was ever grateful.

The remainder of 1846 seems to have been spent in repose, for I can discover no record of its events.

During the short session of 1847 Sidney Herbert spoke several times, but generally on matters of comparatively small importance, and for the most part connected more or less with the posts he had formerly held at the Admiralty or War Office. On February 20th a high compliment was paid to him in the House of Commons by his successor, Mr. Fox Maule,[1] who spoke of his having earned the gratitude of the Army by the scheme he had perfected for the institution of schools for the orphans and children of British soldiers. This subject, however, will be better dealt with when we come to consider, in a subsequent chapter, the whole work of Sidney Herbert in relation to education in the Army.

His attitude during this session, like that of the other Peelites, was one of general support to the Government, and on one question, which caused

[1] Afterwards Earl of Panmure.

perhaps more heat than any other debated during the session—the continued suspension of the Navigation Laws—he spoke strongly in favour of the measure introduced by Ministers. He said (July 2nd, 1847) that he was one of those who for some time had taken the gloomiest views of our prospects of providing food to meet the wants of our population, and especially the wants of the people of Ireland; that it was dangerous to interpose even in the smallest degree any accession of prices between the consumer and producer; that no time was worse for such a discussion than September; and that the immediate adoption of the proposed measure was imperative.

At an earlier period of the session (March 30th) he had delivered a speech on the length of service in the Army, which still possesses some interest. It must be remembered that at that time a man who entered the Army did so, at least nominally, for life. In the speech in question Sidney Herbert declared enlistment for an unlimited period to be objectionable, though he thought its evils exaggerated. There was no such thing practically in this country as unlimited enlistment. He objected to a short-term service, except in "the case of men who served under conscription," and after enumerating various objections to a short-service system, went on to say that—

"there was another danger, namely, that they might produce such a state of things by a legislative measure of this kind that a very large proportion of the population should have passed through the ranks of the Army and thus have obtained a knowledge of military discipline and habits. He was aware that this was a very unpopular view of the subject, but he should not be deterred by that from expressing his opinion upon it. In all those countries to which he had alluded, popular commotions were rendered more dangerous by those who had been

discharged from the Army. In England a disturbance could be put down by a few watchmen or policemen, but in Continental States disturbances, apparently trivial in the first instance, became of a formidable character. On the Continent, any imaginary or just cause of complaint gave rise to serious outbreaks, in which an active part was taken by men who had been trained as soldiers and had been accustomed to military movements, and who only wanted uniforms to make them an army."

He recommended fourteen years' service, or at all events that, if shortened to ten years, it should not then carry a pension. He also proposed a revision of the pension scheme of 1833.

In the summer of 1847 Parliament was dissolved. Sidney Herbert stood again for South Wilts, and in doing so issued an address in which he explained to the electors the political position which he held. After pointing out that a revision of the laws by which the subsistence of the people was affected had been necessitated by the terrible calamity, which, in spite of every effort, had caused many deaths in Ireland and severe privations in England, he avowed his own belief that the permanent result of the measures taken would be to give increased security to all interests and classes by removing animosities between them. And he went on to say:

"I have made special mention of these measures because the course which I felt compelled to take in reference to them was, I know, opposed to the opinions of many for whom I have the most profound respect. Nothing but a paramount sense of duty and an earnest desire, in a moment of public peril, to advise at any personal sacrifice such measures as were fitted to meet so great an emergency could have induced me to place myself for a time at variance with many whose confidence I have so long enjoyed. I have endeavoured, as I always shall endeavour,

to promote the real interests of all classes, to increase the physical comfort of those who live by their labour, and improve their social and moral condition by the diffusion of sound education.

"I shall continue as heretofore to resist every attempt to encroach on the just powers and attributes of the different branches of the legislature, and to further every measure tending to increase the efficiency and strengthen the discipline of the Established Church. Thus, and by the enactment of just and equal laws, the attachment of the people to our institutions may be confirmed, and the blessings of our pure and reformed faith may be more widely diffused."

His return was unopposed.

"My election," he wrote to Sir Robert Peel, "has taken place without so much as a threat of opposition. About four hundred horsemen, *mostly farmers*, accompanied me to the hustings, and scarcely an angry word was heard. . . . I think you will be glad to hear of the result of an election in a purely agricultural constituency which was expected by the Protectionists to take signal vengeance upon a member of your Government."

Soon after the election, he and Mrs. Herbert went abroad, going first to Kreuznach and Ems to drink the waters. From thence they proceeded shortly afterwards to Italy. The following extracts from letters to his mother give some account of this tour:

"Ems, *September*, 1847.

"Your letter arrived this morning with the account of Chatsworth, some mysterious allusions to the ———s, and some reflections on the impropriety of the conduct of the late Duke of Praslin.[1] We are dying to know what has happened as to the ———s. He has never written me a line since we left England, which I think he would have done at the termination of the elections, had he not had something which he knew neither how to say nor how to omit. It is difficult to say what I wish about it, but in a general way, anything is better than a separation between

[1] Who had murdered his wife and committed suicide in prison.

man and wife. He took her for worse as well as for better, and worse he has found her. But with age she might improve, as little D—— has. . . .

"The Praslin business is a horrid affair. If he took the poison without connivance, it arose from the doubt that there was as to the legality of arresting a Peer without an Ordinance or warrant from the Chamber; but it may have been connived at, and if so, was a most foolish and short-sighted proceeding under the notion of avoiding scandal. We go to the opposite extreme in England, and hang a man because he is a Lord, lest it should be said that he was let off on that account. No ordinary man would have been executed in Lord Ferrers's case.

"I think the French Government and even the dynasty are in a somewhat dangerous state, and Guizot seems ever since that Spanish business to have lost all courage, power, and influence. But we need not abuse the French Government as to corruption. It is a phase through which all free nations pass. People unaccustomed to freedom must somehow be governed, and governments which cannot compel them are tempted to buy them. We passed through this phase in Queen Anne's time and the Walpoles, and we became virtuous because the Opposition had said so much about it, in order to damage their adversaries, that when they came into power they were obliged to be virtuous for decency. When next Thiers comes in he will not be able to stock job with the telegraph for Lady A. (the titled lady who cannot meet her engagements).

"I am not at all surprised at MacHale's[1] conduct, which is exactly what I expected of the man, (I wonder *when* you ever heard me defend him). The existence of such men is not an unnatural result of the relations between Ireland and England, and I cannot think the system sound which produces them. The truth is, we have governed Ireland always according to the maxims of expediency, and I am more and more convinced every day that in politics, as in everything else, nothing can be right which is not in accordance with the spirit of the Gospel, which is a rule of life for high as well as low.

"I think you are all gone mad about the Pope,

[1] R. C. Archbishop of Tuam.

calling him the 'Great Reformer.' Believe me, he is not *du bois dont sont faits des great Reformers.* Unluckily we have no proofs, though we have the moral conviction of the truth of the denunciation cases. Add to this they are at Rome mortally afraid of the Irish hierarchy, who threatened a schism when the late Pope once interfered with them."

"KREUZNACH, *September 19th*, 1847.

"Many thanks, dearest Mamsy, for your letter, which, though it arrived after my birthday, was not the less welcome. It was a most dismal day outside was the 16th, but a very happy one within doors, and certainly this place is a good test of domestic happiness, for the time has passed here imperceptibly, though one offering less enjoyment of itself I never was in. No one can tell how charming Liz has been in our tour, and how completely sufficient we are to one another. The temptation to neglect public duties becomes very strong when one is so happy in one's nest, and every day one feels more strongly how very short life is, and with all exertion how miserably small is the amount of usefulness to others which even the best men can produce. But in everything she is a comfort and assistance."

"ROME, *December 22nd*, 1847.

"They lost 11,000 children here by small-pox last year. It seems quite inconceivable. There are physicians appointed to vaccinate gratis, but as they take no trouble to induce the poor to come to them, and the poor know nothing about the matter, their offices, like most other offices here, are sinecures. Certainly one cannot live long in Rome without acknowledging the justice of Lord Clarendon's remark, (the historian, not the Lord Lieutenant,) that of all classes and professions, clergymen make the worst administrators of public affairs.

"—— is in a state of great delight and enthusiasm at some things here, and of indignation at others, and of much hope as to the future, mixed with some apprehension; but as these different passions are all expressed by the same a-a-h-h and the *same* shake of the head, we are in the dark as to which things excite which feelings. . . . We saw the great Titian

at Venice, 'The Assumption of the Virgin.' It is in the gallery, a magnificent composition; but there is another there, 'The *Presentation* of the Virgin,' which no one can ever see and forget. I was very much surprised at the beauty of the Titians. In England, and indeed elsewhere, one generally sees fine black portraits, or else naked Venuses looking like great white snails. I was, *en revanche*, much disappointed with Paul Veronese, who is, after all, but a decorator with a most brilliant colouring, in which story and feeling are lost in costume and millinery. We walk out here, picking up marble, porphyry, giallo, and serpentine, which are to be found anywhere. I have quite a collection, and am going to try to get it cut into shapes and make a little bit of pavement, as in the old churches here, where the patterns are beautiful. I have also tumbled on four mosaic columns like those in Wilton Church, which I hope to bring home; they are very rare now."

"ROME, *February*, 1848.

"I have followed all the Arundel and Shrewsbury correspondence very closely, and have read MacHale and Dr. Brown's letters (the Bishop of Elphin). The first a disgraceful letter, the second a flat denial, which even were it unfounded is better than a palliation. The difficulty is to have proof. I have seen one case which I think is clear, for the priest in some evidence given by himself admits the fact. *I* believe that MacDermott used some language with regard to Major Mahon, but unfortunately all the evidence is the other way. He produces twenty-eight people present at the time who deny it, and we have not one person present to assert it. It is no good taking such a case as that to the Pope. He (the Pope) has written to Ireland to inculcate peace and abstinence from politics, and has sent queries to all the bishops as to the alleged denunciations, to which he will receive, no doubt, satisfactory answers—*i.e.* Murray and Crolly and such men will speak of their own dioceses only, where no such things have occurred, and O'Higgins and MacHale will lie; so I do not expect much in the way of reprimand to individuals, only general inculcations of peace, etc. In all this we are paying for our folly in not communicating with Rome

and keeping them straight, instead of allowing them, as we have hitherto done, to receive everything uncontradicted from the O'Connell party. They are also here not a little afraid of those rampant Irish bishops who in the late Pope's time threatened a schism if he interfered.

"I suppose Lizzy told you of my interview with the Pope. Nothing could be better than his tone and language on the subject of Ireland. If he could only act on his own views! but he is sadly surrounded and crippled, and *joué* in every kind of way. . . .

"We have had a very happy winter here. We could not have been here at a more interesting moment, whilst all this fermentation is going on and mighty changes are brewing, for it is the capital of the religious world still, and her changes will affect to a wonderful degree the state of every other country, even of those not in communion with her. . . .

"The Hampden affair is most disastrous to all engaged in it. Oh that bishops would learn not to write letters in newspapers! Never did two men so gratuitously get into a scrape as Wilberforce and our own bishop. I am most grieved at it. I fear that we have seen but the beginning of the mischief, and that a considerable secession from the Church will be the result. How Lord John could have made such a blunder I cannot conceive. I do not believe in Hampden's *heresy*, from what has been stated to me; but I fully believe in the impropriety of making him a bishop, and Lord John could not have selected a worse champion to counteract the Romish tendency in the Church than he.

"Manning is very unhappy about his brother-in-law (Wilberforce), but says that he is not surprised so much at his acceptance of, as at his remonstrance against, Hampden. This I, too, can corroborate from a long conversation I had with him some years ago, when I was surprised at the anti-Puseyite tone he held. Nevertheless, he has completely done for himself, I fear."

"PALERMO, *March 11th*, 1848.

"Here we are safely arrived in the prettiest little bay in the world. We arrived last night, having sailed from Naples Wednesday morning, but the

wind was so light that we took three days to do it, even in the fast-sailing *Superb*. Corry[1] was very hospitable, and we saw all the ways and habits of a man-of-war.

"The Mount Edgecumbes are in great force, though he is not so well these last few days; but the revolution, the bombardment, and the seeing people and discussing terms (for they all came to him), excited and amused him, and did him great good. They are living in the Buttiera Palace, and I cannot help thinking all the time I am there of poor Robert,[2] who there began his unfortunate career. It is melancholy to think of! . . .

"We have been seeing the beautiful things here, ancient churches, etc.; the Saracens and Normans and Spaniards, having all occupied this country, have left a very peculiar stamp and character on all the buildings."

From Naples he wrote a long letter to Sir Robert Peel on the necessity of establishing direct diplomatic relations between the Vatican and the English Government. It was not through the medium of a British Diplomatist at Rome, but only through that of a Papal Envoy in England that any impression could be made on the counsels of the Holy See.

"In short," he concluded, "like other people, only to a far greater degree, they will believe the accounts of their own man, when they will not believe ours; and we shall make an impression upon them only by convincing a Roman ecclesiastic in London."[3]

After wintering in Rome, and paying a short visit to Sicily, Mr. and Mrs. Herbert returned to England in the spring. Though as usual taking an active share in the business and discussions of the House of Commons, the only important speech made by him during the

[1] Capt. Armar Corry, commanding H.M.S. *Superb*.
[2] Lord Pembroke.
[3] This letter is given *in extenso* in Mr. Parker's Life of Sir Robert Peel, vol. iii. p. 493.

session of 1848 was one upon a motion of Mr. Hume with respect to Parliamentary Reform. He said that—

"he spoke because he wished his vote to be considered distinct from the votes of those who were of opinion that the representation of this country was perfect, or that it was impossible to make any improvement in it. . . . It was with satisfaction that he had heard Lord John Russell give up the doctrine of 'finality.' It was also with pleasure that he had heard him state that he did not approve of uniformity of suffrage. . . . Believing that the representation was not sufficiently varied, he regretted that the different modes of franchise which had existed before the Reform Bill had been abolished. He regretted especially that the franchise commonly known by the name of pot-wallopers had been done away with. It gave the working classes a feeling that they were directly represented, and it diminished the tendency on the part of the people to what was called hero worship, the devotion to some demagogue . . . who had spoken to them of the wonderful things he would do if returned. The admission of men to Parliament who were upon a level with the working classes, would induce the working classes themselves not to pay so much attention to the delusive promises that were held out to them.

"He ridiculed Hume's declaration that England, hitherto in the van of liberal institutions, was now in the rear, and equally ridiculed his assumption that a democratic government was favourable to the reduction of national establishments and a rigid economy. In France, since the recent proclamation of the Republic, the Army had been increased by thirty battalions, and made, with the National Guard, 320,000 men under arms. Would jobbing cease with the system of universal suffrage? Marrast[1] and his printer and publisher had just divided places worth £40,000 a year among them. How was personal liberty respected in France? Prussia was highly educated. Was the Prussian Assembly an object of respect?

[1] Of the French Provisional Government.

"All the causes which led to the Revolution in France existed in this country in a much greater degree than in France. There were in this country larger masses of people suffering from distress. True, we had a Poor Law, and there were other redeeming points. But no one could say that there existed in France the strong contrasts which this country exhibited between vast wealth and extreme penury, for in France the subdivision of land was carried to an extreme point. Distress and suffering arising from vicissitudes of commerce, which were the immediate cause of the recent French Revolution, existed to a greater extent in this country. He had great hope for this country, but he did not derive it from a belief that such a measure as that before the House would remove all 'discontent.'"

In conclusion, he raised a laugh at the expense of the member for Salford, who had said that the number of speeches made by members of necessity bore an exact proportion to the number of their constituents, and he spoke with grave and dignified censure of the recent recriminations between Lord G. Bentinck and Lord John Russell as lowering the character of the House.

After the recess he went to Scotland, whither Mrs. Herbert was at that time unable to accompany him. A few characteristic extracts taken from his letters to her whilst absent on this expedition may close this chapter.

"FOREST HOUSE, DALMALLY, *September 28th*, 1848.

"It is a charming little cottage; everything is cottage-like. Lattices and leaded windows. The drawing-room and dining-room with oak ceilings, and pictures of stags and heads on the walls. We had two little rooms allotted to us, of which I am in possession of the one destined for you. Each room has a little iron tent-bed. My room looks out on a lake and mountains far more wild, but not so beautiful as Auchnacarry. We are on a very high level, and the winds blow wickedly. Our party consists of the Breadalbanes, Abercorns, little Landseer, and a vast-kilted giant, with his neck all open, a Sir Alex-

ander Campbell, a clansman, who is a sort of A.D.C. to Lord B. This is a smudgy letter, because Lord B. does not stand blotting paper in the blotting books."

"BLACKMOUNT, *September 29th*, 1848.

"I have been speculating a good deal on the effect poor George Bentinck's death will have on D'Israeli's course. His prospects are certainly greatly cast down by it. Lincoln suggests that he would take a foreign mission, and that Palmerston would give it him."

"BLACKMOUNT, *October 1st*, 1848.

"The people here are not 'sympathique,' as little Pasolini would say, and except that there are lots of deer, (though I somehow have not killed one yet), the whole thing is tiresome. Yesterday seven people were out stalking, some famous shots. Everybody had some chances, but Ossulston was the only one who got a deer. The house itself is very nice and cottage-like, and everything is made of deers' horns: chandeliers, inkstands, hat pegs, envelope cases, etc. All is very plain and simple, but the walls so treacherously thin that everybody is in full possession of his neighbour's opinion of him. Abercorn is rather good fun, he thinks of nothing but his health, and likes to be bullied, but prefers anything, I think, to the Hills. *She* is nice and lady-like, and I daresay, to people who know her well, has something in her beyond the frivolity of the set she lives in. I always wonder at the undoubting sincerity with which *fashionable* society thinks itself *good* society. The contrast with the refinement and high tone of everything at Balcarres strikes me more than ever."

"TYNINGHAME, *October 30th*, 1848.

"I did not know of the eccentric post hour on Sundays till a footman in pink and white came in and asked for the letters, and then off we went to church, where we had the Presbyterian service, and a very good sermon, though I am not quite sure which was the prayer and which was the sermon. The latter, however, was interrupted in the middle by two verses of a hymn, after which on he went as before. This is clearly borrowed from those unexpected songs which unaccountably break out in the French Vaude-

villes. The church, a handsome old parish church, with a rich Gothic porch, and a stone roof inside. At the end a sort of raised temple on columns, in which appeared Sir David Baird and his family, looking like the idols in the joss-house, in the Chinese Exhibition.

"We had a beautiful ride to and from church, through Binning Wood—magnificent avenues of oak, beech, and Scotch fir, with thorn, and fern, and holly. The house is quite beautiful, like a thing in a play; a view of a creek of the sea from it, and fine woods down to the water's edge. Without any bold feature, yet the house and gardens, and timber, and forestry ground, and sea altogether make it very enjoyable.

"We have here George Hope, a Sir George Suttie and his wife, Lady Harriet, a Charteris. He is a tall, good-looking, and very gentlemanly man, of good fortune, of which he takes most sedulous care. She is very fat, very jolly, and slightly reminding me of Mrs. Sullivan, of Merrion Street, Dublin. Then an old Colonel Talbot, 78 years old, a most jolly old gentleman, who, forty-five years ago, got a grant of backwoods in Canada, on Lake Erie, where he cooked his own dinner and that of his man, washed his own dishes, cut down his own trees, and dug away with his own particular spade. He has now a town of 10,000 people on Lake Erie, and a beautiful place. He is a Talbot of Malahide. He has been twenty years since his last visit to England, yet he knows everything about everybody as if he had been in London all the time."

"INVERNESS, *November 9th*, 1848.

". . . A party of 'gents' had a meeting, where they had partaken freely. We, having been attracted by the row on the staircase, had the satisfaction of seeing those of them who wished to go home succeed in getting out of the house those who wished to stay. This they did by seizing the resisting individual and dragging him to the head of the stairs, and then by a vigorous shove from behind, shooting him at one go down a flight of stairs, where his head *ricoché'd* against the opposite wall, and a fresh struggle with a similar result took place for the next flight. In this way they all went home, happy and comfortable."



Wilton House

CHAPTER V

PEELITE NEUTRALITY

1848–50

THE six years which intervened between his marriage and his resumption of office in 1852 were probably the happiest of Sidney Herbert's life. He was in the enjoyment of comparative leisure, and without losing his interest in public life, or his close touch with it, he was able to spend more of his time at Wilton, and to occupy himself more continuously than was at any subsequent period possible, with plans for the benefit of those residing on the Pembroke estates and his own. His health was still unimpaired. Children were born to him. He was consciously useful, and knew himself to be the object of general respect and of widespread affection. It rarely happens that a man so warmly loved is not also the object of strong antipathy, but in his case popularity was, I believe, unembittered by the existence of a single enemy. This popularity was largely due, no doubt, to the rare combination of winning qualities which he possessed, and which caused affection to mingle with the respect which in any case he would have inspired.

His unfailing courtesy, though partly the teaching of especially courteous parents, was in some sort an inheritance from a long line of courteous predecessors. But it was mainly the natural outcome of a kindly heart. It had its reward in the eager

devotion of almost all who came in contact with him.[1] This courtesy, being true courtesy, was not reserved for his own class, but was the same to all, and, perhaps, most displayed where least appreciated. Easily, and almost unconsciously, he made those with whom he conversed feel themselves on a plane of thought, knowledge, and position equal to his own, and as this was done without a thought of condescension on his part, so it raised no feeling of irritation or inferiority in others. There is all the difference in the world between a man placing others on his own level, or affecting to descend to theirs. The first pleases and satisfies, the latter, however kindly meant, mortifies and humiliates.

Few things are more repulsive to a really well-bred man or woman than the airs by which no small proportion of those in fashionable society seek to impress on others their own immense superiority, and the insignificance of those of slightly inferior social standing with whom they may be conversing. This is often done with a skill and tact which avoid overt transgression of the laws of politeness, but which do not make its ostentatious condescension the more tolerable. Sidney Herbert could effectually repel really arrogant presumption, when occasion required it; but with those who were only unconventional and ignorant, not intentionally offensive, he never allowed himself to betray by word, look, or gesture that their manners were not those of the best society, or their knowledge of the world inferior to his own. Never was the truth of Dr. Johnson's

[1] More than thirty years after his death, his nephew, Sir Robert Meade, a permanent Government official, not given to the display of feeling or the use of strong expressions, said to me with manifest emotion, "I worshipped the ground he trod on."

distinction between courtesy and politeness more strikingly illustrated.[1] And this courtesy was enhanced, and in some circumstances, perhaps, only rendered possible by a sweetness of temper which no provocation seemed to have power to ruffle. The petty worries of life, which so often excite a display of irritation and anger, seemed to be regarded by him as sources of amusement, and its graver vexations and misfortunes were always met with cheerfulness and courage.

Closely allied with this sweetness of temper, and, in fact, its cause, was his rare unselfishness, which deemed it wrong to cloud the cheerfulness of others by preoccupation, absence of mind, or any shadow of his own troubles. To the last, he so well hid the severe sufferings of his illness from others, that only three weeks before his death he still took part in London society, and contrived to be the brightest and liveliest of an assemblage which could not believe that he was really so ill as his appearance indicated. It was the same at his office. When he finally left it, both his private secretaries fully expected his return from Spa in better health to resume his duties.

In public life this unselfishness displayed itself not exactly by indifference to popular approval, but by an entire absence of any self-advertisement, or claim of credit to himself for acts dictated by a sense of duty. While Secretary at War in Lord Aberdeen's Cabinet he practically discharged many of the functions belonging to the Secretary of State for War, but though ever ready to take upon himself the responsibility for any scheme that failed, or any act that incurred popular censure, he took anxious care

[1] Polite = Elegant of manners—glossy.
Courteous = Elegant of manners—kind.

that the credit for everything done well should fall to the Duke of Newcastle, for whom, by delegation, he was acting.

Much the same thing occurred when he was himself Secretary of State. In more than one instance he allowed his own work to be attributed to others, and in no case more signally than in that of the Warrant which relieved soldiers of good conduct from the liability to punishment by flogging. This Warrant was Sidney Herbert's work, to which he had devoted much thought and time. The Commander-in-Chief, the Duke of Cambridge, had loyally supported Mr. Herbert's views, but he had nothing to do with the inception, and but little with the preparation, of the Warrant. Nevertheless, as the name of his Royal Highness was attached to it, he was made the recipient of the praise and applause with which the publication of its provisions was greeted. When this apparent injustice was pointed out to Mr. Herbert, he replied, almost with impatience, "What *does* it matter who gets the credit, so that the thing itself is done?"

This cast of thought was natural to him, but had no doubt been strengthened by association with Sir Robert Peel, in whom, as in most of Peel's more eminent colleagues, a similar desire to get things done without regard to the effect on the doer largely prevailed. It did not strike Sidney Herbert as a virtue but as a matter of course, and it was with a shock of surprise that he heard an eminent Whig leader, his guest at Wilton, exclaim, when discussing some prospective political arrangements, "And, pray, what is to become of ME?" In relating this incident, Mr. Herbert used to say he was sure such a thought could never have even entered the head of Sir Robert Peel. It certainly would never have entered his own.

Unselfishness is naturally allied to benevolence, and the active benevolence of Sidney Herbert never flagged. He was a member of a remarkable private association, to which Mr. Gladstone and some other distinguished men also belonged, the members of which were bound to devote a substantial portion of their income to works of beneficence. No one but the treasurer knew what each gave, but the sum was in all cases considerable. But general charity of this nature did not content him. As Bishop Hamilton of Salisbury said, his was "not an universal benevolence towards the masses as masses, but a real trouble-taking sympathy with the individuals who made up the masses." One of his favourite charities was the education of sons of the widows of poor gentlemen. He maintained at one and the same time boys at Harrow, Marlborough, and Woolwich, another in training for an Australian career, and a fifth who was being educated for missionary work. And he expended much in sending poor clergymen and their families to the seaside for a month's holiday.

Charity towards the poor has never been wanting in England, but the struggles in life of those of the lower middle class have for obvious reasons received less notice. Their relief had no small share of Mr. Herbert's attention. Pecuniary aid was given so delicately as to remove the burden of obligation. A thousand little attentions in time of sickness or sorrow helped and cheered them. In all these works his wife was his active coadjutor, but she has told me that it was not till after his death that she was at all aware of their extent, and even then not fully, so unostentatiously and secretly were they performed. His liberality was matched by his personal self-denial. His own rooms at Wilton were the only apartments

in that stately home of a bare and severe, not to say shabby, character. He made no expensive purchases for his own gratification, and when in the later years of his life he was urged to buy a good hack or hunter, he would reply that he had so much to do for others that he could not afford it.

But a man may be courteous, unselfish, and generous, and yet lack cheerfulness and vigour. This was not the case with Sidney Herbert, whose wonderful buoyancy of spirit was one of his most remarkable characteristics. His sunny presence warmed and cheered all around him, and the charm of his conversation made him the light and centre of any company of which he formed a part. There are, however, many men who are brilliant and joyous in society, over whom a strange change comes when they cross their own threshold. Sidney Herbert was never more brilliant, never more charming, never more witty than when alone with his mother, his wife, his sisters, or his children.[1]

Nowhere was he seen to greater advantage than in his own home. He delighted in country life, and took a keen and almost boyish interest in its sports and pursuits, into the enjoyment of which he threw himself with a zest and fulness not common among busy men. His cheerful spirit enabled him to throw off all care and preoccupation, and devote himself fully and exclusively to any interest of the moment. A good shot, a bold rider, and an expert fisherman, he was welcomed by the country gentlemen as one of themselves, and to this he owed much of his great

[1] "None of us will ever forget the happy, joyous laugh, the droll way of putting things, the vivid descriptions of things or people, or places he had seen, and many a time I have seen his mother laughing, till she almost cried, at his stories, and often has she said to me as he left the room, 'Isn't he a pleasant boy?'"—*Note by Lady Herbert.*

popularity in his own county. But it was also due to the unfailing consideration shown by him to those of every class around him, and the sure trust in his responsive sympathy, which was felt by all, high and low alike, dwelling within many miles of Wilton. By all dependent on him, or in any way under his orders, he was adored, and well deserved to be so. The older servants were virtually members of his family, and he took much pains in seeing to their interests, and helping their children to start well in the world.[1]

When not engaged in Parliamenty duties, Sidney Herbert spent most of his time, whilst out of office, at Wilton, which his own charm, the beauty and ready sympathy of his accomplished wife, and the wit and wisdom of old Lady Pembroke, made one of the most delightful country houses in England, and a visit to it a bright memory not to be forgotten.

To this period of Sidney Herbert's life the Herbert Home at Charmouth owes its origin. He felt strongly the disadvantage at which the poor were placed in being compelled after illness, and perhaps after undergoing painful operations, to return in the earliest stage of convalescence, without rest or change, to their accustomed labour, the severity and fatigue of which often retarded, and sometimes prevented, a complete cure, such as might, under more favourable conditions, have been attained.

In 1850 he hired a cottage at Mudiford, where

[1] "Never did he come down to Wilton, if only for a few days, without going to see Sally Parham, an old housemaid, who had been sixty years in the family, and Larkum, an old carpenter of whom he was very fond, and who on his deathbed gave him the most beautiful and emphatic blessing I ever heard."—*Note by Lady Herbert.*

he sent scrofulous children to be treated with a remedy in use at the baths of Kreuznach. This mixture he imported in barrels from Germany. The experiment having proved successful, he took a large house at Charmouth, which he fitted up for the reception of patients, under the care of a German Protestant sisterhood. He also provided bathing-machines, and a donkey-cart in which to convey to the shore those who were well enough to bathe. The whole of the expenses of the establishment, (the use of which was limited to the inhabitants of the thirty-two villages on the Pembroke estates in Wiltshire, and other residents on the property), were defrayed by him. Cottage hospitals are now no rarity, but in 1848 they were almost, if not altogether, unknown.

After Lord Herbert's untimely death, the county of Wilts resolved to keep up this convalescent home as a memorial to him. It was removed from Charmouth to Bournemouth, and opened to general subscribers, a certain number of beds being devoted to patients from the Salisbury Infirmary. The house at Charmouth was then closed, and the management of the new institution made over to a committee, under whose management it has been ever since successfully conducted. The Herbert Home at Bournemouth receives thirty men and thirty women, under the care of a matron.

Sidney Herbert was also able during this period to devote much of his attention to the improvement of the estate in Ireland left to him by Lord Fitzwilliam. A considerable part of that estate, which is in the close neighbourhood of Dublin, had already, at the time of his accession to it, been built over, and many streets and roads had been constructed; but it was

found that, owing to the very limited powers conveyed under the will of Lord Fitzwilliam, it was impossible to give such leases, or renewals of leases, as would insure the maintenance and improvement of even existing buildings. Parliamentary powers were accordingly obtained, which enabled Mr. Herbert to grant renewals and reversionary leases of such a nature as the case required.

Mr. Herbert, although only a limited owner, devoted a large part of the income arising out of the estate to the improvement and development of the district. He laid out and constructed a number of roads, streets, and lanes, besides making a large outlay on the building of schools and churches, on the embankment of two rivers that run through the estate, and on tidal sluices and bridges as well as on the construction and maintenance of a sea wall along the strand, which made it possible to protect a large tract from the constant inroads of the sea. He also went to considerable expense in laying out ornamental plantations at different points. This great expenditure was not without its reward, for during the thirty years which elapsed between Sidney Herbert's majority and his death, the rent-roll of the estate nearly doubled itself.

Sidney Herbert had been brought up as a loyal son of the English Church, and ecclesiastical questions had at all times a strong interest for him. The old church of Wilton having fallen into decay, he determined, in 1840, to replace it by a new and more spacious one, on a different site. This he, with some assistance from his mother, accomplished at a very great cost; the contract price of the fabric alone being over £30,000, while the total amount expended on the building and its decoration more than doubled that

sum. The work was begun in March, 1841, and the church consecrated on October 9th, 1845. Its architects were Messrs. Wyatt and Brandon, but the design, even in minute details, was that of Herbert himself, and was adapted from that of the two churches at Toscanello. Other churches of similar character have since been erected, but Wilton Church was probably the first—certainly the first of any considerable pretension—built in England in the Lombardic style. Considering what the Gothic architecture of 1835-45 was like, it is fortunate that Sidney Herbert was not induced, as he so naturally might have been, to adopt that style for his building. The basilican form is well adapted for Anglican services, and at the same time lends itself to any amount of gorgeous internal decoration. The interior of Wilton Church is extremely stately, and though the general aspect of the exterior is, like that of all Byzantine churches, less pleasing to the eye, it possesses details of much beauty. On the completion of the work, Herbert was asked to inscribe his name, as founder, over the interior of the western entrance. He placed there instead the words, "Both riches and honour come of Thee, and of Thine own do we give unto Thee."

But it was not only with fabrics of stone and mortar that Sidney Herbert concerned himself: the reinvigoration of the Church and the strengthening of its existing institutions by the removal of abuses occupied no small share of his thoughts. Brought up from boyhood in the immediate vicinity of one of the most famous, and perhaps the most beautiful, of English cathedrals, he took the warmest interest in the welfare and reform of those great institutions, capable of accomplishing so much if effect be only given to their own statutes, and the work imposed by those

statutes on the Chapters be really done, but worse than useless if treated as sinecures, the existence of which needs to be apologised for, rather than as machines long disused, indeed, but intended to render, and capable of rendering, effective service to the Church. The former view, however, was that generally taken of them at the beginning of the late reign. The Capitular Revenues were generally regarded as an available treasure-store of ill-used wealth. To Sidney Herbert these venerable institutions appeared in quite another light. He saw with alarm that not only did the enemies of the Church find in the existing condition of the Cathedral bodies one of the most plausible grounds for their attacks, but that many, indeed most, of the warmest and most sincere friends of the Church, ignorant of the history and functions of the Chapters, were disposed to render them still more useless, and to cripple even further than had yet been done their powers of ever again rendering valuable service to the Church. In 1840 an Act was passed which, among other things, suppressed 81 Residentiary Canonries and 382 other prebendaries and canonries. This sweeping measure also fixed the hitherto largely fluctuating incomes of the Archbishops and Bishops, the surplus of which was vested in the Ecclesiastical Commission. Sidney Herbert would have greatly preferred the entire abolition of the Chapters to their being continued in an useless condition of semi-suspended animation.

Between 1840 and 1850 a good deal was said and written on the subject of an increase in the number of the parochial clergy, and various plans for effecting this object were suggested. In his eagerness to improve the condition of the parochial clergy and augment their number, Mr. Edward Horsman, then a great

Church reformer, proposed to raise the incomes of all the small benefices to £300 a year, and to effect this by cutting down all (or most) parochial endowments of greater amount, and by applying to the same purpose the whole surplus, both of the Episcopal and Capitular Funds, hitherto kept separate and distinct. Lord Ashley, Mr. Colquhoun, and others in 1848 submitted another scheme to Lord John Russell, involving the creation of ten new Bishoprics and many new parishes, and, in order to carry out that scheme, equally proposed to appropriate the whole of the existing surplus of the Episcopal and Capitular Funds, and not only this, but also such further amount as might be realised by the suppression of all Deaneries, and by making other reductions in the existing Cathedral establishments. Other plans were proposed in other quarters, and much as these different schemes might vary, and even conflict, they on the whole agreed in the view—one at that time largely entertained by the public—that the incomes enjoyed by the Capitular bodies were given for discharging no duties at all, and that, to quote the words of one Church reformer, "so far as regarded the interests of the Church, it might be better if these revenues were thrown into the sea." That opinion was by no means shared by Sidney Herbert. That they should be centres of religious life such as St. Paul's and the Cathedral of Southwark have now become, he can hardly have dared to hope; but he was keenly alive to the important service the Cathedrals might render to the Church if only they filled their true place in the general scheme of the Church's work.

Early in 1849 he took advantage of his comparative leisure to address a printed letter to his old friend and tutor, the Dean of Salisbury, in which his views

as to Cathedral reform were set forth earnestly and at length. In this letter, or rather pamphlet, which represents the views and wishes of a large number of the High Churchmen of the day, he suggested a plan for improving the efficiency of Cathedral institutions and enabling them to discharge the duties which they were originally intended to perform. He founded his plan of reform on the actually existing statutes given by Henry VIII. to the Cathedrals of what is known as the "New Foundation," for which he always expressed special admiration. These statutes enact that the Chapter shall, besides being a council for the assistance of the Bishop, provide for—

The maintenance of ecclesiastical learning—*i.e.* theology;
The pure administration of the sacraments and the maintenance of a model ritual, which should tend to preserve uniformity;
The maintenance of discipline and good morals by the example of the Chapter, and their association with the Bishop in the trial of offences against discipline;
The encouragement of general learning (*ut juventus in literis liberaliter instituatur*);
A due retreat for those in the sacred ministry who may be worn out by age or infirmity;
The exercise of a general charity (*et cœtera omnis generis pietatis officia illinc exuberanter in omnia vicina loca longe lateque dimanent*).

The whole of these objects are such as Sidney Herbert would have desired to accomplish; but he wisely says that it would be injudicious in the first instance to attempt too much. The time had perhaps not come to make the Chapter again the council of the Bishop—had certainly not come for the restoration of the original number of the Canons; but what was there to prevent the Chapter becoming again in many

respects what it was meant to be? The key-note of his appeal is struck in the following passage, which insists with much force on the essential difference between the wants which parochial and Capitular institutions were respectively intended to supply:

"The object of the parochial system is the concentration of the attention of individual men on specific small localities. The object of the Cathedral system is to counterbalance and correct the evils of these multiplied isolations, by erecting a body whose attention, authority, and labour shall be diffused over the whole. The parish of the Cathedral is not the Close, but the Diocese.

"The late so-called reforms in the Cathedral establishments entirely lost sight of these objects, and by confounding their duties with parochial duties, have created non-residence and plurality—the very abuses they wished to suppress—and have deprived the parochial system, which they wished to strengthen, of the support which it was the original object of the cathedral to afford. A non-resident Canon, if he has duties, is as great an evil as a non-resident Rector, and if he has not duties he is an indefensible sinecurist. The Act of 1840 was drawn by persons who either ignored the fact of there being special duties to be performed by Cathedral bodies or were quite insensible to their value and importance if performed. They found these bodies in an inert state, and their duties in abeyance. They should either have insisted on the duty being performed, or they should have abolished the office. They did neither; they accepted the non-performance of the duties, recognised and established the neglect, and merely reduced the numbers and the income. But a non-performance of duty is as much overpaid by £500 as by £800 a year, and the Cathedrals which before were accidentally useless by lapse and neglect are now made necessarily useless by law. The Chapters cannot be maintained in a state so anomalous and so discreditable, and they will fall just when their labours are most required, and, if properly enforced, would be of the greatest benefit."

Of the use which the Chapter might be as councillors and assessors to the Bishop he thus wrote:

"It is not that the Bishop is mistrusted as such. It is a matter of habit which makes us prefer the verdict of a jury to the decision of a Judge, who is more learned, more competent, and, in ninety-nine cases out of one hundred, more unbiassed than any jury can be. Right or wrong is a fact; and it is a question whether it might not be advantageous, not as a safeguard against caprice or tyranny, but as a support and protection to the Bishop, that his judgment should be assisted and his verdict fortified by the concurrence of a council. The restoration, therefore, of this part of the duties of a Cathedral body might possibly be an important assistance to the order and discipline of the Church. It might likewise tend to reunite the Chapter and the Episcopate, which have hitherto been, each for their own safety, too much dissevered. The Chapter, divorced from the Episcopate, has maintained a sort of sulky independence; and, having lost their legitimate influence, often resisted and repelled the interference of the Bishop. Whereas they should be the staff of the Bishop, acting under his orders, and carrying out his views for the benefit of the diocese."

But this conciliar function he did not propose at the moment to restore, though regarding it as highly useful. Nor did he propose to restore the original number of Canonries. What he did propose was:

To relieve the parochial clergy, already overtasked by the labours of their cures, from the labour of keeping the accounts, drawing up the reports, and collecting subscriptions for the various general or diocesan charities;

To resuscitate the Cathedral School;

To appropriate a Canonry to the Inspectorship of schools and other institutions of the like character;

To put sisterhoods, penitentiaries, etc., under the control of the Chapter;

To attach Divinity Colleges like those at Wells and Chichester to all the Cathedrals;

To establish a lay College affiliated to one of the Universities, to maintain a limited number of students for Holy Orders at the expense of the Chapter, and, finally, to enforce residence.

Each of these propositions he supports by argument. He urges that half the inutility of our present Chapters proceeds from non-residence.

"Zealous and active parish priests promoted to a canonry come up to their residences only too anxious to devote their three months' leisure to some good work or another, and find all their offers rejected. They find that they can only interfere with, not discharge, any man's business. At the end of three months' residence they must withdraw from whatever they have undertaken. By the time they have learned their business they must give it up; by the time some one else has forgotten his he must recommence it. Their assistance, not being permanent or continuous, is valueless; and with every disposition to work, the members of the Chapter are forced into a state of unsettled idleness. They saunter about their Cathedral Closes, a spectacle which delights the eyes of every enemy to the Church, and affords a point and an epigram for every attack on her discipline. Their cure of souls in the meanwhile, where they *have* duties, and important ones, is left to a curate, equally unsettled from the shortness of *his* residence."

The objection to the creation of his proposed lay colleges, raised on the ground that the funds of the Church would thus be devoted to general education, was met by remarking that education of the laity as well as clergy was one of the objects of a Cathedral foundation, and that therefore the objection, although good as regards funds intended for episcopal and parochial purposes, did not apply to the revenues of a Chapter. That there were practical difficulties in

the way, arising from the jealousy of the Universities and other causes, he readily admitted, but he did not regard them as insuperable. The real question that the Church had to decide was "whether or not her Cathedrals and Chapters are worth retaining. If they are to be retained, they must be made defensible —that is, efficient. You cannot have efficiency without some cost."

He further urged that (to facilitate the creation of additional Bishoprics) a general Act should be passed empowering the Queen in Council to erect a new see whenever it should be certified to her that a certain sum had been placed by voluntary offerings in the hands of the Ecclesiastical Commissioners for the purpose of its endowment. This has since been done.

When Parliament met, he had more than one opportunity of enforcing there the doctrines he had enunciated in his pamphlet. On March 1st, 1850, in voting against a proposal made by Mr. Hume for a suppression of Canonries, on the ground that they were pluralities, he said that he must not be supposed to range himself on the side of pluralities; he hoped to see the time when they would be entirely unknown in the country, and the establishments again made applicable to the uses for which they were intended.

In the course of the summer Lord John Russell, on behalf of the Government, introduced a Bill to make considerable changes in the functions and procedure of the Ecclesiastical Commission. It was introduced at so late a period of the Session as to have no chance of passing that year, and was brought forward rather with a view of being considered and discussed than with any intention to secure its immediate adoption.

This Bill contained the provision, so much deprecated by Mr. Herbert, for throwing together the Episcopal, Capitular, and Parochial Funds.

In the following Session, on April 29th, Sidney Herbert, while discussing one of the annual Church reform motions of Mr. Horsman, asked—

"members who differ from the Church not to carry their hostility into legislation. He differed from those who thought the Church held its property by titles similar to those by which individuals held theirs, but equally differed from those who maintained that the incomes of dignitaries and parish clergymen were held as if they were so many annual payments voted by Parliament. It would be an act of insanity to take any step having a tendency to sacrifice establishments of which they would soon feel the want."

When, somewhat later in the Session, the Government re-introduced their Bill to abolish the distinction between the separate funds at the disposal of the Ecclesiastical Commission, he argued strongly against their amalgamation, urging that £3,000 would often be better spent on the division of an unwieldy diocese than on the maintenance of thirty additional curates.

In Committee he proposed (on July 15th, 1850) clauses which substantially embodied the main features of his pamphlet. They provided for eight months' yearly residence on the part of the Cathedral body, prohibited their holding any other preferment except in the Cathedral City itself, and empowered the Visitor to prepare schemes for a better distribution of the duties of the Chapter, the better celebration of Divine worship, the better visitation and inspection of the diocese, the better management of the Grammar School and training school, the better training of candidates for Holy Orders, and the better education of youth within

the diocese. On the first of these provisions he especially insisted; and when Sir George Grey urged that if the Canons were compelled to reside, there must be an increase in their pay, which could only be provided by a further diminution of their number, he had no difficulty in retorting that what he insisted on was not that the Canons should have more pay, but that they should be bound to do some work for the pay they already received. The first of the proposed clauses was only lost by 20 votes, the numbers being 84 for and 104 against it. As this division, however, indicated the nature of those which would follow, Mr. Herbert withdrew the remaining clauses standing in his name. Some of the reforms then unsuccessfully advocated by Mr. Herbert have been since accomplished by subsequent legislation, but much mischief would have been prevented by their adoption at an earlier date, and by the sanction of those among his proposals which are still unadopted.

Shortly before the fall of Lord Derby's Government in 1852 it was determined to appoint a Royal Commission to inquire into the condition of the Cathedral establishments and the means of rendering them additionally useful. Of this Commission Sidney Herbert was requested by Mr. Walpole, then Home Secretary, to become a member. Mr. Herbert consulted Mr. Gladstone, whose opinion was, on the whole, rather in favour of his doing so, but after full consideration he resolved to decline the offer. He did so in a letter to Mr. Walpole, saying that he was publicly pledged to certain principles of capitular reform; that he had spoken and written in the sense of those principles, and that subsequent reflection had strengthened his conviction of their soundness. But he feared a

majority of the Commissioners, whose names had been mentioned to him, would think his views went much too far, and he therefore preferred to remain at liberty to press his own opinions where he thought he had a better chance of obtaining assent to them.

To Mr. Gladstone he had written that he was "perplexed on the subject." He did not think the Crown had any visitorial power over cathedrals, except, perhaps, in some isolated cases. On the other hand, he continued,

"the visitorial power residing in the hands of the Bishop is a dead letter, or has, at any rate, been long and notoriously dormant. The Church has no means of enforcing on the Bishop the execution of his duties as Visitor, and if the Visitor were to try to enforce on a Chapter the execution of their duties, I suppose he would find himself without much practical power."

Nor did the composition of the proposed Commission please him, and he commented unfavourably on the names of the proposed members. On the other hand, he admitted that it was probably "the last chance for the Chapters. One must work with such tools as one has, and so long as Convocation does not sit, there must necessarily be Church legislation in Parliament alone." He thought the Government should have proposed legislation rather than inquiry; there were no new facts to be got. Mr. Herbert's refusal proved fatal to the scheme, and the Commission was never issued.

Another enterprise also occupied much of Sidney Herbert's attention during the time that he remained out of office. It was in the latter part of the year 1849 that he started an association to promote assisted female emigration. The *Morning Chronicle*, which was at that time a newspaper of a very high class, and

the recognised organ of the Peelite party, had, during the year, contained a series of remarkable articles on the state of the labouring classes in England. On December 5th, 1849, Sidney Herbert addressed to the editor of that paper a letter, from which the following extracts are taken:

"The public have read with painful interest the able reports of your correspondents on the state of the labouring classes in England. That these disclosures of the sufferings of the poor have excited a general and sincere sympathy is proved by the many and liberal contributions which are daily forwarded to your office for the relief of the most suffering of these classes—namely, the needle-women. I rejoice at this evidence of a Christian spirit. It emboldens me to lay shortly before your readers some suggestions which, I trust, they may think not unworthy of their consideration.

"Let me begin, then, with the class which has an undisputable right to priority—the needle-workers. Theirs is the most helpless sex, the most intense poverty, the most fearful degradation.

"I rejoice that the ready sympathy of your readers has sent alms to these poor creatures—that is, to those few out of the 33,500 who had the fortune to come under the observation of your correspondent. There will be a week's food for the children of one; there will be clothes got out of pawn for another; till, in a few weeks, the alms will be exhausted—the subject, by all but a few, forgotten—and the same dreary monotony of starvation will again be their lot. Cannot these alms be so applied that permanent good may be effected? Instead of palliating the symptoms, might we not trace the causes of the malady, and make a vigorous attempt to repress or diminish them?

"But in no trade does the competition of labour with labour exist to the same extent as in all kinds of apparel making; and for this reason, the labour is principally done by women. But the number of women in Great Britain greatly exceeds the number of men. In 1821 the females outnumbered the males, in round numbers,

by 117,000; in 1831, by 213,000; in 1841, by 320,000; and at this moment, so great has been the male emigration in the last nine years, that there cannot be less than half a million more females than males in Great Britain. Now, women have far fewer trades in which they can engage than men. Their choice is very limited, and as their field of employment is narrower, so is it, proportionably, far more crowded. This needleworking, which is one of the largest, is the most overcrowded of all trades; in none, consequently, has the reduction in the price of labour and the cost of the article produced been so great.

"Social evils are neither to be cured by Act of Parliament, nor by attempting to contravene the laws of nature.

"That this plethora of capital and population must have room found for them elsewhere is no new doctrine, nor do many now dispute it. But I have shown that there are peculiar circumstances affecting the female labour market, which entitle it to a priority of relief. Leave this crowd of women here, and they will destroy one another—more and more poverty, more and more infamy—body and soul both destroyed. Why not give them the means of escape? In the southern hemisphere is a vast continent, which is as much a part of the British Empire as Wales. It has been peopled partly by force, partly by voluntary emigration. In the first case, the disproportion of the sexes (the reverse, of course, of that which we see in England) is enormous. Philanthropists have been shocked at the results upon society there. But even in the case of voluntary emigration, the greater hardihood and spirit of adventure of the male sex have naturally brought out a greater number of male emigrants. In 1847 there were in South Australia only 13,622 females, to 17,531 males, including children; the disproportion among adults being, of course, greater. In New South Wales, in 1847, of the adult population 83,572 were males, and only 41,809 were females.

"A redress of this inequality is the crying want of society there, just as the redress of the opposite inequality in this country is the necessity here. Any woman so emigrating is a woman saved; and further, if any numbers go out, the status of the remainder

is bettered; the competition is diminished, and wages *pro tanto* improved.

"The emigration of a few is a certain and positive benefit to those few; but unless we enable large numbers to go, we can effect no sensible or permanent improvement in the situation of those who remain. What we do must be done on a large scale. For this a vast fund will be required; but I have no doubt that in this country, abounding in wealth, abounding also, I trust, in self-denying and Christian spirit, such a fund can and will be raised.

"In the selection of emigrants, one condition must never be lost sight of. None but women of good character must be assisted to go. There must be no taint or discredit upon them to mar their prospects when they arrive at their new home.

"These, then, are my proposals:

"That a fund be forthwith raised to assist distressed females to emigrate;

"That this fund be administered by a committee, with the assistance of the local clergy and the religious societies in the districts;

"That measures be taken in the colonies to insure protection and guidance to the emigrants on their arrival.

"This is the outline of a plan by which, as it appears to me, permanent good can be effected. There are many details upon which I do not touch."

A few days later he wrote thus to Mr. Gladstone in explanation of his scheme:

"WILTON, *December 18th*, 1849.

"I came down from town last night, intending to write to you to-day on two subjects, one being the Rajah Brooke's late campaign in Borneo, the other the Female Emigration scheme.

"I purposely abstained from asking you to join in the latter because, having been formerly Secretary of State for the Colonies, and there being a probability of your again some day occupying that post, I thought it unfair to ask of you what I think it would be prudent in your case to refuse. The less you are personally hampered the better, on Colonial subjects, and especially on the question of Emigration, which

is every day assuming a larger importance; but I knew that you would take a lively interest in what we are doing, and would be glad to have an account of it from me.

"The difficulties, as you truly say, are enormous. I have some difficulty in restraining the clerical members of the Committee, who are impatient, not unnaturally, to send off at once some of these poor creatures who are exposed to so much want and temptation at home. I have, I hope, succeeded in convincing them that till we have the means of receiving and disposing of them, we had best not send out any. We must feel our way and act with great caution. The character of the emigration will be judged in the Colony from the first sample, and they must be most carefully selected.

"I believe that we can get excellent emigrants from among the needle-women. They are not a separate class who can do that and nothing else, but rather they are young women of all classes who have been driven to live on that occupation exclusively as a last resource. They are industrious generally, and are used more or less to domestic service, and a little training before they go will do much for them. We intend sending out a small but well selected number next month, who will go with families who are themselves respectable and will undertake their care, messing and berthing with them. We do not preclude ourselves from taking male emigrants when the presence of the male would keep up the family tie—a husband, a brother, or a father, for example. I think the preservation of the family tie of the first importance. But many of these young women have no such ties, and we must place them under the care of respectable families going out. The more we can disperse them in the passage the better. I am against taking up ships and filling them with this one class of emigrants alone.

"The great difficulty of all is the religious difficulty, and that is to a great degree insurmountable. If there was any attempt to make this a *church* emigration, half of our committee would resist; but they do not object to our giving facilities to others to supply the want. Mr. Ernest Hawkins offers us the assistance of the Society, and we shall allot berths

for schoolmasters, and in some cases possibly for chaplains, but I do not think that we should be able to do more than give them the free passage.

"We have the means of sending a few to Adelaide shortly, Mrs. Chisholm having offered us the use of the 'Home' for female emigrants which she maintains there. I hope we shall be able to advance money, principally as loans. I find that where the system has been tried, the success has been great. Here, if you lend a poor man five pounds you never see it again, because the poor man in nine cases out of ten never betters his condition. In the colonies, on the contrary, he has large wages, and he does not spend in food, for rations are provided for him, and there are not many things to purchase in the bush. There is a great anxiety also to repay passage money, as a free or assisted passage implies pauperism, and they are anxious to be rid of that discredit. Lastly, there are the better feelings of human nature which prompt men to honourable conduct, especially when it is not difficult. If this succeeds in our case as it has succeeded on a small scale done by individuals, our money will return, or at any rate a certain portion of it, and will be again available for the same purpose.

"We are doing very well as yet as to funds. Lord Westminster has given us £500; the London bankers, some £200, some £100. We had about £4,000 yesterday, after two days' advertisement. Jones Loyd, to my surprise, seems to take a great interest in it, and when he cannot come to the committee sends Count Strzelecki to ascertain what is doing. The Protectionist arguments against the plan you will have seen stated. They are easily disposed of. The most common objection, however, is the smallness of the effect we can possibly produce. But because we cannot do everything, are we to do nothing? If, again, we can dig a channel, the water will flow through it ultimately without help of ours. We may be pioneers for public opinion and ultimately for Government assistance. But if we wait till Government take it up, how many women will be lost in the interval? We must do good, possibly much good. The case is of a nature in which harm can scarcely be done. All the change for these poor women must be for the better both physically and morally. . . .

Would your father, do you think, contribute to our emigration fund?"

"WILTON, *Christmas Day*, 1849.

". . . I have seen Elliott's[1] minute and have communicated with Murdoch.[1] They will take a small number of our emigrants in each of their ships. I trust that we may by this system of infusion avoid so far as is possible the evils which are to be dreaded in our case. I hope, too, that in a great number of cases women will be going out with their families. The Emigration Commissioners will give us further the full use of their machinery at Sydney and Melbourne for housing the emigrants, passing them up the country and getting them places. Merewether, at Sydney, is very highly spoken of. He is an excellent clergyman, and Mr. Cook, attached to the emigrant barracks there, and another is going to be immediately appointed at Melbourne. They are paid fully by the Colonial Government and the S.P.G. I have also seen Ernest Hawkins, who will give us all the help he can by sending out chaplains and schoolmasters in the ships in which our emigrants are embarked."

Mr. Gladstone's answers have, unfortunately, not been preserved. From him, and from many other friends, Mr. and Mrs. Herbert received generous help and warm sympathy. The scheme was not, however, regarded with unmixed approval, and more than one public man who professed a general agreement with the object in view, expressed doubts as to the judiciousness of the proposed method of effecting it. Sir Robert Peel, in reply to a request for support, declined to give it, on the grounds that any scheme of assisted emigration should be undertaken by the Government, or not at all; that there was no proof of the alleged excess of females in England or paucity of them in the Colonies; and that in the class it was especially designed to assist

[1] The Emigration Commissioners.

desirable emigrants would not be found. Mr. Herbert replied:

"WILTON, *December 9th*, 1849.

"I quite feel the force of the objections you make to the action of a private society on such a question as emigration, and it was necessary to take them into consideration before engaging in the task I have undertaken. But I do not see the least probability of the Government undertaking it, and it is only in their absence from the field that a private society can step in.

"The annual emigration from this country is now enormous, being far greater, I believe, than any that the Government could have effected. Lord Grey rests their non-interference upon the ground that Government interference would stop all voluntary action without being able to produce the same results. So far as the disparity of the sexes is concerned, we have it as an ascertained fact so far back as 1841 in the Mother Country, and 1817 in the Colony. My suggestion that the excess in this country amounts to 560,000 professes only to be guess. If the increase of females over males has continued since 1841 at the same ratio as before, it is about the mark; but what with greatly increased emigration, the vast amount of transportation when Graham was in office, the large army maintained in foreign and unhealthy climates, the cholera, which the Board of Health asserts to have been more fatal to males than females, it is possible that my estimate may be under the truth. The emigration agents from the respective Colonies, and the reports from their Governments, concur as to the desirableness of a larger proportion of females coming out. Spontaneous emigration takes out the male in an undue proportion. Governments cannot and will not interfere at all. A private society cannot do all nor a tithe of what is necessary, but it can do something, and pave the way for more if they show the feasibility of any plans.

"There are at present above 400 persons per annum going out on loans advanced for their passage, and which they subsequently repay by instalments. The defaulters are not 20 per cent., and this without an organised machinery to receive the repayments.

This is being done by Mrs. Chisholm, who has an establishment at Adelaide, and correspondents at Sydney and other ports, and who is willing to go over and organise all that is necessary on the other side of the water.

"I trouble you with all this, not to induce you to change your decision as to assisting in forming the committee, but to explain what my hopes are founded upon. It would be absurd to say that I expect to remedy the great evils which we have to contend with, but I think we may do a good deal, and show the way to a great deal more. We have had great encouragement to proceed, and warm and general offers of support, the Bishop of London, Lords Carlisle, Ellesmere, and Harrowby, Jones Loyd, the Member for London, Mr. Walter, and Mr. Glyn among others. I do not think G. F. Young's attempt to get up a Protectionist movement against it will have much effect."

Sir Robert rejoined:

"I wish your Emigration Committee may have an easier task than our Exposition Commission is likely to have. The amount of your contribution is a gratifying mark of respect for you, and confidence in your judgment and advice. I fairly own to you that subsequent reflection has not abated my misgivings as to the ultimate effect of your plan on the condition of the class which it is most kindly and benevolently intended to benefit.

"I should doubt whether the fittest subjects for emigration—the women best qualified to be useful in a colony, and, therefore, most likely to provide for their own comfortable maintenance—will be found among the needle-women of the metropolis, and I fear the consequences of the additional stimulus to the seeking of employment in London, and, therefore, to the overstocking of the labour market, which vague aspirations after the lot of an emigrant, as a last or perhaps as a first resource, may administer. You have, however, the aid of some good and prudent men on your committee."

This was very cold comfort, but Mr. Disraeli,

writing to Lord Malmesbury, expressed himself much more cynically: "Sidney Herbert," he wrote, "is in a pretty scrape; 35,000 needle-women to be deported at £15 a-piece (his own estimate) would take upwards of £600,000. He should have subscribed at least one year's income as an example, and if he succeeds in his object, which is impossible, he will do no good." How far the Association was from "doing no good" during the time of its existence may be gathered from the letters of those sent out by it, and in which the benefits they have received are recorded. It would be useless to quote them here, for their value greatly depends on their mass and number. Not in Australia only, though that was the main field of operations, but at the Cape of Good Hope, and in Canada also, hundreds of young women who would have dragged out a miserable and squalid, if not vicious, existence at home, found a happy, useful, and prosperous life opened to them. Surely this was something to have done, even if theoretical problems as to the best possible scheme of emigration were not thoroughly solved.

Mr. Herbert was not himself content with founding a committee and subscribing largely to its funds. He and Mrs. Herbert personally superintended every detail connected with the selection and embarkation of the emigrants, and were always present when the vessels sailed. On these occasions he read aloud a letter of friendly counsel, of which a copy was given to every girl on board. In it the need for gentleness and forbearance towards one another on the voyage, and patience and industry after landing, were inculcated in a few simple and manly sentences, and the hope expressed that, should they obtain comfortable situations, they would not forget to show

their gratitude to God by sending home such offerings as they could save from their wages to the Female Emigration Fund to assist the passage of others.

The first ship chartered by the Association left the Thames on February 25th, 1850, and nineteen others were despatched between that date and January 13th, 1852, carrying in all about 700 young women and girls. From after the latter date I have been unable to trace in detail the working of the Association, nor can Lady Herbert assist me in this respect. No reports seem to have been issued by the Association, except the first in 1851; but I know that until the resumption of office by Mr. Herbert, in December, 1852, and indeed for some months longer, he and Mrs. Herbert personally carried on the work. I am disposed to believe that the Association became ultimately merged in the Family Colonisation Loan Society, founded by Mrs. Chisholm.

But it is time to turn to the more strictly political career of Sidney Herbert.

The position of Sir Robert Peel and his followers during the four years which elapsed between his resignation and his death was one almost, if not altogether, unprecedented. It was one of great power and influence, unattended by any corresponding official responsibility. This is a situation of great temptation, and it is perhaps the most striking merit of the Peelite party and their leader that to these temptations they never yielded. They gave to the existing Ministry, which could not have continued to exist without them, a sincere support—not an ostentatious protection—a support not partisan, but which, as it was given without the exaction or acceptance of any reward, equally reserved the right to criticise and condemn what those who gave it did not approve.

It was inevitable that the principles on which the leaders of the Peelites acted should conduct them further on the Liberal road than they possibly at first either intended or perhaps desired. Of their followers there were two classes. The first consisted of those who had adopted the free trade measures of 1846 with reluctance and under the pressure of a temporary necessity, which they admitted to be inevitable, but who had no belief in the principles on which the measures themselves which they had sanctioned were founded. The second class were those who had become thorough converts to the principle of free trade as in itself desirable. To these latter belonged Sidney Herbert, and he readily assented to the measures which, with the support of Sir Robert Peel, the Whig Government was enabled to carry between 1846 and 1850. First in importance among these came the repeal of the Navigation Laws, to the suspension of which I have already adverted—a step of great hardihood, involving as it did a complete reversal of the traditional policy of the nation. But into none of Sir Robert Peel's measures did he enter with more ardour than the proposal, made in 1849, for dealing with Irish encumbered estates. The course of that Bill through Parliament was at once a striking testimony to Sir Robert Peel's wisdom, and to his power.

In one measure alone, Sidney Herbert, though he adopted the same course as Sir Robert Peel, felt himself unable to adopt the argument by which Sir Robert Peel had justified his action. When, in 1849, Sir Robert Peel supported the removal of Jewish disabilities, it must be confessed that, however right in act, the reasons given by him for his vote were hardly such as would, if they stood alone, justify it. He argued that the disability was of the nature of

a punishment, and that we had no right to inflict punishment on religious grounds, whilst at the same time he maintained in the strongest terms that legislation should be Christian, and marked with distinctively Christian features. It is difficult to reconcile these two positions, or not to think with Sidney Herbert that if legislation is "not to be indifferent" to the preservation of its Christian character, it had better remain in Christian hands. Though himself an advocate for the removal of the disabilities attaching to the Jewish members of the community, it was on different grounds from those just stated that SidneyHerbert voted in favour of Jewish Emancipation.

The educational policy of Lord John Russell in 1847—that of aiding all denominational schools according to the educational results obtained by them—met with Herbert's hearty support. In a speech made on April 26th in that year, he said that he was distinctly of opinion that if the system of education which had existed during the last few years was to be disturbed, it would be right to extend to all classes of Nonconforming Christians the benefit of the grant applied for on behalf of Roman Catholics. But disturbed it must be, owing to the growing wants of the population, and the concurrence of the whole House in the propriety of extending education beyond the wants met by the compromise of 1839.

On September 21st, 1848, Lord George Bentinck died suddenly. With his death there seemed a prospect that the bitter hostility of a large portion of the old Conservative party towards the Peelites might be appeased, and for some time it appeared not improbable that they might gradually re-unite. It is possible that, but for the ferment raised two

years later by what was known as the Papal Aggression Question, they would have done so. That, however, is a topic which will be touched on later.

But while the Peelites on all domestic questions gave their support to the Government, and cordially assisted it in cautious and temperate steps of reform, they were unable to extend the same support to its foreign policy. The "spirited" policy of Lord Palmerston, however well calculated to gain popularity among the ignorant, and evoke cheers from the irresponsible, produced a very different effect among those who really understood its character and effects. That to bully those whom it was safe to bully, and to irritate by taunts, criticism, and meddling those with whom it was not safe openly to quarrel, was a course which did not really redound to the honour or glory of the nation, whilst it was certain to cause the utmost ill-will and coldness on the part of those whom we had cautiously refrained from giving any right of actual quarrel, required no elaborate exposition. It was as manifest to the Cabinet as to the leaders of the Opposition, and Lord John Russell had determined to remove Lord Palmerston from the Foreign Office after the end of the session of 1850. This was, of course, unknown to Sir Robert Peel and Lord Aberdeen, and, being unknown to them, they felt that they had no option but to support the Resolution brought forward by Lord Stanley in the House of Lords condemnatory of Lord Palmerston's action in respect of certain demands made on the Government of Greece. This was doubly unfortunate, for, on the one hand, it prolonged Lord Palmerston's tenure of the Foreign Office for another year, and, on the other, it prevented those offers

being made by Lord John, and that junction between the Peelites and the Liberals effected, which would otherwise have all but certainly come about.

But though it was only with great reluctance that he took this step, Sir Robert Peel had no doubt or hesitation as to its necessity. Lord Stanley's Resolution was carried by a large majority in the House of Lords, but a counter-resolution affirming the confidence of the House of Commons in Lord Palmerston's policy was immediately brought forward by Mr. Roebuck. It was debated with great vigour for four nights, and in its course Lord Palmerston achieved a remarkable oratorical triumph, speaking for four hours. On the same occasion, Sir Robert Peel made what proved to be his last speech. On the third night of the debate, Sidney Herbert delivered one of his best speeches. He made game of Mr. Adair, who had preceded him, touched lightly on the Greek question—dealt equally shortly with our policy in Spain, and the expulsion from that country of Mr. Bulwer; but devoted the greater part of his speech to Italy, exposing with merciless severity the chicanery of Lord Palmerston's treatment of Austria, and the folly and disastrous effect of Lord Minto's mission. The effect of our action was that of "leaving France and Russia—the close amity between which I hold to be fatal to our interests—in a state of close political proximity, which cannot fail to be dangerous to the peace and liberty of Europe." He asked the House to look at those countries in which the noble Lord had not interfered —at Prussia, now free; at Austria, now attempting to consolidate constitutional institutions—and then compare their condition with the condition of those countries which Lord Palmerston had "cursed with his assistance."

"Do you approve of the condition of Sicily? Do you approve of the condition of Rome, which, having achieved its freedom, is now bound down under the yoke of an ignorant and fanatical priesthood? I wish you joy of these conquests of freedom in the countries you have taken under your protection. It is true men must not be always judged by the results of their labours, but constant failure cannot, surely, be a test of merit. There is not one country with which we are at the present moment on terms of kind and constant friendship." He ended thus: "I say that, looking at the state of Europe and recollecting the mode in which these different negotiations have been carried on, bearing in mind how the people of other countries have been flattered by supposing that the success of their cause was guaranteed by the British name, considering the manner in which these people were first encouraged and afterwards betrayed, how, while success appeared probable, they were harcked on, and when failure was certain, they were deserted, I do charge the present unparalleled condition of this country in relation to other states on the Minister of Foreign Affairs of this country. I ask you therefore, as members of a constitutional Government, and as members representing British feeling, to mark with your reprobation that policy which, not only by its sentiments and its objects, but also by its tone, has tended to lower the public character of this country, and to produce alienation from and an aversion to the British people and the British name."

This speech was made after conference with Lord Aberdeen, whose views it embodied. The Government triumphed by a narrow majority.

A few hours afterwards Sir Robert Peel was thrown from his horse, while riding quietly up Constitution Hill. His extraordinary sensitiveness to pain made it impossible to persevere in the treatment necessary to repair the injury done—an adherence to which might, and probably would, have saved his life—and in three days he expired. So long as Sir Robert Peel lived, a combination between his followers and

those of Lord John Russell was impossible. Neither leader could have served either under or with the other. But, considering the attitude of the Peelites in the House of Commons, it would only have been natural that, on Sir Robert Peel's death, Lord John should have sought their co-operation, and that it should have been given. But this in the actual circumstances had become impracticable. After the Pacifico debate, the leading Peelites could not have entered into a Cabinet containing Lord Palmerston, while the very same debate had rendered it equally impossible for Lord John to persist in his intention of disembarrassing himself of his unwelcome colleague.

In these circumstances it is not impossible that the common action they had taken against Lord Palmerston might, in the event of a frank renunciation of Protection by the Conservatives, have led to a renewal of concert between them and the Peelites, and possibly to a closer union. This, however, the events of the autumn put equally out of the question, as will be shown in the next chapter.

The death of Sir Robert Peel was to Sidney Herbert not only the loss of a political chief but the close of a lifelong intimacy, commenced in infancy and continued with close familiarity in domestic intercourse.

A great change has taken place in the last fifty years in the relations of a leader with the members of a Cabinet, and in the relations of the members of a Cabinet towards one another. The close personal intimacy on equal terms which used to exist as a matter of course between members of a Cabinet, who all habitually lived in the same society, has given place to a mere business connection like that which unites the members of a Board of Directors,

who, though meeting together for the transaction of business, may know little or nothing of each other in private life. The change has, among other things, been marked by the discontinuance of the weekly dinners, at which each member of the Cabinet used in turn to entertain his colleagues, and at which much business was settled in an easy and informal way. Every Cabinet now probably contains members in whose houses the Prime Minister and his chief colleagues have never set foot.

The death of Sir Robert Peel was not the only sorrow which Sidney Herbert had to experience in the year 1850. Francis Lear, Dean of Salisbury, who had been his tutor, and to whom he was deeply attached, died in the spring of that year after a very long and painful illness. Of this event, Sidney Herbert, then in Ireland, wrote thus to his wife:

"ABBEYLEIX, *March 31st.*

"The letters from Salisbury were most welcome to me, giving as they do so comforting an account of poor Mrs. Lear. I am writing to her to-day. These losses of dear friends are sent us to sever the ties which bind us to this world, but they are very sad, and one feels that every year one grows older exposes us to fresh sorrow from this source. Now, with the exception of George Moberly, all those with whom I was placed as a boy are gone. Batten at Harrow, Froude at Oxford, George Majendie, and now the one I had known the longest and loved the best. I am so thankful that we were enabled to see so much of him, and to help to cheer him in his sufferings these last three years. He himself is gone to his rest, and is spared from seeing much which I fear is coming on, which would grievously have distressed him; but we have lost a trusted counsellor of sound and unbiassed judgment, singularly just and unprejudiced, and whose opinion and advice would have been invaluable in the crisis which seems to be coming. We all stayed for the Sacrament here to-day."

The "crisis" referred to was that created by the judgment of the Privy Council in the case of the Rev. C. Gorham, who had brought a suit against the Bishop of Exeter for having refused to induct him to a living, on the ground of heterodoxy in the views held by him as to infant baptism.

Sidney Herbert shared the views of those who strongly disapproved of this judgment, and feared its effects; but he was not disposed to go to the lengths in opposition to it which Mr. Gladstone contemplated, and when the latter wrote to him on March 19th, 1850, that "it would be a great consolation if you found yourself at liberty to give the weight of your name to the address to the Bishop of London or any similar document," he declined to do so. Mr. Gladstone was greatly disappointed, and replied:

"Surely secession is a terrible event; but (1) if nothing be done, it is absolutely certain. (2) If it take place with nothing done, it will be the very worst kind of secession (as I think)—viz. in the main a despairing self-abandonment to the Church of Rome, which will certainly destroy the Church of England by leaving it a prey to further innovations; but on the other hand, the secession of the non-Jurors, though bad on its own ground, yet saved the Church of England at the epoch of the Revolution. (3) The specific object of the address is to promote such measures as may avert disruption, and to promote them with a force of course proportioned to the adhesions. The persons who have realised most to themselves the alternatives that would drive them from the Church of England have been the two or perhaps three most reluctant to subscribe."

But he did not succeed in procuring Sidney Herbert's signature.

Sidney Herbert brought back with him from Ireland a melancholy impression of the state of affairs

there. Shortly after his return he wrote to Mr. Gladstone:

"You are in the only flourishing country[1] just now. I was in Ireland the week before last, and found every one disheartened at seeing all the old sores breaking out again, with the new evils of famine and poor law superadded. Here[2] the farmers, partly out of panic and partly out of spite, are reducing their wages to an amount, *6s.* or *7s.* a week, on which no Christian can live, though they have a fair price for barley, a good price for wool, and above an average crop of wheat very cheaply got in, so that they are not getting less per acre for their wheat than what they had before, and their rents have been reduced very generally, on this estate 15 per cent., and a corn rent, taken on wheat, barley, and mutton, established for the future, with the offer of leases for those who wish to have them. We shall have a bad winter to get through, and I greatly fear incendiary fires.

"Palmerston has sent the editor of the *Morning Post* (!) a Mr. Mitchell, consul to St. Petersburg. It is said he was in possession of *inconvenient information.* . . . Who is the new Bishop? I look with fear and trembling to another appointment to press heterodox opinions on the Church."

[1] *i.e.* Scotland. [2] *i.e.* in Wiltshire.

CHAPTER VI

VIA MEDIA

1850–52

ON the death of Sir Robert Peel, Lord Aberdeen was recognised by the Peelites as their head. Lord Aberdeen possessed many great qualities in unusual abundance, but he had few of those which are most essential to the successful conduct of a political party. Slow to act, distrustful of his own judgment, and totally devoid of party spirit or personal ambition, he was not the man to lead vigorous and impassioned attacks upon political opponents, or to defend, for party reasons, measures felt by him to be in themselves indefensible. But as a mediator and conciliator he stood unrivalled, and in the position then occupied by the Peelites, midway between the two great conflicting political parties, he well represented those with whom he acted. He was respected by all as a man wholly incapable of intrigue or insincerity, and, by those who knew him, for the sagacity of his judgment; while he was not only respected but loved by those admitted to his closer intimacy. Sidney Herbert was one of those by whom he was most truly appreciated. Mr. Gladstone has told me that on one occasion Mr. Herbert, while conversing with him after the remarkably successful session of 1853—a success which the events of the following year have caused to be now wholly

forgotten,—attributed that success mainly to the fact that the Government had at its head "its ablest and wisest member," an estimate which, when it is remembered who the other members of that Cabinet were, will seem to some extravagant, but which was undoubtedly sincere. In this opinion Mr. Gladstone at the time expressed, and forty years later deliberately repeated, his own entire concurrence.

It is the fashion to discredit the Peelite party as having been held together rather by personal feeling than by any common principle, but it is a curious fact, and one which shows how real a community of thought existed between its leaders, that when, in the autumn of 1850, Lord John Russell wrote and published his famous letter to the Bishop of Durham, the Peelite leaders, without any previous concert, simultaneously, though separately, arrived at the conclusion that, though applauded by the bulk of both the great political parties, the course taken by Lord John was both unjust and impolitic. They were at the time widely separated. Lord Aberdeen was in Scotland, Mr. Gladstone in Italy, Mr. Herbert, Sir James Graham, and Lord Lincoln in different parts of England; but each, without any communication with his friends, formed the opinion that the Bull of the Pope constituting the new Roman Catholic hierarchy in England, though arrogantly expressed, and rightly meriting censure as a piece of impertinence, was not a measure to be met by penal enactments.

But though his own opinion was formed, Sidney Herbert naturally wished to know if it were shared by those with whom he was most closely associated, and on November 30th, 1850, he wrote to Sir James Graham as follows:

"MY DEAR SIR JAMES,

"One county meeting makes many, and Wiltshire is to pronounce on Friday next at Devizes.

"I hear in London that Lord John is actually preparing a measure of some kind or another against the newly created hierarchy. I should like to know very much from you what line you would recommend to be taken, and your view of the question as it now stands, before I speak, as speak I must, at the meeting. Your official position during the four last years of Sir Robert Peel's Government made you the organ of that Government upon many questions in which the rights and toleration of the Roman Catholics were involved, and the House of Commons will look to your opinion with some anxiety. My own feeling is decidedly against retrogression. I have never had faith in combating religious opinions with Acts of Parliament. I think the spirit of the Constitution as it *now* stands, (whatever the letter may still do), allows the full and undisputed exercise of his religion, however false or absurd in any way or to any extent, which to each man seems best; the whole being voluntary, and seeking enforcement in no way from our law ecclesiastical or secular. From what I see quoted and written, I suppose there is a question whether Wiseman has not, in promulgating the Pope's Bull, been guilty of a misdemeanour, but that the Queen's prerogative has been in any way invaded is not shown.

"I look upon this act of the Pope's as a dangerous religious movement, to be met by counter-movement, in the way of increased exertion and activity, each for themselves, among all Protestant churches, by legitimate argument and discussion, and by increased zeal in reclaiming or winning the mass of population to whom Christianity is only known as a name. I believe England was never so Protestant as now, and if having got rid of the Puseyite tom-fooleries at one end, we can resist the equally insidious attacks of the Germanisers at the other, I believe that the Church of England has that within herself which will always override both Papacy and infidelity in this country.

"Pardon this hurried scrawl. I should be very glad to have from you a confirmation of my view

if you agree with me, and your reasons where you think me wrong. It is well that we should not all be *holding* different language before we meet.

"I passed a month in Ireland lately, and was greatly encouraged by all I heard and saw. All speak cheerfully of the future. Indeed it seems the most happy and contented country in Europe just now. There is certainly far less grumbling than here. Lord John's letter, however, will have thrown all back by renewing agitation."

Sir James Graham replied on December 1st, enclosing a copy of the answer he had returned to an invitation to join in a requisition for a Cumberland county meeting "to consider the propriety of an address to the Queen on the aggression of the Pope."

". . . My position is solitary, and I am not prepared to change it; but you are a friend and an old colleague, and when you wish to know my opinion I am bound to tell it to you without reserve. I have no other copy of my letter to Howard but this one which I enclose; when you have read it, return it to me, and I will thank you not to show it to others.

"Lord John will find great difficulty in passing any new anti-Catholic measure which is not open to grave objections; but considering the national excitement which he has done so much to stimulate, and the extreme delicacy and difficulty of the subject, I wish to reserve to myself entire freedom of action, that I may be enabled fairly and calmly to weigh the wisdom of any legislative proposal which the Government may think it necessary to bring forward.

"Lord John's letter was hasty, intemperate, and ill-advised. He sought to catch some fleeting popularity at the expense of the principles of his political life; and in his eagerness to strike a blow at 'Gladstonism,' he forgot that the 'superstitious mummeries' which he enumerates are part of the creed of one-half of the British Army, and of eight millions of his fellow-subjects. The task of governing this nation

is difficult enough without aggravating it by such imprudence.

"'*Divide et impera*' may be true elsewhere, but consolidation of the Union with Ireland has been the grand object of the policy of the greatest men of the last half-century, and it is melancholy to see it defeated by the rashness of a day. I am told that Stanley approves the letter, the indiscretion, and the whole proceeding. This adoption does not convince me that the course taken is wise, or likely to lead to good results, but it is a new ingredient in the dismemberment of parties, and prescribes more than usual caution in making pledges or public declarations which may embarrass the line of conduct hereafter to be pursued, with a due regard to public safety. For myself I am resolved to come under no private engagements. I shall await events, and the discussion of them in the House of Commons, endeavouring to give effect to the judgment which I may form when they are fully developed, and thinking all party considerations of secondary importance."

Sir James Graham's letter called forth the following answer from Mr. Herbert:

"5, CARLTON GARDENS,
December 4th, 1850.

"MY DEAR SIR JAMES,

"I am very much obliged by your friendly and kind letter. I did not wish to force you into a leadership, but I sought advice from one well versed in these particular questions, which you have frankly given me.

"As member for my county I cannot but attend a public county meeting, and I must there give my opinion on the matter in hand, though reserving my subsequent free action in Parliament.

"I am very much gratified to find by your letter that we are agreed on the political part of this question. I have never taken but one course since I came into Parliament upon questions of religious toleration, and during the early part of my political life that course was opposed to the feelings of the mass of my party. I should grieve to see the fruits of a long struggle thrown away, and the whole policy reversed

on the first symptom of an inconvenience which any one must have foreseen.

"I forget whether I mentioned to you that, two or three days before Lord John Russell's letter came out, Clarendon spoke to me with the greatest confidence of his prospects of carrying the National system of Education, colleges and all, in the teeth of the Synod of Thurles. The laity and the priests were at last disunited. I hear that now the whole thing is changed, MacHale rubbing his hands, and the Lord Lieutenant irritable and dispirited.

"I do not agree with you as to the extent of the danger from within. Depend upon it, Tractarianism has had its day. The extremes to which they have lately gone have alienated all the rational men, and they have failed. The Germanising process will, I think, now be tried at the other end, and that, in my opinion, will fail too. There is a fund of good sense in England, and a strong prejudice in some, and attachment in others, to the Bible and Prayer-book.

"The spiritual supremacy of the Crown is another question, and I feel anything but sanguine about it. It is the fashion now to put it so high, that it amounts to nothing less than papacy. If MacNeil's views had obtained in 1688, we should all be Romanists now. But if people will put it on a moderate and rational basis, and one not subversive of all liberty of conscience, it may stand firm, and the stability of our establishment depends upon it.

"You know from former conversations my rather Presbyterian leanings on this point. My sympathies do not go with Claverhouse (*pace* the name of Graham) in his rather forcible advocacy of the supremacy, and I do not think it is prudent in England, and in the nineteenth century, to set up a Tudor prerogative higher than the Emperor of Russia claims for himself *in pari materiâ* in his own country.

"Have you read Bennet's letter? His explicit avowal of his doctrines, and the tone in which they are avowed, surely puts an end to all apprehensions of danger from that quarter; but his treatment of Lord John is, I confess, enjoyable to me—he handles him in a style worthy of Henry of Exeter himself. I hear that the Bishop of London had a letter from Lord John of earlier date than the Bishop of Durham's,

and *in quite a different tone*, and I heard it from a very accurate authority. The London walls are beginning to show 'No State Church.'

"I have been with Harrowby and a few other persons this morning concocting a church extension move as a fruit of this wordy excitement. I found him much disinclined to penal legislation, and speaking with much displeasure of Lord John's letter."

Mr. Gladstone wrote from Naples on January 25th:

"Lord John Russell's disgraceful letter will probably entail on him the punishment in the shape of embarrassment that it deserves; but it likewise lays snares in the path of everybody, and not least, I think, of those who were connected with the late Government. I think from your speech in Wiltshire (in which I saw that you endeavoured to give a Christian turn to these proceedings—no easy matter), that you have felt this difficulty, as I have, and my mind has shifted a good deal upon the question of legislation or no legislation; but on two things it has not shifted at all; first, which is, of course, that I know I am here without many of the elements of judgment, and therefore I hold and express every opinion subject to correction; secondly, I cannot see my way to legislation on the ground on which it is popularly demanded—*i.e.* prohibition on principle, prohibition grounded on the Supremacy as it is, distinct from territorial sovereignty. For the Colonies I am utterly and outright opposed to legislation in this matter at all. Between Ireland and England as such I cannot think it right or safe to draw a distinction. Scotland I think another great difficulty in the way of legislation of a substantial kind. It is quite plain that the Pope has acted in violation of the territorial rights of the Crown as they are commonly held among civilised nations. But then the violation does not consist in the substance of the act done; it lies in the fact that it has been done by a foreign potentate without the consent of the territorial Sovereign. It is obvious therefore, I think, that we might justly in principle legislate against the Wiseman Bull. But it is equally plain that this

legislation in vindication of territorial rights is something quite different from what 'the country,' as it is called, wants. It wants outright prohibition upon principle; wants us to say no Roman Catholic prelate shall take a title even, for example, from Wapping or from Brentford—and this while there is a Roman Catholic archbishop at St. Petersburg! Not that that is a rule, but it is an argument, and one in many respects *a fortiori*. I am afraid I for one cannot gratify 'the country,' though my constituents are a very prominent part of it; and though I speak subject to correction. The one thing I most hope for the moment is this, that there may be in both Houses a great and marked reserve on the day of the Address, and that the Government may be left and made to show its hand on its own responsibility. They (*i.e.* Lord John) have made the mess; the least they can do is to propose their mode of getting out of it. If important men in either House declare on the Address, determinate forms of opinion, it will greatly, and in my opinion most unduly, diminish their responsibility. Here is my say, which please to take at what it is worth."

Sidney Herbert replied[1]:

"You will have seen the debate on Papal Aggression. Lord John's speech was effective, and was an excellent speech for a concordat, or a penal code, or even a repeal of the Act of 1829—for anything but the Bill which follows it. The Bill includes Ireland (which it could not well avoid after the creation of the diocese of Ross), and excludes the Colonies. The Bill has disappointed the left side of the House by its insignificance, for though they all profess a distaste for penal laws, nothing but penal legislation would be satisfactory to them; but the benches behind the Government are pleased to be let off cheap, as they think, in the way of stringency.

"Lord John dwelt very much, as did Romilly also last night, on the necessity of protecting the Romish laity from the tyranny of their ecclesiastics. I think this view thoroughly untenable. What evidence is there that the laity wish to be protected? What right

[1] Carlton Gardens, Feb. 11th, 1851.

have you to assume it, if they do not avow it? Even if they petitioned for protection, what business is it of ours to undertake to reform the Roman Church for the benefit of its voluntary adherents? And what interest have we in making their Church palatable to the English public?

"The true and sincere argument in Lord John's mind was evident in his speech: 'All Churches are dangerous things, and the State must by any means in its power repress all and any of them as opportunity offers.'

"Romilly made a poor speech from which much was expected, and gave a doubting opinion founded on nothing better than Wiseman's statement of the Canon Law, that the Bill would prevent the synodical action of the Romish Church. I conceive that the movement of the Pope has been a sort of insult and defiance in action, and, whatever measure is passed, should be in the nature of a protest in action; but I am inclined, if it is possible to separate the parts of the measure, to resist what is penal and whatever appears to be an attack on the religious freedom of any Church. I deprecate also the refencing of the *Establishment* with Acts of Parliament against rivals on the ground of their freedom. I hope that we shall soon see you, and that you will be in time for this question."

Sidney Herbert's own views were publicly expressed at the county meeting called in Wiltshire, as such meetings were in every other county all over Great Britain, to address the Queen on the subject of what was called "Papal Aggression." He said there that—

"every man in a country constituted like this, originally composed of various races, and still containing men widely differing in their religious opinions—as must be the case in every country where there is full discussion and freedom of opinion, as there is and I trust will ever be in England—I say that, having these differences, you have no right to punish men for differing from you on the doctrines of your Church. Be they Dissenters or of whatsoever denomination they

may they have a right to their religious opinions. They have a right also to their civil privileges. . . .

"You may depend upon it—I beg pardon of those gentlemen who are interrupting me: I have my own opinions, and I am accustomed to speak them out without reserve. If I have given offence to any man, I am sorry for it; but I say this—that highly as I prize the representation of this county, yet not for all the votes which those gentlemen can give me, not for all the political influence which that high honour confers upon me, will I consent to conceal my religious or political opinions."

When Parliament met, the Cabinet, not a little alarmed by the storm which their chief had done so much to lash into fury, brought forward a measure which rendered penal the assumption of an ecclesiastical title taken from any place in the United Kingdom, made any bequests given or accepted under such a title invalid, and all acts done under such title inoperative. Those who drew the Bill had either failed to remember, or had strangely underestimated the importance of the fact, that in Ireland a Roman Catholic hierarchy taking territorial titles had been already quietly working for a long period with the full cognisance of the Crown. The application of the Act to Ireland would have constituted a virtual repeal of a portion of the great Relief Act of 1829, and would have reconstituted the dominion of penal laws, so far as regarded that part of the United Kingdom. The Bishops of the Scottish Episcopal Church would have been similarly threatened by the Act, though having done nothing to deserve punishment.

Leave to introduce the Bill was opposed by the Irish members and by the leading Peelites, including Sidney Herbert; but they only amounted in all to sixty-three, of whom thirty-seven were Irish. The remaining twenty-six included the flower of the Peelite

party. But though the Government had succeeded in bringing in the Bill, its position was felt to be thoroughly insecure, and on February 18th Sidney Herbert wrote to Mr. Gladstone:

"Matters here are very precarious, and the Budget of last night has damaged the Government very much. It is an *incapable* Budget, and the badness of the measure was in no respect veiled by Wood's speech, which struck us as singularly imprudent when it was not puerile. I think the sooner you are here the better. We hear that the Government will dissolve before they go out. The chances are always in favour of their doing neither, but the contingences are so many, and seem so imminent, that you had better be at home."

Almost immediately afterwards, Lord John Russell's Government was defeated in a thin House by an accidental majority, on a motion of Mr. Locke King with reference to the county franchise, and Mr. Gladstone was again written to by Mr. Herbert in yet more urgent terms:

February 21st. Lord John Russell has to-night, before the debate on the income tax, asked to postpone the Committee of Ways and Means till Monday, saying that he would then state the reasons of the delay, and the course the Government would pursue. He therefore either recasts his Administration, or he dissolves or he resigns. He fixed the Jew Bill for Monday though it could not come on. (This must be for a city election.)

"He announced last night a new Reform Bill for next session. This may be either for a dissolution now or for a plan of opposition next year to his successor. If he intended to resign, he might have announced it to-night. I think he will try to recast, and failing that, and failing a dissolution, which cannot, I think, strengthen him, he may ultimately resign. The Budget has destroyed his Government. I will not now give my opinions in detail as to the future, but you should lose no time in coming over."

Lord John seized the opportunity which he thought thus presented itself for gaining strength by the formation of a reconstituted Cabinet, comprising the Peelite leaders. He at once, with the Queen's approval, opened communications with Lord Aberdeen and Sir James Graham. There was but one obstacle to such an union, but it was insuperable. Neither Lord Aberdeen nor Sir James Graham would have anything to do with the Ecclesiastical Titles Bill. Lord John was willing to abandon the greater part of the Bill, but could not afford to give up the whole. Lord Aberdeen, while willing to assent to a declaration reprobating the Pope's action, was resolute in his refusal to take part in any penal legislation. The negotiation fell through, and an attempt was made by Lord Stanley to form a Government, after Lord Aberdeen, to whom the Queen in the first instance turned, had declined to do so, on the same ground which had prevented his junction with Lord John Russell—namely, his strong dissent from a measure on the adoption of which the voice of the country evidently insisted. Lord Stanley offered the Foreign Secretaryship to Lord Aberdeen, to Lord Canning, and to Mr. Gladstone, who all declined it for the same reason.

Finally, after a week of further efforts to form a new one, the old Government resumed office exactly as it stood before Lord John's resignation. The effect on the further progress of the Ecclesiastical Titles Bill was curious. Lord John, to conciliate support, dropped all its clauses except the first, but Sir F. Thesiger, on behalf of the Conservatives, moved their re-introduction, which was carried by a great majority. Lord John acquiesced in their re-instatement—indeed, he could not have done otherwise; for, forcible as

were the speeches made against the Bill, the strength of numbers in its favour, made up as they were wholly without regard to political party, was overwhelming, the division on the second reading being 438 against 92. The speeches made by Mr. Gladstone, Sir James Graham, and Sidney Herbert against any infringement of religious liberty may still be read with interest. Mr. Herbert admitted that the action taken by the Pope, or rather the manner of taking it, justified protest and remonstrance, but not legislation, which, if effectual, must partake of the nature of persecution, and if meant for a mere empty demonstration had better have taken another form. He pointed out that legislation of the character contemplated had never yet succeeded, and never would succeed. But his main arguments against the Bill were that it would inflict injury on harmless English Roman Catholics who were not responsible for the Pope's action, and that it was popular in the country only because it was believed to be directed, not against Papal arrogance, but against the Roman Catholic religion. Though the tone and language of his speech were studiously guarded and temperate, Herbert did not escape reproach from the Government and the majority as "the Pope's Apologist." Every one now perceives that he was right in regarding the Bill as an enormous blunder, but at the time he had only the satisfaction of knowing that he had performed a most unpopular duty, and had incidentally given Lord John Russell some very uncomfortable moments by showing that he had only a few years before recommended the adoption of the very step against which he was now legislating.

On the third reading the numbers were—Ayes 263, Noes 46; and the Bill went up to the House of Lords,

where its rejection was moved by Lord Aberdeen, who, however, only secured the support of thirty-seven other peers against a majority of 265.

It is seldom that a measure which has formed almost the whole legislative work of a session, and has been the subject of violent agitation from one end of the country to the other, has been so absolutely void of result as was the Ecclesiastical Titles Act of 1851. It was passed with the all but unanimous approval of the country, amidst enthusiastic applause; but it was never even once put in force, and was repealed twenty years later, without a single voice being raised to plead for its retention on the Statute Book.

In recent days this Act has, with a strange oblivion of facts, been brought forward as an example of the bigotry and intolerance of the House of Lords. That the House of Lords did not escape the influence of that strange burst of fanaticism is perfectly true, but the majorities in favour of the Bill were proportionately as great in the House of Commons. That House cannot escape its full share of responsibility. Nor does it become those who think that the House of Lords should agree to every Bill of importance passed by the Commons, to complain that the peers assented to a measure passed with enthusiasm by the votes of three-fourths of the Lower House, and called for by the all but unanimous voice of the public and the Press.

The opposition of Roman Catholics to the Bill was thought only natural, and gave no grave offence; but that any Protestants should vote against it was deemed intolerable, and the members of the Peelite party had to undergo, in the autumn of 1851, a greater degree of obloquy and censure than it usually falls

to the lot of public men in this country to encounter and yet surmount.

This being their position, Mr. Gladstone considered that the Peelites should seek strength through a more strict and complete party organisation than they had hitherto possessed. Lord Aberdeen, though willing to give advice to friends who asked it, and to perform unostentatiously many of the functions belonging to the head of a party, declined to assume a public position of formal leadership. The Peelites, he maintained, were not a party in the proper sense of the term, but individuals temporarily bound together by regard for the memory of one man, and by anxiety to preserve intact from injury one particular enactment, but certain ultimately to fall back into one or other of the two great existing political parties, according to their individual leanings. To organise elaborate machinery for the management of a body of men consisting, so far as Parliament was concerned, of a score of peers and some forty members of the House of Commons seemed to him slightly ridiculous, as well as disrespectful to the memory of Sir Robert Peel, who had always discouraged any such organisation. He thought, moreover, that such a step would be particularly inopportune at a time when the unpopularity under which the Peelites laboured rendered abstinence from all unnecessary self-assertion specially desirable.

Mr. Gladstone, however, with his usual vehemence, continued to press the point, and in October, 1851, wrote to the Duke of Newcastle urging that, if Lord Aberdeen persisted in refusing publicly to assume the leadership, which properly belonged to him, and which he privately exercised, an active and ostensible leader should be elected by the party, and that that leader should be the Duke himself.

The Duke, on October 27th, sent on this letter to Mr. Herbert, with the following comment:

"There is a great deal of truth in the letter, but also much which I think is misapprehension of our position and our difficulties. First, as to leadership. That Lord Aberdeen is, all things considered, our natural leader, and the *only* man who could properly assume that position, I think there can be no doubt. If he would *place himself* in that post, we should all recognise the claim. It has always appeared to me that the idea of *electing* a leader is a mistake, and an inversion of the proper constitutional view of party mechanism. A leader should become such, either because he is generally recognised as *facile princeps* in position, popularity, talent, discretion, debating power, or other qualifications necessary to balance the differences of opinion to be found in all parties, or by being selected by the Sovereign as her adviser when her Ministers have resigned. In the first case, public opinion and Parliament have pointed out to the Queen the man fitted to be consulted by her in an emergency; in the second, she either, having no such guide or repudiating it, selects him whom, if Parliament will support, she thinks fittest to be her Minister. If, however, a leader is *elected* by his party without the claims of superiority and obvious reasons which others beside his party must recognise, it appears to me that he must be placed in a false position, and be subject to suspicions of cabal which will be alike injurious to his friends and himself. You will at once see that the drift of all this is that Lord Aberdeen may *take* the leadership by consent of all, if he will leave his easy-chair and summon his friends; but as for Gladstone's alternative, it is *impossible.* I hope I am not a man to shrink from anything that can be proved to be a duty, and, as you know, I would, if my friends were willing to assist, have even placed myself in a position for which I am so little qualified, when my friend the Baron[1] intimated to me that I might be called upon in the manner indicated in my second case, but this was only if forced by circumstances which, however improbable success might be,

[1] Stockmar.

would fully acquit the individual of arrogance and presumption, and could endanger no great principle of Government, and prejudice no national interest. Unless, therefore, Lord A. will seize the reins, I think, notwithstanding G.'s strong opinion, we must still go on without a leader. Still, I think a meeting of the few who will talk freely to one another may be very useful."

Mr. Herbert expressed entire concurrence in the Duke's opinion, adding that whatever the Duke's personal fitness as a "leader," it was absurd to expect Lord Aberdeen and Sir James Graham to range themselves as "followers" of a man some twenty-five years their junior, and not their equal either in experience or ability.

Lord John Russell's Administration, already weak, was still further weakened by the dismissal of Lord Palmerston in December, 1851. This step, however, diminished the distance between Lord John and the Peelites, and when, in January, 1852, Lord John made overtures to Sir James Graham and Sidney Herbert, Lord Aberdeen would without displeasure have seen those overtures accepted.

But Sir James Graham was not inclined either fully to trust Lord John or to believe in the possibility of maintaining him in power. The Duke of Newcastle, to whom, as well as to Sir James Graham, Lord John made offers, adhered to his objection to any coalition, and wrote to Mr. Herbert from London on December 30th:

"I left Clumber this morning at the summons of Lord John Russell, and went down to Pembroke Lodge this evening; I am now writing at midnight. Of course, I need not tell you the object of the summons.

"I need only say that I neither am in office nor

have given any encouragement to a proposal for amalgamation. At the same time I have in no way committed anybody. I have answered for myself alone, but have at the same time expressed what I believe to be the leaning of others. I think I see what must be the result.

"Lord Ashley has written to the Duke of Bedford remonstrating against the appointment of a Foreign Secretary with a popish wife!

"I do not think you or any other Peelite will have to answer any application from Lord J. R. at present."

Sidney Herbert, unlike his friends, was not drawn nearer to Lord John Russell by the dismissal of Lord Palmerston, and was indeed rather inclined to sympathy with that nobleman, who speedily revenged his own expulsion from office by carrying against Lord John, on the first reading of a Militia Bill at the commencement of the session of 1852, an amendment entirely altering its scope and character—a step which led to Lord John's immediate resignation. He was succeeded by Lord Derby.

Lord Derby did not on this occasion repeat the overtures to the Peelites which he had made in the preceding year, but he was not without hope of securing their support after the question of Protection should have been finally disposed of. In writing to Lord Aberdeen to thank him for the moderate and kindly tone in which he had spoken of the new Government, Lord Derby said:

"I wish I could reckon upon or command equal forbearance, *de part et d'autre*, from our respective friends and partisans; for although I felt, after the failure of all our *pourparlers* last year, any renewed attempt to obtain your official co-operation could only lead to renewed delay and ultimate disappointment, and therefore did not make it, yet I hear with great

regret of the violent tone which is taken by many of my supporters, and shall do everything in my power to check it. If we cannot act together, we need not unnecessarily aggravate or embitter differences; and I shall sedulously discountenance any attempt to do so on our side. . . ."

Whatever may have been Lord Derby's own wishes or efforts, he signally failed to check the rancorous hostility shown by his supporters to the members of the Peelite party.

Sidney Herbert had at this time been summoned to Paris by the dangerous illness of his brother, Lord Pembroke; and it was while there that he heard of the earlier proceedings of the new Government. His view of the state of affairs is shown in his letters to his wife and to Mr. Gladstone.

To Mrs. Herbert.

"Paris, *March 22nd*, 1852.

"I am very glad things are looking better at home. Disraeli and Lord John certainly seem determined to make matters as bad as they can. Lord Derby's answer was far more satisfactory than the swaggering equivocation of Disraeli, but the debate, as far as I have had time to look at it, gives symptoms of a cross fire from behind, and anxious as the Government are to throw over Protection, they will, I have no doubt, have a strong body of supporters determined if possible to keep them to it. These men were in earnest, and believed their leaders when they cried traitor on Peel. I wish he could have lived to see his calumniators trying to wriggle out of their pledges, not daring to take the manly course of avowing their opinions as he did, and preferring the safety of the country to their own party convenience. However, I am for giving them every facility and every bridge to cross over without a taunt or a reproach."

To Mr. Gladstone.

"March 30*th*.

". . . Graham's speech has certainly surprised me. The tone of his conversation had led me to hope, though I admit without much confidence, for a better result. The necessity of finding some new constituencies which should give a representation to education, learning, wealth, and respectability, in lieu of a perpetual transfer of seats from rural to town constituencies, with a perpetual dead level of £10 and £5 householders, his *determined resistance* to ballot, and the impossibility of Lord John acting as leader:—these things, in which my preconceived opinions led me heartily to concur, formed the staple of his talk. The speech at Carlisle, however, pledges him to the great-town view of reform qualification, and, while it deprecates ballot, announces the possibility of his conversion to it, and speaks of returning confidence in Lord John as if he intended in future to act under him. The coalition with another candidate, a very unusual course in the case of a man of Graham's public position, and that other candidate a Radical apparently, is in any case most unwise, but certainly looks most significant.

"The *per contra* appears to be Graham's retirement to his old back bench; but it is impossible to speculate on his course. With all his ability and experience, and his love of straining his sight into the future, he has none of what the French call 'esprit de conduite.' He had a great game before him, and has thrown the cards away—though I doubt whether he is conscious of it. I regret it very much, for it makes our position more difficult.

"If Lord Derby would manfully avow that Protection is at an end, he would stand better next autumn than he now will. This undecided course, meant to save his own honour, will be resented by the country, which likes to be considered first: 'if the thing is wrong, try and reverse it; if it is right, say so, and abide by it,' will be the obvious reflection of the public, who see the country agitated and alarmed because the Ministers are afraid of being abused. I don't know how much will be left of them after the roll in the mud which the autumn has in

store for them. The local burdens scheme will then be their *cheval de bataille*, and the last three years have sadly weakened that policy. It might have been given to an agricultural Opposition by a Free Trade Government, not for the value of the thing, but as a sugar-plum to a child to stop its crying; but a Government of squires proposing to transfer burdens (which Disraeli puts, by-the-bye, only at 1*s.* in the pound) from their own property, which is real property, to be borne on excise and customs, which are paid by the industrious consumer, will never do.

"What the country wants is a progressive Conservative Government, heartily for Free Trade, willing to apply still further the principles of reduction to all taxes of an elastic character, which will regain the amount of their produce by increased consumption consequent upon diminished duty, not opposed to Parliamentary Reform, though stout against mere democratic infusion.

"I was very glad to see that Walpole corrected the impression left, or rather drawn, from Disraeli's brilliant speech, and I think unfairly drawn from it, that the Government declared against all reform. I think such a declaration would be madness, and a certain provocation to democratic movement and success. I attach great importance to the correction, as coming from Walpole, whose character is a guarantee that it was not a firework let off for effect, nor a device to hoodwink an Opposition.

"I see the materials, both in men and in measures, for a sound and practical Government, if the present men do not get so bespattered in this transition from Protection to Free Trade opinions (and which, I think, is of a character to attract the bespattering), that they become unfit for future—or at least for immediate future—use. The Conservative principle is exposed to the worst possible chances at the elections by being coupled so universally with a policy which is odious to the people. If Lord Stanley wants to go to the country on the general issue, he must first get rid of the particular question, which is his weak point, and the strength of his adversaries. Every opponent of his Government will fight the battle on Free Trade, unless his Ministers and supporters refuse at once to fight it on Protection."

To Mrs. Herbert.

"*March* 22. All here is very quiet, everybody amused and gay, and the people generally satisfied that they have got the one form of Government that suits them, and that they deserve. It looks very much like lasting. A good deal will depend upon the behaviour of the Senate and the Corps Législatif; but if they become quiet and acquiescing bodies (and they have been carefully selected with that view) the thing will go on like clockwork.

"I am *émerveillé* with the beauty of the town, far exceeding that of any town I ever saw. The weather is lovely, and the gaiety and brilliancy of the streets is very striking. The garden of the Tuileries, full of hundreds of nurses in white caps, sitting knitting, with thousands of children playing round them, is the gayest and prettiest scene possible.

"*March* 26. . . . Pahlen called in the morning, and to-day we have had a visit from Princess Lieven, as full of politics as ever, and saying that the autocracy here is far more decided in its proceedings than the Russian; yet it marches very well, and on the whole gives thorough satisfaction. They are a curious people, certainly.

"*March* 31. Affairs seem very bad at home, though Graham's line cannot be said to be quite unexpected. He had, however, given such strong indications lately of feeling that he had gone too far, that when I left I had almost hopes of him. He is a strange mixture, with great ability and experience, and considerable foresight as to what is to occur, but none as to how he ought to behave. Lincoln ought to see Cardwell. He is the man most likely to influence him, and the necessity of maintaining a strong body of independent Liberal-Conservatives to contest and overthrow the ultra-Tory element and tendencies of the present Government is more than ever necessary for the safety of the country. I read Walpole's speech with great pleasure."

Lord Pembroke's recovery from a dangerous attack of inflammation of the lungs was very slow and

gradual. During the progress of his convalescence he was most assiduously attended by his brother, who, in spite of many differences, always regarded him with strong affection. His intercourse with Lord Pembroke at this time led Sidney to hope that the serious impressions produced by the near approach of death would permanently affect his character, and that his better impulses, called into unusual prominence, might induce him to adopt a changed manner of life, and perhaps return to fill his proper place, and play his proper part, in English life. Unhappily, the nobler and truer elements in Lord Pembroke's character, warmed into unusual life by gratitude for the escape from a great peril, faded away again, as is too often the case, with returning health, and for the next ten years he never left Paris, where he died in 1862, little more than six months after the death of his younger brother, who was twenty years his junior.

During his stay in Paris Sidney Herbert attended the first meeting of the new Senate and Corps Législatif, which is thus described in a letter to his wife:

"I went with Douglas[1] to see the President open the Senate and the Corps Législatif, so you may guess that I am quite well again. The weather having become very mild, I could not resist going to see a ceremony which no one ever saw yet, and which no one perhaps may ever see again, for one cannot tell what may happen from year to year in this country. The ceremony took place in the Salle des Maréchaux at the Tuileries, a large square room. All the Corps Diplomatique in uniform along one side; the senators, nearly all in uniform, including three or four cardinals, and the Corps Législatif, about one-tenth in uniform, occupied the floor, on benches, together with a few strangers, of whom I was one; the President on a raised platform in a velvet arm-chair; the Ministers

[1] The Duke of Hamilton, who had married the President's cousin, Princess Marie of Baden.

in other chairs to right and left, and no end of staff, etc., behind and about.

"The President had the look of languor with the eyes half shut, which the descriptions of him call 'melancholy,' much more marked than formerly. He read his speech, which was evidently his own composition, having the same epigrammatic style of sentences for which his speeches have been remarkable. It was very well received, and interrupted by loud and boisterous approval; even things which we English should have thought *blessant* were applauded, such as passages when he said that he might have made himself Emperor, if he had liked, and that he could have changed the Government before, if he had wished. '*Il ne me manqua ni les moyens ni l'occasion.*' All these things produced '*très bien.*' The speech was a good speech, well conceived and well worded, at least so it appeared to me in listening, but I have not yet read it, and could not catch some sentences. When he had done, M. Casabianca read the names of the Senate and Corps Législatif, who each took an oath of fidelity to L. N. Each member, when his name was called, rose, put out his right hand, and said '*Je le jure.*' The treble voices made the ladies laugh, and so did the scaramouchy way in which the little Archbishop of Paris jumped up, but otherwise the thing went off very well. Carnot and Cavaignac were both called, but were neither of them present. Upon the whole it was worth seeing. One has the feeling that it is history, though not history of a very high class, or giving any precedents which will be useful to mankind except as warnings. However, every one here (except the *salons*, and they are divided) is satisfied and pleased, and they are the judges of what suits them best."

By the middle of the month of April the health of Lord Pembroke, who had more than once been in great danger, was so much improved as to cause no further apprehension, and his brother consequently returned to England. He immediately resumed, in the following letter, those intimate communications with Sir J. Graham which his visit to Paris had interrupted:

"BELGRAVE SQUARE, *April 24th*, 1852.

"MY DEAR SIR JAMES,

I was very sorry on my return to town to hear that you were laid up at Netherby. I hope you are better, and that we shall soon see you back. Lord Aberdeen is walking with a stick, suffering from rheumatism, and looking very ill. If the east wind does not soon go, I do not know who will be left effective.

"Last night's debate[1] was very unsatisfactory. I saw Tuffnell before the debate commenced, and spoke strongly to him against Lord John's intended course. It appeared to me that such a short turn as voting against the principle of a Militia Bill, after bringing one in himself a few weeks back, would greatly shock public opinion; that it would, by showing a division of opinion on the opposite benches, strengthen the Government; that if he beat them, they would go to the country as a Government deprived by a factious Opposition of the means of defending the country; that if he failed, the Government would have the prestige of a victory; that if a Militia be necessary or advantageous, but unpopular, it was scarcely wise to prevent a Government willing to do so from having the odium of clearing away the difficulty; and that by a similar course on our Assassination Bill in 1846, he had not made a bed of roses for himself. Tuffnell told me that he fully agreed with me; that he was greatly annoyed at the course, and as at present advised would vote against Lord John. I urged him to speak to Lord John, but he found him hot on the subject, and eager to produce arguments which he said Fox-Maule had sent him. The other members of the late Government are equally annoyed, and some Whigs told me last night that they would not go with him.

"The speech came, and a more disastrous affair I never heard. The feeling of the House was shocked at the proceeding, and his speech was received almost contumeliously. Such a speech I never heard him make. If the arguments were Fox-Maule's, he must have left all his good sense behind him when he went up to the Lords. He objected to all increase of a standing army, because you cannot concentrate your

[1] On the Militia Bill of the new Government.

increase on the troops at home, but must spread it over the whole force both at home and abroad! He advocates the maintenance of 10,000 embodied militia, chosen by ballot—*i.e.* 10,000 infantry of the line, who cannot go abroad, and have been made to serve against their will. He is for increasing the pensioners who, with the ten years' service, must soon diminish. The unpopularity of the Militia Bill rests on ballot; yet he insists on ballot as against bounty, and praises his own Bill as being compulsory.

"Palmerston handled him very severely, and with a very general concurrence from the House. The Government, I think, got a good lift last night, and two or three more escapades of this kind from Lord John will greatly raise them in public estimation; for having no merits of their own, it is upon the demerits of their opponents that they must thrive.

"Sir Robert Peel made a very odd, but a very effective, speech, and showed considerable oratorical power. The two brothers, for once, were on the same side. Frederick's was a good argument, but pragmatical in manner, and the whole style bordering too much on the 'preachment.'

"It was a deadly dull debate till the end. Palmerston was very lively and impudent, and Lord John very much irritated by him. His own speech was very tamely delivered, and his manner was conscious and hesitating.

"'Dizzy' gives us his Budget on Friday. There are many rumours afloat; one I hear is that he is to give a slice of his surplus to the taxes on knowledge, and take an instalment off the income tax; but of course nothing is known. He stated the other night that the revenue was *growing*, and he is, I suspect, bent on a prosperity speech and a flashy sort of Budget. They have been making, so Glyn tells me, a good deal of inquiry as to the possibility of dealing with the 3 per cents., but 338 millions is too large a sum to tackle, unless they can get the funds well and permanently above par. They expect them to be at par to-day.

"The late arrivals of gold from Australia excited a good deal of attention among that class of persons who have tried and failed in everything at home, and a large export of that class will, I hope, be the

consequence. The cost of passage is rising, and Green (the shipowner) is putting on more ships for Australia in consequence.

"I have taken a merciless advantage of your prostrate condition in writing four sheets full of gossip, but I trust you will be able to pay me off *vivâ voce* in a day or two."

Sir James Graham's reply will show with how little benevolence the new Government, now fairly launched, was regarded by one of the most important of the Peelite leaders.

"NETHERBY, *April 27th.*

"The state of affairs in Parliament is not attractive, and I begin to feel more and more that I am better away. The Militia Bill in its present form, and in existing circumstances, does not appear to me worthy of support, and I am of opinion that much more necessary and effective measures of precaution may be taken immediately, at no greater cost, and with more general concurrence out of doors; but it is the duty of a Government to devise and to pass these measures, not in 'a moribund Parliament,' but in full possession of the confidence of the Crown and of the country. This surely is not Lord Derby's present position, and if he seek to occupy it, let him take without loss of time the necessary measures, and proceed to rule himself, or make way for those who can. Lord John appears to have forgotten that he had a Militia Bill tied round his neck when he attempted to swim on shore amidst the sharks and thick seaweed which surround Point Danger.[1] You and I are not quite clear of the incumbrance, and before taking a plunge from the wreck, in the absence of life-preservers, it is not amiss to see the flounders of others in shallow water. Lord John's performance and Palmerston's inexorable cruelty are no great encouragement to the repetition of such exhibitions. If the Bill go into committee, the next step to be taken with regard to it will require great caution.

"The wonder of the week, however, will be D'Izzy's Budget."

[1] A reference to the recent wreck of the *Birkenhead.*

Sidney Herbert and Mr. Gladstone, on the other hand, were still disposed to place a more favourable construction on Lord Derby's acts, to make the inevitable acceptance by him of Free Trade as easy as possible, and not to reject the possibility of closer co-operation in the future.

The most prominent appearance made by Sidney Herbert in the House of Commons during the Session of 1852 was on an ecclesiastical question. The Papal aggression frenzy had been marked by more than one demonstration against the High Church party in the Church of England, who were regarded by the mob as conscious or unconscious allies of the Church of Rome. Any display of a ritual at all more ornate or ceremonious than that in common use, though as far as possible from what is now called ritualism, was stigmatised as Popish. The especial objects of popular antipathy were such as are now universally to be seen in all churches of the Church of England, High or Low. The use of the surplice in the pulpit, the presence of a surpliced choir, the reading of the prayer for the Church militant after the sermon, were all regarded as in the highest degree "dangerous and insidious," and were sometimes the cause of riots. Among the "infected" churches, none was more conspicuous than that of St. Barnabas, Pimlico, where lighted candles were placed on the altar during the celebration of the Holy Communion, an usage now not uncommon, but then in the highest degree singular. An excited mob, headed by the butler of a well-known Irvingite apostle (whose own ritual was of a far more gorgeous character than that of any High Churchman), attempted to break into the church, and the Bishop of London, alarmed, exacted from the incumbent, the Rev. W. E. Bennet,

the fulfilment of a promise which he had given at an earlier date, to resign his benefice whenever called upon by the Bishop to do so. Mr. Bennet resigned, and remained for more than a year unbeneficed, but in the spring of 1852 he was presented to the rectory of Frome, in Somersetshire, by the Dowager Marchioness of Bath, acting as guardian of her son, a minor, and was inducted into the living by the Bishop of Bath and Wells. This proceeding gave much umbrage to the Low Church party, and Mr. Horsman, a well-meaning but very narrow-minded and bitter Church reformer, brought the matter before the House of Commons. He probably had contemplated no more than an expression of censure on the patron for presenting, and on the Bishop for inducting, Mr. Bennet to the living; but he had reckoned without his host, and Mr. Gladstone and Sidney Herbert, to his great surprise, insisted, with the approval of the House, that he should exhibit formal articles of impeachment against the Bishop of Bath and Wells. This he was not prepared to do, and the matter dropped, not without ridicule.

As Lord Derby did not possess a majority in the House of Commons, an early dissolution was inevitable. It was delayed for what appeared insufficient reasons, but though too long deferred, it came at last, and the position of the Peelites became more embarrassing than ever, while speculation as to the course they would pursue became more and more eager, and excited more and more interest. On one point they were all thoroughly united, being resolute in their determination to see that the Free Trade policy of Sir Robert Peel received no injury; but there was by no means so entire an agreement among them as to the attitude to be assumed towards Lord

Derby's Government. Some, and among them especially Mr. Gladstone, were disposed to give Lord Derby a cordial support whenever he should have decently disposed of Protection. That Lord Derby would do this, no reasonable man doubted; but a desire to keep well with his more bigoted and retrograde followers led him to indulge in ambiguous language, and to coquet with hopes and expectations of a return to Protection—which he had never any intention of gratifying. Sidney Herbert, on the whole, shared Mr. Gladstone's view, and they both undoubtedly entertained the strange and unfounded expectation that it would be no difficult task to detach a large part of the Conservative party from Mr. Disraeli and other objectionable leaders, and rally them to the standard of a Liberal-Conservative Government. Others, of whom Sir James Graham was the most important representative, were not disposed to look complacently on such a junction, and deemed the formation, not of a Liberally-disposed Conservative Government, but of a Liberal one, animated by a Conservative spirit, that which in the circumstances of the time would be most for the advantage of the country. In this juncture, much depended upon the line which would be taken by Lord Aberdeen. For some time he hesitated. Personal liking for Lord Derby, and former intimacy with him, old associations with the Conservative party, and some distrust of Lord John Russell's foreign policy, drew him in one direction. A yet greater distrust of the honesty of Lord Derby's renunciation of Protection drew him in another, and the balance was turned by the narrow anti-papal bigotry which the supporters and even the subordinate members of the new Government were allowed to exhibit unchecked. Moreover, he no doubt

shared the feelings of dislike and distrust with which Mr. Disraeli was regarded by all *grands seigneurs* of Lord Aberdeen's type, as an adventurer, and by all Peelites, as the persecutor of Peel. On the eve of the elections, Lord Aberdeen was strongly pressed to take a decided line. He, however, confined himself to advising those who considered themselves followers of Sir Robert Peel to vote for candidates who supported Sir Robert Peel's policy. When the elections closed, it was manifest that the Peelites had it in their power, reduced though they were in number to thirty, to turn the balance. As Mr. Gladstone wrote on July 30th:

"We may now consider the general election as at an end, and its result as being this: that Lord Derby is left in a minority, which the support of the Peelite votes may at any time convert into a majority."

Lord Derby made no advances towards the Peelite leaders; but this was not the case with Lord John Russell. So early as July 2nd, 1852, he took advantage of an article which had appeared in *The Times*, implying that he had desired the overthrow of Austrian dominion in Italy, to assure Lord Aberdeen that this was altogether a mistake: that he had no such wish, and that he entirely dissociated himself from Lord Palmerston's expressions of opinion on that subject. A month later he addressed to Lord Aberdeen a direct inquiry, whether he and his friends were prepared to enter into concert with himself and the Whigs as to the course to be pursued in Parliament on its reassembling, and requested him to ascertain the views of the Duke of Newcastle, Mr. Gladstone, Sir James Graham, and Mr. Herbert, on this subject. The tact and patience shown by Lord Aberdeen in the conduct of this negotiation

were very remarkable, and have been more fully described by me elsewhere. Shortly, it may be said that while Mr. Gladstone was most reluctant to take any step which might lead towards the absorption of the Peelites into the Liberal party, the Duke of Newcastle, on the contrary, was prepared for union with the Liberals, but not to accept Lord John Russell as their chief. Sir James Graham, though preferring that Lord Aberdeen should be the head of a new Cabinet, was not unwilling to see Lord John again Prime Minister; but he was aware that Lord Palmerston, the Peelites generally, the Irish members, and a large section of the Whigs themselves, would not consent to it, and therefore considered his accession to the post at this time impossible. Sidney Herbert, though not so hostile to the Government as Sir James Graham, was less friendly to it than Mr. Gladstone. On the other hand, a section of Lord John's friends, and perhaps Lord John himself, dreamed of the restoration of an exclusive Cabinet of pure Whigs, drawn from a few aristocratic families.

It was no easy task to bring together for concerted action men entertaining such discordant views, and perhaps no man then living, except Lord Aberdeen, could have effected it. As the recipient of the confidences of each, and the medium of communication between them, he laboured during the autumn to smooth down points of difference and combine and consolidate what there was of agreement. By the time Parliament met on November 11th, a practical accord had been established between the Peelites and Whigs for purposes of opposition, though it was doubtful whether it was of such a nature as would justify official co-operation.

Sidney Herbert's views at this juncture are fully

expressed in a long letter written by him to Lord Aberdeen on October 22nd, which contains an interesting account of Lord Palmerston's endeavours to lay the ground for the formation of a Liberal Ministry under Lord Lansdowne:

"WILTON, *October 22nd*, 1852.

"I have just returned from a two days' visit to Broadlands, during which Lord Palmerston talked very freely on politics, and on the state of parties, and it has occurred to me that the views of a man who is not unimportant in the political world at this moment would be quite worth communicating to you.

"In the first place, he confirmed all that we have heard as to exertions to bring about a Lansdowne administration. He said that his confidence in 'Johnny,' as a *leader*, was quite destroyed, and that his love of popularity would always lead him into scrapes, and that when a man made sudden announcements of a new policy without consulting his colleagues, one might acquiesce rather than break up a Government when the actor was a friend, but not otherwise.

"He thought, therefore, that, Lord John being out of the question as a leader (though he had no objection whatever to act with him under any one else), Lord Lansdowne, from his experience, character, and the known moderation of his opinions, would be more likely than any one else to combine under his standard the conservative Whigs and the Peelites. He said that he had proposed this plan to Lord Lansdowne, whose answer was, 'Give me a majority of a hundred and I am ready,' which he construed as an acceptance, and I construe as a refusal. Since that, he said, he had had a long conversation with the Duke of Bedford, to whom he had held the same language as he then held to me. The Duke said his brother, Lord John, was of opinion that no Government should be formed of which the head was not in the Commons, to which Lord Palmerston answered that that was not his opinion three years ago, when on account of his health he (Lord John) had agreed to go to the Lords, leaving Palmerston to lead the Commons with the Home Office. His

health, it appears, just then improved, and the plan was abandoned.

"I told Lord Palmerston that Lord Lansdowne had formally taken leave of public life, and that he had been very ill this autumn, that he is 72 years old, and a broken man, and that, even if now capable, he could not long remain so, and the public would look upon it as a mere provisional arrangement with little prospect of permanence or stability.

"We then talked of Lord Derby's Government, which consists, he says, of three men and a half: Lord Derby, the Chancellor, and D'Israeli being the three men, and Sir John Pakington the half. His expectation is that Lord Derby will declare a Free Trade policy in the Queen's speech, and that he will, as soon as that is settled and his general measures announced, adjourn the House and seek to strengthen his Government. He has eight places to dispose of (the eight, according to him, being all ready and willing to go), and if eight places are offered, that gives such a preponderance to the party coming in 'that it becomes quite another affair.' In short, he evidently has two strings to his bow, and, failing them, I shall not be surprised if he were to overcome his dislike to Lord John.

"I was struck by his sanguine disposition, and his readiness to believe whatever he wishes.

"His talk in detail was very conservative. He admitted that reform would be an embarrassment, and wished for as little as possible.

"He is evidently very distrustful of his friend the Emperor's pacific intentions, and very anxious about national defences; but he is so willing to think well of Louis Napoleon, having once committed himself in that direction, that he has invented a theory, that, having reached the Empire by means of despotism, he will now slacken the rein, and restore a certain amount of constitutional government.

"He told me that a French map had been confidentially shown to him, in which the new fortifications at Pembroke are described, and undefended points are pointed out with the words, '*Heureusement on a oublié*,' etc. He spoke of the necessity of giving the present Government plenty of rope, and said that Lord John was quite convinced that an aggressive course would

be very impolitic. This, I think, is the sum of his conversation.

"Having been lately both at Clumber and Hawarden, I had the opportunity of reading over all the letters which had passed between yourself and Lord John and others in the summer.

"We appear to me to meet this Session, so far as combination is concerned, exactly as we parted in July last. I confess I think, upon the whole, this is best. It is impossible to conceal from oneself that public opinion has rallied to Lord Derby in a far greater degree than could have been expected when his course of proceeding is considered. I believe this is owing not to a low standard of public feeling, but because a vast body in this country is undergoing the same change which is being forced on the Government—namely, a change from a Protectionist to a Free Trade creed, and their sympathy with the object prevents their looking very closely at the manner in which it was effected.

"Whatever, however, may be the cause of it, I am certain that the Government must be left to destroy itself, if it is to be destroyed. An open appearance of organised junction, no new circumstances having occurred, would, I think, have reacted in favour of the Government as much as the Chesham Place meeting did last spring. The country does not hold that the only business of a statesman out of office is to get in again, which I suspect is Lord John's creed; still less would they pardon any attempt to destroy a Government on the part of those who have no means of replacing it. Lord John has always been too hasty to take office and too slow in leaving it for the interests of his party, and I doubt whether he can change his nature in this respect; at any rate it will be prudent to see, before others are irretrievably committed to him.

"Political junctions, too, can only be effected insensibly, as the result of sympathy and co-operation. Strangers cannot suddenly swear an eternal friendship, and it seems to me unwise in Lord John, for the purpose he has in view, to press such junction prematurely, or to think himself aggrieved by the non-acceptance of his offers.

"Pray pardon this very long letter, from the first

object of which I have digressed. I hope you will be in town a few days before Parliament actually meets for business, in order that nothing may be said or done without your previous sanction.

"Lord Ellesmere, whom I saw the other day, was anxious for a general meeting, which, however, in the uncertainty as to who is who, would, I think, be imprudent. He is much impressed with the dishonest and shifty course of the Government."

When Parliament at last met, on November 11th, there was every disposition on the part of the Peelites and most of the Whig leaders to render the acceptance of Free Trade principles by the Government as easy as so distasteful an operation could well be made. Such an acquiescence on the part of the Government —which had all along been inevitable—had been rendered all the more difficult and degrading by the manner in which they had played fast and loose with their supporters on the subject during the previous six months. A Resolution was therefore prepared, an assent to which would have merely recognised the indisputable fact that a Free Trade policy had been accepted by the country, and could not now be reversed. This Resolution was to be moved by Mr. C. Villiers, one of the oldest Free Traders in the House; but Mr. Cobden objected to so tame a conclusion of the long struggle, and insisted that the resolution should not only secure the continuance of a Free Trade policy, but also affirm its beneficial character, and eulogise the measure of 1846, which the Conservatives had so strenuously opposed. Mr. Cobden's special connection with the Anti-Corn Law Agitation gave great weight to his wishes in regard to any action on the subject, and out of deference to them, though contrary to the opinion of the Peelites, it was decided that words declaring the legislation of 1846

to have been "wise, just, and beneficial," should be inserted in the Resolution. This was more than even a much humiliated Government could swallow, and it was supposed that they would be compelled reluctantly to court certain defeat, by opposing the Resolution. They were, however, saved from immediate destruction by the skilful interposition of Lord Palmerston, who moved an amendment very similar in its terms to the original Resolution which it had been intended Mr. Villiers should propose, and which in the end was accepted by all parties, with the exception of fifty bigoted Protectionists, who went at the time by the name of "the Cannon Balls," an allusion to certain old iron shot of singular hardness, which had been found to have resisted the heat of the furnace in which others of less tough material had been completely melted. The debate lasted a week, and during its course Sidney Herbert made a speech of the greatest power, and with the most telling effect. He exposed with unsparing clearness the series of shifts and pretexts by which the Government had sought to obtain support. He denounced with scorn, though in the most polished and courteous terms, their abandonment of the doctrines on which they had traded as a means of climbing into office, and, with outstretched arm and finger pointed at the Treasury Bench, he exclaimed, "Humiliation is a painful sight, God knows, but if any one wishes to see humiliation, let him look *there*."

The respite obtained by the Government was not a long one. A month later, on December 17th, after a week's debate, the Budget proposed by Mr. Disraeli was rejected by a majority of 19. Sidney Herbert did not take a part in this debate, which was rendered memorable by the two great speeches of Mr. Disraeli

and Mr. Gladstone, marking the commencement of that sharp and bitter personal rivalry which was to last for the next thirty years. But though silent, Sidney Herbert was one of the most interested auditors of that remarkable contest. Those speeches may still be read with interest, but when read they lack the expression given to them by the widely different manner of the speakers. Disraeli's face was an expressionless mask, his voice calm, monotonous, wholly without passion, but dropping sarcasms and inflicting wounds with cold malevolence. To this, Gladstone's countenance, lighted up with excitement, his features speaking almost as distinctly as his tongue, and his beautiful voice ringing out in the clear tones of a silver trumpet, presented as great a contrast as could well be imagined. "Thank God, that noble fellow is my friend!" exclaimed an eminent prelate,[1] seated under the gallery that night:—a sentiment echoed by the hearts of others present,—by that of Sidney Herbert, I doubt not, among them.

Lord Derby resigned upon the following day, and the Queen sent for Lord Aberdeen and Lord Lansdowne. Lord Lansdowne was ill and could not go to Osborne, and Lord Aberdeen would not go without him. A second summons, however, directed him to go alone. Fortified by the offer of Lord John Russell to serve under him, Lord Aberdeen accepted the task of forming a Government. A week of uncertainty followed. Lord John, who on Lord Aberdeen's return from Osborne was still in the same mind, and had agreed to take the Foreign Office, changed his intention on the following day. Of the discussions and anxieties of the following week

[1] Bishop Wilberforce.

Sidney Herbert had his full share. On Christmas Day he wrote to Mr. Gladstone:

"Christmas Day—and the dreariest one I ever passed. —I went to your house, but found there were no letters from Chandos or Patten. The former was in town yesterday. I wrote this morning to Lord Aberdeen, suggesting an exchange between Strutt and Ben. Stanley, which he seemed to approve of. Lord Aberdeen went off to Windsor after church, and will be back to-night. In the interim the Whig fat is all in the fire again, and Graham is to take Lord John at 9.30 to Argyll House. I believe Ireland is now the difficulty. I confess I am out of all heart. The sooner you get back the better, for one cannot tell at any moment what the next hour may bring."

Lord Aberdeen, with much trouble, at length succeeded in forming a Cabinet, in which Sidney Herbert resumed his old place of Secretary at War. To his mother's congratulations on his appointment he thus replied:

"WILTON, *January 1st*, 1853.

"A happy new year to you, my own dearest Mamsey, and many more after this one. Indeed I think they will be happy ones, if the love of so many people can make any life happy. I cannot say how much I have been touched by your kind and loving letters during this trying time. You do not know how anxious these weeks have been, nor how disagreeable. Everything has certainly turned out very differently from what I had expected a few weeks ago. I think the Jew was determined at all events to make a union impossible in that direction, and not to risk his ascendancy in his Cabinet, which seems to have been complete.

"I hope the new Government may do good service. We shall be fired into by both extremes, and it will be anything but pleasant. I felt that it was my duty to help in any way I could, and if we fail, at any rate, as the old Duke used to say, 'we shall have done our best.'

"I wonder sometimes how any one can engage in public life; and yet the willingness of men of fortune

and station to undertake the labour and the cares, and face the abuse, is what maintains this nation. Still, sometimes, when I look at little George,[1] I think, 'When you grow up, if you want something to do, sweep a crossing, but don't go into Parliament.'

"We have lost a great many trees in the gale here. One of the two large elms on the left of the walk going to the East Seat has lost his head, a large oak on the right has fallen, a large limb of a cedar is hanging over the river, an elm between the orangery and the island, an immense old ash in Sir Philip Sidney's walk, and two elms near the old Netherhampton wall and gate were blown down. . . ."

[1] His eldest son.

CHAPTER VII

THE EVE OF WAR

1853–54

THE Cabinet of Lord Aberdeen was composed in nearly equal numbers of those who had followed the leadership of Lord John Russell and those who had been the adherents of Sir Robert Peel. Up to the fall of that great minister, in 1846, they had always found themselves opposed to one another in the contests of public life; but from that date the relations between the old Whig party and the more liberal section of the Conservatives were greatly changed. During the life of Sir Robert Peel, his friends, like their leader, gave a general, though somewhat critical, support to Lord John Russell's Government. After Peel's death the chief among them drew yet closer to the Liberals. In 1851, Lord Aberdeen admitted that, except for the Ecclesiastical Titles Bill, it was distrust of the foreign policy of the Cabinet, as administered by Lord Palmerston, which alone alienated his sympathies from the existing administration; and on the removal of Lord Palmerston from the Foreign Office at the close of that year, he openly avowed his wish that his friends should join the Government. The fall of Lord John Russell, however, two months later, prevented these wishes from bearing the fruit they would otherwise have done. Common hostility to Lord Derby's Government cemented the alliance of Conservative Liberals

and Liberal Conservatives, and when, at the end of 1852, the Queen again sent for Lord Aberdeen, there was little difficulty in effecting that agreement between him and Lord John to work together in office, which, but for the Ecclesiastical Titles Act, would have been accomplished in the previous year. Composed as it was of men formerly opponents, who had only lately acted in concert, it was generally supposed that the new Cabinet must from the first be split into two hostile camps. Such, however, was far from being the case. As a matter of fact, nothing could be more cordial or united than were the relations of its members during the first year of its existence, I might, indeed, say throughout its whole existence; for though there undoubtedly arose a great diversity of opinion as to the policy of the war with Russia, and subsequently as to its conduct, that division did not follow the old lines of party cleavage.

In every Cabinet there are, of course, differences of opinion on many topics; but in those which arose in Lord Aberdeen's Cabinet in 1853, the disputants on both sides were in all cases composed of a mingled array of Whigs and Peelites.

The dissentients from Mr. Gladstone's Budget of 1853 were Lord Lansdowne, Lord Palmerston, and Sir Charles Wood, all members, no doubt, of Lord John Russell's Cabinet; but Lord John Russell himself, Lord Clarendon, Lord Granville, and others, who were equally members of Lord John's previous administration, shared the views of Lord Aberdeen, Mr. Gladstone, and Sir James Graham.

On the Reform question, Lord Palmerston, Lord Lansdowne, and Mr. Gladstone constituted the minority who deprecated any change in the Parliamentary Franchise.

On the question of the prosecution or postponement of the Bill for the renewal of the East India Company's Charter, Lord John was the sole member of the Government in favour of the latter course. All his own former colleagues, as well as the remainder of the Cabinet, held an opposite opinion.

On the questions connected with the Russian war, the division was not that of Whigs and Peelites. Sir W. Molesworth was the most advanced Liberal in the Cabinet. There could not be a more typical party Whig than Lord Granville. But both were heartily agreed with Lord Aberdeen and Mr. Gladstone. The Duke of Newcastle was a Peelite of the Peelites; but he was as warlike in tone as Lord Palmerston or Lord Lansdowne.

But even in 1853, though harmony existed in the Cabinet, the old influences of party feeling still reigned supreme in the regions just beyond it. All Whigs who had been disappointed of office (a disappointment rendered all the more keen by the inclusion in the new administration of men on their own side whose superiority to themselves they did not admit) looked with resentful antipathy on the new Government, and especially on those members of it who seemed in their eyes to be usurping the posts which, in a purely Whig administration, they might themselves have filled. This resentment was perhaps all the stronger because it had to be concealed; for, as followers of Lord John Russell and members of his party, they could not openly condemn the course which he had taken in joining Lord Aberdeen, or vote against measures which he had had a share in preparing.

Nor can it in fairness be denied that there were some among the Peelites who took a somewhat similar

view as to their own exclusive merits. Mr. Cardwell, who, though in office as President of the Board of Trade, was not in the Cabinet, met Lord Granville at Carlsbad in September, 1854. He is described by the latter in a letter to Mr. Herbert as a very great resource, though "ponderous and insisting on explaining astronomical problems in a popular manner to Lady G." But he goes on to add:

"Argyll used to say that some of the Whigs talked of themselves as if they were a particular breed of spaniels. I certainly never had an idea of what a Peelite was till I had seen much of Cardwell. He is much discontented with the present state of things, and his simple remedy seems to be to get rid of everybody in office except you, Newcastle, Gladstone, Lord Aberdeen, and, perhaps, Graham. I have personal, social, and political objections to this arrangement, but there is much sense in a great deal that he says. Is there much of this sort of old party feeling among the Government people who are not in the Cabinet?"

During the Session of 1853 the Whig discontent, though felt, did not openly show itself, and in both Houses of Parliament the success of the Government measures was striking and complete. On all domestic questions the Cabinet was united and strong, and though there were unpleasant features in the position of foreign affairs, there were few who did not anticipate, at the time of the prorogation of Parliament in September, that the negotiations then going on would terminate in a pacific issue.

Meanwhile, at home the Government had carried triumphantly an original and somewhat startling Budget, had granted a new Charter, on new terms, to the East India Company, had abolished all patronage connected with first appointments to the Indian Service, and effected much other useful legislation with unvarying success.

In all these things Sidney Herbert took interest and played his part, but he was, of course, chiefly occupied with the duties of his own office. For the first six months of 1853 they were, generally speaking, as "dull and dry" as he had declared them to be eight years earlier. Monotonous routine, the close inspection of a dreary mass of trivial details and statistics, made up their sum. Opportunities for coming into close touch with the soldier's life were few, and those for initiating large schemes of reform yet fewer; but whenever they presented themselves, they were eagerly seized and improved to the utmost. Very soon after his appointment his generous spirit revolted against an attempt of the Treasury to deprive the military pensioners in Canada of the land granted them, and to substitute for it a small annual payment. He wrote urgently to Mr. Wilson, then Secretary to the Treasury, saying that he foresaw several evil results from the course taken by the Treasury in this matter:

"1. A promise of land formally made to the soldiers by authority is one thing, and a compensation in money for the non-fulfilment of the promise is another. The soldier prefers the land, and will still hold that faith has not been kept with him. Soldiers and sailors understand nothing about State convenience, but they do understand a direct promise and they resent its violation.

"2. A sum of money given to a soldier in lieu of land is a positive evil to him. The money will be improvidently disposed of, and the men will be left with nothing but their pension.

"3. If the pensioner is not retained on or adjoining to the spot where his services are required, he will be of no use as a soldier. Pensioners dispersed over the backwoods are, of course, not available for service in case of emergency.

"The result will have been therefore a great and

wanton waste of public money, for if the pensioners' services are not to be made available for public protection, the whole expense of conveying them to Canada (and it has been large) has been thrown away, and if we are to replace them by regular troops, not only will the expense be still further increased, but a retrograde step will be taken as to the relations of the Colony to the Mother Country as regards military defence. . . . The question of value cannot affect an engagement nor diminish the feeling, which will be, and is already, excited by the breach of faith.

"I confess I entirely agree with the view taken by Lord Grey and Mr. Fox-Maule, and when the question comes before Parliament I must acquit them of any complicity in the transaction. If portions of the Reserve are worth immense sums per acre as accommodation land, and other land in contiguity can be obtained for the pensioners with the proceeds of it by sale, that arrangement might be worth consideration; but land ought to be given to the pensioner for his sake and with a view to our own character, and that land ought to be near to Toronto for the sake of the public, who have a claim to the services of the pensioner in return for the cost of sending him out. . . ."

With all his aristocratic and conservative instincts Sidney Herbert was a born reformer. His energies were always directed not to the petrification of existing institutions, but to improving them into increased usefulness. He had shown this in regard to the Cathedrals, to Assisted Emigration, to Military Education, and, indeed, on every subject which interested him. The time was now favourable for Military Reform.

The death of the Duke of Wellington in September, 1852, rendered practicable many changes in Army administration, which during his lifetime it would have been impossible to effect, and into the prosecution of these reforms Sidney Herbert threw himself with characteristic eagerness. There is a popular

belief that, while the Duke lived, the introduction of any new weapon for use in the Army was steadily discouraged. This is an error. The Duke had, no doubt, a prejudice (in the circumstances a natural one) in favour of the arm by which his own successes had been achieved; but that prejudice yielded to evidence which carried with it conviction, and more than a year before his death the Duke had, both officially and privately, expressed his wish that the whole of the infantry of the British Army should be armed with the Minié rifle, which had lately been adopted by the French troops.[1]

Even had this not been the case, and had the Duke of Wellington been as much disinclined to the introduction of improved armaments as he unquestionably was to that of other reforms which experience suggested and time had rendered necessary, no obstacle now stood in the way of the supersession of the smooth-bore musket by a more serviceable arm. Experiments were at once set on foot, which had for their result the invention of the Enfield rifle. That arm has now been superseded by later and yet more perfect weapons, but its adoption by the Army was the first great step taken in the way of

[1] In writing officially to the Marquess of Anglesey, then Master-General of the Ordnance, on May 13th, 1851, he had said:

"I quite concur in your Lordship's opinion of the superiority of the Minié Rifled Musquet, with which I consider it desirable that all the Infantry of Her Majesty's Army should be supplied." And when writing privately to the same officer on October 7th, he dwelt upon the great importance of having only one pattern of musket in common use, and the consequent necessity for providing the Minié Rifles speedily.

"This appears to me to be so necessary," he wrote, "that if the fifty odd thousand musquet barrels now in store cannot be turned into the Minié musquets of the same calibre with the newly ordered Minié musquets, I would recommend you to sacrifice the value of fifty odd thousand pounds," and at once purchase more Minié Rifles.

a reform of military armament. Nor was the weapon itself, if inferior to some creations of later date, other than a most powerful and useful arm. A greater gap lies between it and the "Brown Bess" of former days than between any later military rifle and itself.

The experiments at Enfield, though not originated by him, were largely instigated and warmly sustained by Mr. Herbert, while the early adoption of the new rifle throughout the Army was largely due to his insistence. Without his backing the experiments might have been prematurely discontinued. The expense attending the issue of a new kind of arm to the whole of the British Army would probably have been deemed a sufficient reason for hesitating to take so bold a step, or at least for taking it only partially and by slow degrees.

Another measure, for which Mr. Herbert was largely responsible, was the formation of an experimental camp at Chobham. This was at the time an entire novelty, no such camp having existed for nearly half a century. It revealed many wants and imperfections, which there was not sufficient time to cure before the commencement of hostilities in the following year. But the lessons there learned proved of the utmost service when the troops first took the field. This camp was the precursor of Aldershot Camp, which has been of such great utility, and is now an integral and important part of the English military system. So accustomed are we now to its existence, that the denunciations which its foundation drew forth from even large-minded and sober-judging friends of peace, between 1855 and 1859, appear to-day well-nigh unintelligible; but at that time the wide prevalence of a prejudice against any permanent

military encampment, formed no slight obstacle to all plans for improving the efficiency of the Army and bettering its condition.

Much of Sidney Herbert's time was also taken up by efforts to provide a better education for both officers and men; but these efforts may be better described along with those of later years in the same direction. They will be found in a subsequent chapter devoted to the subject of Sidney Herbert's work in connection with the cause of Army Education.

The Session closed triumphantly, and the acceptance of the Vienna Note by the Emperor of Russia appeared for a short time to remove all apprehension of any disturbance to the peace of Europe. But the unexpected rejection of the Note by the Porte, followed at a short interval by its declaration of war against Russia, entirely changed the face of affairs; and though war between Great Britain and Russia was not actually declared until March, 1854, its rapidly deepening shadow darkened the last three or four months of the previous year.

It is a curious fact, and one which should not be forgotten, that at the beginning of 1853, though apprehensions of war were entertained, they were of war, not with Russia, but with France. Lord Palmerston almost immediately on assuming office pressed strongly for the fortification of the Channel Islands, and expressed apprehensions that the Emperor of the French might entertain designs of seizing them. Sidney Herbert urged that not only would any plan for the fortification of the Channel Islands involve very great expense, but that it was improbable that Louis Napoleon would undertake an adventure which Napoleon the Great at the height of his power, had

never attempted. Lord Palmerston's reply is worthy of record[1]:

"I think the fact that Napoleon the First never made an attempt on the Channel Islands may be accounted for by reasons which do not apply to Napoleon the Third.

"The elder Napoleon had his mind and his armies almost always engaged by great Continental wars. He was not a man accustomed to stoop to pick up his sixpences. He meant at one time to invade England in great force, but, foiled in that attempt, he went off to great operations elsewhere. Steam navigation was not then practised, and the seas round the Channel Islands are, from the rapidity of tides and quantity of rocks, dangerous for sailing vessels, and especially for a fleet of transports. We had during the war good garrisons in the islands, and our large military force at home afforded us the means of succour or recapture; and then after Trafalgar we had the complete command of the seas, so that no expedition to those islands would have any chance of permanent success. Moreover, Cherburgh [*sic*] and the other neighbouring ports were not then what they are now.

"In the present state of things the French might by steam easily throw a large body of troops into the Channel Islands, and if they gained intire [*sic*] possession we should find it a hard matter to expel them.

"Those islands in our hands are a security for our Channel trade and a powerful check on French naval operations. In the hands of the French they would give them the complete command of the southern part of the Channel to harass our trade, and we could not watch the French ports and their naval movements except by having strong blockading squadrons constantly at sea.

"The Duke of Wellington, who was a good judge of strategy, attached the greatest importance to these islands as a military position. The best thing would be to fortify them all, to have good harbours in each, and in each a good garrison, with a squadron in the one best suited for it at the moment; but this is impossible: what is possible is to make Alderney

[1] Lord Palmerston to Mr. Herbert, February 5th, 1853.

strong enough to hold out with a comparatively small garrison till relieved, and to give it a harbour capable of receiving a good squadron and sufficiently commanded to be no resting-place for French ships of war. This is what is now proposed and what seems of great importance. With Alderney thus safe, Guernsey and Jersey would not be easily taken by the French.

"It would be something in point of moral effect for us to lose islands which have belonged to us since the Norman Conquest."

Sidney Herbert himself wrote that he was informed on sure authority that—

"there are at Dunkirk, Calais, Boulogne, Havre, and Dieppe steamers enough to tow over 75,000 men in sailing vessels at one trip.

" . . . One year's work with £30,000 will put Portsmouth beyond hazard by a *coup de main*."

But as the year went on the prospect materially altered. As the apprehensions of a rupture with France waned, those of a conflict with Russia augmented. A quarrel had arisen between Russia and Turkey, not so much as to the custody of the Holy Places at Jerusalem, as with regard to the bad faith shown by the Porte in its negotiations on the subject. This quarrel assumed an acute form almost exactly contemporaneously with the formation of the Aberdeen Government. It rapidly assumed a more serious character.

At the end of the summer, England, in concert with Austria, Prussia, and France, but in more strict and especial concert with the last-named Power, was to be found engaged in endeavours to arrange pacifically, differences which had now become far from easy of settlement, and which were recognised as a serious source of danger to the peace of Europe. It was not generally anticipated that war would ensue;

but little by little, as the negotiations proceeded, England was drawn into closer relations with France on the one hand and with Turkey on the other, becoming more and more morally bound to give active assistance to Turkey in her resistance to the Russian demands, and more and more entangled in common action with France, from which no escape was allowed by the Emperor Louis Napoleon. Some members of the English Cabinet were disposed to foster this separate action of France and England, to make light of the concert of the Powers of Europe, and to anticipate without apprehension or serious regret the prospect of war with Russia. Others—and they formed the large majority of the Cabinet—regarded the possibility of war with abhorrence and dismay, and strongly deprecated being committed to any course of action in advance of that which was supported by the concert of the great Powers of Europe, and was therefore irresistible. Of this latter number was Sidney Herbert; but the fact that he was himself, through his mother, half a Russian, and a nephew of the Governor-General of Georgia and the Caucasus, Prince Woronzow, imposed on him a degree of reticence which he would not otherwise have shown in combating the apprehensions expressed with regard to the designs of Russia, or in demonstrating the impolicy of lending an unqualified support to Turkey.

Much as has been written about the Crimean War, its causes are even yet very imperfectly understood, and its object as imperfectly appreciated. That object might have been attained—more slowly no doubt, but probably more surely—without war, the main causes of which are to be looked for, not in the course of the negotiations, but in events exterior to them.

It was held by all parties in England, except perhaps

a few individuals here and there, that the possession of Constantinople by Russia, with a free entry for her fleets into the Mediterranean, would constitute a menace and danger to Europe, and that a similar danger would arise if Russia possessed by treaty such a right of interference in the domestic affairs of Turkey as would give her a virtual control of the Sultan's actions. But while all agreed that the possession of Constantinople by Russia would constitute a danger to Europe, there was a great divergence of view as to the probability of any descent on Constantinople being made. Any intention of taking or even occupying Constantinople was always disclaimed by Russia; and Lord Aberdeen and others, among them Sidney Herbert, considered this disclaimer to be probably sincere, not because they had much belief in Russian disinterestedness, but because they thought the Emperor Nicholas unwilling to incur the general hostility of Europe, and endued with sufficient patience to await a more favourable opportunity. A section, and no unimportant section, of the Cabinet took a very different view, and believed a descent on Constantinople to be fully planned and its execution imminent. This was also the view generally taken by the public and by the press, and probably even now the popular idea of the Crimean War is that it was undertaken to protect the Sultan from an attack on Constantinople. But it cannot be truly said that the war was undertaken to resist an attack which was never threatened, and probably never contemplated. All the Powers of Europe and all the members of the English Cabinet were at one in their determination to oppose a Russian attack on Constantinople, and the only difference of opinion among them on that subject was as to the

greater or less probability of such an attack being made.

It was far otherwise with the other threatened danger. Any amount of conflicting opinions might exist as to the degree in which the terms of a diplomatic arrangement did or did not give to Russia an undue influence over the internal administration of Turkey. It was apprehension of this danger, not that of a descent on Constantinople, which brought about the interposition of the Western Powers in the differences of the Porte with Russia. That danger might have been, and with the exercise of a little more patience would have been, as effectually averted by negotiation as by war. All the Great Powers of Europe, England included, agreed that Russia had a right to demand some guarantee for the future observance of promises made to her, but which had been broken; and all the Great Powers, Russia included, were agreed that no power should be given to Russia dangerous to the independent sovereignty of the Sultan. The question was how to arrange terms which would satisfy both these conditions. It was clear that the Emperor of Russia would accept a settlement pressed on him by the united concert of Europe; and an all-important object, therefore, to all who desired peace was the maintenance of that concert.

It is impossible to review in detail the negotiations which occupied the six months subsequent to the rejection of the Vienna Note without perceiving that, had they been prolonged, terms would have been ultimately arrived at, which Austria certainly, and Prussia probably, would have agreed with England and France in pressing—and if necessary in forcing—upon Russia, and which Russia would have in that case accepted. But this did not suit either those who

wished for war, or those who, while really desirous of peace, believed war to be inevitable, and therefore naturally wished that it should be undertaken under the most favourable conditions. The reasons urged for an immediate declaration of war in March, 1854, appear now, at this distance of time, altogether inadequate. They were that its delay would involve the loss of a part of the season most favourable for active operations, and the fear that the interval would be used by Russia in strengthening her defences and completing her preparations. The impatience—the irrational impatience—of the English nation was not to be restrained, and war was declared before it could with truth be said that the resources of negotiation were exhausted. This will be the more clearly seen if we attempt to separate the course of the actual negotiations for the discovery of an arrangement which should reconcile the difference between what Russia asked to receive and what Turkey was willing to give, from those events external to the negotiations themselves which irritated public feeling in England on the one hand and the pride of the Russian Emperor on the other, and became the real causes of the ultimate rupture.

When the Porte first refused to sign, except with modifications of its own, the Note which the Powers of Europe had prepared on its behalf, and which the Emperor of Russia had intimated his willingness to accept as a satisfaction of his demands, no one could have felt surprise or expressed censure if the Emperor had refused any additional concession, and had simply repeated his willingness to accept that which his allies had already asked him to receive. But, in fact, he did not do so. He was as willing after as he had been before the rejection of the Note to come to an

arrangement. He assured Lord Westmorland at Olmütz that he asked for no new rights, no increased authority, that he desired nothing for the protection of his co-religionists but what was *already* conceded to him by treaties, and the *status quo* established by those treaties. He could, he said, now do nothing but remain passive, and wait till the just pretensions he had put forward, as a security for the rights he possessed by treaties, were accorded to him.[1] At the same time he, through Count Nesselrode, urged Count Buol to propose that the original Vienna Note should be signed by the Porte, and that the Powers should sign a declaration that what the Emperor desired was only for a general guarantee of the immunities already granted to the Greek Church, and that he asked for nothing which could in any way prejudice the independence or rights of the Sultan or which would imply a desire to interfere with the internal affairs of the Porte. What he desired was the strict maintenance of the *status quo* in all matters appertaining to the Orthodox Greek Church, and a promise to make that Church participate in any future advantages which at any time subsequent to the present, the Sultan might be disposed to grant to any other denomination of Christians.[2]

These proposals were not closed with, and that for sufficient reasons. It is true that the course suggested was substantially the same as that which, on the first receipt of the Emperor of Russia's refusal to accept a modified Note, it had been intended by England and France to impose upon the Porte; but the publication of the Russian despatch analysing those modifications had so dis-

[1] Lord Westmorland to Lord Clarendon September 27th, 1853.
[2] *Idem*, September 28th, 1853.

credited the original Note as to make it impossible to force its acceptance on the Porte, even with the clumsy guarantee mentioned—nor did the last clause commend itself to the Powers as acceptable without the addition of the final words, "being subjects of the Porte." But the Russian overtures were generally temperate, and might have well been used for a basis of fresh negotiation. They possessed special value on account of the personal assurance given by the Emperor Nicholas to Lord Westmorland; The Emperor of Austria had made himself personally responsible for the sincerity and loyalty of that declaration. He strongly urged Lord Westmorland to press on Her Majesty's Government the expediency of accepting the arrangement which Count Buol and Count Nesselrode, with the approval of the two Emperors, had formulated. "If I were not entirely persuaded of the sincerity with which the Emperor Nicholas has made me these declarations," said the Emperor Francis Joseph, "I would not recommend to you to transmit to your Government the decision he has thus announced; but being so, I beg you will state them, and on my part call on the Queen's Ministers to aid in securing their attainment."[1]

The French Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Drouyn de Lhuys, was at first inclined to receive this proposal favourably; but, after conference with the British Cabinet, the Emperor Napoleon concurred with it in considering that the adoption of the original Vienna Note had then become impossible. This was intimated to the Austrian Government; and it was right that it should have been so, for events had then made proposals, which would at one time have been accepted with eagerness, out of the question. But, unfortu-

[1] Lord Westmorland to Lord Clarendon, September 27th, 1853.

nately, this notification was not accompanied by any corresponding overture. The Austrian suggestion, which Russia had declared its willingness to accept, was coldly declined, the reasons for so doing being forcibly stated by Lord Clarendon. There, so far as England was concerned, the matter was allowed to rest, and negotiations for the time terminated. It was this omission which Lord Aberdeen subsequently so bitterly regretted. He believed that, had he insisted, counter-proposals might then have been made, which would have been adopted, and would have led to the preservation of peace. What was done was to adopt a proposal made by Lord Stratford that a new Note should be prepared, embodying the spirit of the Turkish modifications. This proposal was, in the first instance, rejected by Austria, on the ground that, if the original Note were set aside, there was no use in proposing a modified version of it; but the policy was adhered to by England and France, and Lord Stratford was informed of this in an excellent despatch of October 24th, in which the hope was expressed that it might arrive in time to avert war; but if not, and if fighting had begun, it was urged that all further progress of hostilities should be suspended by the Porte for a reasonable time during the course of the negotiations. How this important order was met will be hereafter seen.

On October 25th the negotiations may be said to have been renewed by the proposal of Count Buol that the Ministers of the four Powers at Vienna should address a collective Note to the Porte, containing a renewed declaration of the assurances given by the Emperor of Russia, and their own adherence to the conditions to which the Porte had agreed, and

inviting the conclusion of an armistice and a treaty on these bases.

Meanwhile, on October 22nd, Lord Stratford had prepared the draft of a declaration and new Note "for the use of the Conference," whilst other drafts of these instruments accompanying Lord Clarendon's instructions of October 24th were sent from England to Vienna. Count Buol not unreasonably preferred his own scheme to that suggested by England, rightly observing that it was based on an overture of the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, and that therein lay one of the best chances of its acceptance. Now that war between Turkey and Russia had begun, a Note could not restore peace, and he thought any Note from the Porte should be addressed to the Conference rather than to Russia. He consequently declined, without further discussion, to support the English proposals at Constantinople; while the French Government, on the other hand, flatly refused to adopt Count Buol's scheme, which it considered would certainly be rejected by the Porte, and would convert a question of European interest into one to be settled between the Porte and Russia. On November 20th, after much correspondence, a complete understanding between the four Powers was, however, re-established, a Note agreed to for presentation to the Turkish Government by the Ambassador at Constantinople, and a protocol signed, which, with the Note, was communicated to the Turkish Ambassador at Vienna.

But, after all, that Note was never presented to the Porte, the Ambassadors at Constantinople having already devised and presented one on their own account, and much precious time was lost in discussing their relative merits. Although Count Buol was indignant at this substitution, he in the end agreed to

make the best of what had actually been done, and could not then be undone, and on January 13th the terms on which Turkey was willing to make peace were approved by the Conference, and were forwarded by it to St. Petersburg, with an intimation that the Conference considered them fitting conditions for acceptance by Russia. These propositions laboured under one great disadvantage at St. Petersburg—a disadvantage which terms elaborated at Vienna or Paris would not have had: they were known to have been mainly prepared by Lord Stratford, and were therefore sure to be regarded suspiciously by the Emperor Nicholas. It was hardly to be expected that Russia should accept them exactly as they stood; nor indeed were they proposed as an ultimatum. There was therefore nothing extraordinary in a proposal being made to amend them. Count Orloff was despatched to Vienna, mainly in hopes of securing a promise of the neutrality of Austria, in the probably impending war—a promise which he failed to obtain. But he was also the bearer of counter-propositions in reply to those put forward on behalf of Turkey by the Conference on January 13th, and on leaving Vienna on his return to Russia he expressed his willingness to recommend the Emperor to send from St. Petersburg to Vienna the preliminaries of a peace based on the propositions of January 13th; to authorise M. de Meyendorff, the Russian Minister at Vienna, to introduce into them any modifications thought necessary by the Conference, to the consideration of which they would be submitted; to consent that these preliminaries, if approved, should be sent without delay to Constantinople; and to agree that their acceptance by the Porte should be followed at once by an armistice, the immediate evacuation of the

Principalities by the Russian troops, and of the Black Sea by the English and French fleets.

The Emperor of the French very truly observed that, if Count Orloff's suggestions were adopted, the question of the dispute between Russia and Turkey was in his opinion settled, because every point of consequence had been guarded by the propositions of January 13th, the substantial acceptance of which was to form the basis of the suggested arrangement. Nevertheless, he joined England in acting as though no such overture had been made, and, without waiting to see the promised proposals embodying it, the two Governments despatched to St. Petersburg a summons to the Emperor Nicholas to evacuate the Principalities before a certain day—a summons which was, in fact, a virtual declaration of war. The messenger bearing it reached Vienna at the same time that the Russian proposals founded on Count Orloff's report arrived there, and was detained, more or less grudgingly, till those proposals were seen by the Conference. They were pronounced by it to be inadmissible, and the messenger of war proceeded unchecked upon his way.

These "inadmissible" proposals (not offered, be it observed, as an ultimatum) but slightly differed from those which the Allies had themselves proposed. They did so only in the following particulars:

In Article III. of the Russian project of treaty, after the enumeration of the firmans, by which privileges have been conferred on Christian communities, the words "nommément en ce qui concerne le culte et les églises du rit Grec" are added; and when the privileges of the Christian Churches are mentioned, the Russian project adds "droits et immunités." In the draft sent from Vienna, it is provided that the firman in question

was to be communicated to the Powers and to Russia specially: the Russian draft adds that it shall also be annexed to the treaty.

Article VI. of the Russian project provides that, on the evacuation of the Principalities, the Black Sea and Bosphorus shall be evacuated simultaneously by the English and French fleets,—a condition not found in the Vienna project.

Article VIII. of the Russian counter-proposal provides that the Russian and Turkish plenipotentiaries should meet at a place to be designated by them. The Vienna project had suggested that the place of meeting should be named by the four Powers.

These differences are slight, and are eminently such as might have been removed by negotiation and discussion.[1] At every fresh stage of the proceedings Russia had conceded something, and it was probable, nay, almost certain, that she would concede still more.

[1] It is not easy to contest the reasoning of the Russian Government on this point.

"In the last attempt just spoken of, which preceded our rupture with the West, the Imperial Cabinet did not reject the conditions of peace proposed by the Porte, but it considered itself justified in discussing them. Since the Turkish Government had been allowed to modify an act put forth by Europe, accepted by us, and presented as an ultimatum, we might well claim the right of discussing a project which had, it is true, the approbation of the Conference, but did not emanate from it. The Porte had been asked on what conditions it would consent to make peace. The Conference approved these conditions and communicated them to us. Was it forbidden to us to examine them and to express our opinion? Or was the Porte to be the sole arbiter in this debate? Of the seven points included in the Turkish proposition, the last two were beyond the question. They referred to the renewal of the arrangement of 1841 and to the internal development of the Turkish administration. We neither rejected them nor accepted them. They did not affect our quarrel with the Porte. As to the first five, we adhered to them with two reserves. To begin with, the evacuation of the Principalities (simultaneously with that of the Straits) was to be not the first point, but the last. It

Few will now venture to assert that the negotiations came to an end on account of any irreconcilable deadlock in them. They came to an end because the Western Powers had already determined on war, in every case but that of absolute and unconditional submission on the part of Russia. The grounds of this determination, and of the rupture resulting from it, must be looked for, not in the exhaustion of negotiation, but in events external to it.

It was those events and their consequences which made war inevitable. Both Russia and the Western Powers must in turn incur the blame for steps each of which rendered negotiation more difficult, and a peaceful settlement less probable, but which, once taken, could not be recalled. The first of these steps was taken by Russia, when, on the refusal of the Porte to enter into the engagements demanded of her, not only did Prince Menchikoff bring his own special mission to the Sultan to an abrupt close, but withdrew from Constantinople the whole staff of the ordinary Russian Embassy there. An end was thus put to any further direct negotiation between the two Governments. Had the embassy been entrusted, as was at one time intended, to Count Orloff instead of Prince Menchikoff, it would probably have had a different termination.[1]

was to be the consequence and not the condition of peace. In the next place, negotiations were to be absolutely direct, and were to take place either at St. Petersburg or at Bucharest. There lay the insurmountable obstacle."—*Diplomatic Study on the Crimean War* (Russian official publication), chap. vii., p. 436.

[1] Such at least was the opinion of Count Orloff. Prince Menchikoff having in a letter to him expressed regret that Count Orloff had not been in his place, saying, "Vous auriez montré plus d'esprit, vous auriez eu, sans doute, plus de succès que moi," Count Orloff replied, "Non, je n'aurais pas montré plus d'esprit, mais probablement j'aurais été plus heureux, parceque j'aurais été plus conciliant et que j'aurais pris plus sur moi."

The next dangerous step taken was the despatch of the French fleet to Salamis by the Emperor Louis Napoleon on hearing of Prince Menchikoff's departure from Constantinople. The English Government at that time remained calm, and the quiet stay of the British fleet at Malta went far to neutralise the irritation excited at St. Petersburg by the action of the French Emperor.

Somewhat later a much graver and less excusable advance was made by the Emperor Nicholas, who directed the occupation of the Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia by Russian troops, with the intention of holding those provinces as a material guarantee until he received from the Porte that satisfaction which he required, and to which he deemed himself entitled. Almost at the same time, and in fact quite independently of this act of aggression, the English Government departed from its quiescent attitude by despatching the Mediterranean fleet to the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles. This step was taken against the judgment of Lord Aberdeen, who pointed out that it would not save Constantinople, if, as Lord Clarendon feared, a *coup de main* against it were contemplated by Russia, whilst it would release the Emperor Nicholas from obligations which he had voluntarily contracted.

"If you expect a *coup de main*," he wrote, "it is not at the Dardanelles that you can prevent it. . . . If we have good reason to expect an attack on Constantinople, and are disposed to quarrel with Russia for the protection of the Turks, we ought to approach the capital, or rather to enter the Black Sea, by which means any naval movement on the part of Russia could be effectually stopped. The only effect of such half-measures as are recommended would be to release the Emperor of Russia from the obligations which he has voluntarily contracted towards us, without

accomplishing our own object. . . . I think it is unwise to give up the moral guarantee we now possess of the conduct of the Emperor towards us, for no definite object. If he should violate his engagements towards us and give us real ground of offence, if we act at all we ought to resent it worthily, and not by a poor demonstration, which only insults him, and does nothing effectual either for us or for the Power we desire to protect. . . . I think our best prospect of success [in preserving peace] is to be found in the union of the Four Powers, and in their firm but friendly representations at St. Petersburg."

These were words of wisdom, but they were far too calm and dispassionate for men animated by a jealous suspicion of Russia, or influenced by the desire to satisfy popular clamour.

Lord Clarendon, in pressing for the advance of the fleets, wrote:

"I recommend this as the least measure that *will satisfy public opinion* and save the Government from shame hereafter, if, as I firmly believe, the Russian hordes pour into Turkey from every side. *It may do some good to ourselves*, which should not be our last consideration."

Meanwhile, in spite of the injudicious steps taken on all sides, the Governments of Austria, England, France, and Prussia succeeded in framing an arrangement for the peaceable settlement of the original question in dispute between the Emperor of Russia and the Porte. Under it, the Porte would have signed a Note giving to Russia all that she had a right to ask, but at the same time, in the opinion of the Powers, completely safeguarding the rights of Turkey. This Note was accepted at St. Petersburg as a satisfactory settlement, but unfortunately the fatal blunder was committed of not, in the first instance, securing the

assent of that Power by which the Note was to be signed. That there were deliberate reasons for this apparent oversight is not improbable; but its results were not the less disastrous. Full advantage of it was taken by Turkey to suggest modifications of the Note. The acceptance of these modifications was recommended to Russia by the Four Powers, but declined by the Emperor Nicholas on the ground that he could allow no alteration to be made in the settlement which had already been recommended by the Great Powers of Europe for his acceptance, and to which he had already assented. Probably, had matters rested there, the signature of the Note, accompanied by a guarantee of the Four Powers as to its interpretation, would have been forced upon the Porte, or, in the event of its refusal, the Powers would have retired from further interference in the dispute. But the publication in a Berlin newspaper, whether through an act of indiscretion or treachery is not known, of a despatch from Count Nesselrode to Baron Meyendorff, which showed that Russia interpreted the Note in a sense different from that assigned to it at Vienna, made it difficult further to press its acceptance on the Porte, and the idea of doing so was, after a short hesitation, abandoned.

Meanwhile, the action taken by Russia was conciliatory and judicious, a fresh plan of accommodation being suggested by the Emperor Nicholas—a plan which has been already described when rapidly narrating the course of the negotiations. This scheme was essentially the same as the plan of Note and guarantee which had been proposed at Vienna. A few weeks earlier, before the publication of Count Nesselrode's despatch, it would have been hailed with satisfaction, but circumstances had now so changed as to render

it no practical solution. The prospect, however, of the possibility of any peaceful settlement created the utmost alarm at Constantinople, and led the Porte to take the step which, more than any which had preceded it, aggravated the difficulty of the situation: it determined to declare war with Russia. Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, who had been directed to do his utmost to prevent this catastrophe, formally obeyed his instructions, remonstrated against the commencement of hostilities, and deprecated their prosecution, when, at a rather later period, he was directed to obtain a suspension of hostilities during the progress of negotiations. But he was not a man whose real opinions were readily concealed, and it was easy for the Porte to perceive that his sympathies were wholly on the side of Turkey, and that, while he did what he deemed to be his strict duty under the instructions he had received, he would not do more. He had great personal influence at the Porte. When he found any resistance to his wishes, or even hesitation to comply with them, he was accustomed to demand, as was his right, a personal interview with the Sultan, and seldom, if ever, had the Sultan been known to resist the pressure of his terrible insistence. He was urged by his diplomatic colleagues to try again the effect of a proceeding which had so often before proved efficacious. He coldly refused.

"I replied," he wrote,[1] "that . . . I could not perceive the slightest chance of any success to result from the proposed step. Were the Sultan, I observed, to comply with our advice, he would thereby expose himself to no small degree of embarrassment and even of danger. The order to summon a general council had emanated directly from the throne, and the resolutions submitted by that assembly for His

[1] Lord Stratford to Lord Clarendon, October 17th, 1853.

Majesty's approval had been unanimously adopted in accordance with the opinion of the Mussulman public. The Sultan could not therefore accede to our representations without placing himself in flagrant opposition to the chief notabilities of his empire, who had expressed the national sentiment, and also in contradiction virtually of his own deliberate act. . . . Compliance might save him from the immediate perils of war, but only at the risk of disturbing the public tranquillity, and finally of losing both his throne and his life."

Can this be interpreted otherwise than as the language of a man who had, as he deemed, scrupulously fulfilled his official duty of making remonstrances against the declaration of war, but who really believed that the Sultan would do well to disregard them, and who therefore declined to take any step, however likely to prove efficacious in preventing war, which had not been officially prescribed to him?[1]

The Porte felt secure that, whatever verbal disapproval might be intimated, it would not fail to receive the practical support of England; and though professing to delay for a fortnight the commencement of hostilities, took no effective steps to prevent Omar Pasha from crossing the Danube and attacking the Russian forces in Wallachia on the day originally appointed—if not, indeed, a day earlier.

Meanwhile, in spite of these sinister events, an agreement between the Four Powers had restored the concert of Europe; and notwithstanding the obstacles

[1] So at least thought those in the position best enabling them to judge. I find Lord Clarendon writing to Mr. Herbert on September 11th: "It is quite clear that the Turks don't want a settlement. The titular Sultan is for peace, but the real Sultan (Stratford) thinks that now or never is the time for putting an end to Russia. I am afraid there is trouble in store for us." And again, somewhat later, he wrote that "it is to Stratford's *amour propre froissé* that the obstacles to peace must be attributed."

thrown in the way of a pacific settlement by the action of the Turkish Government, there was now again a fair prospect of the settlement of the original dispute, when once more all the difficulties of the situation were aggravated by an unlooked-for event.

On November 5th Lord Stratford reported that he had prevented the despatch of a Turkish fleet to the Black Sea; nor did he ever report that (with or without his previous knowledge) it had on a subsequent date actually gone there. A portion of it returned to Constantinople on November 25th, but another portion was left in the Black Sea, and on November 30th was destroyed in the harbour of Sinope by a Russian squadron. Who was really responsible for the despatch of the Turkish fleet to the Black Sea, what were its objects, and how its entrance into the Black Sea escaped Lord Stratford's vigilance—or, if it did not, failed to be reported by him—are, I believe, still mysteries. Whether the inquiries on the first point, which were at once instituted, ever received an answer, I do not know. What I do know is that, although frequently repeated, they had not received any answer whatever in February, 1855, considerably more than a year later, from which time my personal knowledge of such matters ceased.

The news of the battle, somewhat absurdly styled the Massacre of Sinope, lighted up a flame in England which there was no quenching; and from that time it is unquestionable that war was eagerly desired by the people, and that under the pressure of public opinion steps were taken by the Governments of England and France which went far to make it inevitable. Sir James Graham had already pointed out the danger of the instructions to Lord Stratford, which gave him a contingent power of sending the fleets into the Black

Sea. It was felt certain that he would exercise it. It was falsely reported by telegraph that he had already exercised it, and the proposition of France that the fleets should enter the Black Sea and prevent Russian ships traversing it was therefore agreed to as the formal sanction of an act already performed and consequently irrevocable. This was the next door to war, but there was still an opportunity for avoiding actual hostilities. Russia asked whether this veto was to be equally imposed as against both belligerent powers, or against Russia only? It was only on receiving a reply in the latter sense that the Emperor Nicholas withdrew his ministers from London and Paris.

But even yet there was still a last chance of preserving peace. Negotiations had been going on all the while, and, so far as the settlement of the original quarrel between Russia and Turkey was concerned, had been going on successfully. On January 13th, 1854, terms of peace between Russia and Turkey, approved by all the Powers and accepted by Turkey, were forwarded from Vienna to St. Petersburg. While they were still under consideration, and before any answer had been received from Russia, it was determined by France and England to summon the Emperor Nicholas to evacuate the Principalities, and to consider his refusal as a declaration of war. The step was precipitate, injudicious, and disastrous. Terms had been sent to St. Petersburg, the acceptance of which by Russia would, as the Emperor Louis Napoleon justly observed, put an end to all strife, and yet he agreed, if he did not actually propose, without waiting for an answer, to take a step which would render accommodation impossible. Thus to anticipate the course of events was unjustifiable, and can only be

accounted for by fear of running counter to the war fever in France and England. The precipitancy with which the summons was sent was as injudicious as it was uncalled for. It fatally compromised peace, and it broke up the concert of Europe, which was the guarantee of peace. It served the interests of Turkey and those of Louis Napoleon, who desired for the moment an exclusive English alliance; but had it been delayed, it is almost certain that war might have been avoided. The Russian modifications, on the Vienna draft of preliminaries, inadmissible, perhaps, as they stood, were, as has already been shown, very slight, and might have been arranged.[1] Even if they had not, the summons ought never to have been sent till Austria was ready to support it, not only with words, but arms. True, the British Government thought they had secured this support, but in such a matter there should have been no room left for doubt. Had the summons not been sent till Austria was prepared (as she was a few months later) to insist on the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Principalities, peace would almost certainly have been preserved. If not, the war would have been of short duration. The truth is that the final rupture was wholly due to the abrupt cessation of negotiations which, if carried on in good faith and with a belief in their honesty, might have led to a different issue. But this belief did not exist, and the impatience of the English people, altogether generous, and not unnatural, if somewhat irrational, precipitated a decision.

[1] "At the present day (1862) regret is felt that we did not accept this position just as it was offered to us by the Austrian Government. This is neither the first nor the last time that expression has been given to this regret during the course of this fatal crisis."—*Diplomatic Study on the Crimean War*, 1852—1856 (Russian official publication), chap. vii., p. 434.

On an impartial and distant view it is difficult to resist the conclusion that, whilst acting in good faith ourselves, we entirely misapprehended the quarters in which it was wanting on the part of others. Bad faith was suspected on the part of Russia and of Austria. The entire good faith of the latter Power has since been without doubt established. And it would certainly appear not only that there was no desire for war on the part of the Emperor Nicholas, but that the objects at which he really aimed at that time in Turkey were neither extravagant nor unjustifiable. We believed, or professed to believe, in the good faith of France and Turkey, neither of whom really desired peace—the latter because it was perfectly aware that it would never again have so favourable a chance of entering into a contest with Russia with the support of European Powers, the former because it was an object to Louis Napoleon to be prominent and allied with us alone. For his purposes a "concert of Europe" was neither desirable nor favourable, and he therefore did his best to create suspicions of Austria, which Lord Cowley at Paris, and Sir G. Seymour at St. Petersburg, only too greedily swallowed and too industriously spread.

Let us now see what were the personal views and action of Sidney Herbert during this grave period. Mr. Herbert shared Lord Aberdeen's reluctance to sanction the advance of the fleet to the Bosphorus, though he did not foresee so clearly as the latter the disastrous consequences which it might involve. He was one of those who, previously to the disclosure of the Russian interpretation of it, was prepared to insist on the Porte's acceptance of the Vienna Note; and when Sir James Graham, on September 15th, wrote to him that "Stratford Canning

is deeply responsible for the present embarrassing state of affairs, and in truth ought not to have been sent [back] to Constantinople at this juncture; but I have a strong impression that in these days Europe cannot be involved in war on account of the phrases of a Note, and for the sake of the pedantry of a word-mongering and disappointed diplomatist," Sidney Herbert cordially concurred in the sentiments expressed.

A few days later he received a letter in the most optimistic strain from Lord Palmerston, making light of the evils of war, and eulogising the Sultan and the Turkish Government as liberal, progressive, and beneficent.[1]

There are few now who share the strange but honestly entertained delusions of Lord Palmerston and Lord Stratford as to the regeneration of the Turkish Empire. The massacres of Damascus and Syria in 1860, which called forth the reprobation and intervention of united Europe; the massacres in Bulgaria in 1876, which led to the loss by the Sultan of three-fourths of what was then called Turkey in Europe; the massacres in Armenia in 1895 and Constantinople in 1896; the misgovernment and violence now existing in Macedonia, the growing corruption and anarchy in every province of the Ottoman Empire, form a strangely ironical commentary on assumptions that the Turkish system of government is "progressively liberal"; that under it the Christian population is safe from "oppression, vexation, and injury," and well aware that they are better off than they would be under Russian rule; or that they owe gratitude to the Sultan for delivering them, by his

[1] The letter is printed in Mr. Ashley's "Life of Lord Palmerston," vol. ii., p. 36.

"liberal measures and progressive improvement," from "the arbitrary and tyrannical powers which the Greek clergy now too often exercise."

Sidney Herbert neither shared the delusion nor admired the tone of Lord Palmerston, and noted with great alarm the rapid growth of the popular desire for war. In writing to his wife a few days later (October 5th), after telling her that the Emperor of Russia had used very moderate language at Olmütz, and was apparently willing to accept the Turkish modifications of the Note in substance, though not in form, he added:

"I cannot say that I think anything else looks better. The public seems to think that there is nothing to do but to declare war against Russia, just when she is yielding the point in dispute, and back the Turk, just when he acts contrary to our advice; and this without any guarantee on our part obliging us so to act, and without any English or European interest at stake, if the question of the Note be adjusted, as I think it would be, or rather would have been, if the Turks could have been kept quiet. I believe they, the Turks, expect to take Petersburg before Christmas!"

On October 7th the Cabinet reassembled for the first time since the prorogation of Parliament. Lord Clarendon made a *résumé* of what had since taken place, but ended with no specific proposal. Lord Palmerston proposed that, if war against Russia were declared by Turkey, the French and English squadrons should enter the Black Sea, and send word to the admiral at Sebastopol that, in the existing state of things, any Russian ship of war found cruising in the Black Sea would be detained and given over to the Turkish Government. He was faintly supported in general terms by Lord John Russell, who, however, did not appear to his colleagues to be much in earnest

about it. Lord Aberdeen said the course proposed would necessarily involve war with Russia, and the immediate assembling of Parliament, and the Cabinet as a whole concurred with him. Lord Aberdeen, in writing to Sir James Graham, who was in attendance on the Queen at Balmoral, told him that—

"the aspect of the Cabinet was, on the whole very good,—Gladstone active and energetic for peace; Argyll, Herbert, Charles Wood, and Granville all in the same sense; Newcastle not quite so much so; Lansdowne not so warlike as formerly; Lord John warlike enough, but subdued in tone. Palmerston urged his views perseveringly, but not disagreeably. The Chancellor said little, but was evidently peaceful. Molesworth was not present."

Sidney Herbert was one of those who strongly shared Lord Aberdeen's view that greater use should have been made of the disposition shown by the Emperor Nicholas at Olmütz than was actually the case. And he was one of those who would have imposed absolutely on the Turks the necessity for abstaining from hostile operations during negotiation.

The evening after the Cabinet of the 7th, he wrote thus to Lord Clarendon:

"My dear Clarendon,

"You have so much handwriting to read that I hesitate about adding a sheet of paper to the quantity; but a decision must be taken to-day which may lead to momentous consequences, and everything may depend on the manner in which effect is given to that decision by the instructions based upon it. I therefore write what it occurs to me ought to be kept in view in framing these instructions.

"We are all agreed as to the objects in view. We must have a Power at the Bosphorus holding the keys of the Mediterranean from the east, which shall not be Russia, and we cannot allow Russia to encroach upon or undermine the Power which is there necessary

for us. We are not bound by treaty to interfere in this quarrel; but we are bound by our own interests, and by European interests, not to allow Turkey to be overborne. We are further bound in honour not to abandon Turkey in difficulties consequent on a course taken with our sanction and by our advice.

"But if we can secure Turkey without war, we first preserve the general peace, and ward off eventualities which no man can pretend, foresee, or limit; and we do an immense service to Turkey, inasmuch as war, even if successful, must exhaust her. The preparations have pretty well drained her resources; but to maintain these forces through the winter and through a campaign next year will be destruction to her. I need only point to Lord Stratford's opinion on this head.

"Well, we have now got to deal with two eventualities. Two unexpected occurrences are announced to us simultaneously. While negotiations are still pending, war is declared by Turkey. While Turkey is declaring war, the first sign is given of receding on the part of Russia.

"That the Turkish declaration of war greatly aggravates our difficulties no one can deny. It does not destroy the possibility, but it greatly lessens the probability, of peace. It is a declaration on the part of Turkey that negotiations are at an end. Now, she was not negotiating, but we were, and we were the persons who had the right to declare when negotiations had become hopeless. Surely, if Turkey asks and accepts our aid, it must be upon our terms. She has a perfect right to declare war, but the policy and wisdom of the proceeding is for us to judge of, if we are to act in consequence.

"We have a right to say to Turkey, 'We have undertaken to procure you terms by peaceable means, if possible, and, failing these, to protect you in case of war; but we prefer peace to war, if equally effective for our purpose, and you must not by unnecessarily hastening the latter make the former impossible.'

"I know that every allowance is to be made for Turkey, and this act is the act, not of the Sultan nor of his ministers, but of the coffee-houses of Constantinople acting on the fears of the former. This, however, only makes it the more important that we should hold our own, and not allow the fanaticism and folly of the

rabble at Constantinople to supersede the decisions of the Cabinets of Paris and London.

"I assume, however, that the declaration is a *fait accompli*. We cannot abandon Turkey, because in this instance she has acted against the advice and remonstrances of Lord Stratford; but we must take care that we do not, by our conduct on the occasion, stamp that course and fix it as necessarily putting an end to negotiation and leading to war.

"To send our fleets up the Bosphorus, to instruct them to resist any attack on Turkish territory, is the indispensable and just course; but that course, taken alone, is equivalent to an approval of the declaration of war, and, in the present temper of the Turks, will act as an encouragement to them to begin fighting. Should that be the result, there is an end to all hope of a peaceable solution, and an end likewise to the strength and ultimate stability of Turkey—for her Constitution will not stand blood-letting.

"I put myself in the position of an Opposition member reading the blue-books; for we must recollect that, once we are engaged in war, it will not be long before the Opposition, now so warlike, begin to sing the blessings of peace. Our difficulty will then be to show that we took all, and the most effectual, means to preserve peace. The war feeling in this country never long survives the commencement of hostilities, and at present we only hear the noisy part of the population.

"Reading the blue-books, a bystander would say: 'Here are your instructions in case of war; but what efforts have you made in Constantinople to prevent that war actually commencing?' I find here, to my great surprise, a report from Olmütz of the Emperor having offered to adopt the sense of the principal modification proposed by the Turks. True, that modification gives to the Greeks something which the Roman Catholics alone had before; but if the Turk is willing to give that—and Reschid Pasha has so written it—are we to insist on the Turks refusing what they do not object to grant? At any rate, if this is not all we want, still it is a beginning. It is a *rapprochement*. How have you met it? Have you reopened negotiations when, for the first time, daylight appears? Have you endeavoured to induce

Turkey to stay its hand? and, while promising protection, which is right and just, have you impressed upon them the difficulties their last step has created (that step being taken in ignorance of the apparent inclination to yield at Olmütz), and urged them at all events now to stay their hand? What answer can be made to this? We have taken no step on the Olmütz paper, except to say, rightly I think, that the Vienna Note is now so blown upon, and each party so committed against it, in one or the other of its two existing shapes, that it is hopeless to press it further. But we have offered no other alternative. Your proposal, sent privately to Lord Stratford, was sent, not very hopefully, before the Olmütz news.

"Now, I do not overrate the value of the Olmütz paper. Except as an indication of a wish to retreat, it is not good for much. But if we do nothing upon it, it will assume an immense importance hereafter, and we shall never cease to hear from Russia that it was a frank offer of concession, and from the public here, fearing or tired of war, that it is obvious that we had an opening of which we could have availed ourselves had we chosen, and had we been sincere in wishing to preserve the peace.

"And we are bound to try it. The Russians have been throughout in the wrong, but it is not our interest to keep them there. We are not attorneys trying to keep an adversary at a disadvantage. On the contrary, if we get Russia out of a scrape, we get Turkey and ourselves out of one likewise.

"It seems to me that our course will be incomplete and one-sided if we do not accompany our instructions for the operations of the fleet, first, with a full approval of Lord Stratford's conduct, in remonstrating against the declaration of war, pointing out the aggravation of our difficulties which it has produced, and instructing him to press upon the Porte the necessity of abstaining from any act of war so long as they shall be unattacked. If the Russians fire the first shot, of course the whole position is changed. Secondly, simultaneously with these instructions, while showing the reasons why the Olmütz proposal is hopeless, and therefore inadmissible, we should acknowledge the spirit in which it appears to be made and propose a new form (nothing can be better than your Constantinople

project), fixing all upon which the two parties seem now almost agreed, and omitting those parts which have no practical value or effect either way, but which are wounding to the susceptibilities of Turkey.

"I do not say it will succeed. It will very likely fail; but we ought to show that we have tried; and then, if it fail, the responsibility will not be ours. *But it will be ours if it is not attempted.*

"We must remember that we are now specially bound to make this effort, inasmuch as we are not free from blame ourselves. The truth is, we blundered the Vienna Note. Baron Meyendorf, no bad judge, thinks that if the Conference had drawn that Note, as afterwards modified, it would have been accepted as readily as it was in its first shape. It was the *origin* of the modifications which ruined it.

"My view, therefore, is this: that we ought with our fleet to protect Turkey from attack, that we ought to endeavour to prevent her bringing on that attack by any act of war, and that we should endeavour to reopen negotiations with a view to a pacific adjustment in the interim if possible.

"I am ashamed of this long letter, but I am anxious to put before you a part of the case which strikes me strongly, and which I thought was omitted in our deliberations of yesterday.

"49, BELGRAVE SQUARE,
"*October 7th*, 1853."

The next day another Cabinet met, which may be described in Lord Aberdeen's own words:

"At the meeting of the Cabinet to-day instructions were agreed upon with reference to the position of the fleets at Constantinople and their possible employment in future. This was very clearly limited to operations of a strictly defensive character. It may be possible to preserve this distinction for a time; but it is obvious that it will every day become more difficult to draw the line between defensive and offensive warfare. It is probable that before long a difference in the Cabinet may take place, which will be found irreconcilable, in consequence of some proposal of active hostility which would constitute this country a principal in the war. For the present, however, the

instructions relating to the fleets are satisfactory enough.

"It is intended to continue negotiations; but unless the Turks can be persuaded to suspend hostilities, it does not appear possible to hope for a successful result."

Lord Aberdeen added that he—

"was not satisfied with the tone or substance of the answer to the Olmütz proposal. This, although not possible to be adopted in the manner recommended by Austria, furnished a very useful element in any future proceedings; it was, however, treated as furnishing rather ground for controversy and dispute. The despatch to Lord Westmorland, in which the Olmütz proposal is answered, received some amendments, but will not advance the work of conciliation. To this the whole efforts of the Government ought to be turned; and with a sincere desire to seek for a peaceful solution, it might still be found."

Sidney Herbert left town again for Ireland immediately after the Cabinet, and was kept informed by letters from Sir James Graham of the transactions of the next few days:

"Admiralty, *October 14th*, 1853.

"My dear Herbert,

"You know that my gloom is proverbial, and you must therefore make some abatement from the dark shade of my colouring; but I am not well pleased with the state of affairs. I fear that Clarendon has in the main adopted the views of Palmerston and of Lord John, and carries his instructions further in that sense than either the Cabinet or Lord Aberdeen approve. It is quite clear that we have shot ahead of the wishes and intentions of the Emperor of the French, and no direct communication has been made to Russia of the instructions given to our Ambassador and Admiral at Constantinople. This omission appears to me to be serious, and I wish it to be remedied; but we have gone so far already in the line of covert hostilities that, I see plainly, we are afraid of the immediate consequence of declaring the truth. Lord John remains

in London *now* till Monday. He has broached the significant proposal of assembling Parliament immediately; if he insist on this proposal, the effect and the intent are obvious and inevitable. I hope that we may be able to stave off so fatal a decision. There is no talk of an early Cabinet, but I know not that we are safer when we are separated. The presence of the Queen at Windsor will give greater authority and power to our Chief. He goes there to-morrow. He really wields the whole power of the Crown, such as it is, if he think fit to use it; and he commands the entire confidence and warm attachment of a large majority of his colleagues. This is no bad position after all; and the advantage of it must not be tamely surrendered. I will write to you again to-morrow."

"*October* 15*th*, 1853.

"Lord John remains in London, and has sent for Lady John from Scotland. I do not consider this a favourable omen. Lord Aberdeen went to Windsor to-day. I have not yet seen him since his return. There is an important new Note on the anvil, in lieu of the Vienna Note; and the instruction to Stratford Canning, which will accompany it, may give rise to very serious discussions. It ought to assume the character of our Ultimatum, on which the course to be taken with regard both to Russia and to the Porte on our part should be made to depend. Before it assumes this shape, I suspect that another Cabinet must be assembled, and that grave objections will be urged. I shall not fail to summon you by telegraph if it be necessary. You must hold yourself in readiness to start at the shortest notice.

"I quite agree with you in opinion that the invalided soldier is well entitled to kinder and more generous treatment on his passage home than he now receives. The terms of the contract must be altered, and increased expense will be incurred. The question is, On what Estimate shall it be charged? But I have no doubt that the public must bear the necessary expense."

"*October* 16*th*, 1853.

"Lord A., after seeing the Queen yesterday, has resolved to accompany the new proposal to the Turk

with a strong intimation that he must yield to our advice. The Note is not yet finally arranged, and must probably be submitted to the members of the Cabinet now in London. Palmerston will certainly be present, and will probably dissent. Lord John is here, and will remain; for Lady John has *arrived* in London. There are at present only Lord Aberdeen, Lord Clarendon, the Duke of Newcastle, and myself.

"I wish you were here; and Gladstone's absence is unfortunate. Clarendon has as yet given no notice of calling us together. I expect the notice any moment. If it be not given, the sign is favourable; for in that case Lord Aberdeen's words will have been adopted with the acquiescence of Lord Palmerston and of Lord John.

"In these circumstances you must decide for yourself about coming over."

"*October 17th*, 1853.

"I have nothing either new or positive which I can repeat to you. The Note and the covering despatch to Stratford Canning hang fire; and the *Fury* still awaits the messenger at Marseilles. Lord Aberdeen's words of coercive warning to the Turk are under Palmerston's consideration, and he is unwilling to admit them. Lord John Russell seeks to modify them. I am more sanguine in my hope that we shall arrive at an agreement without either a Cabinet or a break up.

"I have appointed Sir Edmond Lyons to be second in command on the Mediterranean. He has visited every port in the Black Sea, and is almost the only English officer who has circumnavigated it. My belief is, that this appointment will do as much as sending five sail of the line to the Sea of Marmora. Brunnow came here this morning and met Lyons by accident in the waiting-room, fresh from Stockholm. This *tête-à-tête* would not be thrown away."

"*October 18th*, 1853.

"Things look better. I hope and think that there will be an agreement with respect to the warning to be given to the Turk.

"Palmerston has consented to the substance, though not to the words, of Lord Aberdeen's proposal; and

Lord Aberdeen will not insist on the particular form of expression.

"I am glad that you are on the spot where your presence is so much required, and it will not be necessary, I hope, to call you away for some time."

"*October 20th*, 1853.

"The question has now assumed a new shape. The recast Note has become so Turkish in its fresh attire, that there is little danger of its rejection at Constantinople, but much less chance of its acceptance at St. Petersburg, and Lord Aberdeen is now uneasy under the pressure of the other horn of the dilemma. He is disposed to take his stand on a requisition to the Turk that there shall be an armed truce while negotiations are pending. Whether Palmerston and Lord John will assent to this requisition is still uncertain.

"There is a question also as to the prorogation of Parliament, whether to a day in the middle or end of November. The advocates of war desire an early day, the Friends of Peace a more distant one.

"The Council is summoned for Monday next, at Windsor, at three o'clock.

"I still somehow believe that for the present all differences will be adjourned, if not accommodated."

"*October 22nd*, 1853.

"I enclose a note from Lord Aberdeen, which will show you how matters stood yesterday evening. I still hope that a Cabinet may be unnecessary, and trust the course which we consider prudent may be adopted by consent. But Palmerston and Lord John are somewhat jealous of each other, and when one makes a concession the other is disposed to hang back.

"There is a Council at Windsor on Wednesday. Parliament will be prorogued till the 29th of next month.

"France rather wishes nothing to be said or done, and hopes, as I believe, that the Turks may get a good licking; and then the Emperor will propose sending a French army to occupy both the Dardanelles and Constantinople!

"The verge on which we stand is slippery, and the staff on which we rest is broken."

"*October 23rd*, 1853.

"The Note and the course of proceeding have been settled without a Cabinet, by the concurrence of Lord Aberdeen, John Russell, and Palmerston. Concord exists here; but while we are deliberating, my belief is that they are fighting in the East. A licking may cool the courage of the Turk, and make him more amenable to reason.

"I see no immediate hurry for your return. I shall not write again, unless something unforeseen arises, before I hear from you that you are about to return to England.

"The fleets from France and England entered the Dardanelles on the 17th."

Lord Aberdeen wished to insert words in the Declaration to be presented to the Porte by the Ambassadors of the Four Powers which should give the Sultan plainly to understand that the support he would receive from England was contingent on his adoption of her advice both as to the form of Note sent out being signed without alteration, and as to the cessation of hostilities during negotiation. But this he found could not be insisted on without breaking up the Cabinet (which would have meant immediate war with Russia), and finally he resolved to require the insertion of the following passage in the instructions to be given to Lord Stratford:

"Considering the assurances of support already given and the measures actually adopted by Great Britain for the protection of the Turkish territory, it is indispensable that all further progress of hostilities should be suspended by the Porte during the course of the negotiation in which Her Majesty's Government are at present engaged for the restoration of a good understanding between the Porte and Russia."

This paragraph (again to use Lord Aberdeen's words)—

"entirely agreed with the instructions already sent to Lord Stratford by telegraph and otherwise; and in case of the refusal of the Turks it laid the ground for reviewing the engagements under which we are at present bound, and the course which it may be desirable to follow hereafter. In short, it will give us the liberty of action we desire."

Lord Clarendon did not object to this proposal, but it was opposed by Lord Palmerston and modified by Lord John, and was finally despatched in the following form:

"Considering the assurances of support already given and the measures actually adopted by Great Britain for the protection of the Turkish territory, it is indispensable that all further progress of hostilities should be suspended by the Porte [*for a reasonable time*] during the course of the negotiation in which Her Majesty's Government are engaged for the re-establishment of friendly relations between the Porte and Russia, [*upon the understanding that no hostile movement is made upon the part of Russia.*"]

The importance of these additions was not fully appreciated at the moment. Liberty of action appeared to have been recovered, and a wholesome warning administered to the Turks. On November 2nd Sir James Graham wrote to Mr. Herbert that he was "certain that, if Stratford Canning only runs honest, peace is secure." But Sir James underrated the resources and ingenuity of the Turkish Government. Full and fatal advantage was taken by the Porte of the qualifications. A fortnight was considered a "reasonable" time for negotiation; and the last phrase, by which Her Majesty's Government had meant to indicate any attempt of Russia to cross the Danube, was construed literally, and made to apply to the *resistance* offered by Russian troops in the Principalities to the operations of Omar Pasha on the north

side of the river, which he had crossed in spite of Lord Stratford's official remonstrances.

Nevertheless, in spite of difficulties, an important step was taken in the direction of a pacific settlement by the signature of the protocol of December 5th. This protocol restored the concert of Europe; and before the concert of Europe, if maintained, the Emperor of Russia would without doubt have yielded. On November 29th Sidney Herbert wrote to Mr. Gladstone:

"On Saturday last we took a real and good step in the Cabinet by agreeing to the French protocol stating that, whatever be the result of the war between Russia and Turkey, we cannot allow the territorial *circonscription* and 'l'état de possession que le temps a consacré en l'Orient' to be altered. I think this is a good move; it defines the limit and cause of our interference, namely, the preservation of the *status quo*, and it tells the belligerents plainly that they are fighting for nothing, which may greatly cool their ardour. If Austria and Prussia sign this, it will be an immense *coup*, and will so mark the isolation of the Emperor that it *must* have an effect on him. The tone of Austria is changing very much, and I am not without hopes. Louis Napoleon told the Austrian Ambassador that he would not send a man to Constantinople, that it would require 100,000 men to dislodge the Emperor from the Principalities, and that he could not afford it and would not do it; 'but I can send 100,000 men to the Rhine; and I can—and if you side with Russia I can and will—set Italy in a flame.' Rather strong language, but I believe it has had its effect at Vienna."

But while Sidney Herbert and other friends of peace were congratulating themselves on the improved prospects of a satisfactory and pacific settlement, news was travelling westwards from the Black Sea destined to frustrate all their hopes and not unreasonable expectations. I have at an earlier stage remarked on the effect produced on the English mind by the

battle of Sinope. It gave strength to those within and without the Cabinet who, regarding war as certain and perhaps desirable, clamoured for its early commencement. And not only this; it shook those who had been till then the strongest advocates for peace. Sidney Herbert himself was not wholly free from its influence, but he still clung to the last vestiges of hope.

On December 28th, writing to Mr. Gladstone of the terms of peace between Russia and Turkey, which, already agreed to by the Porte, were to be sent to St. Petersburg by the four Powers for acceptance by the Emperor Nicholas, he says:

"*December 23rd*, 1853.

"I had no doubt that the French would not only accept our proposal, but urge it warmly on the Turks. It is quite in the sense of their repeatedly declared opinion. I had, however, some doubt whether Clarendon would urge it on them with any great zeal—he seemed so little inclined to it. I think for our own justification it ought to be tried, though I have little hope now of a pacific result. But the Russian power has been so underrated of late, and the Turkish so unduly magnified, that, once engaged in a struggle which will be far more severe than this wayward, unreflecting public choose now to think, there will be a great reaction, and these warlike gentlemen will begin to abuse us for not having done enough to preserve peace. The Russian campaign in Asia has been triumphant. The Georgians have fought gallantly under Russian colours—militia and volunteers as well as regulars; and the three victorious generals are all Georgians. This is very significant. Georgia is the best-governed province, because governed by the most enlightened and able man in Russia,[1] and I believe the army of the Caucasus to be one of the finest armies in the world. With Persia in arms against us, India disquieted, the Turks beginning by ferocity and fanaticism directed against the Christians to disgust

[1] Prince Woronzow.

and alienate public opinion in Europe, it is a bad prospect; for except destroying the two Russian fleets if we can get at them, I do not know what we can do against Russia."

Parliament reassembled on February 1st. Its meetings gave fresh stimulus to the cry for war. Nevertheless, there was at that time a far better prospect of a successful issue to the negotiations still going on at Vienna than had been the case for many months. Count Orloff had pledged his Government to make proposals founded on the protocol of January 13th, 1854. His manifest desire for peace, the language he employed, and his influence in the counsels of his sovereign afforded grounds—and, as the event showed, well-warranted grounds—for the expectation that the terms of peace embodied in that protocol would be substantially accepted by the Emperor Nicholas. Even so late as February 12th Lord Aberdeen was able to write, "I still say war is *not inevitable*—unless, indeed, we are determined to have it, which perhaps, for aught I know, may be the case."

Unfortunately it was the case. The nation was bent on war. Its impatience disregarded and rendered of no account negotiations the complicated steps of which it did not follow, or care to follow. The popular voice demanded the commencement of hostilities, and deemed every moment wasted till they had begun. The House of Commons, though less urgent, was pervaded by the same spirit. A large majority of its members honestly shared the passions of the multitude. Others, whatever their private opinion, feared to run counter to the wishes of their constituents; while the purely party managers were only anxious to terminate a dangerous crisis by bringing the action of the administration into

way of preparation for war, if it came. In all this he only used language similar to that of other members of the Government, but he also had the courage to say some words of warning as to an unjust depreciation of Russia and undue exaltation of Turkey. He eulogised the Emperor Nicholas, and did justice to the masculine energy with which he set in motion and controlled all the operations of Russia. This was probably the last speech made before the war which contained even a touch of friendliness towards the great Power not yet become our enemy.

Mr. Herbert had an easier and more popular task in dealing with the strictures of Cobden and those who deprecated all warlike measures and doubted whether any English interest was involved. He told them that wherever there was an European interest there was an English interest—a sentiment perhaps more rhetorical than sound, but which raised the cheers of the House and chimed in with the temper of the moment. Having restored the good humour of the House, he again ventured in his closing sentences to denounce the guilt which would attach to those who entered on war without taking every means to avert it.

A few days later the irrevocable step was taken which rendered the continuance of peace impossible. A summons to evacuate the Danubian Principalities was sent by England and France to the Emperor of Russia.

The excitement that pervaded Parliament, the Press, and the public seems to have spread to the Cabinet, and impaired the calmness of its judgment. An alarm was raised that the Russian Army on the Danube might advance to Constantinople and take possession of it before any succour could be sent to its defence. The experience of the previous Russian

campaign in Turkey in 1828-9 showed this anticipation to be unreasonable. A march from the Danube to the Bosphorus is not so easily accomplished. But the panic, though ill-grounded, was sincere, and extended even to some of those who, up to this time, had been the staunchest advocates of peace. Among these was Sidney Herbert.

In a memorandum written by him for the Cabinet he drew attention to the travels of Marshal Marmont. In that work the Marshal pointed out the ease with which Constantinople might be defended against a combined attack from England, France, and Austria, and the equal ease with which it could be defended by those three Powers if once in possession of it.

"The important point of this opinion," Mr. Herbert wrote, "is that which refers to the question of time. Whoever gets the position first will hold it. If once Russia reaches it and captures it, all the combined forces could do would be to blockade her from the Mediterranean—that is, confine her within, but not expel her from, or even molest her in, her newly conquered territories. Everything must depend on the rapidity with which the troops of France and England can be carried to the scene of action. The time we have to do it in is measured by the time during which the Turkish lines—first, along the Danube, and, secondly, along the Balkans—can be maintained. If Kalafat should fall—and great preparations are being made to overwhelm the Turks by numbers on that point—the second line may offer much less resistance than the nature of the country would secure were it occupied by an unbroken army. There is great risk that when our troops arrive at the Dardanelles they may find themselves too late. In that case we shall be obliged to confine ourselves to blockading Russia, abandoning altogether the defence of Turkey."

It is not easy to understand how the reluctance to commence hostilities felt by those members of the

Cabinet who still clung to peace was finally overcome. They were incredulous as to the danger of Constantinople. They were certainly sensible of the unfairness of drawing the sword before the answer of Russia to the last proposals made to her had been received, and of the impolicy of doing so before the accession of Austria to the Alliance was fully effected. The advocates of immediate war declared it to be evident that Russia meant to send no answer to the propositions of January 13th, and that the accession of Austria was already secured. On both points they were mistaken. But even had it been otherwise, facts on which such momentous issues hung should have been clearly ascertained beyond the possibility of doubt; nor can the Aberdeen Cabinet be acquitted of having hastily cut short negotiations which afforded a prospect of success, or of having shown negligence in ascertaining the exact position and intentions of a Power which it presumed to be an Ally.

However it may have been procured, the assent of the friends of peace in the Cabinet was given to the despatch of the summons to St. Petersburg, with, of course, a full knowledge that it would be unheeded, and that they would have no option but to concur in the Declaration of War, which was its inevitable result.

That Declaration was issued on March 28th, 1854.

CHAPTER VIII

FIRST YEAR OF WAR

1854-55

FROM the commencement of the Crimean War to the fall of Lord Aberdeen's Government, Sidney Herbert filled the post of Secretary at War. But he was not Secretary of State for War. The functions of the latter were in time of peace so completely overshadowed and obscured by those which he performed as Secretary for the Colonies, that very few persons beyond the limit of official circles were aware that such an officer as a Secretary of State for War and Colonies existed. The staff of his office did not include a single soldier, and was entirely composed of men well versed indeed in colonial affairs, but totally ignorant of military matters. He was universally known as Secretary of State for the Colonies. But to him belonged all the higher attributes of the political direction and movement of armies on active service.

When war became imminent, it was at once recognised that, whatever might have been the case during the Peninsular campaign at the beginning of the century, it would, under the conditions existing forty years later, be altogether impracticable for any one man, in time of war, to discharge, with any pretence to efficiency, the duties of the Secretary of State for War and Colonies. It became manifestly necessary to separate the two offices. It was Lord Aberdeen's

wish that the Duke of Newcastle, who made an excellent Colonial Minister, should retain that office, and that Sidney Herbert should become Secretary of State for War. But to the accomplishment of this wish on the part of the Prime Minister a double obstacle was opposed. The Duke of Newcastle was in actual possession of the office, and he was naturally indisposed to relinquish that post, which, of the two he held, occupied the higher position in public estimation, and was, so long as the war might last, of more considerable importance. But even had he been otherwise disposed, there were members of the Cabinet who thought that, in the event of the Duke of Newcastle quitting the office, it should be filled by Lord Palmerston, and who, though they could raise no objection to the Duke's retention of the post he held, were not prepared to acquiesce in the substitution for him of Mr. Herbert. The Duke of Newcastle accordingly—unfortunately for himself and for the Government to which he belonged—remained Secretary for War. He was a man of the highest integrity, great courage, good sense, untiring industry, and, in the opinion of highly competent judges, a man of larger grasp of mind and more statesmanlike character than Mr. Herbert. But he was deficient in the knowledge of men, making the strangest mistakes both as to their capacity and character. Nor had he that power of attaching men to him and leading them to work for him with real enthusiasm which was so eminently conspicuous in Sidney Herbert, who also possessed an instinctive appreciation of men and tact in dealing with them which his colleague wanted.

The office of Secretary at War was a comparatively subordinate one, its duties being thus defined by Sidney Herbert himself before the Sebastopol Committee:

"The Secretary at War is strictly a financial officer; he exercises a control and check over all expenditure, and no alteration even in matters of promotion and discipline which necessitates any increased expenditure can be carried into effect by the Commander-in-Chief without his sanction. He has other civil duties, such as giving protection to the subject in cases of enlistment and minute duties of that description; but he properly has no executive duties except those which of late years he has acquired by his having originated certain improvements and reforms in the army; and being the originator, he has, I apprehend, kept them in his own hands to see them effectually carried out. I take such cases as the organisation of the pensioners and the establishment of regimental schools and normal schools at Chelsea, where the masters for the different regiments are trained; these remained in the hands of the Secretary at War. . . . He has also the preparation of the Mutiny Bill and the Estimates."

Except, therefore, as a member of the Cabinet, Mr. Herbert was not responsible for the conduct of operations in the Crimea. Practically, however, Sidney Herbert's authority, after the commencement of the war, went a good deal beyond the narrow limitations within which the functions of the Secretary at War were confined; for, as he himself says in another part of his evidence:

"Subsequently I undertook, with a view to relieve the Duke of Newcastle, to do a good deal which properly it was not the business of my office to do; but I did it as his assistant by delegation from him."

The maintenance of the office of Secretary at War after the War Department had been separated from the Colonial Office, left two men, both in the Cabinet, to conduct separately, without any well-defined division of duties, the administration of military matters. Such an arrangement almost appears to have been a device for the express purpose of creating

wish that the Duke of Newcastle, who made an excellent Colonial Minister, should retain that office, and that Sidney Herbert should become Secretary of State for War. But to the accomplishment of this wish on the part of the Prime Minister a double obstacle was opposed. The Duke of Newcastle was in actual possession of the office, and he was naturally indisposed to relinquish that post, which, of the two he held, occupied the higher position in public estimation, and was, so long as the war might last, of more considerable importance. But even had he been otherwise disposed, there were members of the Cabinet who thought that, in the event of the Duke of Newcastle quitting the office, it should be filled by Lord Palmerston, and who, though they could raise no objection to the Duke's retention of the post he held, were not prepared to acquiesce in the substitution for him of Mr. Herbert. The Duke of Newcastle accordingly—unfortunately for himself and for the Government to which he belonged—remained Secretary for War. He was a man of the highest integrity, great courage, good sense, untiring industry, and, in the opinion of highly competent judges, a man of larger grasp of mind and more statesmanlike character than Mr. Herbert. But he was deficient in the knowledge of men, making the strangest mistakes both as to their capacity and character. Nor had he that power of attaching men to him and leading them to work for him with real enthusiasm which was so eminently conspicuous in Sidney Herbert, who also possessed an instinctive appreciation of men and tact in dealing with them which his colleague wanted.

The office of Secretary at War was a comparatively subordinate one, its duties being thus defined by Sidney Herbert himself before the Sebastopol Committee:

"The Secretary at War is strictly a financial officer; he exercises a control and check over all expenditure, and no alteration even in matters of promotion and discipline which necessitates any increased expenditure can be carried into effect by the Commander-in-Chief without his sanction. He has other civil duties, such as giving protection to the subject in cases of enlistment and minute duties of that description; but he properly has no executive duties except those which of late years he has acquired by his having originated certain improvements and reforms in the army; and being the originator, he has, I apprehend, kept them in his own hands to see them effectually carried out. I take such cases as the organisation of the pensioners and the establishment of regimental schools and normal schools at Chelsea, where the masters for the different regiments are trained; these remained in the hands of the Secretary at War. . . . He has also the preparation of the Mutiny Bill and the Estimates."

Except, therefore, as a member of the Cabinet, Mr. Herbert was not responsible for the conduct of operations in the Crimea. Practically, however, Sidney Herbert's authority, after the commencement of the war, went a good deal beyond the narrow limitations within which the functions of the Secretary at War were confined; for, as he himself says in another part of his evidence:

"Subsequently I undertook, with a view to relieve the Duke of Newcastle, to do a good deal which properly it was not the business of my office to do; but I did it as his assistant by delegation from him."

The maintenance of the office of Secretary at War after the War Department had been separated from the Colonial Office, left two men, both in the Cabinet, to conduct separately, without any well-defined division of duties, the administration of military matters. Such an arrangement almost appears to have been a device for the express purpose of creating

the greatest possible amount of friction and confusion. That it did not do so is due to the character and antecedents of the two men themselves who held these posts in 1854. They had been on terms of close intimacy since the time when they were undergraduates together at Oxford. Both were entirely free from jealousy, and neither was animated by any mean desire to magnify his own importance. The Duke of Newcastle accepted Mr. Herbert's assistance with gratitude, and without apprehension of its impairing his own position. Mr. Herbert gave that assistance with a single eye to help his friend, and without a thought of self-aggrandisement. But the position was a false one; and in 1855, on Mr. Herbert's resignation, the office of Secretary at War was merged in that of the Secretary of State for War.

War was declared on March 28th, 1854, and for the first six months of its duration its records were those of continuous success. Speaking on July 25th, on a motion of Lord Dudley Stuart for the prolongation of the Session, Mr. Herbert was able to say:

"The noble lord expresses his surprise that in four months Russia has not been 'crumpled up.' He appears to think that in four months a great country, distant and almost inaccessible, should have been brought to an ignominious capitulation. Has nothing been done? . . .

"Is it nothing to have in four months established a complete, effective, irresistible blockade of the whole of the Russian coast? Those who speak with so much impatience appear to forget that the one-half of Nelson's life was spent in establishing blockades. . . . If you require to have victory after victory, followed up with an enemy who dare not meet you even with his superior numbers, you are exacting impossibilities from your seamen—and from seamen, be it remembered, to whose want of courage it is not owing.

"The hon. member is not satisfied with the enemy's

running away. He appears to justify the opinion formed by the Duke of Wellington that the people of England liked a long butcher's bill. The hon. member wants, not a great victory, but a great sacrifice of human life. I do not believe that is the general opinion of the people of England. I believe they rejoice that this chain of forts[1] should have fallen into our hands without such loss of life as would ornament the pages of a *Gazette*. . . .

"The Danube is blockaded, Sebastopol is blockaded, the whole coast of Russia is closely blockaded. Not one grain of wheat, not one pound of meat, not one cartridge, can be brought to them, except by the long journey through Bessarabia by land. The distance to be journeyed is so great, the roads are so bad, and so tedious is the operation, that by the time the bullocks with the carts have arrived at their destination a very large proportion of them have consumed all the provisions with which they started for the camp, and are reduced to so wretched a condition that they produce only a small and unwholesome supply of meat. These are not small results."

Although the progress of the campaign enabled the Government to prorogue Parliament with credit, the Session of 1854 was, on the whole, one unfavourable to the Government. In the House of Lords, which then counted for more than it does now, it was uniformly successful; but in the House of Commons it was less fortunate.

Lord John Russell had announced during the previous year that the principal legislative measure of the Session of 1854 would be one of Parliamentary Reform. The Bill prepared in the autumn of 1853 was strongly objected to by Lord Palmerston, who declined to accept its provisions, and resigned rather than do so. He provisionally withdrew that resignation, on being informed that the details of the Bill were still open to discussion; and when, a month

[1] Those in Circassia.

later, the Bill was finally adopted by the Government, without any alteration of the clauses to which he had objected, he did not renew his tender of resignation.

Some changes, though not those desired by Lord Palmerston, were, however, made, and Sidney Herbert's opinion of them, and of the Bill generally, may be gathered from the enclosed letter addressed by him to Lord Aberdeen:

"WILTON, *January 1st*, 1854.

"I read Lord John's letter so hurriedly, with the hand of the clock staring me in the face, that I am not very sure that I am correct as to his proposals where a change is made from the plan first broached.

"This disfranchisement is, I think, right in principal and in amount, but it tends rather to the diminution of rotten than of corrupt boroughs. Where there is nomination, there is of course no corruption, for there is no struggle. The popular demand is for the suppression of corrupt boroughs, but that is nearly an impossibility, and nomination boroughs are no longer maintainable as a part of the Constitution as they were argued for before the Reform Bill. I think we can fight all this pretty well.

"The redistribution is more difficult. I regret with you the small amount given to learning or learned professions. The number of counties gaining seats will look more agricultural than it really is; for Yorkshire, Lancashire, parts of Cheshire and Staffordshire, and Middlesex are rather an aggregate of towns than counties in the ordinary sense.

"I am not clear whether Lord John proposes to allow votes to be clubbed as plumpers. If so, these county seats will be fairly enough distributed. Am I right in thinking that he gives but one member to each of his newly enfranchised towns? If so, it will be a blot. Think of Birkenhead, Burnley, and Staleybridge put on the same footing with Honiton, Tiverton, or Devizes, and in an inferior position to the smallest of the two-member constituencies! His leaving out the Metropolitan members is quite right and quite defensible.

"As regards suffrage, on the whole I am for an

extension, and a considerable one. If we open this question, it ought to be so dealt with as to be closed. With this view, and for the prevention of future Reform Bills, I should allow no writ to be issued to any borough that falls hereafter below our standard of population and constituency.

"There are, however, one or two inconsistencies in our franchise scheme. The main argument for lowering the county franchise to £10 is that what is good for the town is *a fortiori* good for the county, and that men living in unrepresented towns will be compensated by votes for the county. But this argument presupposes the limitation of the suffrage to the ten-pounders in the towns, or else our new six-pound men living in unrepresented towns will have exactly the same grievance as the unrepresented ten-pound men now have. I confess I like inequalities and varieties in the suffrage, because the society to be represented is composed of unequal and various materials; nor do I think it wise to assimilate so nearly the county to the town constituencies. The ten-pounders have already too much power; you will not now gain a real uniformity by admitting them to the county franchise unless you admit the six-pound man too, which nobody proposes.

"I hope the Savings Bank franchise will not be omitted. It is a conservative franchise, more so than any other can be which is so low in mere property value. The greater number you can include without danger, the greater is your safety.

"I am shut up with a cold on my chest, and can scarcely speak, so I write in revenge, though probably obscurely enough, for I am stupefied."

The draft of a Reform Bill was agreed to; but when the Cabinet reassembled three weeks later, a large section of its members, among whom Sidney Herbert was included, desired that its introduction should be postponed, on the ground that, as war seemed imminent, proper attention could not be given to a matter of such importance. This, however, was not the view of Lord John or of the Prime Minister. The Bill was read a first time on February 11th, and its second

reading fixed for March 13th. Before the arrival of that date, however, matters in the East had assumed so threatening an appearance that even Lord John consented to postpone the second reading of the Bill till April 27th. On March 30th war was declared, and the pressure of those who desired to suspend the Bill was renewed with overwhelming force. Lord Aberdeen wished either to go on with the Bill, if the majority of his colleagues supported him, and risk the chance of defeat in the House of Commons; or to resign along with Lord John and Sir James Graham, if the Cabinet declined to agree to the prosecution of the measure. But the demand for the postponement of the Bill was irresistible, and the only question remaining was whether the Government should yield to it, or whether Lord John and those agreeing with him should resign. He was disposed to do so, but after more than one change of mind on the point consented to remain in office. Among the many letters addressed to him urging him not to abandon his post was one from Sidney Herbert, to the following effect:

"BELGRAVE SQUARE, *April 11th*, 1854.

"MY DEAR LORD JOHN,

"I have now served under your lead for sixteen months, and I have learned to take a strong interest in whatever concerns your political and personal position. Surely this is a moment when no one ought to evade what are great difficulties and great responsibilities. Whatever course you take, the country will believe, as I shall believe, in the rectitude of your motives; but there will have been a sacrifice to be made and a service to be rendered which will not have been done, and I cannot think you will stand in the position you ought if you leave it undone.

"I earnestly hope that you will not lightly abandon the position which you occupy under engagements not only to party but to the country. It will be a

great political error and a great public misfortune, and I doubt whether the country, on whom the loss will fall, will think your course justifiable.

"Pardon me for writing so freely; I would venture to do it for no reason but that stated in the first sentence of this letter.

"Whatever course you take, I shall recollect with pleasure the period during which I have served under you, and learned to know the many noble qualities of one to whom I was once politically opposed."

If the outbreak of war had been assigned as a reason for not bringing forward the measure of Parliamentary Reform which had been promised by Lord John Russell, no one could have objected. Its introduction, and subsequent withdrawal under pressure, dealt a serious blow to the Government.

Only two measures of first-rate importance were passed during the Session—the Merchant Shipping Act, and one for the Reform of the University of Oxford. The former was one of the best-drawn Acts ever passed, and has proved one of the most useful; the latter revolutionised the whole administrative system and social life of the University. It would be curious to know whether, when voting for this latter Bill, Sidney Herbert remembered his own maiden speech in Parliament. The world had greatly changed during the twenty years which had intervened.

The adoption of one wholesome measure of administrative reform which did not require the aid of legislation to carry it into effect was, soon after the commencement of the war, successfully urged upon his colleagues by Sidney Herbert.

Up to that time, promotion in the Army, apart from the succession by seniority to vacancies caused by death or retirement, was made by what was called

a Brevet; that is to say, a wholesale promotion of the senior officers of every rank to the rank immediately above their own. These Brevets were issued at irregular intervals. Any special occasion of public rejoicing, especially when connected with events affecting the Royal Family, such as a Coronation or the birth of an heir to the throne, was usually accompanied by one. When no such cause for a Brevet existed, it was customary to issue one at intervals of three or four years, in order to prevent a stagnation of promotion.

Of this system Mr. Herbert wholly disapproved, and proposed its abolition.

In its place he suggested, first, the adoption of a system of promotion by selection, guarded by rules and restraints, intended to avert the influence of favouritism or political bias. Promotion for distinguished service would thus leaven the rule of promotion by seniority, although the just claims of seniority would still be respected. Secondly, he proposed to give seniority of active service a preference over mere seniority in the date of an officer's commission; and thirdly, that only those Lieutenant-Colonels who had exercised at least three years' responsible command in that rank should be promoted to the rank of Colonel.

But as these changes would press hardly on those who already had a vested interest in the existing system, under which they had a right to anticipate early promotion, he proposed the issue of a final Brevet, after which a system similar to that which on his recommendation had been adopted in the Navy in 1846 should be extended to the Army also, the establishment of General Officers being limited to a fixed number, and promotions to

the rank of Major-General being made only on the occurrence of vacancies in that establishment.

These recommendations received the approval of a strong Commission appointed on Mr. Herbert's advice, and were carried into effect before the close of the year, the last General Brevet being gazetted on December 29th, 1854.

The Government majority in the House of Commons, on all important questions, was still considerable, but it sustained a series of petty defeats on subjects of minor importance. That these irritating, and in the long run humiliating, attacks were successful was largely due to the wayward conduct and uncertain attitude of the leader of the House—Lord John Russell. Lord John had become thoroughly tired of the part which he had himself elected to perform, and longed to be at the head of affairs once more. It was of no use to tell him that Lord Aberdeen could not, without reason, abandon, in the first months of the prosecution of a war for the declaration of which he was responsible, the post he held. It was as useless to remind him that his colleagues, including many of his own old friends, would not accept him again as their head. He admitted the facts, and apparently acquiesced in the reasoning based on them; but in his heart he did not. He may be acquitted of any active participation in the constant intrigues set on foot to supplant Lord Aberdeen and replace him by a successor at the head of a pure Whig Government. Yet he was cognisant of them; nor did he take any such decided steps to repress them as loyalty to his chief, so long as he ostensibly served under him, demanded. After the withdrawal of the Reform Bill, he took little trouble

as to the business of the House. He allowed his discontent with his position to appear publicly, and this was taken by his old adherents as an intimation that he would not be displeased by the overthrow of the Government to which he belonged. It was, in fact, a mere display of peevish fretfulness; but it is not wonderful that it should have been differently construed. He repeatedly tendered, and as repeatedly withdrew, his resignation, which, if accepted, would have brought the Government to an end, and, as he thought, lead to his being sent for by the Queen to form a new one, while, if it were declined, he counted on being entrusted with greater power, and treated with greater deference than before by his colleagues, in order to conciliate him and retain his support.

After the prorogation of Parliament early in August, his restlessness increased, and was not abated by the growing discontent at the conduct of the war, which the slow progress of the siege of Sebastopol and the sufferings endured by the besieging force had awakened in the country. This discontent, a certain measure of which the impatience of the public for speedy results would in any case have rendered inevitable, was greatly intensified by the disappointment of the false hopes raised by the circulation of a report, universally believed for some days, that Sebastopol had fallen, late in September. Forwarded by the English Consul at Belgrade, and apparently confirmed by the authentic news of the victory at the Alma, the intelligence was received with the same credulity by Ministers of State and public men of all ranks as by the public. Lord Aberdeen forgot his usual caution, and expressed his opinion that the news was true. The Duke of Newcastle, writing to

Mr. Herbert on September 30th, mentions with some doubt that a telegram had—

"been received from Colquhoun at Bucharest, purporting to be a letter from Omer Pasha that 'Sebastopol attaqué par terre et par mer a succombé.' I fear there can——

"God be thanked! I stop to say that a telegram has this moment come from Stratford—a great battle on the 20th on the Alma—the Russians driven in on Sebastopol with heavy loss—our loss killed and wounded 1,400—French the same. Victory complete. I now am convinced Sebastopol HAS really fallen. Again thank Heaven!"

All over England bells were rung, salutes were fired, congratulatory resolutions passed. The disappointment was the keener for the previous elation; and, quite irrationally but very naturally, the irritation of the public at having been fooled vented itself on the Government, which, as unreasonably but as naturally, was somehow felt to be responsible for the false intelligence.

At the time of the declaration of war the Russian armies were assembled in imposing force on the Danube. It was not anticipated that the Ottoman forces would be able to resist their advance, and Bulgaria was looked on as the probable field on which the first great encounter of the new European war would be decided. The presence of two young English officers was, however, sufficient to secure the successful defence of Silistria, which had been besieged by the Russians; and the arrival in the Bosphorus of the allied armies, prepared to march to its relief, convinced Prince Gortschakoff that the siege must be relinquished. He was equally unsuccessful in an attempt to drive the Turks, supported by English gunboats, from Giurgevo, on the north bank of the

Danube, which they had occupied; and on a summons from Austria to evacuate the Principalities—a summons which we should have done well to await before presenting our own—the Russian forces were altogether withdrawn from them by the Emperor Nicholas.

In looking at the matter from this distance of time, it is impossible not to feel regret that overtures for the restoration of peace were not then made. In the south, the main object for which we were contending —the liberation of the Principalities—had been effected. In the north, the Aland Islands had been taken and occupied, the strong fortifications of Bomarsund destroyed, and the Russian fleets both in the Baltic and the Black Sea compelled to remain sealed up in the recesses of their fortified harbours. We had done enough fully to warrant us in offering terms of peace—so much, indeed, that it might be doubtful whether Russia would consent to treat. She had been worsted, but not humiliated, and it was highly probable that she would not consent to forego the chance of regaining by subsequent military successes the advantages she had lost. But it would have been well to try the chance. So little, however, was this deemed possible at the time, that not even Lord Aberdeen or Mr. Gladstone thought of proposing peace negotiations, and the former strongly advocated the immediate dispatch of that expedition to the Crimea which had from the first been contemplated in the event of the Russian forces evacuating the Principalities or being driven from them. The expedition sailed, and at first the same good fortune which had hitherto smiled on the Allies seemed to attend it. The difficult operation of landing two armies on a hostile coast was successfully accomplished; a great battle, where the Russians had every advantage of position and numbers,

was gallantly won; a flank march of the most hazardous character was performed without disaster; and the armies sat down before Sebastopol in the full belief that a few days' siege would lead to its surrender. Then came a check, a period of suffering to the Army, and of delay in military operations. The siege, which it was supposed would take only a few days, was continued during ten months; but in the face of the exaggerated language currently used with regard to the "Crimean Disasters," it is well to bear in mind that, in a military sense, there was never any "disaster" at all. The progress of the siege was delayed—a delay all the more resented by the public because of the universal belief for a time obtained by the false report of its capture; but though protracted beyond expectation, it was ultimately successful. During its course the Allies fought and won two pitched battles (Inkerman, November 5th, 1854, and Traktir, June 2nd, 1855) and lost none. True it is that during the earlier part of the winter there was much suffering from cold, from insufficient supplies of food and clothing, and from indifferent hospital accommodation. That suffering was not greater, and the hospital accommodation, bad as it may have been, was far better, than they had been in the forces engaged in the Duke of Wellington's Peninsular campaigns.

When Parliament reassembled in December, the expression of dissatisfied popular feeling had to be encountered. Parliament had been summoned earlier than usual in order to pass a measure urgently demanded by Lord Raglan, and to which no serious opposition was anticipated.

The recruits obtained for the Army were, generally speaking, so young as to be quite unfit to encounter

the rough service which awaited them in the Crimea: they died there, as Lord Raglan himself expressed it, "like flies." In these circumstances he earnestly pleaded for the enlistment of a few regiments of adult Germans—Hanoverians, if possible—to replace the gaps made by disease and hardship in the ranks of the Army.

The employment of mercenary troops has always been distasteful, and rightly so, to English feeling; and when the Bill to give effect to Lord Raglan's wishes was introduced into the House of Lords by the Duke of Newcastle in a sound and sensible but not very effective speech, this prejudice, skilfully worked on by Lord Derby and other leaders of the Opposition, was sufficient, when combined with the vague dissatisfaction and disappointment felt at the progress of events in the Crimea, to raise a formidable obstacle to the Bill, which only passed the Lords by a majority of twelve. It was reserved for Mr. Herbert in the House of Commons to turn the current of opinion, and roll back, for the moment, the advancing tide of discontent.

In the debate on the second reading of the Bill, Sir John Pakington brought against the Government many charges :—that it had acted without any distinct plan, and that, such as it was, that plan was an unjustifiable one;—that the Army was too small, and was ill-appointed; and that the Government neglected to reinforce it. All these accusations Sidney Herbert repelled with no little skill and with marked success. They had, indeed, been previously met and answered by the Duke of Newcastle; but while the facts and figures and reasoned arguments of the Duke had only extorted a species of judicial assent from those who had carefully followed him, Sidney Herbert's

vigorous sentences raised enthusiasm; and when he sat down, the great mass of the members of the House were, for the time being, ready to maintain that the Government had done all, or nearly all, that could be expected of it.

Mr. Herbert showed that, from the beginning, the war had been conducted on a distinct plan: first, to secure the Dardanelles; next, to defend Constantinople; then, Constantinople being safe, to defend the line of the Balkans; and, lastly, to strike a blow at some vital part of the Russian Empire. He pointed out how this plan had been step by step followed up successfully. He dwelt on the striking fact that the instructions to Lord Raglan to invade Russia and capture Sebastopol were sent two days after the siege of Silistria was raised, and that the unfortunate delay which retarded the landing of the troops in the Crimea was mainly due to the terrible attack of cholera which prostrated both the English and French camps whilst at Varna. He had no difficulty in showing that large reinforcements had been sent out in monthly increasing numbers, and he triumphantly established the impossibility of providing at the commencement of a war such reinforcements as could be secured later.

"You may argue that these reinforcements were small for a Power like England, that can pour out its battalions like water. But, I ask, on whom rests the responsibility that England, at the commencement of a war, must make small wars? Why is it? It is because through every Government and every Parliament we have always had the same stereotyped system of economy in military affairs.

"I am speaking the whole plain truth in this matter. I am as much to blame as any one. I have held for some years the responsible situation of Secretary at War, and I know what have been my own shortcomings in this respect; but this, too, I know, that

whenever I have brought forward, as I have done, what are called Peace Estimates, I have constantly been met with motions for large reductions. I say, therefore, that it has been the fault of all Parties, all Administrations, every Parliament; I am afraid I cannot give my assent to any exception, however eager I may be to do so. I have seen Administrations formed of various Parties, I have seen them taking different courses on almost every conceivable subject, but on one they have agreed, and that has been the one to which I have alluded—one of improvident economy. What has been the result?

"At the commencement of the war we had to make means, and to create an Army and to use it at the same time. . . . It is a difficulty which you have to encounter when you have to make an Army at the same time that you are to use it. Recollect this: we have few well-seasoned soldiers in this country.

"See the difficulties we have had to encounter. We have no conscription in England; we have no compulsory service whatever in England, except for internal defence; we have to trust entirely to the voluntary system. You cannot make an Army as other nations may. You cannot make an Army by a stroke of the pen, or by an Ukase raise 100,000 soldiers. We must get men willing to come. But, on the other hand, when they do come, you have got the materials which no conscription in the world can furnish: you have got for your materials men, not dragged from their reluctant homes against their wills, and from their peaceful pursuits, to be forced into scenes of blood and scenes of horror to which they were averse; you have got free men—men animated by high spirit, full of adventure, full of life, full of ambition—men whom no suffering can break, who can never complain that one hardship or suffering to which they have been exposed has been forced upon them by a tyrannical Government. You have had that difficulty; but you have had another—at least, when we are talking of augmentation we have had a difficulty which has pressed very much upon us; for some time emigration to a great extent has been going on from this country, and more especially from the sister country, Ireland, where it has dried up the sources of our military supply. You have

had great prosperity in trade and agriculture, and consequent demand for labour, and all that would not be in favour of the recruiting sergeant. But when I look back to the records of history, and see what were the means by which in former wars we attempted to get men—how we persuaded men into the militia by a bounty of ten guineas, and drafted them out of it by a bounty of eleven guineas, and, after all, we could only raise 24,000 men in one year —and when I look at what has been done during this the first year of the war, I must confess the contrast is not unfavourable."

He exposed some of the exaggerations and misstatements made, and showed how wholly illusory were calculations based on the number of "bayonets," from which it was deduced that Lord Raglan's Army had dwindled to 16,000. Counted in the same way, the Duke of Wellington would be held to have had only 18,000 men with him at Waterloo. Sir J. Pakington had censured the absence of tents after Alma. Mr. Herbert showed that every regiment had tents in abundance, and that their not being in the first instance brought over to the Crimea was due to a deliberate purpose and a sound reason:

"But let me put another question, and let any one judge whether Lord Raglan is to be blamed. He knew that they had to meet a very powerful army, which had entrenched itself, and it was very obvious that within a short time of landing, and probably at the time of landing, they would have to meet an energetic, determined, and skilful enemy. Lord Raglan might have brought all his tents, but then he would have left behind him all those battalions the space for which would have been taken up by the tents. A powerful force is stationed at the Alma, and nothing can be done until their position is forced or turned. Now, if the result of the battle of the Alma, instead of being a glorious victory, had been an undecided success in consequence of the want of two or three battalions, the expedition

would have been lost; and what would then have been said of Lord Raglan? It would have been said, 'Why did you fill your ships with ambulances and tents when you had men, and such men, lying idle at Varna? You were going upon an expedition in which you knew that the first blow was everything, and to take men with you, and plenty of them, should have been the one and only consideration.' But now the battle of the Alma has been won, it is easy for the right honourable gentleman to say that it might have been won with fewer men. Just so."

In dealing with complaints made as to the hospital establishments, he did not deny or attempt to palliate defects, but he proved that their number and importance had been grossly exaggerated, and left every hearer convinced of his determination to set right, at any cost, whatever might be amiss. An eloquent and heart-stirring description of the great battle fought at Inkerman, the detailed accounts of which had only reached England a week or two previously, touched the feelings and roused the pride of his hearers, and a spirited rejection of Sir J. Pakington's proffered support appealed to the fighting instincts of his party:

"He [Sir John Pakington] says, however, that he gave extraordinary powers to the present Government, whom he thought incapable of using them with wisdom, prudence, or foresight. If that be his rule, it is not mine. If we are to derive any advantage from this strange proceeding on his part, I reject it; if he thinks the Government incapable of carrying on affairs, it is not his duty to entrust them with power, but to transfer it to some other men more honest and capable of conducting affairs, so as to satisfy himself and the country."

For a time the Government was saved, to a great extent through Sidney Herbert's exertions. The

Foreign Enlistment Bill passed, and Parliament adjourned till January 23rd, 1855.

During this short recess, the various forces repulsed for the moment by Herbert's speech again gathered head. It is not easy to reproduce the daily fluctuating impressions of any past period of time. Conclusions, more or less accurate with regard to its events and the actors in them, have been arrived at and accepted, and it is difficult to believe that they did not always prevail. As a fact, the public estimate of living men and the public appreciation of the transactions of the day, vary from hour to hour, and are in a large degree formed by influences little connected with the real merits of the case.

The pages of a diary, if honestly kept and honestly edited, preserve, however, some record of the fleeting moods of the moment, and from Journals which have been published relating to the winter of 1854-55, and from the columns of the daily papers, we may form some estimate of the follies and cruelties advocated by public opinion, and of the mistakes and lies which gained general currency and belief. Of these Journals, Greville's is probably the most interesting and important, though those of Lord Malmesbury, Reeve, and others are not without their value. Greville, reflecting naturally the colour of his environment, condemns Lord Raglan in terms which he was subsequently ashamed to have expressed, and recorded opinions which at a later period he admitted to be erroneous. Others as loudly condemned what they termed the inaction of the Government, and the height of absurdity was reached when Mr. Roebuck confided to the Duke of Newcastle his belief that the Prince Consort was in league with Russia, and was, in her interest, hampering the efforts of the

Army in the Crimea and of the military authorities at home.

Lord John Russell watched the rising storm with apparently little dissatisfaction, and viewed, with toleration at least, the manifold intrigues, for the most part abortive, which, in such a state of things, were repeatedly set on foot to disunite and destroy the existing administration.

On January 21st, 1855, the Cabinet adopted a scheme drawn up by Mr. Herbert for the formation of a Board consisting of the heads of the different military departments presided over by the Secretary of State. On the following day, Lord John circulated a memorandum proposing an extension of this Board, so as to include the Board of Ordnance, which he suggested should be discussed at the next Cabinet. But that discussion never took place and that Cabinet was never held; for on the 23rd, the day on which Parliament reassembled, he resigned his office of Lord President of the Council, on the ground that he could not defend in the House of Commons the conduct of the war by the Government of which he was a member, and for the acts of which he, equally with its other members, was responsible.

Lord John Russell had anticipated, as indeed he had good reason to do, that he would succeed Lord Aberdeen as Prime Minister, whenever that statesman found himself able, without injury to the Government, to retire. Had peace been preserved, this transfer of power would have been quietly effected; for though the Cabinet was, as a whole, averse to the contemplated change, Lord Aberdeen had succeeded in persuading most of its members to consent to it, and would in the end have overcome the obstinate opposition of Mr. Gladstone to the suggestion. But peace was not

preserved, and Lord John Russell himself admitted that Lord Aberdeen could not "run away" after the commencement of the war. But while Lord John admitted this, he could not reconcile himself to the situation. He became more than ever restless and uncertain of purpose, and often threatened to retire, though well aware that by so doing he would destroy the Government. He thus unconsciously made the realisation of his wishes even more difficult than it would otherwise have been; for many of those members of the Cabinet (including some of the most distinguished of his own particular following) who in September, 1853, had been ready to accept him as their head were a year later firmly resolved not to do so. Of this, however, I do not believe that Lord John was himself at all aware.

Early in January, 1855, Lord John made a short visit to Paris, where his wife's family were then assembled. He returned to England on the 16th, and attended a Cabinet held on that day, at which, according to Lord Clarendon, he appeared in unusually high good humour. On the 22nd he suggested, in a memorandum which he sent to Lord Aberdeen, a modification of Mr. Herbert's proposed Army Board, which he said he would bring forward for consideration at the next Cabinet.

On the following day, Parliament reassembled after its adjournment for Christmas. Mr. Roebuck gave notice of a motion for a Committee of Inquiry into the conduct of the War. Lord John, professing himself unable to meet such a motion, sent in his resignation to Lord Aberdeen the same evening.

That a motion for inquiry would be made must have been as well known to Lord John as to every one else. On being told by Lord Aberdeen

that it was supposed a vote of censure would be proposed by Sir Robert Peel, he congratulated himself that it was not Sir Robert's father he would have to meet, but gave no hint that he was unprepared for the encounter. If he had made up his mind not to oppose such a motion, common fairness to his colleagues required that he should have intimated that intention to them. His resignation, if dissatisfied with the acts of the Government, would have been perfectly justifiable. His defence of acts for which, so long as he did not resign, he was equally responsible with his colleagues, would have been equally intelligible. The course which it was not open to him, without damage to himself, to pursue was to remain a member of the Government up to the last moment that he could do so without criticism in Parliament, and then to resign, not on account of difference with his colleagues as to the policy which by remaining in the Cabinet he had condoned, and for which he was himself responsible, but because it was attacked. But this, unfortunately, was the course that he adopted.

That Lord John did not act with conscious treachery may safely be assumed: his whole character belies such a suspicion. But it cannot be denied that he acted in a manner most injurious to his own reputation, and that if he had sedulously laboured to give to his proceedings an appearance of duplicity and intrigue he could hardly have succeeded better.

It was unanimously resolved by his colleagues not to resign, but to face with a direct negative the motion which he had shrunk from meeting, although they were well aware that his secession had rendered defeat on such an issue well-nigh inevitable. Had the Government remained united, the motion would probably have been met in the manner suggested by Lord

Palmerston in a letter to Lord John (published in Mr. Ashley's Life of the former),[1] and which well expresses the general feeling of the time as to Lord John's action.

Feelings of honour urged the Cabinet to adopt the line they did, but as a matter of tactics that course was ill chosen, and it is by no means improbable that an adroit amendment to Mr. Roebuck's motion, open as it was to very obvious objections, might have met with success. As it was, when, on January 28th, Mr. Roebuck brought forward his motion for the appointment of a Select Committee of Investigation, it fell to Mr. Herbert, as Secretary at War, to be the first to speak against it on behalf of the Government. In doing so he not only laboured under the disadvantage of addressing a generally hostile audience, but under another of an unusual character. Mr. Roebuck's health was bad, and, finding himself altogether unable to make the speech he had intended, he contented himself by simply moving the Resolution for the appointment of the Committee, after having given utterance to little more than the opening sentences of a carefully prepared oration. Mr. Herbert, therefore, had not any definite charges to meet and deny, but had himself to suggest the charges which might be made, in order that he might answer them. Every one knows the prejudicial effect produced by voluntary excuses. In this unusual and trying position, Mr. Herbert acquitted himself with even more than his usual tact, good taste, and power.

He began by kindly and sympathetic reference to Roebuck's illness, and then skilfully availed himself of an admission made in the few sentences he had uttered. Roebuck had said: "You have transported

[1] Vol. ii., p. 70.

to the shores of the Black Sea stores enough to feed and shelter twice the number of men that you have sent out." But if the Government had done this, it had, at least, so far done its duty, and Roebuck's strictures in the matter must be held to be directed not against it but against the administration of affairs in the Crimea itself. But what was the case? It was admitted that the regimental organisation was perfect, but alleged that the administration of the general affairs of the Army through the Deputy Quartermaster-General and Commissary-General was not equally efficient. Who denied it? Could it possibly be otherwise in the circumstances? Men who had hardly ever seen even two regiments brigaded together could hardly be expected, however able, to become all at once heaven-born administrators of a great Army. The disbandment of the Militia and the destruction of the waggon train had hampered the efforts of the Government and made efficient organisation in a moment impossible. It was always so.

"I do not know any instance in which England has been plunged into war in which she has not suffered reverses. But former cases differ from the present in this, that we have now to set against misfortunes of this description great military successes."

People talked of disaster, but though there had been suffering there had been no disaster: the destruction of an army in Afghanistan was a disaster; the retreat from Burgos was a disaster;—though they were disasters which had not prevented ultimate success. But in this war there had been no failure such as those. And much as the Army had suffered, its mortality was wonderfully less than that of previous campaigns. In the Burma campaign a few years back the mortality was 48 per cent.; in the Crimea it was but

14 per cent. Almost all the misfortunes complained of were due to the difficulty of transport from Balaclava to the camp. "You have sent out plenty of everything, and you have sent it 3,000 miles; but the distance to the camp is 3,006." The misfortunes not caused by the want of transport were due to the November gales. In a fine burst of eloquence he declared, "You boast that you command the seas, and in your boasting you perhaps too much forget Him who rules them. At His breath the stormy wind ariseth, and the impotence of man is seen." He then gave full statistics of the losses sustained in the gale, and of the supplies and reinforcements sent. He declared that the Government took responsibility for blame if it attached, but—

"we have written to the Commander-in-Chief pointing out the failures which appear to have taken place, drawing his attention to circumstances which have been reported to us, and we have asked him to tell the Government with whom the blame lay. We have also desired him to use the supreme powers entrusted to him to displace those men who may have shown themselves incompetent, and to replace them by those acting under his eye who have qualified themselves in the stern school of experience, and who may have given proof of their administrative ability in those services in which their exertions are required. But it is not in the power of the Government, at this distance and without the information that is requisite, and it would be a cowardly and discreditable thing unless they were certain of what they were saying or doing, to attempt to throw the blame on men who are absent, who after all may be accused unjustly, and who, at any rate, are now gallantly perilling their lives in the service of their country."

He showed how exaggerated and inconsistent many of the charges made and commonly believed were, and how extraordinary were others. Shells said

by one correspondent to be too large, were by another deemed too small. The huts were said to be erected without nails and coats issued without buttons. Extraordinary and wholly false as these charges were they were believed nevertheless. He explained the re-modelling of the War Department, and announced that the Commissariat had been removed to its control from that of the Treasury. He dealt with the practical objections to such a Committee as was proposed—its utter inability to ascertain accurately either the actual state of things in the Army or to apportion blame or praise, unless all the military chiefs were called home to be examined, and its paralysing effect for the time, on the prosecution of even the most urgent reforms. Inquiry, however, into its own action the Government courted and ought to court.

"It had been exposed to much obloquy and calumny, which some people said it should despise; but however much and justly the calumniator may be despised, no Government in a country like this can afford to despise the calumny itself."

He spoke in vain. Prejudice and passion reigned supreme, and the extraordinary exaggeration which pervaded the tone of the public mind is well expressed by the words of Henry Drummond, who followed Mr. Herbert:

"I impute it to the gross incompetence of some men that a *catastrophe has occurred without a parallel in history*; that an army three times victorious has been left *to perish*—to be *utterly destroyed*—by the incompetence of those whose duty it was to have supported it."

Speech after speech was filled with excited but honest indignation, fanned for party reasons by cooler-headed men, who sought to utilise an ardour of denun-

ciation which they were too well informed to share, and secretly despised. Lord Palmerston, Mr. Gladstone, and Sir George Grey spoke forcibly against the motion, but the union of Derbyites and Russellite Whigs was too strong to resist. The Government was defeated by a large majority on the night of February 1st, and Lord Aberdeen resigned the following day.

Lord Derby, sent for by the Queen in the first instance, failed to form a Government; Lord John Russell who was next tried, underwent the humiliating mortification of receiving from nearly every one of his late colleagues in the Cabinet an absolute refusal to serve under him as the head of another. At length the Queen sent for Lord Palmerston, who, as Lord Derby and Lord John had done before him, at once made proposals to Lord Aberdeen's friends to join him.

Mr. Herbert was in favour of accepting these proposals; Sir James Graham and Mr. Gladstone were against doing so. On the night of the 4th Mr. Herbert urged his own views in a forcible letter to Mr. Gladstone.

MR. HERBERT TO MR. GLADSTONE.

"*Sunday night, February 4th*, 1855.

"MY DEAR GLADSTONE,

"I am very much disturbed about our position. There are some occasions in which the acceptance of office carries with it in vulgar estimation a certain amount of suspicion, and the refusal is held to be a *primâ facie* evidence of virtue. In the present instance it is exactly the contrary, and the national instinct is right. The only man who cannot accept office without suspicion is Lord John. Any others who now hold aloof on a great public emergency, and who, unable to form a Government themselves, refuse their aid to any of those who with their assistance could do it, will be held to be intriguing for their own ends.

My instinct tells me that this is a moment when we ought to be helping, not obstructing.

"Lord John Russell's attempt to form a Government when the public feeling justly condemned him to a purgation for his late offences was an indecent contempt of a just public opinion.

"Our attempt to stand aloof from the public service at a moment of great public difficulty will be misinterpreted, perhaps, but condemned, and, upon the broad aspect of the case, justly so. We are not asked to form a new coalition, or if there be any novelty it is the exclusion of the man who was the most hostile to ourselves, and by his presence in the Cabinet gave the strongest party colour to the neutral combination. The Whigs have discarded Lord John, principally because he had behaved disloyally to ourselves, and made any continued junction with us, so long as he was there, impossible. I cannot see on what public grounds we can refuse to continue co-operation, under circumstances of great difficulty to which we have ourselves contributed, to men who show this readiness to continue to act with us. The Queen said, and had a right to say, that she trusted others would sacrifice their personal feelings, as she was ready to sacrifice hers. My personal feelings are certainly in favour of entire abstinence from office. I have been for some time so unwell that I am conscious that without rest I run great risk for the future. But I am not the less bound, so long as I can remain in public life, and if I do so remain, to do my utmost for what seems to me the public welfare.

"One of three things must now happen. I assume (which you do not) that Lord Aberdeen's Government is at an end. The circumstances of its extinction were such that its resuscitation, much as we may wish it, is simply impossible. First, then, either we shall continue to act with our late colleagues in a Government reconstructed to meet the peculiar exigencies of the moment; or, second, our late colleagues will go on without us; or, lastly, it must go back to Derby *pur et simple.*

"I take the last first.

"I am not one of those who exaggerate the different degrees of ability in different men. In the formation

of ministries circumstances are sometimes more powerful than the men in producing successful results. But even if Derby had a sufficient number of good men, which he has not, what, after all, do we know of his intentions or feelings on the subject of the war? We know this, that the tone of the criticism of his party has been directed against the supposed Russian leanings of the late Government, next to that against its Austrian leanings, and in Disraeli, the moving spirit of the whole, we know of no principle but that of seizing and making capital of the popular feeling of the moment. We know that Ellenborough is to be the War Minister, bent upon making the utmost of displaying on an European field his military genius.

"As to joining him [Lord Derby], that is a sudden turn, a second coalition with men who have denounced all coalitions, and with whom we have been fighting night after night till Tuesday last. No public character can stand such rough usage as that.

"Palmerston without us (I am now putting our own position entirely aside) may be, and I think will be, very dangerous (I think we made a great mistake the other day in not clenching Lord Lansdowne). Alone in a Cabinet, he would give a war impetus to our foreign policy which would be the greatest public calamity. The result of the Conference at Vienna will depend mainly on the composition of Lord Palmerston's Cabinet. He entertains honestly strong opinions as to the possible results of a Russian war. But even when he thinks strongly he is wonderfully pliable. When only Secretary of State he swallowed all his opinions on Reform rather than resign. Nothing could be more sincere or decided than those opinions were. His position as Prime Minister he will be still less disposed to give up or to hazard by disruption of the Cabinet.

"I am putting the question now simply on the ground of what is the course best calculated to secure Peace.

"Go on I think he will, under any circumstances. The prize is too great and his own time is too short to allow of postponement. If we decline, we must state why. We cannot talk about fidelity to this or that colleague. The country is thinking not of

colleagues or of men, but of War and Peace. I cannot name Lord Palmerston in the same breath as Lord Aberdeen as a statesman, still less as a Prime Minister, but one is impossible and the other possible and probable, and possibilities are what we must look to. Our reasons for not joining Palmerston must be public reasons. It is possible that by joining him we may keep him in a right course, and he can afford to make peace on easier terms than almost any one else, if he can be got to do it. It is of course possible that we may fail; that is a matter for us to discuss and consider. But if we stand aloof, we must say why; and if we state that we are for peace, or for a peace which he is not for, then we divide England into two camps, and encourage the Emperor of Russia to trade on our divisions and to hold out for terms far less favourable for us than those now under discussion even in their largest interpretation. In this way we should do immeasurable mischief. We should protract the contest and render certain a result less favourable to England.

"I am putting one side of the argument all along, because you are in the possession of the other. I want you to consider the whole case.

"Clarendon told Lord Lansdowne that his refusal to Lord John was very much influenced by the hope of continuing a Government in some shape with us.

"The Whigs have acted on this feeling of indignation against Lord John and have virtually ostracised him.

"The Queen and the country are in difficulties. If we can get any fair terms and a clear understanding on the Peace Question from Palmerston, shall we be justified in refusing to act with him?

"Looking at the combination in a party point of view, we shall have a neutral head of a Whig and Peelite combination. If Palmerston will give us no satisfactory assurances, our course is clear. If he do, what reason can we give to the country or to our friends for refusing assistance in such an emergency? Our friends, some few of whom I have seen, cannot even understand our doubts. They think we shall, if we do not mind, find ourselves classed with Lord John, and be thought to be trying to hold the balance with a view of becoming what the French call 'masters

of the situation.' In short, I look upon our position as most critical.

"Excuse this long and hurried letter.

"I enclose a note from Clarendon. Palmerston has announced a visit to-morrow morning.

"The last words at Graham's this evening (where Lord Aberdeen was) were, 'It will require much consideration.'"

LORD CLARENDON TO MR. HERBERT.

"GROSVENOR CRESCENT,
"*February 4th*, 1855.

"MY DEAR HERBERT,

"I have had a long talk with Aberdeen, and much fear that he agrees with Gladstone, that he is the only proper head of a Coalition Government. I am far from disagreeing with them, but the question is whether that is now practicable, and whether the war and the business of the country can be efficiently carried on by the present-late Government. If I thought so, I would ask no better arrangement, for I would not wish to serve under a more honourable, kind, and right-judging man than Aberdeen.

"There has been a most unjust cry against him and Newcastle, but until some time has passed I am afraid that neither of them can form part of a Government with advantage to themselves or the country. Would it be right, then, because the Government we might desire is impracticable, to render all other combinations impossible, which it will be if you and Gladstone and Graham decline to act with Palmerston (supposing him to be charged with forming a Government)? At least I shall think him hyper-rash if he makes the attempt without you. There will then be Derby, again, and no mistake next time, but that in consequence of our inability to come to an understanding among ourselves will be utterly disgraceful to us, both at home and abroad."

MR. GLADSTONE TO MR. HERBERT.

"*February 4th*, 1855.
"1½ after midnight.

"MY DEAR HERBERT,

"I quite agree that an issue so grave as that of joining Palmerston or not should be well considered,

and as we are to meet at Graham's to-morrow, at half-past 10, for the purpose, I will not attempt to reply to your letter, which I have found on my return home at 1 o'clock from Lord Aberdeen's, whither I went after Lord P. had been here.

"One thing, however, I must say: I put aside as altogether visionary the idea that, with whatever terms or understandings beforehand, we, minus Lord Aberdeen, (and especially in the absence of Lord John Russell), can impress upon a Palmerston Cabinet from within any direction of policy more pacific than the joint result of the ideas and wishes of Lord Lansdowne, Clarendon, and Palmerston, of whom, again, the two first will derive their inspiration mainly from the clearer knowledge and infinitely stronger will of Palmerston himself.

"I send your letter to Graham, that he may read it before we meet."

On the following morning the three friends met at the Admiralty to discuss the question, and not agreeing, sent to ask Lord Aberdeen to join them in their deliberations. He declined to do so, saying that the question was one to be decided by themselves and on their own responsibility, according to their conscience. They would, however, take no denial, and a more urgent summons was sent him that *unâ voce* they agreed they could not come to a decision without his assistance. On his joining them, he advised that they should accept Lord Palmerston's offer. Nevertheless, Mr. Gladstone and Sir James Graham remained unshaken in their reluctance to form part of the new Cabinet. Rather than separate himself from them, Mr. Herbert took, though reluctantly, the same course, and separate letters were written by each of them to Lord Palmerston, declining to accept office under him. Lord Aberdeen, returned home, but ill pleased with his friends, and remarking, not unreasonably, that when they insisted with such vehemence on his

giving them his advice, he had supposed it was because they meant to take it when given.

Sidney Herbert, though he had agreed to act in the same manner as his friends, felt ill at ease, and, as the day wore on, became more and more dissatisfied with the decision to which, in opposition to his own better judgment, he had assented. Letters came in from friends which increased his dissatisfaction.

The Duke of Newcastle wrote that he believed a great mistake had been made, "both as regards the public and yourselves." He admitted that some of the reasons arising out of the personal qualifications of Palmerston were shared by him, but thought that the dangers apprehended would be removed by joining him and aggravated by refusal to do so.

From Lord Lansdowne Herbert received the following letter:

LORD LANSDOWNE TO MR. HERBERT.

"*February 5th*, 1855.

"MY DEAR HERBERT,

"I have been deeply concerned to hear of the determination adopted at the Admiralty this afternoon. I should not write, however, to say so, if it had not appeared to me that there are yet the means of averting what I must consider its disastrous effects on the country in depriving it of your services at this moment and that of others whose co-operation is essential, if not to the formation of any Government at this moment, at least of any that would be efficient and durable.

"I have therefore been led to write to Lord Aberdeen this evening earnestly requesting him to reconsider any determination he may have formed not to accept a situation in the new Cabinet, after having ascertained that there would be every disposition to make the proposition to him if he were disposed to consider it favourably.

"I have been induced to take this step by a long conversation on the subject with the Duke of New-

castle, who seemed to think it might remove all difficulty, and whose feeling on the subject is as warm and disinterested as my own; and I mention to you what I have done in the hope that you will still keep your mind open on this most critical question, involving, as it does, the credit and the character of the country.

"Believe me, yours sincerely,
"LANSDOWNE."

MR. HERBERT TO MR. GLADSTONE.

"49, BELGRAVE SQUARE,
"*February 5th*, 1855.

"MY DEAR GLADSTONE,

"I write a line to report progress.

"Canning has just been here. He is on his way to Palmerston. He will commit himself in no way now. He thinks our course not inexplicable, but unexplainable and wrong. He is going up to Argyll House after seeing Lord Palmerston. I enclose a note from Cook[1] as a good specimen of the view of intelligent bystanders.

"I do not know what has passed between John Russell and Palmerston. I infer from the latter's letter in answer to yours that he was about to make him an offer, and I infer from his sending to Canning that John Russell has declined, and that there is room for, consequently, and a necessity for, non-Whig recruits. Lincoln seems to think there is a chance of Lord Aberdeen joining. I do not agree with him, much as I should rejoice at a *dénouement* which would save our honour, which I cannot but feel is seriously compromised by the one taken this morning.

"I am not yet clear as to what I ought to do. But with the opinions I entertain I feel that I am in a thoroughly false position.

"Will you send me my letter to you of last night? I should like to take a copy of it."

[1] Editor of *The Morning Chronicle*. He asked whether the effect of the Peelites refusing to join Lord Palmerston would not be to withdraw the public indignation from Lord John Russell and bring it on themselves.

MR. GLADSTONE TO MR. HERBERT.

"ADMIRALTY, *February 5th*, 1855,
"*Midnight.*

"MY DEAR HERBERT,

"I am not surprised at Cook's note. It is, I daresay, a true prognostication of what is in store for us during the next few days and weeks, and it is a natural view from a position outside the Government and the facts.

"I hope with Sir J. Graham that if you think you decided wrongly this morning, you will not be prevented by any personal feeling from altering your mind. That, however, is a slippery process.

"I will send you your letter to-morrow morning, but I do not keep your messenger to-night. On second thoughts, you are the best judge, so I will go home and get it. But pray go to bed.

"Ever yours,
"W. E. G."

Sidney Herbert's growing conviction that he had acted wrongly induced him late at night to write to Lord Aberdeen as follows:

MR. HERBERT TO LORD ABERDEEN.

"BELGRAVE SQUARE,
"*February 5th*, 1855.
"11.30 P.M.

"MY DEAR LORD ABERDEEN,

"I am in great difficulty as to the course I ought to take. I am not satisfied that the decision at which we arrived this morning was the right one, but the contrary. There is an instinct about these matters which tells us the right and the wrong of a course better than all the reasoning in the world.

"There existed up to last Tuesday a Government which was a good Government, to the best of my belief, but which was then destroyed in a manner and under circumstances which render its resuscitation impossible.

"Three combinations have since been tried.

"The first pre-supposed a new coalition between what was the most hated in the late Government, and what was most abusive in the late Opposition,

a *volte face* so rapid and so damaging that no public character could stand it.

"The second was on personal grounds (but those of a public character) most objectionable.

"The third we have declined on what I cannot help thinking an exaggerated estimate of public inconvenience or danger, but at any rate a danger which is very much increased by the very course we have taken.

"Granville, I understand, is still holding aloof, and there is a fear, among the moderate Whigs, that Palmerston may be driven, through our refusal, to recruit himself among wilder and more dangerous men.

"The moderate Whigs are men with whom we hold a great deal in common. They have behaved most honourably to us. Their conduct in ostracising Lord John on account of his breaking up our connection is entitled to practical acknowledgment at our hands.

"We think a Palmerston Government dangerous to the Austrian Alliance. How can it fail to be so, if, by our secession, we fix upon it the very character which would deter Austria from co-operation with it?

"We hope for peace, and, if he chooses to try for it, there is no man who could make peace so easily as Palmerston. Terms would be accepted from him here in England which would be hooted at from you. I do not believe in the 'iron will' and the inflexibility of Palmerston. On the contrary, I never saw a man so pliable, even when his prejudices (which are far more unmovable things than opinions) are at stake. Witness the Succession Duty and the Reform Bill. And on foreign policy, though he has occasionally talked about Poland, he has never embodied any of his ideas on the map of Europe in a proposal to the Cabinet. You say that he gives up the fortifications at Sebastopol as part of the third point.

"Now, I quite admit that in negotiations the complexion of which necessarily alters every day, the tendencies and leanings of the negotiator are far better guarantees of a result than any written professions or stipulations on particular points; but Palmerston is not to be Foreign Minister, nor is

he to be the negotiator; and if we were in sufficient force in his Cabinet, I confess I do not entertain much apprehension as to our power of keeping matters within proper bounds. Out of office, do what we will, we raise a peace standard, which would drive him for support on a war party. We show our hand to the Russian Emperor, and encourage him, by the evidence of our divisions, to hold out for better terms. We alarm Austria, by the declaration that his Government is not one in which we can repose confidence.

"In short, I think Palmerston's Government will depend mainly on us for the character it is to bear, and which, having got, it would act up to: we propose to fix upon it the very character most dangerous to the State. Our own honour and characters are involved in the course we are to take. Our retirement justifies the suspicion that we never were in earnest concert in the war, and that the John Russell section contained within it all the honesty and the vigour. We shall draw down on ourselves all the indignation now resting on Lord John, for selfishness and indifference to the public interests. If you join the Government, security would be given, and our false step recovered. I do not deny that it is a great sacrifice to call on you to make—but in proportion to the greatness of the sacrifice is the greatness also of the appreciation of the service. I do not think it possible to render a greater one to the State.

"I know that I am an interested party in asking you to consider the possibility of this course. I am in a position in which I never found myself placed before. I took this morning, against my own judgment, a course which does not appear to me to be defensible. The conjuncture was too grave a one to justify my adoption of that course in deference to the opinions of others. But I do not see how the step can be retraced without a great alteration of circumstances, and the existence of securities which did not exist this morning. But I do not do it for my own sake alone, or even principally. Gladstone's position is really far worse than mine, because the necessity for his services is so great, that his disappearance from the Treasury Bench is so much the greater injury to the country. So of Graham likewise. This

is a great public emergency, and a case of a singularly exceptional character, and we must not be bound by precedents or routine, but must make sacrifices freely."

Lord Aberdeen's reply was to the effect that this letter ought to have been addressed to Mr. Gladstone or Sir James Graham rather than to himself, for he, as Mr. Herbert was aware, entirely agreed with him in thinking refusal to join Lord Palmerston wrong and ill-judged, and was still ready to do all he could to make it possible. At the same time he gave an emphatic negative to the suggestion that he should himself form part of the administration (a suggestion which had also been made to him by the Prince Consort and by Lord Lansdowne), declaring that he would rather die than do so.

The next day the discussion was resumed, and, thanks to Lord Aberdeen's strenuous efforts, all his three friends were ultimately persuaded to remain in office. They did so, however, upon slightly different grounds. Mr. Herbert continued in office because he felt it was the right thing to do, Mr. Gladstone because Lord Aberdeen assured him he "had confidence" in the new Government, and Sir James Graham because Lord Aberdeen "wished" him to do so. Mr. Herbert accepted in the new Cabinet the Secretaryship of State for the Colonies. Sir James Graham and Mr. Gladstone remained where they already were, at the head of the Admiralty and the Exchequer respectively.

But strange to say, while Mr. Gladstone had guarded his acceptance of office by reservations as to Church patronage and sound finance, and all three had made stipulations on the subject of the impending peace negotiations, no understanding had been come to on the subject of the appointment of the Committee of Inquiry. Lord Palmerston had told them that he

would try to get rid of it, and with this they seem to have been content. Always sanguine, he appears to have thought that he should have no difficulty in effecting this, and that the popular satisfaction at his appointment as First Minister would render the country indifferent to the establishment of any inquiry by a Select Committee. He speedily discovered, however, that the task was one which it was beyond his strength to accomplish. He attempted it indeed, but found that a comparison of himself to Richard II. after the suppression of Wat Tyler's revolt only made the House of Commons laugh, and quickly realised that however little he liked it, he must make up his mind to go through with the appointment of the Committee, or resign the position he had only just assumed.

Those who had joined his Government in the first instance unwillingly were perhaps not altogether sorry to avail themselves of this door of escape, and Sir James Graham and Mr. Gladstone intimated that their objection to the nomination of the Committee under any circumstances was too strong to be overcome. The case was somewhat different with Mr. Herbert. That he was alive to the dangers of the Committee, but saw its appointment to be now inevitable, and was prepared to face it, is sufficiently apparent from a note he addressed to Mr. Gladstone on the morning of the day on which a Cabinet was held for the final decision of the question.

"If there is any chance," he wrote, "of the Cabinet being over sufficently early to make it possible for you to run up here, pray do so before the House.

"I take it for granted that the Government will decide to allow the nomination of the Committee or some nomination of the Committee without limitation as to powers. At least I judge, from what I hear, that that is the general intention, and if so, we shall

find ourselves in a position of considerable difficulty. On the one side of the question stands the Committee, full of practical danger, and in that respect a reality, but for every purpose of investigation—*i.e.* every good purpose—a sham. On the other side stands the fact that the Committee had been voted and stood for nomination before we joined the Government, and that therefore we did it with our eyes open to the improbability of the House of Commons rescinding its vote to please anybody.

"PS.—I am very much vexed at not being in the House to-night, as I wished to make a speech in answer to Lord Goderich's motion, which will require very delicate handling. The House is ignorant of the facts, and thinks that promotion from the ranks is a rare exception, instead of an ordinary practice."

Illness unfortunately prevented Mr. Herbert from attending this Cabinet. Had he done so, it might possibly have had a different issue. Either the inevitable would have been accepted, or a modification of the powers of the Committee, limiting it to an inquiry into the conduct of departments at home, would have been attempted. Sir Charles Wood wrote to Mr. Herbert a few days later:

"I cannot help thinking, with you, that this catastrophe might have been prevented. Gladstone spoke of a Commission—which I had thought a good thing; but it seemed to me to drop through in the Cabinet, and certainly Gladstone never pressed it, as a thing which would have made the difference of staying or going. I doubt whether it would have answered its purpose, but it *might*."

But Sir James Graham and Mr. Gladstone were immovable. They would take no part in the appointment of the Committee; they did not earnestly press for the substitution of a Commission; and although himself prepared to take a different course, Sidney Herbert would not separate himself from the two friends with whom he chiefly acted. Accordingly,

with a heavy heart and much misgiving, he resigned the seals of the Colonial Office, which he had only a few days before received. Having agreed to act together, the three friends made their explanations in the House of Commons on February 23rd. Mr. Herbert, who was still very unwell, referred shortly to his illness, and then remarked that Roebuck's motion was divided into two portions, between which he drew the widest possible distinction. That motion proposed to institute an examination into the state of the Army, and an inquiry as to the conduct of departments at home. The House of Commons had the right and duty to institute the latter. He did not object to that portion of the motion, and would go before such a Committee. He had nothing to conceal. He would not say that he had nothing to regret; but he had nothing to be ashamed of. He did not shirk the inquiry. He had regarded, he believed most men had regarded, the vote as a vote of censure, which would not be persevered in after it had effected its purpose. Lord Palmerston had so regarded it, and was of opinion it would be negatived without discussion. But that appeared all altered, and if the Committee was to go on, he must consider not only that part of the resolution to which he was ready to bow, but that also to which he could by no means consent. The Committee was useless for examining into the condition of the Army—not only useless, but mischievous. A Commission on the spot might be of use; a Committee in England could not. As a vote of censure its work was done; as an inquiry it was a sham. He was told the demand for such a Committee was irresistible. He did not believe it. Men had voted for the motion, some for one reason, some another, and with little regard to the thing

moved for. The Government should have led intelligence, not abdicated its leadership.

Though he defended as best he could the course he and his friends had taken, he was ill at ease, nor can he have been much consoled by what Sir James Graham wrote to him on the following day:

"ADMIRALTY,
"*February 24th*, 1855.

"I am anxious," wrote Sir James, "to hear how you are this evening. Last night must have done you good. Our case stood the test of discussion, and though I regret the apparent harshness of our conduct towards Palmerston, who has behaved well, yet I am sure that our decision was necessary and right, and it is a consolation at all events to feel and cherish this belief.

"Only think of Lord John having accepted the seals of the Colonial Office! I conclude that Palmerston will go to the House of Peers, continuing First Minister. But we know that Lord John knows how to dispose of Premiers in the Upper House when they stand in his way."

And the following letter from Sir Charles Wood can only have increased his discomfort:

SIR CHARLES WOOD TO MR. HERBERT.

"INDIA BOARD,
"*Wednesday Evening.*

"MY DEAR HERBERT,

"I cannot refrain from pouring out my sorrow. I will say nothing on private grounds, because I am sure that, without any assurances, you will believe how sincerely I regret this separation. We may, and I trust we shall, remain united by the most friendly feelings for the rest of our lives, but the opportunities of daily intercourse are cut off, and that, trifling as it may appear, is no little matter in even the longest and oldest friendship.

"But I do regret it, and more deeply than I can express, on public, mere public grounds. On the most *general* grounds, what an impulse to the present

outcry against aristocratic Government the events of the last three weeks have given! From Lord John's resignation we have appeared (I mean by we, the persons in whose hands on either side of the House the Government of the country has been, and which, of whatever materials composed, is designated as aristocratic) unable to agree amongst ourselves, and have disgraced representative government in the eyes of the world. My own personal friend and party leader gave the first overt sign of this, and when we seemed to have emerged from anarchy we are plunged into it again. It is sad to think that from the dissensions of the chiefs of all parties, those who hate all chiefs derive strength, and the country suffers. Do not think that I mean it as a reproach to you, but I am ashamed of the figure which the first men in England have made during the last month. You have only put the finishing blow to it. I could shut myself up in despair, and renounce public life with pleasure.

"On more confined grounds—here we have come to an end of that fusion of all the liberal bodies which has been a public object for years. If those of the old Whig party had gone, or two Peelites and one Whig, it might not have signified so much; but whatever we your colleagues may know, depend upon it, the party will consider it as a move.

"The aspirants for office, the excluded from the Whig Government, may rejoice at the loaves and fishes thrown open to them. I do not deny that there may be joy in the old coterie of Brookes, but the sensible and reflecting men of the party will grieve, and grieve deeply.

"I am not of a desponding nature, but I do feel very, very uncomfortable, not for the mere present state of matters, but for what I think is a serious shake to any Government.

"Any popular assembly with a popular feeling is a dangerous element if under no check, and we have now had no check on them for weeks, and shall have a weaker one than ever.

"I don't think any man of sense could have been deluded with the notion of Palmerston's popularity doing any real good—I thought it a bubble, and told him so; but the breaking up of Government after Government, formed and half-formed, in a time of

great political and public difficulty might reconcile one to an Imperial despotism.

"I perhaps ought not to have inflicted this on you, but I do feel so strongly that perhaps my feeling has run away with my discretion.

"Sorry and grieved, unhappy I am more than I can say, and equally hopeless of seeing a happy or even comfortable issue out of our difficulties.

"Yours very sincerely,

"CHARLES WOOD."

Lord Aberdeen disapproved of the action taken by his friends, and said so, but did not feel called on a second time to make their retention of office an object for the special exertion of his personal influence. Two of those friends, however, the Duke of Argyll and Lord Canning, retained office, and Mr. Herbert would have had his full approval had he also done so. In the interests of peace it is to be regretted that all the Peelite connection did not remain in the Cabinet. Had they done so, Lord John Russell, fortified by their support, would probably, when at Vienna, have been able to insist on the acceptance of the terms of peace which he himself thought should have been closed with, and peace would then have been made early in 1855. It is a melancholy reflection that the withdrawal from the Cabinet of Sir J. Graham, Mr. Gladstone, and Mr. Herbert may have prolonged the war for another year, and caused the loss of thousands of lives.

Nor was their action unfortunate only—it was not easily susceptible of intelligible defence. Had they refused to enter office, whether from distrust of Lord Palmerston or a determination not to consent to the appointment of the Committee of Inquiry, their course might have been censured, but could hardly have been misunderstood; but having accepted office with-

out any preliminary stipulation or agreement on this subject, their leaving it was not logically defensible. The truth seems to be that Lord Palmerston's sanguine temperament led him to believe that his popularity would enable him without difficulty to get rid of the Committee, and that he succeeded in persuading Mr. Gladstone and Sir James Graham to think so too. But it is clear that no positive engagement on the subject was made, and the improbability of the House of Commons consenting to reverse a decision at which it had so recently arrived, ought to have been evident to all but those possessed in an unusual degree of the power of seeing things as they wished to see them.

On the secession of the Peelites, Lord John Russell re-entered the Government, succeeding Mr. Herbert as Colonial Secretary. This fact, and the withdrawal of any check on the tendencies of Lord Palmerston's foreign policy naturally increased the distance between the Peelites and the Government. It is true that Lord John did not remain for many weeks a member of the Cabinet, but the fact of his having joined it produced an alienation on the part of Lord Aberdeen's friends which was not healed by his subsequent retirement.

CHAPTER IX

THE CRIMEAN WINTER

1854–55

THE withdrawal of Sidney Herbert and his friends from Lord Palmerston's Cabinet appears to be the proper point at which to inquire whether the members of the Aberdeen Government in general, and Sidney Herbert in particular, merited the censures cast on them, or were victims of an ill-informed, though honest, popular prejudice.

There is no doubt that the Army of the Crimea underwent much suffering, both in the field and in hospital, and in so far as this was due to preventable causes, those who failed to perceive and to remove them must incur blame. We have already seen that, although not strictly a duty of his office as Secretary at War, Sidney Herbert did in fact undertake to a great degree the supervision of the provision and despatch of stores (not being war material) and the direction of the Medical Department, and thereby became to a great extent personally responsible for the measures taken to supply the Army with food, clothing, and shelter, and to secure proper attention and comfort for the sick and wounded. He therefore cannot escape from censure, if censure be merited, on the plea that his office did not give him, except very indirectly, any control over such

matters, or that he only shared the general responsibility of the Cabinet.

The points in regard to which the Government at home has been held responsible for the sufferings of the Army in the Crimea are chiefly three:

1. That the expedition was sent, without deliberate forethought, on very imperfect information, and therefore ought not to have been sent at all.

2. That the troops were insufficiently supplied with food and clothing.

3. That the sick were neglected.

The first of these charges was supported by the Report of the Roebuck Committee, which, by the casting vote of the Chairman, agreed to assert that the Administration ordered the expedition without adequate information of the amount of the enemy's force, the strength of his fortresses, and the resources of his country. But the assertion is not well grounded, and therefore not very difficult to disprove.

Unquestionably the British Government did not expect the defences of Sebastopol would be found so strong as they proved to be, or that its resistance would be so protracted; but the English Cabinet can hardly be blamed for a belief shared by the Russian Government and its generals, or for not discovering, before the siege began, defences which did not then exist. They were almost entirely thrown up by General Todleben after its commencement. Mr. Laurence Oliphant's assertion that in October, 1852, the land defences of Sebastopol consisted only of the Malakoff tower, may not be strictly accurate; but down to the summer of 1854 the fortifications, strong towards the sea, were on the land side inconsiderable. Of their condition and extent at that time the English Cabinet, to my

personal knowledge, was in possession of detailed and accurate information. The Committee of the House of Commons was not, and could not with propriety be, placed in possession of that information. It had been obtained in ways which could not be disclosed, and from sources which could not be even indicated without danger to those who furnished it. Nor could it be communicated to the Committee without violation of the pledges of absolute secrecy on the faith of which it had been obtained. The majority of the members of the Cabinet itself were, in many cases, ignorant whence the information came. Sidney Herbert mentioned a striking example of this in his speech, in July, 1855, on Mr. Roebuck's motion of censure, founded on the report of the Committee:

"Lord Palmerston got some information of a remarkably accurate description. It was given to him in the strictest confidence. It was contained in letters written by a man evidently intimately acquainted with the subject upon which he was writing. . . . The information was given under such a seal of secrecy that Lord Palmerston never revealed to his colleagues whence it came, and nobody, save himself, with the single exception, perhaps, of Lord Clarendon, has the remotest notion at this moment who was the writer of those letters, which were singularly accurate, and showed a remarkable and minute knowledge of the subject, which was of the greatest value to the Government. The Committee had no right to say, because such things were not placed before them, that they did not exist."

The information held by the Government fully justified its action, nor would it have been thought a sufficient reason for desisting from an enterprise which offered so fair a prospect of success to have urged that, though the town was on the land side practically open and defenceless, an engineer of marvellous skill

might be discovered who might possibly improvise works for its defence which it would be difficult to carry. That an assault would succeed was, in the first instance, the opinion of the Russian Commander-in-Chief himself. On September 25th, four days after the battle of Alma, Prince Menchikoff, knowing that the land defences of Sebastopol could not sustain a serious attack, evacuated the fortress, with a view of taking up a position on the Simpheropol Road, where he believed he would be in the rear and on the flank of the invading army. He sank his ships at the mouth of the harbour to render the port useless to the enemy, and left only the crews of those ships and some irregular troops as a garrison to make what show of defence they could, and to delay, if possible, any advance of the allied force into the interior. On the southern side of Sebastopol there were but 3,000 men left to oppose the hosts of France and England. But among them was an officer of engineers, then but little known, Colonel Todleben. During the three weeks which elapsed whilst the Allies were making their preparations for a formal assault, he was busily engaged in strengthening, with consummate skill, the defective fortifications. He showed Prince Menchikoff that, thus strengthened, Sebastopol might well stand a siege; and before October 17th, when the bombardment formally opened, the 25,000 men who had been withdrawn on September 25th had returned to carry on the defence which has rendered the Russian garrison employed in it illustrious. The British Government had not received false or inadequate information as to the strength of Sebastopol when the invasion took place, neither was it unjustified in the expectation of effecting its reduction by a *coup de main*, which, if attempted

at once after Alma, would, with little doubt, have been successful. The short space of a fortnight, however, sufficed to render the Sebastopol of October 15th a wholly different place for purposes of defence from the Sebastopol of September 30th.

But it is said that if the Crimea was to be invaded, means should have been taken to prevent the reinforcement of the Russian armies; and it is pointed out that in the earlier part of the war Kertch was left unmolested, and Perekop and Genitchi unoccupied. This is true, but that it was so was not the fault of the British Government. An attack on Sebastopol had from the first been contemplated as, in certain eventualities, possible, and the following directions were given as early as April 10th, 1854, before Lord Raglan had even landed at Constantinople:

"As all communications by sea are now in the hands of the allied Powers, it becomes of importance to endeavour to cut off all communication by land between the Crimea and the other parts of the Russian dominions. This would be effectually done by the occupation of the Isthmus of Perekop, and I would suggest to you that if a sufficient number of the Turkish Army can now be spared for this purpose, it would be highly important that measures should be taken without delay for sending an adequate force to that point, and associating with the troops of the Sultan such English and French officers as would assist by their advice in holding permanently this position. With the same object important assistance might be rendered by Admiral Dundas, if he has yet been able to obtain any vessels of a light draught which would prevent the passage of Russian troops to the Crimea through the Sea of Azof."

Six steamers were sent out for this purpose, and not only Admiral Dundas, but also Admiral Houston Stewart at Malta, and Captain Grey at Gibraltar,

were empowered to purchase and fit out any vessels suitable for the service contemplated.

The transfer of the Army from Varna to the Crimea engaged the whole naval force; but so soon as the landing was effected, the attention of Admiral Dundas was called by the Admiralty to "the necessity of exercising the utmost vigilance and care in preventing the movement of craft of all descriptions proceeding out of the Bay of Kherson and the River Dneister," and he was directed "to take every precaution to prevent communication with the Crimea from ports in that direction." He was also told that "proper measures should be concerted with your colleagues in command of the allied forces for obtaining an entrance by the Gulf of Kertch into the Sea of Azof with a view to interrupt the communications of the enemy with the eastern shores of the Crimea, to which their lordships have always attached the greatest importance." . . . "No opportunities should be lost to occupy the attention of the enemy by frequent attacks upon all parts of the coast, extending from the mouths of the Danube to the Isthmus of Perekop, and any proper opportunity for the bombardment of Odessa should not be omitted."

On October 25th and November 3rd these orders were again more peremptorily repeated, and some dissatisfaction expressed that the measures referred to had not already been adopted. On December 8th the Admiral's attention was again directed to the importance of making an attack on Odessa.

No doubt, if compliance with directions be not enforced, those by whom they were issued become in time responsible for the disregard of them; but the Government of Lord Aberdeen was overthrown almost before it had become fully aware of

the hesitation displayed in the execution of its instructions.

The next matter for consideration, and one with which Mr. Herbert was more intimately concerned, is that of Supply.

Of warlike stores—which, after all, are the first requisites of a military expedition—there was no deficiency; and though the losses sustained in the hurricane of November 14th were enormous[1] no serious complaint was ever made as to their failure.

The necessity for an adequate supply of food was fully recognised by the Government before the war began, and steadily kept in view subsequently.[2] The Army did not start without a good store of provisions. On leaving Varna for the Crimea it was accompanied by 2,196,547 lb. of biscuit, 448,136 lb. of raw beef, 330,200 lb. of salt pork, 272,322 lb. of sugar, 193,393 lb. of rice, 130,080 lb. of coffee, 15,029 lb. of tea, 31,317 lb. of Scotch barley, 29,228 gallons of rum, and 55,000 gallons of porter.[3]

These supplies were well kept up from England, 3,710,300 lb. of biscuit being sent out between September and December, and all other supplies in proportion. In fact, but for the hurricane of November 14th, and the absence of a road between

[1] No less than 4,000,000 cartridges went down in the *Resolute*.

[2] "We must not forget that this expedition goes from London, the headquarters of vigilant public opinion, and that the health and comfort of the troops are judged now by a very different standard from that which prevailed on former occasions. . . . Whether, therefore, we regard the efficiency of the Army or the cost of the supplies, true economy requires that we should prepare and send forward these things beforehand, and not depend upon the chances of a limited and precarious local market."— *Sir C. E. Trevelyan*, February 13th, 1854.

[3] Compare this with the equipment of Wellington's army in the Peninsula and Costello's accounts of the unsatisfied hunger of the men who broke biscuit for the Duke's hounds.

Balaclava and the camp, there would probably never have been any want of food at all. In that gale were lost 359,744 lb. of biscuit, 74,880 lb. of salt meat, 157 head of cattle, 645 sheep, 8,000 gallons of rum, 73,986 lb. of rice, 11,200 lb. of coffee, 1,116,172 lb. of corn, 800,000 lb. of hay. Unquestionably these enormous losses did for a time produce suffering, but most energetic efforts were at once made to repair the effects of the disaster, and with the exception of a very short period, the soldiers of the Crimean Army were better fed than any English Army had ever been before; far better than the French encamped beside them.

General Estcourt wrote thus to Mr. Herbert on November 18th:

"Never was an army better fed. The ration is ample and most liberal, but the men cannot cook for want of camp kettles and for want of fuel. The want of camp kettles is their own fault. This expedition was looked upon so much as a sort of foray upon the Crimea, a hurried march, accompanied with severe fighting and severe marching; but no one expected so long a job as this, and least of all a winter in this inclement corner."

This, it may be said, was the testimony of an officer of the Headquarter Staff; but did that of the *Times* correspondent, Mr. Russell, who was certainly more inclined to exaggerate than to minimise anything that seemed like neglect on the part of the authorities on the one hand, or hardship and suffering in the ranks on the other, materially differ from it?

"The commissariat department of this Army, in spite of unforeseen calamities, in spite of deficient transport, of bad roads, of sea delays, of winds and waves, have continued to feed the men wonderfully well; and I maintain, and will ever do so, that no

body of troops ever took the field with such an abundance of supplies derived from distant countries, and that no army was ever so well fed when away from their own homes, as the present British expedition."

That was the view of Mr. Russell, as conveyed in a private letter to Mr. Delane, by whom the above extract was sent to Mr. Herbert on December 12th.

From the feeding of the Army we may pass to its equipment.

Nothing roused public indignation against the Government more than the representations which reached England of the inadequate clothing of the troops in December, 1854. No doubt here, too, for a time, there was deficiency, but that deficiency was in great measure due to the same cause that so seriously diminished the supply of food—the hurricane of November 14th. In that fatal storm there went down, just outside Balaclava, 25,000 fur caps, 8,000 seal-skin boots, 15,000 pairs brown leather boots, 40,000 water-proof capes, 40,000 fur coats, 1,500 paletots, 12,000 seal-skin mitts, 40,000 leggings, 10,000 flannel shirts, 30,000 cholera belts, 10,000 warm gloves. But, in spite of facts, ignorance and malevolence went on asserting that the *Prince* had been mainly loaded with military stores, and that her loss had no important bearing on the supply of clothing. The authorities at home knew better, and the moment the news of the disaster reached England by telegraph, which it did on November 28th, 1854, agents were despatched through the country to purchase up warm clothing similar to what had been lost. So quickly was this done, that by the time the particulars of the catastrophe arrived by post, the goods were ready for shipment, and were actually

despatched a day or two later. During the week which followed the arrival of the news of the loss of the transports, Mr. Herbert hardly slept at all, devoting the whole of his time, both day and night, to the work of expediting supplies to replace those lost. Here again there was want for a time, but here again defects were made good so soon as they reached the knowledge of the Government.

The subject of clothing was one which largely occupied the thoughts both of Lord Raglan and his Staff, and of the authorities at home. It had formed the subject of correspondence between Lord Raglan and Sidney Herbert before the expeditionary force left the Bosphorus,[1] and shortly after the battle of Alma, the Adjutant-General of the Army, General Estcourt, wrote[2] that—

"There is another want we shall have to consider as soon as we get into Sebastopol—or rather as soon as we get out of it again. I mean clothing. The work in this country has been far more hard upon flesh and blood and wearing apparel than perhaps has often happened before. No tents, no covering, no beds, nothing to clean themselves with, and roughish work on September 20th, have combined to make us, officers and men—for the officers

[1] Lord Raglan, June 23rd, 1854: "The watch cloaks will perhaps be useful, if they have arms and sleeves. But it would be dangerous in the presence of the enemy to place a man on sentry hampered in a cloak. The cavalry cloaks are very inconvenient things. They are afraid to let the men wear the cloaks because the arms are hampered. The Russians have a capital great-coat, which all wear—infantry, cavalry, soldier and officer, all alike, a thick cloth gray great-coat. The material is excellent. I think our great-coats too thin. All the Army ought to have great-coats and no cloaks. The uniform being now more sensible, and shoulder ornaments dispensed with, we may, and ought to have, a large-sized great-coat for all arms and ranks, not of the absurd short-waist shape of the Russians, but, at any rate, a great-coat."

[2] Estcourt to Herbert, October 13th, 1854.

have not fared one jot better than the men—a very ragged set. Schakos are for the most part gone. Forage caps are worn out, coatees are ragged, trowsers worse, shoes also. We shall want all these things for the winter, and I would suggest a handkerchief *which will wash* for the neck."

Sidney Herbert was able to reply that all these needs had been foreseen and provided for. With some exultation he pointed to the long list of stores already sent out in the *Prince*, the *Golden Fleece*, the *Jason*, and other vessels. But alas! though the ships reached Balaclava in safety, the stores they bore were destined never to be applied to the uses for which they were intended. Lord Raglan had to write on November 23rd:

"We have sustained a great misfortune in the loss of the *Prince* steamer. It was full of every kind of thing that we could want, and I daily looked forward to the pleasure of notifying to the troops that each man should have a jersey frock, and then the tempest arose, and she and all she had went to the bottom."

General Estcourt on the 18th wrote:

"The forethought of you and your officers deserves our best thanks. Nothing is more wanted with us than warm clothing except houses and fuel to cook with. Our position is extremely critical. With your liberal efforts in full exercise you cannot relieve this Army from a winter of extreme hardship. I hate that word—it is used so often when the circumstances do not warrant it; but that is not so now. The guards of the trenches, the working parties, the various armed and unarmed duties besides—general, divisional, and regimental—are so severe on the men that they are worn out. Their clothes are in rags, and, as you know, they have no houses to get shelter in, nor fuel to cook their meals. A storm occurred on Tuesday which brought all our exposure to a crisis; wind which blew down every tent and marquee, not excepting the field

hospitals full of sick. Rain and sleet fell and froze upon every one. . . . All day that lasted. Towards night they got their tents pitched again, but very few fires could be lighted. Either no food or uncooked food was all that could be had. Well, the sun is now shining again and things are looking cheerful; but it is to be remembered that we lost many men on Tuesday night from exposure; many horses too: they die, however, frequently from exposure and want of hay. And we have to lament the loss of a great many ships, transports, and commissariat ships, the *Prince* amongst them, with all your bountiful supply on board, the *Resolute* with ammunition, divers, and a great many valuable things, which few people know and we do not publish; you will know by application to the Board of Ordnance. You can also learn what has been lost in the *Prince* by reference to the bill of lading. It will distress you to think of all being gone, but I see that some things which you had ordered had not been sent off actually, so all that, at least, we shall get. The things of course we want are the jerseys, flannel drawers (long), worsted stockings, woollen comforters for the throat, caps to cover the ears, coats, great and small, trowsers, mitts, camp kettles, and we want fuel, which you cannot provide, and houses or huts. . . . There is *no* murmuring in camp; not a word is heard; the men come out of the trenches after twenty-four hours of duty under rain and extreme cold, and suffering as half of them are, men and officers, from diarrhœa, and find themselves put again upon picquet after less than twelve hours off duty. I hear of cases where from some circumstances a man has been four nights in succession on duty and the like. Now, all this of course wears down the spirits as well as the health. The condition of the Army is as I have depicted it. The aspect is that of a set of ragged dirty fellows who look as if they had something serious on hand, which they mean to do, but under which they may sink too.

"Now you can do little to help us. We want men—50,000 between us and the French. We want warm clothing. We want heavier mortars and fresh siege guns, ours being nearly worn out. We want more ammunition for small arms as well as great guns.

We want fuel, houses, and we want forage—hay, that is."

But a month later he was able to say[1]:

"The efforts you are making, I must repeat again, are most generous, and when the articles come which you are sending, no doubt the men will feel a very great benefit. Already they have jerseys, flannel drawers, and socks, not in the quantity each which you intended, but still in a certain measure, and they have expressed their comfort in them incidentally to many with whom I communicate. I do not know where to direct your attention next, you have been so thoughtful and have done so much. When the clothing arrives, a very considerable improvement will be felt. At present, of course, rags are the order of the day for the upper garments, though the under are so much better than they were, and indeed very well. The caps will be a great comfort. The caps they now wear are very much worn out—forage caps, for very few schakoes are to be seen amongst those who landed in the Crimea with the expedition in September. Of course we are stiff about the preservation of those things and all equipments amongst those who join us now. The capes, too, will be a great protection at night during the rains we seem destined to have."

And a little later he was able to report that the men were well supplied with warm clothing.

On this head, therefore, we must come to the conclusion that of the supply of clothing sent out from home, a great part went down in the transports lost on November 13th; that its want produced for a time a deficiency of proper clothing in the Army; that the losses thus sustained were repaired with great and praiseworthy rapidity; and that, before the end of January, the Army was well and comfortably clothed. It may, I think, be conceded that as regards clothing, and indeed supplies of every description, there was

[1] Estcourt to Herbert, December 22nd, 1854.

no niggardliness in their supply, no delay in their despatch, and no slackness in remedying unforeseen but remediable defects so soon as they became known.[1]

The hospital question will be dealt with in the following chapter, and I now turn to that of transport, a far more serious one than that of clothing, and one in which with far more plausibility, and indeed with some justice, the Government at home, as well as

[1] In the matter of clothing, as indeed in all others, it was the fashion of fault-finders to extol the superior equipment and arrangements of the French forces. Of this, Lord Raglan wrote to Mr. Herbert from Varna on June 23rd, 1854, as follows:

"The French Army either wear the stock or a large, sky-blue handkerchief, which, if it were spotted, would by the Oxonians be termed a 'bird's eye fogle.' I do not like the equipment of the French soldier as well as our own. His coat reaches below the knees, must be heavy being made of a coarse material, and must impede his walking, and he has an immense pair of red breeches which have a cumbersome appearance. He carries a sword as well as a musket and bayonet, a great deal of ammunition, a portion of which is in his knapsack, and a great many other things besides, including nearly, as a matter of course, five days' biscuit. In short, the Englishman's equipment is a feather to his.

"Our *tenue* is greatly admired by our allies, who already imitate our formations, and by an *ordre du jour* are directed to form in two ranks instead of three, and to adopt our mode of forming square. I am repeatedly complimented upon the superiority of our discipline, which, I am told, was always better than theirs; that has been a good deal injured, moreover, by the service in Algeria, and is therefore less good now than it was during the former Imperial *régime*. A comparison is drawn, too, in favour of our officers. 'Vous trouverez, my lord,' said a staff officer of great weight to me the other day, 'que nos officiers sont moins *gentlemen* que les votres. Malheureusement les deux tiers sortent des rangs.'

"The same officer represented the misery of the company officers. They are generally without private servants, live badly, and walk their marches, and many of them suffer in their health in consequence.

"Seeing the abuse that is lavished upon every branch of the British Army (by 'our own correspondents' and by the leaders in *The Times*), and that we are told all day long that the arrangements and equipments of the French Army are in every way superior, I was surprised to find that we were viewed in a different light by officers of experience in another service, and that justice, which is denied to us by many of our own countrymen, is readily conceded to us by foreigners."

the commissariat officers on the spot, may be said to have failed to do all that was in the circumstances required of them.

We have already seen that the provision of food was abundant, and that as late as December 22nd General Estcourt was able to say that no army was ever better fed. Nevertheless it is true that rations were irregularly served out, and that the clothing, so rapidly supplied from home, did not reach the camp with anything like similar rapidity. The Army wanted food and clothing not because they were not at hand, but because they could not be got at. This was due entirely to the want of adequate transport. To use Lord Raglan's own words, "All our misfortunes arise from the want of transport, and the irregularity of the issue of rations"—an irregularity wholly due to want of transport. Its absence prevented the keeping up of the reserve of store supplies *in camp* which is essential to secure punctual and regular issues. The deficiency of transport itself was mainly due to the want of forage.

The inefficiency of the commissariat service, and of the transport provided by it, began to manifest themselves from a very early period. Lord Raglan wrote from Varna in June:

"Stores arrive by driblets, and the organisation of the commissariat is so much in its infancy that I cannot tell you either what we have or what we want. I know I ordered 40,000 flannel belts, very much at the suggestion of Louis Napoleon, but I cannot find that they have arrived, nor can I at this moment say what store we have of blankets or shoes. You can get this information from the Ordnance, and if the supply of either be scanty, be so good as to cause an immediate augmentation of the number to a considerable extent to be sent out. The climate, judging from my short experience of it, is most

variable and treacherous, and in the course of a few hours you have a change from intense heat to extreme cold; and I observe that your comfortable Turk clothes himself most warmly. The large cloak you mention could only be used in stationary quarters. I think something of the kind might be got here at a moderate price.

"The artillery have brought out jerseys. It would be well if a supply of these were to be provided, also worsted socks. If the next year's clothing were to be made somewhat larger, it would be cooler in summer, and would enable the wearer to have other garments under the coatee in winter.

"Some of the white cap covers have arrived, and are viewed by the men with great favour, and the officers who have served in India say they are indispensable."

General Estcourt, in his letters to Mr. Herbert, lost no opportunity of pressing the necessity for an entire reform of the commissariat and transport services, and his suggestions did not fall on unwilling or inattentive ears.

GENERAL ESTCOURT TO MR. HERBERT.

"CAMP BEFORE SEBASTOPOL,
"*December 8th*, 1854.

"You are excellent people, and do your best, certainly, to make this great and difficult work to *gee*.

"The transport is a serious difficulty—the transport of provisions, forage, and the sick from the field hospitals to Balaklava. The ambulance is done. The horses and mules are either dead or dead beat. The roads are impossible for wheels.

"Now, this is a great question which you should consider speedily. We have never been a movable army since we came into the country. It was equally bad in Bulgaria as it is here. There we were obliged to send an infantry guard with every convoy of provisions consisting of native wagons, not to protect it against *enemies*, but to prevent the natives, the drivers, our friends and allies, from running away, beasts and all, and leaving their wagons behind. Moreover, we had the greatest difficulty in

collecting wagons, notwithstanding they were well paid and fed. The same in respect of the drivers engaged for our reserve ammunition animals. The animals were purchased, but the drivers and superintendents were hired: some ran away; all cared not one farthing about the animals. Sore-backs, lameness, and inefficiency soon prevailed.

"So much for provisions and small ammunition. Now, in respect to the sick: the ambulance is not rightly composed. The wagons of Dr. Smith are the best vehicles of those sent out. The carts are bad; they sway about and are dangerous. But even wagons will stop sometimes, as now. The roads will not admit of their moving. What, then, is to be done? The French have a sort of chair, one for each side of a mule. The pair of chairs are slung over a mule on a particular kind of saddle—or rather on their own pack saddle, which is somewhat peculiar, though simple in shape. When they want to remove sick, say 600, they send down 300 mules saddled in the above manner, and they walk off with the 600 sick; or when they have to carry off the wounded from the field of battle (always a monstrous job), they send their *cacolets*, load them, and walk them off to the hospital. They can clear a field in a day, whilst we are three or four days, and more when we have to clear the ground of Russian wounded as well as our own. The mules can move about on the hill-sides, perhaps, and on ground a wagon cannot venture to take. These mules are of the greatest use. Just now we have 2,500 and odd sick men in the field hospitals—*i.e.* marquees, and we should be unable to move them, though they die because they cannot be removed to better shelter, but for the French. They are going to lend us their *cacolets* (about 300), and we shall clear off 600 sick men. These mules are belonging to an organised corps, with officers, under-officers, etc. But these mules when not wanted for the sick are not idle. They never rest. They are well fed, which our animals are not, and they work hard. This same corps, useful to remove sick, to assist the ambulance, also carry provisions to every part of the camp. You may see a string of thirty or forty mules, with their own men to take care of them, with their own N.C.O.s to look

after them, with their own officers—generally, I believe, old cavalry officers—to superintend them, walking away in a regular string with all the ease and regularity of a troop of cavalry. The men who belong to these mules are also in various trades. They have bakers, carpenters, smiths, masons, collar makers, harness makers, etc., etc., etc. The chief of all is the Intendant-General, their Commissary-General, who is a military man. His department is a military organised department. He can build magazines, ovens, workshops, etc., etc. He can repair as well as fabricate. He can bake all the bread for the troops, and does so. He has a train of wagons to use when wagons are useable, and he has the mules I have mentioned, used at all times in addition to the wagons; and when the wagons cannot move, then they become the sole dependence of the Army for supplying the necessary things. They carry out clothing and all things, as well as provisions. The Intendant has a train of wagons and a train of mules, all organised with officers and N.C.O.s, all moving with regularity, and supplying the wants of the Army without doubt or uncertainty.[1]

"How are we off? We have a very excellent man as Commissary-General, who has a zealous number of officers under him; but there they stop. There is no organised transport. They depend upon the resources of the country. These fail. They are *nil.* The troops are for ever harassed to guard the drivers; they move with great difficulty, and occasion no end of vexation. It is a hand-to-mouth system, a scramble occasioning annoyance, perplexity, and uncertainty. Arabas are used. The oxen begin to die on the road. The provisions are robbed, or the guard is kept out all night, the weather pouring. Diarrhœa, dysentery,

[1] The great superiority of the French system of transport was mainly due to two causes: the fact that it was not under civil control, independent of military authorities, and the experience gained in the constant warfare which up to 1848 had for nearly twenty years prevailed in Algeria. It may be asked, "Why, when the superiority of the French system was perceived, was it not at once introduced into our own forces?" But those who ask this question are unconscious of the enormous obstructive power of the Treasury, especially when the Chancellor of the Exchequer is a man possessing Mr. Gladstone's strength of will and tenacity of purpose.

and vexations; ill-humour and disorganisation. The roads become impassable. What is to be done? The arabas are stopped. Why? The supply of food to the troops is uncertain, if not stopped too. There are no mules to carry ready, organised, and constantly going, but the Commissary-General must abandon wheel transport, and have recourse to pack saddles. But they have to be organised. They do not exist. In the meantime, the troops suffer. They are doing wonders in respect to duty under arms; the weather inclement besides; and then they cannot get their rations. The evil is not simply in the failure of the means at the disposal of the Commissary-General, but in the disorganisation to the Army which the very evident scramble occasions. Every one sees the want of system. Every feeling of regularity is broken down.

"Therefore I am convinced that a commissariat without a transport service attached to it of an organised and military character cannot perform its duty in the field, or render the Army efficient for great enterprises. Our provisions are excellent, but our transport is rotten. Forage has been denied our *bât* horses ever since we came into the Crimea. The cavalry and artillery and our chargers have had some, but often short commons; but the reserve, ammunition, and *bât* ponies have never had hay nor straw since we came into the Crimea. They have had grain, but no hay nor straw. The consequence is that many have died. If we go out to fight a battle to-morrow, there will be a very small portion of the reserve of small-arm ammunition ponies to carry that important article. The French have small-arm ammunition wagons. They form part of the military establishment, not got up for the day, but existing always. Our cavalry and artillery are at this moment ineffective. The cavalry could not charge, and the artillery could not drag the guns into position. A *prodigious* number of both have died. Why? Not only exposure, rain, and cold, but want of hay and straw. When the weather becomes inclement, more forage is necessary—not so much more grain as more hay *or* straw. Ours have been but irregular supplies and very short allowances. Is this my opinion only? It is seen and spoken of throughout the whole Army. All your

efforts are unavailing if, when the cavalry comes out, they are treated so unfairly by the Commissary-General; but remember, he may do his best, but the country has not resources for his purpose. It has been the ruin of the cavalry, the artillery, the reserve ammunition, and the *morale* which depends upon all three."

And on the 18th he added:

"Our own ambulance has broken down. Carts and wagons cannot move; but besides that the ambulance horses, like all the other horses, have been starved by the Commissary in the article of hay or straw, and therefore are too weak to do anything. Cavalry and artillery are in the same plight, and the very important establishment of ponies to carry the 1st Reserve of small-arm ammunition is nearly extinct. All the fault of old Filder, because he has not organised transport either of wagons or mules. We shall never do without a great change in that department."

GENERAL ESTCOURT TO MR. HERBERT.

"*December 22nd.*

"The huts will be capital, if we can only get them up; but here opens the great grievance of the Army, viz. the transport. The Commissary will not be able to give us mules or horses; the cavalry are too weak to do anything, and the artillery pretty much the same. Pray look into the question of transport. It won't do to depend upon a man of the country for any one single thing. We must have our own departments complete, *personnel* and *matériel* English, and organised in a military manner.

"Don't depend upon Constantinople for anything. Though a 'city of wood and a nation of carpenters,' it would take them till next winter twelvemonth to erect anything like what we want. They must first go and cut down the forest, then saw the timber, then bring it, then erect the buildings. We have bought many warm woollens at Constantinople, £30,000 worth. Sheepskin coats are not to be had. Some, I believe, are to be sent to us from Bucharest. They are

very good things. The Russian boots are not to be had, more's the pity. They are excellent things. Recurring again to the transport, I must tell you that we are dependent upon the good offices of the French for the removal of our sick from the heights to Balaklava. To-morrow morning they are to lend us 300 mules again. They will carry down 600 sick men; but we shall still have in the field hospitals upwards of 2,400. So fast do they accumulate that we ought to have 200 mules working daily upon this duty at least. Now this question is mixed up with the Commissariat transport. It ought to be all the same establishment, sometimes used for one thing, sometimes for another."

"CAMP BEFORE SEBASTOPOL,
"*January 19th*, 1855.

"MY DEAR HERBERT,

"I proceed to answer your last letter, dated December 29th, in the first place thanking you for it, and for the ready ear you have lent to my suggestions. I do not know, however, that with so ready a listener, and so anxious a friend to our welfare, I am justified in writing with the freedom I have hitherto exercised. I have ventured to write upon and to criticise departments to which I am not connected, and to hazard opinions, very sincerely entertained certainly, upon subjects which do not belong to my office. As yet, however, I have done no harm. I am justified in my opinion in respect to the hospital orderlies, the propriety of having a set of men expressly set apart for that duty, a branch of the ambulance, by the concurrent opinion of every one to whom I have spoken on the subject, medical or military. I will more particularly quote Dr. Hall. The step you have therefore taken in respect to these will meet with the thankful approbation of every man here, whether sick or well. I do not doubt we shall be able to add to the men you send out by some of our men not fit for the exposure of the field.

"You are mistaken in supposing that the *cacolets* can be made here, *i.e.*, at Constantinople. The *cacolet* chair requires the peculiar pack saddle upon which it rides. And I am not sure that we must not have the stout mule too; but, however, the ponies of this

country, though small, might perhaps carry, when well fed, two men. Of course the load is not complete without two, one to balance the other. Verdon, not Verdun, in the north of France, is the place where they are made. I should think we ought to have 800 or 1,000. The loss of time is nothing compared to the certainty of getting the right thing.

"The next subject in your letter is the Commissariat. It is not so much that it is short-handed, though it is short-handed, and is obliged to come upon the troops for all sorts of servants, issuers, clerks, etc., but it is inefficient in the department of conveyance for want of an establishment equal to the demands upon it, and for want of organisation. The system of our service has been to make the Commissariat the carriers of everything for the Army —provisions, forage, fuel, stores of all sorts. Our system has been also a system of contracts. That system has entirely failed here. There are no contractors who deserve to be trusted. And we have no sufficient establishment of conveyance or of animals, or of people to look after what there are. For that reason the huts and clothes and corn food find their way to the front with great difficulty and very, very slowly. The individual exertions of officers, who place their own single horses, perhaps, at the service of the public for the sake of their men, do bring some of the good things you have sent out to the camps, but very slowly, as I have said. This is a serious question, involving much more than comfort only and alleviation of very severe hardships; it involves the question of numbers, from the question of the cause of our great sickness being so much mixed up in it. If we could get the men off the ground, I believe they would not suffer so severely from diarrhœa; and if they were housed, as you meant they should be, in those beautiful huts you have sent out, I believe we should not have to send away one-third the number which now we do. Our sick at this moment in the camps of the divisions exceeds 5,000 men. Our effective strength taking duties is not much above 13,000. Think of that! We are melting away fast, you perceive.

"If, therefore, the transport service of the Army were of the strength and organisation proper for it, we

should convey food, fuel (there is none to be had on the heights near two of the divisions), clothes, huts, stores, and the thousand necessaries and comforts and luxuries which have come, and still are coming, to us."

The reforms here advocated, which were directed to the transfer of the Commissariat from civil to military control, and the separation from it of the management of transport, to effect which a new force (the Land Transport Corps) was to be constituted, were already contemplated by the Government, but the operation involved necessarily consumed much time.

To detach the provision of transport from the Commissariat, and constitute an organised Land Transport Corps under military control, was not in itself an easy task, nor could it be effected in a moment; but it was easier to do this than to remove the Commissariat from subordination to the Treasury, and place it under the War Department. The members of the Government generally were convinced of the necessity of the step, but the Treasury was reluctant to part with the powers it possessed, and steadily opposed the suggestion. Sir Charles Trevelyan brought all the resources of his great ability to the defence of the existing system, and was supported by his chief, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who regarded the supervision of the Treasury as the sole effective check on extravagant and wasteful expenditure. Nothing less than the disclosures produced by the Crimean campaign would have sufficed to effect the change. Even after their occurrence it was only brought about with difficulty. At any previous time it would have been wholly impossible to accomplish.

It has been already pointed out that, though the

privations of the Army were partly due to the hurricane of November 14th, their chief cause is to be found in the inadequacy of the means of transport from Balaclava to the camp, and that want of transport must in no slight degree be attributed to the inadequate supply of forage. For this want of forage, the responsibility must rest partly upon the Treasury at home, and partly upon the Commissary-General with the Army.

The Prime Minister was at that time officially styled, as up to 1885 he habitually was styled, First Lord of the Treasury, and a seat was provided for him at the Treasury Board. There was also a huge gilded armchair at the head of the table for the Queen's use, should she take it into her head to preside at a meeting, as Queen Anne had done. But as a fact, neither the Queen nor the Prime Minister ever attended, or was ever expected to attend, a Board meeting, or even knew what was transacted at them, so far as concerned the mere departmental administration of its business. The Chancellor of the Exchequer was virtually the head of the office, and the Permanent Secretary of the Treasury his Lieutenant.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer of that day had, with a heavy heart, assented to the commencement of a war which seemed to him unavoidable; but the extravagance it engendered drew from him daily groans. He was ready to make war, but he cherished the delusive hope that war might perhaps be made cheaply. He thus anxiously sought to escape incurring any expense which could possibly be avoided. The Commissary-General had, in a letter dated September 13th, 1854, suggested "that, as a measure of precaution, 2,000 tons of hay should be forwarded

to Constantinople from England." In so doing, he probably anticipated that his wishes would be at once complied with, as a matter of course, as it is likely that under ordinary circumstances they would have been. It is not difficult to trace the hand which drew the delicate distinction between a *suggestion* and a *request*, and ruled, that though the latter, if made by an officer holding so responsible a position as that of Commissary-General, should at once be met, the former was only meant for the consideration of the Treasury, and might be dealt with at its pleasure. In this case, as the suggestion was avowedly only a measure of precaution, and not of immediate urgency, it was thought unnecessary to take any immediate action, and no order was given upon it.

The decision to pass by this suggestion unheeded turned out to be a momentous one, but at the time little importance seems to have been attached to it. It would appear to have been treated as a mere detail of Treasury business, and it is very doubtful whether it was communicated to the Duke of Newcastle or Sidney Herbert. It certainly was not made known to the Prime Minister or to the Cabinet. But the results of the Treasury's delay in this matter were like those of the loss of the nail in the knight's horse-shoe. Because the Treasury left the matter to stand over for further consideration, the forage was not sent; because the forage was not sent, the horses of the Army and commissariat service died; because the horses died, transport became inefficient; because the transport was inefficient, supplies sent out to Balaclava in abundance only reached the camp irregularly; because supplies were irregular, the Army suffered; and for this some blame clearly attaches to the Home Government.

But not exclusively to them. A large portion of that blame must rest with the Commissary-General himself. He should not have trusted to the effect of a "suggestion" only. He should have renewed and enforced his demand. And he should have made greater efforts to provide supplies himself in the East.[1]

In spite of defects of transport and all that it entailed—in spite of the enormous losses due to causes which were not easily (and in some cases not at all) preventable—the efforts made by the Government to remedy these evils met with gratifying success. On January 23rd, 1855, General Estcourt wrote:

"CAMP BEFORE SEBASTOPOL,
"*January 23rd*, 1855.

"MY DEAR HERBERT,

"And so now they take to abusing us! This is rather hard measure. However, I hope we are really grateful for the generous aid in every way which has been given us, whether we are found fault with or not. We have no cause to find fault with anything in England, and we may, I think, have easy consciences about the efforts we have ourselves made to help ourselves out here. Our only blot, as I have often said before, and it is the

[1] It may be feared that Mr. Filder himself hardly appreciated the vital importance of this matter. Mr. Herbert had pressed upon the attention of Sir Charles Trevelyan at a very early period—indeed, at the very commencement of the war—the necessity for accumulating supplies and forage. To this Mr. Filder replied: "With respect to forage for cavalry and the remarks of Mr. Herbert thereon, I would observe that cavalry are never stationed in mountainous districts; . . . it is customary to distribute them and canton them in parts of the country favourable for foraging. We can bring corn to them, but not hay or straw from any great distance inland. If it should turn out that we want assistance from other countries in the way of hay, it would be during the winter and following spring. *I will watch and give timely notice.*"—(*Filder to Trevelyan*, May 16th, 1854.) But he did not.

beginning and end of all our serious difficulties, is the absence of an organised military conveyance establishment.

"However, I think we have seen the worst of our position. The sun rises higher than it did. The days are longer. A fresh arrangement with the French has relieved us of some of the duties we were giving, but which we had not strength to give. Some of the huts have found their way up to the camps. The third division has, I saw this morning, five of them nearly finished, and I thought I saw the materials of a sixth lying about. The other divisions will probably by degrees get other houses up for themselves too. I believe there is nothing else wanted to diminish our sick-list, nothing but getting the men off the ground. If they had but boards to lie upon, I believe they would do well, even though under canvas, and that grown so worn as to admit both rain and snow. Next campaign we shall want new tents for the most part. I am told some of these saw Abercrombie's campaign in Egypt. So it is said. Some, however, are new, and are very good. It has been a very serious misfortune, did I tell you, that the boots come out are much too small? The men lie down in their tents, and to give ease to their feet take off their boots. The frosts, however, are sharp, and in the morning the boots are as hard as iron; there is no getting them on, nor is there a way to thaw or soften them. In other respects the men are more comfortable; a good deal of warm clothing has been given out. The skin coats especially do them good service. Caps and comforters are still only partially arrived. To recur to boots again I must praise the boots with which the 18th are provided, who have just come out. Such things are of the greatest comfort both in mud and snow. But moccasins, reaching up to the knee, would have been invaluable. Your capes are not come yet. I long to see them on the men's shoulders. The buffalo robes have added to the comfort of the sick in camp very much. All these things are tending to make the men more comfortable, but still our sick-list rather increases; the frost, which I thought would have had a good effect upon the tendency to diarrhœa, has not had that; rather the contrary. Diarrhœa has been quite as frequent; and

besides, there have been colds and fevers and frost-bitten feet. The outer garments are not yet come out. Trousers we have had some of, but by no means all. However, I am sending home to the Adjutant-General a return of the regiments which have received their annual clothing, which you have undertaken to give gratuitously to the men in addition to the suit due on April 1st. The railroad is not yet begun, but I believe the engineers attached to it have been occupied in surveying the ground and considering the line it should take.

"The cavalry horses still die. But I understand that those which have been housed lately, and put into comfortable quarters comparatively, have broken out with glanders and farcy. It is a curious thing.

. . . . . .

"I think we shall have got as much as will be good for us as soon as we receive the warm clothing now on its way. And I do not think we care to encourage good people in England to send us luxuries to eat and to drink. They are pleasant things, and do their own amount of good to those who live half their lives in the trenches; but the essentials are provided, I gather from your letters, boots excepted. Do not let us fall in the estimation of our countrymen by any apparent desire for luxuries. We are engaged, we know, in a matter which is serious, and must be accompanied with hardship and suffering; but we mean to go through with it. Do not let it be supposed we are an army of croakers because we have exposed our difficulties. We have wanted certain essentials to help us to go on, and you have given them liberally. We want other things which cannot be furnished in a moment; such as a change in some branches of our military organisation, which, nevertheless, presses heavily upon us, augmenting our difficulties, rendering our position critical, and increasing our losses by disease. But we shall rub through, and be prepared for those alterations and improvements which you will, no doubt, adopt. Above all, do not let the centre of our confidence, the watchful guardian of the comforts of the soldiers, be ill-treated by an ungratified Press. Let not the ignorant criticisms of the writers of letters from the camp, who see things which Lord

Raglan sees too, and tries night and day to mend, turn the current of his popularity into ungrateful and unjust abuse.

"Some of those stories to which you allude are true enough, I daresay; but unless there are officers and N.C. officers, and privates too, well accustomed to the management of horses and of loading them, such things as you speak of must often take place.

"You are surprised and puzzled why we should not get hay and straw as well as the French. We are puzzled too. We blame our Commissary-General in, perhaps, our ignorance. We think it is his alliance with the Treasury, where a penny saved is often supposed to be a penny gained; not so, however, in this case. Balaklava has been often overhauled. It is a very difficult place to keep in order. It is very small. There are no quays. The streets are very, very narrow. The ingress to the town is along one narrow road, with a steep rocky hill on one side and the muddy end of the harbour on the other. There were no magazines, nor houses which could be converted into them, nor houses for the sick, except one hospital. The sick Turks are difficult to manage. They must be accommodated there. The Turkish Government do not take away their sick so frequently as they ought. The landing of thousands of stores, the issuing of forage, provisions, and stores of all kinds, the mixed population, military and naval, and many other things rendered it no easy matter to put things into order. However, I think it is in very good order. There is a police force and scavenging force, and there is a commander, an officer of great reputed energy, and there are officers under him, and of the Q.M.-General's department too. I do not think there is much to find fault with. It will always be a crowded place. Nothing can make that otherwise. We have not the means of making extensive quays, nor of blowing up the rock on the opposite side, as has been suggested from England, and forming a *corniche* quay there. Our powder is there, and the ships are close, and we cannot remove them. We want them daily. In short, it is a place which presents many difficulties to the many plans which have been suggested both here and in England. Hasty observers imagine mismanagement when perhaps correction for

what is noticed may not be within reach. Such must be for ever the case. We meet with difficulties at every turn. That is the nature of war. Some we can overcome, some we cannot. We must bear the inconvenience they occasion perhaps."

"*January 27th.*

"Since writing the above the sun has shone each day. We have, we think, turned the corner. I have this moment received your letter of the 12th. It has just come, whilst the outward bound, or rather homeward bound, mail is going now. Balaklava, one of the subjects you write about, is improving. Colonel D—— worked hard in a very difficult position and at the beginning of all things. But he broke down *under* it, as many a good man has under what he has to bear here. He is gone, and he has been succeeded by Colonel Harris, of the 21st, who, in his turn, has given place to Colonel Harding, A.D.C. of General Penefather, who is absent sick at Malta. I perceive that you are overwhelmed with stories about a thousand evils which surround this Army, and which are not attended to by the officers whose duty it is supposed to be to attend them. Of course, our situation here was very peculiar. No doubt, stones could be pelted upon every official man here; but how far those who have pelted have had their eyes directed with justice is very questionable. Those who have been here and have gone away and got into warm, comfortable lodgings, and are living surrounded by the regularity of life in England, are not the people to give an opinion of what can and what cannot be done under our circumstances. In our case there are some evils which *cannot be* mended; they must be borne. However, it is not worth while to tell you all this: you know it, I am sure, and understand it, I am confident. I have only to say in respect to your office that you have either adopted the suggestions I have ventured to make, or you have (as in most cases you have) *anticipated* them. Therefore no stones will be thrown from this Army on your department. In short, we centre all our complaints, such as they are, in the want of a military organised transport service. You are not to blame because we have not got it already. This experience was necessary in order to create it. It

will not be lost, I daresay. Never put your trust in contracts, nor in commissaries who depend on contracts. Let our difficulties be a warning. But the sun shines. Mount our cavalry, horse our guns, fill up our ranks. We shall give a good account of ourselves again, as we did before, you have said, and therefore it is no boast to repeat it.

"Believe me, very sincerely yours,
"J. B. BUCKNALL ESTCOURT."

This letter, it will be observed, was commenced on the very day on which Lord John Russell resigned, on the ground that he could not oppose Mr. Roebuck's motion for a Committee of Inquiry because he was not satisfied with what his colleagues had done for the Army in the Crimea.

Letters of February 3rd, 10th, and 17th reiterate the same story as those of earlier date:

"We have turned the corner. Dr. Hall tells me so too."

"The warm clothing is still being distributed. The huts come up by slow degrees for the hospitals."

"You can do nothing more except send us larger boots—a good deal larger. These are too small."

"Whether in or out of office you should know that we are well supplied with warm clothing. The capes have not yet turned up, but, except boots, the men have great comforts in the clothing line. Pray let General Wetherall know that the boots which are so much too small, and so bad in many cases, are the ammunition boots, as they are termed, not the long boots. Really we are rich. But we have not as yet the means of distribution. However, the huts are daily finding their way to the front. . . . If you are out of office, sleep sound. You have done your duty by the Army. You have *anticipated* most of our wants. The heavy blow to us was the act of Providence. The *Prince* went down at the beginning of the bad weather.

"The men are warmly clothed now—the distribution

of warm clothing and the erecting of huts tells on the eye too. You see them everywhere."

There was an interval during which the troops suffered severely, but that period was not of long duration, and, thanks to the prompt and judicious measures taken by the authorities at home, the Army had been restored to a position of comparative comfort at the time when Lord John Russell surprised his colleagues by his sudden refusal to defend them and himself from the charge of having failed to prevent or to remedy a state of things which he justly described as "horrible and heartrending."

No position could have been more trying or more difficult than that of the Government at home, when reports of suffering and allegations of mismanagement were poured in upon them from all quarters. On the one hand, every generous instinct prompted them to support officers in whom they had reason to place confidence, who were far distant and unable to defend themselves, and who, whether mistaken or not, were at all events exposing their lives freely and labouring under great privations to do what they deemed their duty.[1] They knew how much the State would on previous occasions have suffered from yielding to the dictation of popular clamour. They remembered

[1] Nor did the complainants always deserve confidence, while it was difficult to induce those on the spot to reply to them. Quite early in the day, on some strictures on the supplies at Gallipoli being brought to Mr. Filder's notice, he declined to answer them. "I do not think what our own correspondent says worth attention. These people write such trash that I am in hopes they will soon lose the confidence of the public and write themselves down. They pick up what they do know at public tables and from young subalterns. In no case—not in this country, at least—do they get access to the highest sources of information. There are two of them at the hotel where I am now staying. One of them is author of the article in *The Times* on Gallipoli."—*Filder to Trevelyan*, May 14th.

that shortly before the battle of the Nile, Nelson's dismissal had been loudly called for on account of the alleged inefficiency of his action in the Mediterranean, and that at a later date the Common Council of London had petitioned for the recall of Wellington from the Peninsula on the grounds of his incompetence as a General, and his indifference to the sufferings to which he had exposed his army. On the other hand, the complaints of mismanagement and inefficiency were loud and clamorous. Many of them unquestionably proceeded from ignorance, rash and hasty generalisation, misconceptions of fact, from a grumbling and captious spirit, and even in some cases from malice. But many, again, came from sources entitled to respect, and from men who might be supposed to possess more or less of a judicial spirit. Moreover, the members of the Government knew, which those outside did not, the magnitude of the exertions made to anticipate and to relieve the wants of the Army. It was not unnatural that, knowing what they had done, they should be inclined to suppose that it must be the neglect of those on the spot alone which prevented those exertions from producing their full effect, and Mr. Gladstone, among others, at once jumped to the conclusion that it was to be attributed to the "total insufficiency" of Lord Raglan's chief assistants, if not of Lord Raglan himself: for a General who is unable to perceive the incompetence of his principal lieutenants, and, on the contrary, maintains that their services are invaluable, can hardly be himself a competent commander.

Mr. Herbert, though conscious of the enormous exertions made by himself and the Duke of Newcastle, and therefore disposed to think that it must be local negligence which prevented their being attended

with the full effects anticipated from them, was more alive than many to the shortcomings of those employed at home. On January 8th he had written to the Duke of Newcastle:

"WILTON, *January 8th*, 1855.

"MY DEAR L[INCOLN],

"I have written to Graham urging that there should be an immediate inquiry into the scandalous confusion which takes place in the transmission of stores and in the packing and loading of our ships for the East. The last mail from Scutari announces that the iron beds are arrived, I believe in the *Manilla*, but that the legs were put into another ship and sent on to Balaclava (I believe in the *Jura*). This, as you know, is not the first case of the kind. There must be an immediate and searching inquiry into this matter, and the guilty person, if detected, ought to be signally punished. Whether the Ordnance people at the Tower are in fault or the Admiralty people who stow the ship I do not know, but it cannot be difficult to ascertain it. The bales, I presume, are numbered by the Ordnance and entered in an embarkation account. But we ought immediately to have an inquiry.

"We should likewise make an effort to correct this in future. A good man from the Ordnance, one from the Admiralty, and such a man as Howell, would in two days devise a system of transfer which would secure us against such scandals. But hitherto we have made no effort to improve this system, and until we do we have no right to complain of the mismanagement at Balaclava, for matters here are under our own eye, and we are responsible for them. We should have a meeting on Wednesday to settle this.

"Hardinge has instituted an inquiry as to the landing from the *Himalaya*, and I have written to the Treasury about the examination of the men's packs and their consequent detention.

"We have a storm brewing against the working of the military departments, and if we intend to outlive it we must make vigorous use of the fortnight between this and the meeting of Parliament.

"Lord Grey's dictum is that the Army must be governed by a Board, of which you will be the head, and at which the different military departments should be represented. I, as you know, entirely concur in this view, and I do not see how the business can now be satisfactorily done in any other way. All these stories (and I fear there will be a plentiful crop of them) of cross purposes between departments are, after all, the natural result of the different departments who are to co-operate all working in ignorance of what the other is doing. If we can succeed in giving our meetings the regularity of a Board, we shall in a great degree meet the difficulty, not only the Parliamentary but the practical difficulty. If we met twice a week on fixed days and hours, and each brought the cases which he does not know how to deal with singly, and all joint operations were preconcerted there, we should soon learn to work harmoniously together. Much valuable suggestion would also grow out of it, for no one can originate and recollect all the details, the omission of any one of which may have disastrous consequences. Copies of our minutes should always be sent to Lord Aberdeen and Lord John; the Prime Minister and the leader of the House of Commons ought always to know what is being done, and what they may be called upon to defend.

"It seems to me that for your own sake you should make much greater use of the Cabinet than you do, and of Lord John likewise. People to be carried with you must be kept *au courant* of what is being done, and made parties to it by giving their assent. Clarendon tells me that he scarcely omits a day in which he does not send a box to Lord John showing what he is doing, and asking his opinion and getting from him, as the result, first, very good advice and suggestions; secondly, which is still more important, a very full and hearty defence in Parliament. The *amour propre* of Lord John is satisfied, and his foibles enlisted in favour of instead of against the public service. In this world we must accept men as they are, and turn not their virtues only, but their failings, to good account.

"I trust, therefore, we shall have regular meetings, and that you will communicate all that is done. It

is quite as necessary for Lord Aberdeen's sake, though for very different reasons. But we have a terrible arrear to make up in this fortnight. Among us all the work hangs, and the things which remain undone or undecided are just those which in impression, if not in fact, are the most important.

"The distribution of the Bath for Alma is still undecided. This is a good deal talked about. The medals are not yet struck. This, however, I hear is in progress. An 'Order of Merit' was stated in Parliament the other day to be 'under consideration.' We must have this settled before Parliament meets.

"Huts for hospitals are only just ordered, I believe. I must say I hope we shall be out of the Crimea before they arrive, though this is my own opinion only, and is not shared by others.

"Balaclava is an urgent case, and we have done nothing yet to meet it. I have pressed Graham very much about a harbour master, but we want there efficient men to receive, to warehouse, and to re-issue the stores. A ship came back to the Bosphorus the other day without discharging her cargo of *forage*. I enclose some extracts from Bracebridge's last letter. The story about the foolscap paper *must* be an exaggeration; but the accounts all tally—that ships arrive there and find no one to give them a receipt for their goods. We must get the proper men for the work and send them out *directly*. You have no notion how the clubs are talking on these subjects. They take account of the day we must first have known of these deficiencies and of the time which has since elapsed without any measure being taken to prevent the continuance of the evil.

"Lastly, there is the Foreign Legion, in which as yet we have made no progress. The Act passed December 23rd, and by January 23rd I fear we shall not have a battalion, even on paper. I do not know what progress you have made with the baggage train. I should think Colonel MacMurdo could give a good sketch of what should be done.

"In a fortnight we ought to be able to give a good account of all these matters.

"Knollys and Sir F. Smith ought to go to Paris forthwith, unless you destine Knollys for some other appointment.

"I do not see why we should not have all these matters settled *this week*, and the men who are to go out might then be off before the next week is out. But it will require great efforts to carry the ship through. If, however, we set to work with a will we shall be able to manage it. If there is anything I can do or relieve you of, I will do it with pleasure. I shall be up for the Cabinet to-morrow, and I hope we shall have a war meeting on Wednesday.

"Believe me, yours affectionately,

"S. H."

No man could be more generous or chivalrous than Mr. Herbert, but, knowing how much he and the Duke had done to meet or anticipate the needs of the Army, the outcry raised—raised not only in the country but in the Cabinet itself—as to the incompetence of those in command in the Crimea, certainly affected him. On December 8th he wrote thus to Lord Raglan:

"*December 8th*, 1854.

"I am rejoiced to hear that Captain Wetheral has been to Constantinople to get clothing for your men and has been successful. I trust the same will have happened as to huts, for our distance and the drain of steamers makes all our efforts unavailing so far as a quick supply is concerned. We have clothing on its way to you, and more waiting conveyance; some of our huts are gone, and others are embarking.

"Newcastle has sent a circular to the newspapers remonstrating on the statements they publish from their correspondents. They promise vigilance to exclude all objectionable information, and amendment generally. I hope that your interference will have prevented such information being sent, but they are a reckless race, and the long habit of newsgathering and publishing in any way and at any price altogether dulls their sense of right and wrong.

"Mr. Layard, who is returned, speaks of favour shown as to the issue of rations to the correspondent of *The Times*, and to him only, and says that Kinglake was allowed and he refused rations,

upon the former stating that he was, and on his (Layard's) denying that he was, a correspondent of *The Times*. How he contrived to deny *that* I do not know! The whole thing sounds like a mare's nest.

"We shall have warm work on Tuesday night with this gentleman, who is come home full of criticism of everything and everybody.

"Kinglake I have seen. He is quite the contrary, and I was much pleased with his tone.

"By-the-bye, I heard that Layard spoke to Newcastle of the necessity of some functionary being appointed to each division to act as a sanitary officer and keep the camp clear of offal and excrement, etc., etc., which, he says, lies about to such an extent as to threaten health. Ought not this to be done?

"We have been offered vast quantities of woollen socks, stockings, mitts, frocks, and shirts, all of which I have accepted, inasmuch as it gratifies the donors, and will, I think, not only add to our stock and therefore to the comfort of the men, but will also give them pleasure as showing the warmth of feeling entertained towards your Army here at home.

"These disasters you have had at sea increase our anxiety. I trust, however, that you will soon be in a position as regards ammunition to recommence vigorously. It appears to me at this distance that if the place is not taken or destroyed within two months, it will not be taken or destroyed at all. We have had a lesson as to the Russian power of reinforcement. We are endeavouring to form a sort of reserve at Malta, consisting of two or three companies of the regiments under your orders, so that they would always be within reach. The recruiting continues very briskly at the rate of 5,000 a month or more."

There is a hint of dissatisfaction in this letter, and in another of December 22nd it is more strongly perceptible:

"I fear there is great neglect on the part of the Commissariat at Balaklava. I enclose extracts of letters I have received.

"Newcastle has promised me to send out a good

dock master, captains of the quay, and warehousemen from St. Katherine's Dock. These are the sort of men required to transact business of this kind, and they should be attached to the commissariat for the purpose.

"Newcastle has also ordered more mules and baggage horses to be bought in Spain, but I hope you will have got a fresh supply through your own people from Turkey and elsewhere. I fancy you have sent to Malta for the mules despatched from Alicant. I hope Colonel MacMurdo will be able to organise a good baggage train for you. He is said, though very *Napieresque* in his ways and notions, to be an able man. Clearly the Commissariat have enough on their hands without undertaking the management of the animals likewise. I do not know whether Mr. Filder has ever complained to you of being short-handed. He never has to Newcastle, and yet I am told his staff at Constantinople is far too weak, and that the hospital is often short of fuel. People are apt to think that what is sufficient for an hospital in one place is sufficient in another; but when you come to have 4,000 people and upwards sick and wounded, it is really twenty or thirty hospitals concentrated.

"I trust the fine weather may have brought you some alleviation of the prevalent sickness, but I fear it is fatigue quite as much as exposure that injures our men. It seems to me we have made an error from the first in dividing the work equally between two unequal armies. Indeed, we have, from the nature of the ground, far heavier work than the French, and a longer line to cover and protect. The French Government say they are anxious and willing to relieve us of more than they have hitherto done, and I hope you will make good use of them. I can quite imagine the difficulty of re-dividing the ground when we have our guns and material already in position, but anything is better than the constant overwork.

"The violence and abuse of *The Times* has, I think, inspired great disgust, but still these attacks, daily repeated, tell. I think the position of the Government here very precarious. We meet on the 23rd. How long we may survive I cannot say. The public are impatient and dissatisfied, and the Government is the

natural object on which to wreak their feelings. But you have firm friends, and will, I think, find the advantage of a reaction soon if matters at all mend with your Army. I fear you are not well served as regards the two chief officers of your staff.[1] At this distance one can only judge by rumour, and great allowance must be made for inexperience of such duties after so long a peace. But if it be so, I hope you will not hesitate about a change, or hesitate about putting it on us at home if you prefer it. The Duke's proceeding with Sir W. Gordon and Sir H. Lowe is a precedent. Airey is an excellent officer, and would probably command a division well, though not as active and as full of resource as was expected as Q.M.-G.

"I hope you will pardon my great want of reserve in all these matters, as you know by what motives it is dictated."

And a day or two later he wrote:

"I think a visit from yourself in person to the field hospital and to the general hospital at Balaklava, with a rather searching inspection, would be productive of great good. There is nothing like the eye of the master, and it would put an end to the ill-natured remarks which are current about your not seeing things with your own eyes. I know you will forgive my saying this; but my regard and affection for you makes me as sensitive to these remarks as you would be yourself—perhaps more so; and I judge from extracts of letters which I have seen that both men and

[1] Lord Raglan replied January 23rd, 1855: "I am perfectly satisfied with my staff, and I cannot conceive upon what ground a row has been established against them; neither the Adjutant-General nor Quartermaster-General have charge of the supply or the transport of the Army, or anything to do with it, and all our misfortunes arise from the want of transport and the irregularity of the issue of rations. General Estcourt and General Airey work incessantly, and they are nobly seconded. Airey, whose duties are more immediately connected with the business of the Army, not connected with discipline, works like a slave with the greatest ability. I hear his assistants are called by the *Times* 'beardless boys.' They are none of them very young, and they all have beards long enough to frighten half the children in England."

officers are in that state that the certainty that the commander knows their state, and is doing what he can to alleviate it, does good."

In a letter of the 12th to General Estcourt his dissatisfaction is yet more plainly expressed:

"I hear disastrous stories of ships arriving at Balaklava and leaving it without discharging their cargo—finding no one to take charge of it. Newcastle is sending out men from the docks here to assist, supposing that the Commissariat must be short-handed; and if they are, they never write to say so, nor to ask for what they want. Lord Raglan ought to put a very active, energetic, and intelligent officer as Commandant at Balaklava, for on good management there depends the safety and comfort of your Army. Colonel D—— is said to be entirely unequal to it, and might surely be replaced.

"I hope, in spite of your protest to the contrary, that efforts will have been made at Constantinople to get workmen to assist in building and erecting your materials, also baggage animals, for money will get them, though they may be bad; but bad are better than none.

"I have no hope, however, of hearing of a better state of health till arrangements are made with the French to relieve our men of some of the duty; 70,000 and 20,000 cannot divide the ground or their duty equally without destroying the lesser number, and the allied army should be treated as one whole, not as two separate armies.

"I hope that you and those acting with you supply for Lord Raglan that which his age prevents his obtaining for himself—namely, suggestions which an ocular acquaintance with all details can alone inspire.

"Though all these matters lie in the Quartermaster-General's department rather than in yours, yet any one can indirectly assist. The Commissariat seems, so far as the getting food was concerned, to have secured good supplies, though the salt provision of the Admiralty, I am afraid, is the staple; but details seem there, too, to have been wanting, and the issue of green coffee to the men without the means of roasting it the small supplies of vegetables, etc., look like a

want of active foresight in their officers, and they seem to have allowed their baggage animals to perish without making an effort to send out to Asia Minor or to European Turkey to procure others. This may all have arisen from want of hands, but still they could have a fresh supply of men by merely asking."

To the implied accusation that Lord Raglan was too old to seek information himself, and that General Estcourt did not supply him with it, neither made any direct reply, but in answering the question put with regard to sanitation, Lord Raglan obliquely, but effectually, disposed of the charge that he neither sought nor obtained information as to the condition of the camp.

LORD RAGLAN TO MR. HERBERT.

"BEFORE SEBASTOPOL,
"*December 24th*, 1854.

. . . . . .

"I pity our poor new-comers sadly. I mentioned the inclemency of the weather in my despatch of yesterday. It rained all night. To-day the wind is north-east, and the rain is turned into snow; but that does not seem to lie, so I hope it may soon disappear. We shall have plenty of warm clothing by-and-by. We have issued a good deal already, but the difficulty is to get anything up. Our baggage animals die in vast numbers, owing to exposure, hard work, and want of food. The train road, if it could be laid by magic, would render our labour light, but as yet we have only a Mr. Campbell, who seems a sensible man, and two chainmen. None of the huts have as yet made their appearance. Somebody said that there were some in the *Royal Albert*, but they have not been reported, and I am not inclined to credit the statement, for Sir Thomas Pasley was here two or three days ago, and did not mention having them, though he said he had a vast number of things for officers.

"It is wonderful what a number of steamers you have been able to push into the service for con-

veyance of French and English troops and supplies of all kinds. Your exertions demand our warmest thanks. 'Our own correspondents' (at least those Romaine has been able to get hold of) promise great discretion for the future. The contrast between Mr. Delane's letter of the 6th to the Duke of Newcastle and the article of *The Times* on the following day is very striking.

. . . . . .

"A quartermaster of every division is charged with the duty of seeing that the ground occupied by the troops is kept clean, and that the offal is buried and the latrines properly attended to; *and in riding through the different camps, as I do almost every day,*[1] I have often been surprised to see how little there was to complain of in this Army, notwithstanding the great discomfort which was apparent, arising chiefly from the bad weather. How the matter stood in the artillery camp where Layard lived I cannot say. But it must be borne in mind that the whole of the ridge on which we stand is covered with troops, either English, French, or Turkish, and not a few of these gentry prefer to satisfy the calls of nature in the most conspicuous places and nearest to the great thoroughfares. Moreover, the country is covered with dead animals of all nations. We, I believe, are the only people that, as a matter of course, bury the offal. The great labour our men have undergone, and are still undergoing, may have rendered the cleanliness of the camp less an object of care than it would be under ordinary circumstances, but, as I have above said, I am surprised that the camps are in as good a state as I have found them to be."

General Estcourt at the same time wrote:

"Mr. Layard's idea about an officer to take care of the cleanliness of the camp is carried out already, divisionally and regimentally. But we want men to do the work, not an officer to direct it. Dead horses may be seen all about, it is true, and a great deal of dirtiness, the consequence of the generally diseased state of the Army. But the remedy is not

[1] The italics are mine.—S.

to be found in an officer to direct. We want fine weather to relieve the disease, and we want men to do the work. These are evils which follow naturally upon the heels of such a state of things as those which surround the Army. They must be borne.

"Mr. Layard means well, and to suggest something for our advantage, but he does not understand the question. We want, as I have said before, an organised transport attendant upon the Army, to carry our provisions, to carry away the sick and the wounded, to bring up our huts when they come, and the clothing, and to save the skeleton legs which now trudge through the mud, sinking in much above the ankle."

What General Estcourt foresaw happened. On January 5th Lord Raglan wrote that some of the huts had arrived and seven had been landed; but he was obliged to add, "These occupy 150 packages, and each package weighs 400 pounds, and the difficulty of bringing them up will be very great."[1]

Mr. Gladstone, quite unconscious that the neglect of the Treasury to attend to Mr. Filder's suggestions as to the supply of forage was one of the main causes why supplies sent out failed to reach the front, but well aware how great and successful the efforts to send out other supplies had been, wrote thus to Mr. Herbert on January 14th:

"It is heartrending to read and hear from day to day fresh evidence of the total insufficiency of those persons, or the principal among them, under Lord Raglan, on whom the government and management of the Army in other than strictly military matters depends. This evidence grows incessantly in amount, and it burns as if written in letters of fire. Ought not some attempt to be made to mitigate the evil?

[1] In another letter he says: "We have been able to put up a few huts; they will be immediately occupied, and will be comfortable enough. But the labour of getting up a single hut is excessive. *One hundred and eighty men* are required to carry one, or twenty-five horses, and this in our state of transport is enormous."

"You succeeded by a skilful and powerful effort in once, I might say twice, beating back the tide; it is gathering again. You promised Parliament that everything should be done to secure the Army in the Crimea a complete and speedy triumph, and you have taken measures for that end, in conjunction with Newcastle, which ought to have attained it. You have sent out everything except common sense: must you not try even now at the *twelfth* hour to send common sense also in the shape of some person who can use the materials so largely supplied—materials which, so long as there is no head to master, arrange, and use them, serve even to aggravate the evils they were meant to remove?

"The last tidings are about the huts, and all to the effect that long after arriving they remain unused.

"Although you have sent out a road, who can answer for it that some impediment will not be offered to its being made or made useful?

"I saw Lord Aberdeen to-day, and suggested that the discontent of the public mind, which will soon become exasperation, will amply justify the Government, with Lord Raglan, in saying, 'We see that, whether blame be due or not, your staff is entirely under-handed and over-worked. We send you such and such persons; the state of public feeling demands that you should find the means of employing them.'"

Mr. Gladstone was mistaken. Stores indeed of every description had been sent to the Crimea, but the most important of all supplies, that of *men*, was wanting. For this the Generals in the Crimea were, of course, not responsible, but it would have been nearly as unjust to lay blame for it on the existing British Government. Under the system of voluntary enlistment recruits were indeed obtained in not inconsiderable numbers, but not recruits of the right stamp. Undeveloped and weedy boys were not fit to endure the hardships of an ordinary campaign, far less the rigours of a Crimean winter, and the severe work of the trenches. Such reinforcements

only lengthened the rolls of disease and death. Had men in sufficient numbers been present, the breakdown of the transport service occasioned by the want of forage might have been to some degree, even if inadequately, supplied by manual labour, which might also have sufficed to improve the ways of communication between Balaclava and the camp. But the men were wanting, as they always have been and always will be under our present system, at the commencement of a war.

The ungenerous disposition to throw blame on Lord Raglan and his staff grew rapidly. Lord Raglan may not have been a General of the highest order. He was not a Marlborough or a Wellington; but he was far superior to the two men who after his death were successively placed in command of the Army in the East, while in the peculiar qualities required of the head of a force acting in concert with the Army of another nation, he probably had at that time no equal. But this was not apparent to the British public or the press. They saw that Sebastopol was not taken, they knew that the suffering of the Army was severe, nor is it strange that they should have deemed their disappointment to be due to the misconduct either of the Government at home or of those in command in the Crimea, or of both. It is equally natural that those members of the Cabinet more immediately concerned in the conduct of the war, knowing what they did of the efforts they had made, should have inclined to the belief that if faults there were, they were to be found rather in the Crimea than in Downing Street. I fear Mr. Herbert was not a stranger to the despatch addressed to Lord Raglan by the Duke of Newcastle on January 22nd, although I think it improbable that

he can have approved some of its sentences. It is still less probable that he shares the responsibility of Lord Panmure's far less defensible letter of February 12th, 1855. There is, indeed, some reason to suppose that it was never seen by Mr. Herbert, and never sanctioned by the Queen. Lord Raglan's dignified and convincing reply to its censures has been given to the world by Kinglake (vol. vi., p. 337). What General Estcourt thought of them, and what impression he held them to have made upon the Army, is told in the following letter:

"The confusion at home, and the unjust course which the Government has consented to pursue in obedience to the frantic follies of the country, or rather to the mischievous representations of *The Times*, fills us here with some uneasiness and annoyance. The state of this Army in respect to hardships and disease and death has been very alarmingly but not very untruly made public by private letters and by the correspondent of *The Times*; but the spirit of the Army has not been understood. Some letters from hence have been adopted as expressing the feelings of the camp, and very unjust and untrue deductions have been made in consequence. The attacks upon Lord Raglan are those which we most resent—those ignorant attacks upon him for not appearing enough in the camps to please the writers of these letters, worse, unjust insinuations that he was neglectful of the condition of the soldiers. All that time he was occupied from morning to late at night, and to past midnight, writing and arranging for the improvement of the condition of the soldiers. But, in their charity, people could not believe that that might possibly be the case. No; it was assumed by some, and, I am sorry to say, adopted by the Duke of Newcastle, that Lord Raglan was not to be seen in the camps, and that he neither knew from his own observations, nor was informed by his '*inefficient*' staff, what was the state of the soldiers. I must assert the contrary to be the truth, and I will do so to you with confidence, although to those who

do not know me any such assertion would probably produce no conviction. But I may very truly say that I do not think there was any one in the Army *so* well informed of the state of things in camp as Lord Raglan. Every one had easy access to him; they told him freely all their difficulties, and he was certainly not kept in ignorance by us, his staff. But it does not seem to occur to people that such a service as ours was likely to produce the hardships which this Army had to endure. A siege in winter in the Crimea, with small numbers, considering the service, and no previous provision made, was surely enough to produce terrible distress; and I think in England, instead of turning upon us, they may bless their stars that we have got through the winter without loss of credit to England or to ourselves. But I do not think there is another man who could have carried the Army through what it had to bear with the spirit and good conduct, which have been so admirable, than Lord Raglan. And I don't believe an army otherwise officered than ours is could have got on as ours has under the severity of that trench duty.

"An unworthy insinuation was made, we saw, that our officers did not share the severe duty of the men. I know of men, when questioned about how they were getting on under their severe duty, answering, 'Why, sir, we see our officers no better off than ourselves; how can we complain?' Such has been literally the case. They have had means of their own to purchase some varieties for diet which have rendered them healthier, perhaps, but nothing else. They have had their share, poor fellows, of the trenches. Rain and snow and pinching frost, they have borne it all like the men. They had the means, too, no doubt, of providing themselves with some additional clothing before that which you sent could arrive, or that which was bought at Constantinople had arrived; but except these advantages, which no one need grudge them, they had none over the common soldier.

"Unhappily, Lord Panmure has followed in the same line with the Duke of Newcastle. That which has been written in private letters is held to be true. The reports of Lord Raglan, who ought to possess the

whole confidence of the Government from his position and his character, go for nothing in the face of the private letters and the statements of *The Times*. It would be a sad day for us if he were driven to resign.

"The attacks upon Airey and myself *we* think very unjust. We are said by the Duke of Newcastle to be either inefficient or negligent, and yet Lord Raglan has made no such report. I am able to judge of Airey much better, perhaps, than I can of myself, and I am able to say that no man has worked harder than Airey, and I don't know who could have done better. It is all very well for people judging after the fact; but when in early days the question of a road was raised by him, I remember the answer given was, 'But where are the men?' That has been the answer to many a good scheme for the bettering of our condition. In respect to myself, I can say but little. I may be inefficient in comparison with many another man, but I have not been negligent, I am pretty sure."

At the beginning of the new year Sidney Herbert drew up the following memorandum for the Cabinet:

"*January 9th*, 1855.

"The allied armies have now been upwards of three months before Sevastopol. It is impossible not to see that they are in a very critical situation, and the Governments of France and England must not shrink from looking their difficulties in the face, and examining what are the various courses which it may be necessary to take in the event either of success or failure.

"We now know a great deal more as to our own strength, as well as that of the enemy, than we did three months ago.

"The march upon Balaclava, so far as our success was concerned, was the culminating point of the campaign. We had landed successfully, had fought a great battle successfully, and had successfully made a flank march, which brought us to that side of the town which was undefended, and where we were least expected. The enemy, on the other hand, had received no reinforcements, and were dispirited by defeat and failure.

"Whether the allied commanders should have pursued Prince Menchikoff's army to Bachti Serai and

beaten it again, and dispersed it before it could be reinforced, or have at once assaulted the town as proposed by Sir G. Cathcart, or whether they were right in besieging it in force, it is impossible now to decide, and, therefore, useless to discuss. I confess it seems to me that if we had succeeded on October 17th in destroying the works which the Russians had created while we were making our batteries, we should merely have brought back the relative position of the besiegers and besieged to what it was three weeks before—namely, we should have again found ourselves before an almost open town.

"Other considerations, however, besides the calculations of the engineers, may have operated with Lord Raglan. Mr. Kinglake informs me that the battle of the Alma had produced a deep impression upon our Army, who had never before seen a battle, and were shocked at the slaughter at the expense of which it was won. There was a general feeling that flesh and blood must not again be led against batteries. There are moral considerations affecting the chances of success which a General must consider, as well as material ones; and the disinclination which existed in the Army to attempt an operation unfairly murderous in its character, even if successful, may have decided the matter when the reasons for and against the particular course were doubtful.

"Be that, however, as it may, the result of the siege disappointed the engineers. The attack by sea was not successful, and upon the whole, whether well or ill conducted, the ships suffered more than the forts.

"The engineering department of the French Army did not conduct its operations with the same skill as our own. Their batteries were insufficiently constructed, and were seriously damaged in the first twelve hours, and their magazines were so placed and so little guarded that they blew up within the same period.

"At the end of three weeks, no impression was made.

"Balaclava and Inkerman followed.

"The Russians had received large reinforcements, brought in an incredibly short time over an immense extent of inhospitable country, till they apparently

outnumbered the forces of the allies. We then found ourselves a minority besieging a majority, who had besides in their favour the shelter of a town, and all the resources of the greatest arsenal in Russia, which is kept in a state habitually to keep in awe Circassia, Georgia, and Turkey.

"The Russians now began to act on the offensive.

"At Balaclava the small portion of the Army engaged displayed in a manner almost unexampled the first qualities of soldiers; but we had our redoubts, our cavalry, and above all our only communication by a metal road between the camp and Balaclava, the basis of our whole operations.

"At Inkerman, on the contrary, we inflicted on the Russians a defeat which made both morally and materially an impression upon the Russians, upon which our Army has rested ever since.

"But a worse enemy than the Russians had now again to be encountered. The exposure, the wet, the fatigue in the trenches, when our men had to guard an immense extent of lines, a position from the French right to Balaclava, a distance of some eight or nine miles, produced dysentery in its worst form. The raw reinforcements suffered from cholera, and our Army melted away as fast as the fresh drafts arrived.

"At last the storm of the 14th wrecked our ships, destroying in them vast quantities of ammunition, provisions, forage, and clothing, in consequence of which the siege was necessarily suspended. Our animals died of starvation; the roads, or rather the tracks to which we had recourse in the absence of roads, became impassable; short rations were issued, and the men deprived by the storm for a time even of the shelter of their tents, were drenched with wet. Disease and death were proportionately augmented. Our ill fortunes seem to have culminated on November 14th, as our good fortune did on September 2nd.

"Since then, however, the French have erected new and advanced batteries, and armed them with mortars. We are doing the same, but are ten days behindhand. The French are waiting for us. In the meanwhile, a large force, believed to be another *corps d'armée*, has moved from Odessa towards the Crimea. Arabas and cattle have been seen to collect

between Perekop and Simpheropol, as they did before when Menchikoff's first great reinforcements arrived. These troops have probably now joined.

"I recapitulate all these occurrences because they assist us in forming a judgment as to the amount of force we are likely to have again to encounter, and our chances of success.

"We underrated originally the means possessed by Russia of pouring reinforcements into the Crimea. We underrated the speed with which the movements could be effected, and, consequently, the loss of life by which the operations would be attended.

"The same holds good as to supplies. When men can be brought in carts and arabas, food and ammunition can of course be brought likewise.

"Whether the winter will befriend us or not remains to be seen. Persons acquainted with the country assure us that there is frost enough in the south in winter to allow of sledging at any rate so far as Perekop, sometimes up to the walls of Sevastopol; but, at any rate, there is a hard metal road from Perekop, which will ensure the transit to the south of whatever can be brought to the Isthmus. There is likewise a communication through the Sea of Azoff, which it is out of our power at present to intercept.

"The two months supposed to be most unfavourable to Russian communication as being the wettest, and in which the roads may be the most impassable, are now past, and yet, even during these months, there is reason to think that a *corps d'armée* has been successfully transported to the Crimea. During this period the allied armies have been reinforced till they probably amount at this time to nearly 100,000 men.

"The French, I apprehend, are not in a position to send any very large additional force, and 3,000 men a month will be required at the least (say 4,000, now that their army is augmented) to keep up their force to its present numbers.

"We can do little more in the way of fresh regiments, and that little not very soon. If we can by drafts to the existing regiments, keep up our numbers, it is as much as we can safely undertake to do.

"The Russians, on the contrary, are steadily organising fresh reinforcements for the Crimea. Every

available regiment at Petersburg goes to Warsaw, and as soon as it arrives, a corresponding force is hurried south. Each *corps d'armée* as it moves down is replaced by another, and Podolia and Volhynia have a constant stream passing through them. Nothing can arrest this but a blow struck by Austria, and that blow will not come in time.

"If, therefore, we have at this moment a superiority of force in the Crimea, it appears to me that it can only be a temporary one. Unless, therefore, a blow be struck by us now, it cannot be struck at all with any great hope of success. A few days may tell us of some decisive event. I cannot help fearing that the ten days' delay made necessary by the grievous error in making no second road from Balaclava may put the Russians again in such force on the Tchernaia as to force us to act on the defensive on one side, while attempting an assault on the other.

"Should the assault fail, the siege of Sevastopol becomes hopeless, as it appears to me, for we already see the limits of our reinforcements, and we know that those of the Russians are comparatively unexhausted.

"I believe the allied Generals have received no instructions as to the course to be pursued with a view to, or in consequence of, the capture of Sevastopol, since those in which the expedition was authorised.

"Had we known then what we know now, I apprehend that our instructions would have been different, not as to the undertaking the expedition at all, but as to the mode of conducting it, founded upon a better estimate of the chances of success. We should probably have said, 'Make a dash at the place, but if you fail, withdraw; don't let yourself be caught in a position from which you cannot escape.' But our Army is in a position from which, clearly, it cannot escape, in case of the failure of the assault, without great loss and disaster.

"It may be true that the Army could maintain itself in its present position as in an impregnable citadel, but, even if it did so, it would require all our efforts to reinforce and maintain it, and would be an army (and our only army) locked up and wasted for any

purpose of the war. A Russian army would likewise be wasted in besieging it, but that would be one army out of many, as they have others available for active service elsewhere. It must, however, be recollected that there is great risk lest such a protracted imprisonment in the Chersonese as that supposition contemplates should so dispirit and demoralise our Army as to destroy its power of resistance to the superior forces which would be brought against it.

"On the other hand, the assault may succeed, and yet the necessity for withdrawal may be as urgent even as in the case of failure.

"I believe it may be assumed that the Government do not in any case contemplate a change in the territorial possession of the Crimea. It would be of use, however, to us to hold in our hand in a negotiation for peace. For every other purpose it would be a great embarrassment.

"Once the fleet is destroyed, and the arsenal not supplied, and the forts not protecting the fleet, our object is accomplished, and twenty-five years' repose are guaranteed to the countries bordering on the Black Sea. If we retain it, it will require our whole Army to do so, with a constant risk of failure and an enforced abstinence, for want of disposable troops, for any attack on other vulnerable parts of the Russian Empire. It appears to me, therefore, that if we succeed in capturing the arsenal and the fleet, and can either destroy both or bring the latter away, we shall have done all that it is our object or our interest to do, unless we have a prospect of serious negotiation for peace, and our Army will require long and entire rest before it is again fit for active service.

"At all events, the course to be taken in the event of the assault succeeding is a political as well as a military question, and, even if politically we think it advisable to stay in the Crimea, our power of doing so will depend on the state of our Army—and that of the Russians likewise. The latter question is one which can only be decided by the Generals on the spot. The first can only be decided here and by the allied Governments, and the Generals ought not to have thrown upon them the responsibility of deciding it.

"Either, then, in the case of success or of failure,

as it seems to me, the evacuation of the Crimea may become necessary. I confess that in my opinion it will be even more desirable in case of success, for it will be more possible. Others, however, probably take a different view of it; but I think the Governments of France and England ought to come to a decision upon it, and give instructions to the allied Generals accordingly.

"In case of failure, it may become necessary to raise the siege and withdraw from the Chersonese. It is a fearful alternative to contemplate, because *matériel*, baggage, and, possibly, a portion of the Army, would probably be sacrificed in the operation. It could only be attempted, probably, after some chastisement inflicted on the enemy on the field subsequent to the failure of the assault; but in any case it would be very hazardous, and the moral effect of the operation, even if successful, would no doubt be most injurious to us. It is useless, however, to shut our eyes to the possibility of the necessity.

"But all these alternatives ought to be placed clearly before the Generals. They should have full discretion as to which they choose to adopt. They are men of courage and honour, and we need not fear their having recourse, except under a paramount necessity, to the course which we should the most deplore; but they ought to know that they are not restricted from taking it. They must not consider themselves chained to a rock. So long as they have no instructions, they may so consider themselves, and our Army might, in the worst of all their eventualities, be sacrificed in consequence.

"Again, in the case of a successful assault, the Generals may consider themselves precluded, or may be very unwilling to take such a course as withdrawal, even if wishing it, unless they have reason to think that such a possibility has been contemplated by their Governments at home.

"It appears to me, therefore, that whatever be the opinion of the Government, it ought to be conveyed to the Generals at once in the form of instructions. Their discretion would not be in the least fettered by it, but the contrary. It is possible that they may be fettered by the want of them. No instructions and general instructions are very different things, and

Lord Raglan is entitled to know what the Government wish him to do, if he can do it, as we are entitled to know from Lord Raglan what, with the forces we have entrusted to him, he expects to be able to do.

"I propose, therefore, first, that we should come to a clear decision as to what we think should be done. Secondly, that we should endeavour to obtain from the French Government a concurrence in our opinion, whatever that opinion may be; and thirdly, that when agreed, instructions in accordance with that opinion should be sent to the allied Generals. Fourthly, that we should require Lord Raglan to state to us, in full, his opinion of the position of his Army, the nature of the operations which he contemplates, and his expectations of success or failure. Fifthly, I think he should likewise give his opinion as to advantages or disadvantages of an armistice, should the negotiations at Vienna be commenced.

"SIDNEY HERBERT."

A fortnight later Lord John Russell's hasty resignation virtually destroyed the Aberdeen Cabinet, and though Sidney Herbert remained in office as Colonial Secretary for a few weeks longer, his connection with the Government was severed by his resignation on February 21st. Of the letters from General Estcourt, reporting the improved condition of the Army, from which I have quoted above, the later ones were, of course, not received by Mr. Herbert till after he had quitted office. To those which had reached him previously, he replied briefly on February 26th, as follows:

"BELGRAVE SQUARE,
"*February 26th*, 1855.

"MY DEAR ESTCOURT,

"I am a country gentleman again at last, but I must all the more write a line to thank you for your letter. It can only be a line, for I am winding up my old office business, and am going to the House for the Army Estimates.

"I will extract what you say about the ration, but you

should recollect that all these changes can be at once made by Lord Raglan without waiting for reference home. I wrote some time ago to desire vegetables to be issued to the men without charge, as I hold that whatever ration is necessary to keep the men healthy and efficient ought to be given them by the public. If, therefore, one thing should be substituted for another, you have the power and the means to do it, and should do it without loss of time.

"I confess that I am in despair about Filder. I hear that the moment Admiral Grey was employed to get mules, he got an excellent supply with one month's forage, and I see that the Navy is running steamers to Sinope to supply themselves with fresh meat and vegetables. Why could not our commissariat do this themselves?

"I trust the Ordnance will trounce the villainous contractors who supplied the bad boots. I will do what I can to keep them up to the mark."

To Lord Raglan he wrote at greater length, plainly avowing that he did not think the Government had received sufficiently ample information from him, and this letter may well form the conclusion of the present chapter.

"*March 5th*, 1855.

"I have not written to you for a long time, for I have lived in a turmoil of doubts and difficulties and 'crisis,' and so on, but I am now at last out of office and free again.

"The mishaps of the Army were resented by an unreasoning crowd—who have no fortitude under disappointment, and are as pusillanimous under ill-fortune as they are arrogant and presumptuous in good—on Lord Aberdeen and Newcastle. Every exaggeration—nay, every invention—is believed, and there has been no question as to what amount of blame was due. The only doubt was on whom the retribution should be inflicted.

"It was clear to me that the sacrifice was not complete or satisfactory so long as I remained in office, for though I had no authority in the management of the war, I was supposed to have, and the end of it

was that Graham, Gladstone, and myself retired when we found Palmerston yielding to what he had denounced, and commencing a system of weakness which never answers with the House of Commons.

"You, I trust and believe, will live the clamour down, and I see symptoms of reaction already. Still, I think you have not done yourself justice or given yourself a fair chance, and I write to you now without disguise or reserve, because I think you may derive advantage for the future from seeing what impression has been produced on the mind of a friend who has been *à même*, to judge of the results, at any rate of late events, so far as opinion here is concerned.

"But first let me say that in your answers to Newcastle's despatches you have fallen into error in thinking that he adopted the stories told, or brought them as accusations against you. He, as I conceive, recited what had been told him, wishing to have from you the explanation or contradiction.

"One great difficulty, however, which the Cabinet experienced was the absence of detailed information from yourself. Of the prospects of the siege, its chance of success, and the measures you contemplated for its prosecution, the Cabinet knew nothing direct from yourself, except in the instance of the disagreement between Burgoyne and the French engineers, in which case the correspondence showed what was intended. Else we derived our information either from General Rose's despatches, which are very full and clear, or from Canrobert's, copies of which were communicated to us. I think the result was not favourable to the public service, nor to your relations with the Government at home. The Cabinet ought to hear from the person wielding the chief authority, from his own lips and told in his own way, the impressions which he wishes to convey. He is the person most competent to inform them, indeed the only person, and it is important for him, as well as for them, that all facts, prospects, and intentions should come to them with the colour of his mind upon them.

"It is bad for both parties when the Government are obliged to rely upon or to seek information from others, and a full account of all that is happening, constantly given, justifies men in setting down what is not told them as exaggerations, if not untruths.

"I am certain, therefore, that great advantage would result from a more detailed and unreserved communication, either in despatches or private letters, keeping the Government *au fait*, not only of what has happened or is happening, but of your own expectations of what is likely to happen. Without such information from the officer in whom their confidence is reposed, they are unable to form any opinion as to the probable results of the campaign, or of what course ought to be recommended or suggested by them. It reacts, therefore, on yourself, by leaving you without the support of instructions or advice from home.

"I believe that you have done all that, under the circumstances and the difficulties of the case, could be done, but you know that I have doubted whether you were as well served as you ought to be, and I cannot help fearing that you have been too generous to others. I conceive that the whole difficulty arose from our holding an extent of ground equal, if not larger, than that held by the French, with a quarter of the force possessed by them. For this obviously no man could be responsible, unless he commanded the French Army as well as the English. But when animals begin to die, and forage to be short, and the means of transport to fail, I cannot but think that Mr. Filder showed a great want of energy and resource. I cannot conceive that he really expected to be supplied from England in ships receiving sixty shillings a ton, and I see that no sooner was Admiral Grey authorised to buy mules than he buys a large number in Canada, with forage for a month. Again, I see that the Navy is running steamers for fresh meat and vegetables to Sinope. All these things Filder could have done as well, if not better, weeks before; for forage, of course, is easier to get at the beginning of winter than towards the end of it; but people here make you responsible for his shortcomings, and, out of generosity to those who are serving you, you make yourself responsible.

"He has been now at the head of your commissariat at Constantinople, at Varna, and at Sevastopol. In all these cases, save during the march from Old Fort to Balaclava, the Army has been stationary, and the Navy has been supplying a large proportion of the rations.

How will he do when you have an army moving on an extended line over an enemy's country?

"I do not underrate the difficulties of supplying an army; on the contrary, I think them enormous, and when an army is moving I confess I do not understand how it can be done at all; but Filder has not been exposed to these difficulties. He has friendly countries to draw from, an ample sea transport, and a navy helping him with provisions as well as carriage. I feel confident that you are not safe in his hands, and that there must be now among his subordinates some man with youth and energy on his side who would serve your Army much better. I shall therefore rejoice for your sake, as well as for that of the public, when I hear that he is on his way home.

"Now you see that I have spoken my mind very plainly, and I do not make the slightest apology for it, for you will, I know, feel that it is my anxiety for you which alone prompts me to say things which, at our relative ages and in our relative positions, I have no business to say. But pray think over these two subjects. I am certain that you may and will stand much better by showing confidence in the Cabinet, a confidence which is always reciprocated, and by dealing summarily with those who, however zealous and well intentioned, are not equal to their position.

"I am glad to see letters of a cheering character from Lyons, who always speaks of you in a way which gives me pleasure. Estcourt, too, writes to me that you have turned the corner; so does Miss Nightingale from Scutari. She, by the way, mentions that the French medical men have an advantage in always getting early notice to prepare for so many sick—3,000, 4,000, 5,000, as the case may be; whereas our notice comes in the shape of a steamer with the patients. I told her I would mention it to you, but that in the meanwhile she must be ready for 2,000 wounded any day, and that if not a sick man more comes, they want room for 2,000 or more, merely to thin the present over-crowded hospitals.

"What an event is the death of the Emperor![1] I think it must ultimately tend to peace, because the

[1] The Emperor Nicholas died on March 2nd, 1855.

young Emperor is not the man of resolution which his father was, and I have no doubt those who wish for peace will speak more loudly than they did under Nicholas; but, in the first instance, his reputation for pacific leanings may force him, as a hedge, into warlike demonstration.

"I have written you a terribly long letter. Do not think it necessary to answer it. I hope it will not annoy you. You have trouble and worry enough on your hands without your friends doing that, but I have written from anxiety that you should know what is felt here by one at least of those who have your interests at heart."

CHAPTER X

SCUTARI

1854–55

IN the earlier years of the nineteenth century the science of sanitation was well nigh unknown. It had made immense strides between 1800 and 1850, and the system of Army Hospital administration, which had been endured, and, indeed, complacently regarded, in 1804, was altogether out of date half a century later. Consequently, of the shortcomings due to the inexperience born of a long peace, none affected the public mind more keenly than those disclosed as existing in the great military hospital at Scutari, and among the sick and wounded before Sebastopol.

For those shortcomings there were, no doubt, many excuses. However positively imperfect, there can be no question that, as compared with the state of things in the Peninsula, the hospital arrangements for the Crimean campaign might be considered—and probably were considered—by those who had served in the campaigns of 1810-15 to be relatively perfect.[1]

[1] "It would perhaps astonish you to walk along these long corridors when lit up after dark, and see how the men are occupied—many of course in bed, but with their comrades talking and gossiping over scenes in which they have recently been such conspicuous actors; some—too many—smoking, and a great number in groups reading or listening to others reading from the papers what is going on in the Crimea. A striking contrast, I suspect, to a military hospital during the Peninsular War, and, I presume, in favour of Scutari."—*Dr. Cumming to Mr. Herbert*, December 18th, 1854.

No one can read the accounts given by contemporaries of the military hospitals in Spain during the Peninsular War without recognising that to their unhappy inmates Scutari or Kulali would have been a paradise of luxury, and the medical men in chief command in 1854—men whose traditions were those of Wellington's campaigns—may be in some degree excused if they were more alive to the enormous improvements which had been effected than to the additional improvement yet attainable.

The chief military hospital was established at Scutari, on the Asiatic shore of the Bosphorus, just opposite Constantinople, in an enormous barrack, which had been made over for the purpose on the first arrival of the British forces in the East. The plan of breaking up hospitals into small blocks of buildings had not then been adopted, and no objection was made, or was then likely to be made, to the huge dimensions of the area occupied. Another hospital called the "General" hospital, of smaller size, where were the headquarters of the medical staff, as well as two others, the Sultan's Palace Hospital and the Stable Hospital, containing together about 300 or 400 men, were established in the same locality. At a later period others, as they became needed, were set up at Kulali, Therapia, Smyrna, and elsewhere, and an additional hospital was provided at Scutari for wounded Russians. There were also two or three hospital ships.

Until after the battle of Alma the number of patients to be treated was comparatively small, and the resources of the establishment at Scutari were fairly equal to meet their wants. The case became different after the invasion of the Crimea, when large numbers of wounded and sick were sent down continually from the front. The pressure upon the hospital was,

moreover, augmented by two unforeseen causes. Of these one should never have arisen, while the other should have been immediately rectified. On disembarking in the Crimea, it was determined by three of the four Generals of division not to disembark the men's knapsacks with them. They would march lighter, it was said, without them, and as it was confidently anticipated that the allies would be in possession of Sebastopol in a few days' time, it was proposed that the knapsacks should be restored to them there—a hope never realised. Only one division, that of the Duke of Cambridge, had its kit with it throughout. The other three were long in recovering the knapsacks, many of which were wholly lost. Consequently, the men, when received into hospital had nothing with them but the clothes they stood in, and, if they recovered, new clothes had to be provided for them on their discharge, which had not been contemplated. Again, a large amount of medical stores and hospital appliances were accumulated at Varna, which, when the Army left that place for the Crimea, ought to have been sent down at once to Scutari. Owing to the absence of means of transport, and the blundering of those in charge of them—blunders never, I believe, fully traced home to their authors—these stores remained unforwarded until a much later period, by which time a large portion of them had been wasted, lost, or destroyed in Bulgaria. Supplies, attendance, management, all became inadequate and inefficient. Bad, however, as the state of things really was, it was grossly exaggerated by popular report. The widest publicity was given by the newspapers to every hasty complaint. They were readily believed, generalised, and understood to be of universal application.

By the middle of October, public opinion in England had been harrowed by revolting accounts of the state of the hospitals. Denunciations of the incompetence of those managing them, together with charges, some well founded, others grossly exaggerated, and many altogether false, were daily reiterated in the columns of *The Times* and other journals. Without accepting these statements, and, indeed, in the main disbelieving them, the Cabinet was fully alive to their serious nature, and determined to send out a Commission to inquire into their accuracy, and to provide remedies for all defects discovered. Meanwhile, Ministers were comforted by the strong assurances sent home by Dr. Menzies, the head of the Scutari establishment, who in writing to the Director-General on October 26th, "to refute the false statements in *The Times* of October 9th and 12th, in which it is stated that no sufficient preparations have been made for the proper care of the wounded," thus expressed himself:

"I beg to state that every preparation that kindness and humanity could suggest was in readiness to alleviate the sufferings of both sick and wounded. I personally superintended the operations both day and night, and it is extremely mortifying that a public journal of so respectable a character as *The Times* should advance statements so utterly false. There was no want of either linen or bandages, but an ample supply of both. . . . As for there being 'no preparations for the commonest surgical operations,' this statement is false in every particular. *The Times* remarks that 'when the wounded were placed in the spacious building where they were led to believe that everything was ready that could ease their pain or facilitate their recovery, it was found that the commonest appliances of a workhouse sick-ward were wanting, and that the men must die through the medical staff of the British Army having forgotten that old rags for the dressing of the wounds are useful.' There never was such a tissue of falsehood

fabricated! . . . *The Times* is also pleased to observe, 'But what is almost incredible, but nevertheless true, there is not even linen or lint to bind the wounds.' This is quite at variance with facts, for, as I said in a former communication to you, there has been no want of either."

Notwithstanding these reassuring statements, *The Times* maintained its attitude, and called for subscriptions to a Fund, to be administered by its own agents, and devoted to supplying those wants of the Army to which the Government had, as it asserted, failed to attend. It was reported to Sidney Herbert that, influenced by the outraged *amour propre* of the Army Medical Service, the Director-General, Dr. Smith, meditated the rejection of aid from this Fund, and intended to prohibit its agents from entering the hospitals. It was further said that the Duke of Newcastle was inclined to accept this recommendation. Mr. Herbert desired the adoption of a wiser and more generous course, and addressed the Duke as follows:

"I have an impression that I heard Dr. Smith say that he had desired Dr. Menzies on no account to let Mr. Macdonald, the almoner of *The Times*, into the hospital. . . . I do not think that Dr. Smith's line, if it is his line, is the right one. It would, I think, be clearly impossible to allow Mr. M. or any one else charged with a mission of any sort to be allowed to overhaul everything in the Hospital, to question and criticise the medical authorities, and to send in whatever he chooses to think is deficient or ought to be used. If we have confidence in our medical men, and I believe we are justified in having it, we are bound to protect them against a system of espionage or the usurpation by an unauthorised person of authority over them or the hospital under their charge. On the other hand, to refuse a man admittance who comes with £7,000 in his hand, subscribed by respectable and benevolent people in England for the benefit of

the sick and wounded, would be a churlish proceeding, and would have the appearance either of temper or of a wish to conceal what will not bear the light."

It is hardly necessary to say that the contemplated restrictions were not enforced.

It was in these circumstances that a few benevolent men and women in England formed a private association to send a small number of female nurses to Constantinople, who were, on arrival, to offer their services in the military hospitals there. Of this expedition Miss Florence Nightingale was to be the head. She had long been intimately acquainted with Mr. and Mrs. Herbert, and on October 14th she wrote to the latter to inform her that a small private expedition of nurses had been organised for Scutari, and that she had been asked to command it. She was to pay the expenses of her own voyage out, and those of one nurse. Lady Maria Forester had given £200 to take out three others. They were to feed and lodge themselves, and to be no expense whatever to the country.

"I do not mean to say," she wrote, "that I believe *The Times* accounts, but I do believe that we may be of use to the wounded wretches." She proceeded to ask whether the Committee of the Ladies' Hospital in Harley Street, by which she was at the time employed, would sanction her going; whether Mr. Herbert would recommend the party to the officials at Scutari; and, finally, begged that Mrs. Herbert, or some other member of her Committee, "would write to Lady Stratford to say, 'This is not a lady, but a real hospital nurse, and she has had experience.'"

Strangely enough this letter actually crossed one from Mr. Herbert to Miss Nightingale, requesting her to take command of the nurses about to be sent

out by the Government for service in the hospitals at Scutari.

From the commencement of the war, Mr. Herbert's attention had been earnestly directed towards the amelioration of the condition of the soldier when in hospital. The existing system of nursing by hospital orderlies, who had no sort of training, and who consisted simply of such men as could be laid hold of, and could be spared from other duties, was evidently not such as to ensure the comfort of the patient or materially assist his recovery. These orderlies had no special fitness or training, they were frequently changed when they began to learn their duties, and they might be, and often were, wholly devoid of tenderness of hand, kindly feeling, or intelligence. An attempt was first made to organise a corps of trained male nurses, but the plan had to be abandoned in consequence of the entire absence of materials from which to form such an establishment. In all civil hospitals, and in all ordinary nursing of the sick, women are almost exclusively employed. Sidney Herbert asked himself why the system thus generally followed in civil life should not be extended to the Army also, and it appeared to him that no adequate objection could be urged in reply. I say Sidney Herbert, because in all relating to this matter he was, so far as official circles were concerned, the originating and moving spirit, but it would be highly unjust not to recognise the readiness with which the Duke of Newcastle perceived the value of Herbert's suggestions, or the heartiness and absence of jealousy with which he adopted them as his own, and used the whole power of his office to anticipate objections and overbear them when raised. It was a great and untried experiment. It proved a most successful one, but

it cannot be wondered that both the Duke and Mr. Herbert should have thought it necessary to begin cautiously, and not without misgiving.

While Mr. Herbert had at once grasped the immense benefits which would attend the introduction of a properly qualified staff of nurses into the military hospitals, he at the same time perceived how impossible it would be to take advantage of their services, except under the strictest discipline, and under the orders of a properly authorised and responsible head, answerable both to the medical authorities on the spot and to the Imperial Government at home. His knowledge of Miss Nightingale enabled him to say with decision that she possessed all the requisite qualities for such a post, and before her letter of the 14th from Harley Street had been received by him, he had himself addressed to her from Wilton the following letter:

"DEAR MISS NIGHTINGALE,

"You would have seen in the papers that there is a great deficiency of nurses at the hospital at Scutari. The other alleged deficiencies—namely, of medical men, lint, sheets, etc.—must, if they have really ever existed, have been remedied ere this, as the number of medical officers with the Army amounts to one to every 95 men in the whole force, being nearly double what we have ever had before, and 30 more surgeons went out there three weeks ago, and must by this time, therefore, be at Constantinople. A further supply went on Monday, and a fresh batch sails next week. As to medical stores, they have been sent out in profusion, by the ton weight: 15,000 pair of sheets, medicines, wines, arrowroot, in the same proportion, and the only way of accounting for the deficiency at Scutari, if it exists, is that the mass of the stores went to Varna, and had not been sent back when the Army left for the Crimea, but four days would have remedied that. In the meantime stores are arriving. But the deficiency of female

nurses is undoubted, none but male nurses having ever been admitted to military hospitals. It would be impossible to carry about a large staff of female nurses with an army in the field. But at Scutari, having now a fixed hospital, no military reason exists against their introduction, and I am confident they might be introduced with great benefit, for hospital orderlies must be very rough hands, and most of them, on such an occasion as this, very inexperienced ones. I receive numbers of offers from ladies to go out, but they are ladies who have no conception of what a hospital is, nor of the nature of its duties, and they would, when the time came, either recoil from the work or be entirely useless, and consequently, what is worse, entirely in the way; nor would those ladies probably even understand the necessity, especially in a military hospital, of strict obedience to rule, etc.

. . . . . .

"There is but one person in England that I know of who would be capable of organising and superintending such a scheme, and I have been several times on the point of asking you hypothetically if, supposing the attempt were made, you would undertake to direct it. The selection of the rank and file of nurses would be very difficult; no one knows that better than yourself. The difficulty of finding women equal to a task, after all, full of horror, and requiring, besides knowledge and goodwill, great knowledge and great courage, will be great; the task of ruling and introducing system among them great; and not the least will be the difficulty of making the whole work smoothly with the medical and military authorities out there. That it is which makes it so important that the experiment should be carried out by one with administrative capacity and experience. A number of sentimental enthusiastic ladies turned loose into the hospital at Scutari would probably after a few days be *mises à la porte* by those whose business they would interrupt, and whose authority they would dispute. My question simply is, would you listen to the request to go out and supervise the whole thing? You would, of course, have plenary authority over all the nurses, and I think I could secure you the fullest assistance and co-operation from the medical

staff, and you would also have an unlimited power of drawing on the Government for what you think requisite for the success of your mission. On this part of the subject the details are too many for a letter, and I reserve it for our meeting, for, whatever decision you take, I know you will give me every assistance and advice. I do not say one word to press you. You are the only person who can judge for yourself which of conflicting or incompatible duties is the first, or the highest, but I think I must not conceal from you that upon your decision will depend the ultimate success or failure of the plan. Your own personal qualities, your knowledge, and your power of administration, and among greater things your rank and position in society, give you advantages in such a work which no other person possesses. If this succeeds, an enormous amount of good will be done now, and to persons deserving everything at our hands, and which will multiply the good to all time. I hardly like to be sanguine as to your answer. If it were 'Yes,' I am certain the Bracebridges would go with you and give you all the comforts you would require and which their society and sympathy only could give you. I have written very long, for the subject is very near my heart. Liz[1] is writing to Mrs. Bracebridge to tell her what I am doing. I go back to town to-morrow morning. Shall I come to you between three and five? Will you let me have a line at the War Office to let me know? There is one point which I have hardly a right to touch upon, but I trust you will pardon me. If you were inclined to undertake the great work, would Mr. and Mrs. Nightingale consent? This work would be so national, and the request made to you proceeding from the Government, which represents the nation, comes at such a moment that I do not despair of their consent. Deriving your authority from the Government, your position would ensure the respect and consideration of every one, especially in a service where official rank carries so much respect. This would secure you every attention or comfort on your way out there, together with a complete submission to your orders. I know these things are a matter of indifference to you, except so far as they may further the great object

[1] Mrs. Herbert.

you would have in view; but they are of importance in themselves, and of every importance to those who have a right to take an interest in your personal position and comfort. I know you will come to a right and wise decision. God grant it may be in accordance with my hopes."

Miss Nightingale readily responded to this appeal, and the conditions on which she did so were set forth in a letter from Sidney Herbert to the Director-General, Dr. Smith. The Government, Dr. Smith was told, considered that the best mode of obviating dangers and inconveniences would be to appoint some one person to select a staff of female nurses at home, and afterwards to superintend and direct it in Turkey. Miss Nightingale's special fitness for such an appointment was explained, and her nomination to this post intimated. It was also explicitly stated that no one would be admitted into any hospital as a nurse except she had a certificate signed by a medical authority, on Miss Nightingale's recommendation.

Just a week after her letter of October 14th to Mr. Herbert was written, Miss Nightingale was on her way to Constantinople, not at the head of half a dozen nurses sent out at the expense of a few benevolent ladies, but as a recognised official, under whose authority all female nurses in the military hospitals were placed, and on whose recommendation alone they were to be in future admitted.

For the few days which elapsed between Miss Nightingale's appointment and her departure for the East, Mr. Herbert's house in Belgrave Square became the headquarters of the expedition, and its rooms were given up to interviews and correspondence. The selection of the forty nurses who were to form the first party sent was deputed by Miss Nightingale to Miss Mary Stanley and Mrs.

Bracebridge. The material from which they had to choose was not altogether promising.

"Here we sit all day," wrote Miss Stanley. "I wish people who may hereafter complain of the women selected could have seen the set we had to choose from. All London was scoured for them. We sent emissaries in every direction to every likely place. . . . We felt ashamed to have in the house such women as came. One alone expressed a wish to go from a good motive. . . . Money was the only inducement."

Applications from all quarters were received and sifted. Hospitals and other charitable institutions were begged to give assistance to the Government in providing nurses of such character and experience as should ensure the success of the great experiment on which it had determined. Strange to say, not a few declined to afford this help,[1] and the first party which left London Bridge Station, on October 23rd, was finally composed of ten Roman Catholic nurses, eight Anglican sisters, six nurses from St. John's Home, and fourteen nurses from English hospitals. On the eve of their departure they were assembled in Mr. Herbert's dining-room, and addressed by him. No record remains of this speech, but to its effect there is abundant testimony. All started on their ways strengthened by his heart-stirring words, and cheered no less by the sunny brightness of his presence than by his kindly and unfailing sympathy.

[1] "We tried the sound Protestant Institution for Nurses in Devonshire Square first. They refused peremptorily to accept Government terms, *i.e.* to be Government servants for the time under Miss N.'s control. They would only go as dependent and subject to the Committee in Devonshire Square. This was a great disappointment to us. Next we tried St. John's Home, which is verging on Tractarianism, but considers itself very sound, not going into any extremes. Here also we met with a peremptory refusal, exactly for the same reason, but, after a battle, they surrendered, and sent out six, who are, at all events, respectable and well trained."

Sidney Herbert was confident as to the success of the scheme which he had originated, and he had reason to be so. Nevertheless, when Miss Nightingale and her party were well on their way, and the bolt sped beyond recall, it is impossible but that he should have experienced some anxiety as to the reception which this novel venture might meet with from the military and medical authorities at Constantinople and Scutari. The letters, therefore, which he received on November 16th, announcing the arrival of Miss Nightingale and her staff at Scutari on the 4th of that month, must have been opened with eagerness and perused with infinite relief.

A few lines from Miss Nightingale herself announced her arrival at her post in a deluge of rain that made Constantinople "look like a bad Daguerreotype washed out," and informed Mr. Herbert that, having arrived at the very moment when the wounded from the battle of Balaclava were being landed, she at once, without an instant's delay, found herself in active discharge of the duties of her beneficent mission.

A longer letter from Mr. Bracebridge, consisting of a series of fragmentary notes evidently jotted down at intervals, without method or order, vividly records the first impressions received, and consequently merits extensive quotation.

MR. BRACEBRIDGE TO MR. HERBERT.

"*November 8th.*

"We have one sitting-room with divans, where I and the courier sleep; a small room for Mrs. B. and Miss N. One room for thirteen nurses, one room for eight sisters, and one room for ten R.C. sisters.

"Bedsteads (iron) were bought at Marseilles. Mattresses are supplied from purveyors, so is meat, etc. We buy small things in the town.

"Great difficulty in buying anything in the trumpery shops at Galata.

"These quarters are closed by two doors, opening to the great corridor.

"We have been well received by the doctors and Commandant; the orders for us were received by the preceding mail.

"The men and officers in this, the Barrack Hospital, last night, were 1,730, and 650 in the General Hospital; 45 doctors, old and young.

"Five hundred have been buried; 400 are paraded for embarkation for the Krimea, and as many are passed by the Medical Board, and are to sail for Malta or England.

"The Barrack Hospital is a quadrangle of 500 by 200 paces inside, arcades and corridors all round within, glazed; and rooms behind them to the external walls. A huge kitchen and offices in the centre; the building three stories high in some places, two in others. The General Hospital is on the same plan, but much smaller.

"The great corridor, 450 yards long, and four rooms holding 27 each, have been filled with beds and men in double rows, leaving 4 feet to walk in the middle. This was done from 12 o'clock to 6 o'clock to-day. They were all well dressed and fed by 8 o'clock. Miss N. and all her staff assisted. The sisters washed and dressed the wounds.

"We had 400 shirts sent by Macdonald;[1] about 500 clean shirts were put on; half the men had only rags, or shirts saturated with blood.

"There was long waiting for bread and tea, and out came Mrs. Clarke with warm arrowroot, and another with chicken broth, and fed those who were faint with a spoon. At last enough lint came from the stores. The poor fellows are greatly pleased with their reception, and hardly one even groaned. The behaviour of sisters and nurses perfect, and especially the Catholic sisters, and the patients behaved very well to them.

"The beds reach to our door. We are in one angle of the great quadrangle.

"The doctors live four in a room, so great is the want of space.

[1] The agent of *The Times*.

"Dr. Cumming has given up his private kitchen to Miss N. for her nurses.

"She began yesterday, after a day's arrangement with Drs. Cumming, Menzies, and MacGregor. She went from ward to ward, with nine nurses, and after dressing 62 people after the surgeon, she placed them two and two along wards. To-day a number of bad cases are given to them. In several days they will all be distributed.

"Miss N. is decidedly well received.

"Menzies and Cumming are good but slow, MacGregor admirable. Many of the surgeons are very young.

"Senior chaplain a quiet, active man; the second not much less so.

"No Presbyterian chaplain. Soldiers for the most part respectful to them.

"I pass 200 sick in going to the chaplain's to dine; the legs and arms cut off after the Alma are all but healed. The wounded men all look cheerful and calm, but the fever and dysentery men are wan and lean. The place is clean and airy; few bad smells.

"Miss N. is organising a separate kitchen for her people to have charge of, making and giving delicacies, etc. No doubt many have been lost for want of nourishment, not being able to eat the food they get; they tire of boiled food cooked in great coppers, and the officers complain more than the men.

"There is great want of shirts, which we are getting supplied.

"The purveyor Wreford has done well to-day in procuring beds, blankets, etc.

"There are 120 men upstairs without shirts, and this want was not admitted. The fact is, the numbers have outgrown the staff.

"Menzies, though very good, is slow, and too cautious; repeated offers of linen, etc., were made and put aside.

"The arrival of Miss N. and her staff has put new life into the hospital.

"Sillery[1] writes day and night, and is most kind.

"Adams[2] tells me the Army must winter in the

[1] The Commandant.

[2] General Adams, in hospital badly wounded. He died a month later

Krimea, and must want warm clothing, which, with old linen, is *most acceptable here.*

"We have prayers at 8 by the chaplain. Sacrament next Sunday.

"Major Sillery has written last night to the Adjutant-General to offer a plan of making shedding across our quadrangle, on the French plan, wood and plaster, and tiles above, which he says would hold 1,500 or 2,000 troops, and clear the whole barracks for sick and wounded. He thinks it might cost £2,000, but it could not be built much before Christmas. This would be inside these walls, and no more staff required.

"The other barrack is not good, and 4½ miles off. As we stand, both Barrack Hospital and General Hospital will be full to-morrow night: I mean as full as convenient, allowing for the bad air from wounds.

"Our quarters are quite full with our 40.

"In case of sending out other nurses it is easy. Our expenses were by Marseilles £307, not including passages in the *Vectis.*

"Please let Dr. A. Smith know what I say commending the medical staff of the Barrack Hospital.

"Ever yours,

"C. BRACEBRIDGE."

The Royal Commission arrived in the Bosphorus on the same day as Miss Nightingale, and its head, Dr. Spence, went on at once to the Crimea, where he unfortunately lost his life in the great storm of November 13th.

He had only time to write one letter to Mr. Herbert whilst at Constantinople, in which, on November 5th, he said that he was—

"just returned from Scutari, perfectly delighted to find things so well managed."

The tenour of the reports brought by the next week's mail was equally satisfactory, both as to the cordiality with which Miss Nightingale and her party had been received, and as to the rapid improvement

which was being effected through her influence. One of her letters of November 14th commenced thus abruptly:

"'I came out, ma'am, prepared to submit to everything, to be put upon in every way. But there are *some* things, ma'am, one can't submit to. There is the caps, ma'am, that suits one face and some that suits another; and if I'd known, ma'am, about the caps, great as was my desire to come out to nurse at Scutari, I wouldn't have come, ma'am.'—*Speech of Mrs. L., Barrack Hospital, Scutari, Asiatic Side, November 14th*, 1854.

"Time must be at a discount with the man who can adjust the balance of such an important question as the above, and I for one have none, as you will easily suppose when I tell you that on Thursday last we had 1,715 sick and wounded in this hospital (among whom 120 cholera patients), and 650 severely wounded in the other building, called the General Hospital, of which we also have charge, when a message came to me to prepare for 510 wounded on our side of the hospital, who were arriving from the dreadful affair of November 5th, from Balaclava, in which battle were 1,763 wounded and 442 killed, besides 96 officers wounded and 38 killed. I always expected to end my days as a Hospital Matron, but I never expected to be Barrack Mistress. We had but half an hour's notice before they began landing the wounded. Between one and nine o'clock we had the mattresses stuffed, sewn up, laid down (alas! only upon matting on the floor), the men washed and put to bed, and all their wounds dressed.

"We are very lucky in our medical heads. Two of them are brutes and four are angels—for this is a work which makes either angels or devils of men, and of women too. As for the assistants, they are all cubs, and will, while a man is breathing his last breath under the knife, lament the 'annoyance of being called up from their dinners by such a fresh influx of wounded.' But unlicked cubs grow up into good old bears, though I don't know how; for certain it is, the old bears are good. We have now *four miles* of beds and not 18 inches apart.

"We have our quarters in one tower of the barracks, and all this fresh influx has been laid down between

us and the main guard, in two corridors, with a line of beds down each side, just room for one person to pass between, and four wards. Yet in the midst of this appalling horror (we are steeped up to our necks in blood) there is good—and I can truly say, like St. Peter, 'It is good for us to be here'—though I doubt whether, if St. Peter had been here, he would have said so."

Whatever distaste the Medical Staff may have felt to the invasion of the hospital by females, Miss Nightingale was received with much apparent and some real cordiality, both by them and by the civil and military authorities. Some lurking doubt may perhaps be detected in the oddly stilted language of Lord Stratford, who wrote to Mr. Herbert on November 5th, that the nurses were now "actually under the same roof with the gallant and suffering objects of their compassion," and that "notwithstanding the reluctance of the Faculty to admit nurses of the softer sex into the wards of the hospital, I cannot but hope that much additional comfort and relief may be derived by the sick and wounded from that attractive source." In the same letter, Lord Stratford assured Mr. Herbert that the Relief Fund raised by *The Times* was altogether superfluous, and that "as the subscribed money is rendered useless as to its intended object by the liberality of the Government and the philanthropy of Miss Nightingale," he wished "the subscribers would consent to apply the funds, which it would be so difficult to return, to the erection of an Anglican Church at Constantinople." Lord Stratford lived within a short distance of Scutari. His reputation for acuteness and sagacity equalled that which he possessed for energetic and masterful action. He had at his command a host of emissaries and informants. If with all these advantages he was pro-

foundly ignorant of the state of the hospitals, can it be wondered that Ministers, 3,000 miles off, became but gradually acquainted with the facts existing? On whose assurances were they to place reliance if not on those of the British Ambassador at Constantinople? No one had a greater command of materials on which to form a judgment. No one was in a better position to ascertain the truth, no one less biassed by professional feeling—military or medical—to overlook and condone what was amiss.

Lord Stratford was mistaken; but the quotations I have made from the letters of Miss Nightingale are sufficient to show that her language also was at the outset anything but that of complaint.

The Hon. and Rev. Sidney Godolphin Osborne, better known as *The Times* correspondent "S.G.O.," reached Scutari about the same time as Miss Nightingale, and he too wrote to Mr. Herbert as though very fairly satisfied with what he saw there.

THE HON. AND REV. S. G. OSBORNE TO MR. HERBERT.

"MISSOURIES HOTEL, SCUTARI.

"*November 15th.*

"MY DEAR HERBERT,

"I have now had near a week's opportunity of closely observing the details of the hospitals at Scutari. First, as to Miss Nightingale and her company, nothing can be said too strong in their praise; she works them wonderfully, and they are so useful that I have no hesitation in saying some twenty more of the same sort would be a very great blessing to the establishment. Her nerve is equal to her good sense; she, with one of her nurses and myself, gave efficient aid at an amputation of the thigh yesterday. She was just as cool as if she had had to do it herself. We are close allies, and through Macdonald and the funds at my own command, I get her everything for which she asks, and this is saying a great deal.

"My honest view of the matter is this: I found

but too great evidence of the *staff* and *means* being unequal to the emergency; the requirements have almost doubled through the last two unhappy actions at Balaclava. Still, day by day I see manifest improvement; no Government, no nation *could* have provided, on a sudden, staff and appliances for accident wards miles in length, and for such sickness as that horrid Varna dysentery. To manage more than 3,000 casualties of the worst nature is indeed a task to be met in an entirely satisfactory way by nothing short of a miraculous energy with the means it would require. The men are landed necessarily in a most pitiable state, and have to be carried up steep ground for considerable distance, either by those beasts of Turks, who are as stupid as callous, or by our invalids, who are not equal to the task. Still it is done, and as this is *war*, not peace, and Scutari is really a battle-field, I am more disposed to lament than to blame.

"There seems now, so far *as I can see*, no lack of lint and plaister; there is a lack of linen, we have sent home for it. The surgeons are working their utmost, and serious cases seem treated with great humanity and skill. There was and is an awful want of shirts for the men, and socks, and such matters; we have already let Miss Nightingale have all she applies for, and this morning I, with Macdonald's sanction, or rather in concert with him, have sent to the Crimea a large stock of shirts of warm serge, socks, flannel, tea, etc., etc. I spend the best part of every day there acting, at one time as priest to the dying, at another helping the surgeons or the men to dress their wounds; again, I go to the landing-place and try and work them into method for an hour or two, etc., etc. One and all are *now* most kind and civil to me, meet my wishes in every way they can. Alas! I fear, with every possible effort of the existing establishment, the crisis is still too great; there are wanted hundreds of beds—*i.e.* many hundreds have only matting between the beds and the stone floor. I slept here Sunday night, and walked the wards late and early in the morning; I fear the cold weather in these passages will produce, on men so crippled and so maimed, much supplementary evil in the way of coughs and chest diseases;

the wounded do better than the sick. I scarce pray with one of the latter one day but I hear he is dead on the morrow. That horrid Varna diarrhœa seems to baffle treatment; in a good warm hospital, with all our best help at home, we should, I fear, save few; very few here, I expect, will eventually survive it. I am glad to say the authorities have left off swearing they had everything and wanted nothing; they are now grateful for the help which, with the Fund at command, we liberally meet. The wounds are many of them of the most fearful character, and yet I have not heard a murmur, even from those who, from the pressing urgency of the case, are often left with most obvious grounds of complaint. Stafford O'Brien is here; he, at my suggestion, aids my son and self in letter writing for the poor creatures. My room is a post office; I pay the post of every letter from every hospital patient, and we write masses every day. They show one what the British soldier really is; I only wish to God the people of England, who regard the red coat as the mere guise of a roystering rake in the private, and a dandified exclusive in the officer, could see the patience, true modesty, and courageous endurance of all ranks.

"Understand me clearly. I could pick many a hole; I could show where head has been wanting, truth perverted, duty neglected, etc.; but I feel that the pressure was such and of so frightful, so severe (in one day) a character, there is such an effort at what we desire, that I for one cry out, of the past—'*Non mi ricordo*'; of the present—'if the cart is in the rut, there is every shoulder at the wheel.' The things wanted we cannot wait for you to supply in England; if the slaughter is to go on as it has done the last fortnight, the need must be met at once. Macdonald is doing his work most sensibly, steadily, and I believe not only with no offence to any, but is earning the good-will of all.

"I hope, yet, in a few days to see the cooking, the carrying of the wounded, the beds, etc., improve as other matters have. I stick to my promise—you shall have my honest opinion as 'a friend.' I will not—it is not needed I should—give it to the public as S.G.O. I can have no objection to your showing this to Lord Clarendon or the Duke of Newcastle. If

more nurses come, send a good *chef* with them as Lieutenant-Colonel to the Nightingale.

"Yours ever,

"S. G. OSBORNE."

The reports received from observers so keen and so little inclined to indulgence as Miss Nightingale and Mr. Osborne were therefore in the first instance by no means such as to lead the Government at home to suppose that the complaints made public in *The Times* were otherwise than highly exaggerated, or that the administrative staff was otherwise than efficient. Of the Purveying Department, indeed, Miss Nightingale had very soon reason to complain. Its failure to provide adequately for the wants of the hospital was only too apparent. But she was not in the first instance inclined to censure the military or the medical authorities in charge of the hospital. On the contrary, "the fault," she wrote emphatically, on November 25th, is "*not* with the medical officers, but in the separation of the department which affords every necessary supply to them except medicines," and in the insufficient numbers and timidity of the officers of the Purveying Department. "Their habits and honour," she wrote, "fix their attention upon the correctness of their book-keeping as the primary object of life."

The skill with which, without adopting as accurate every assertion of his correspondents, reforms were urged by Sidney Herbert, will be best shown by a selection from his own letters.

MR. HERBERT TO DR. CUMMING.

"W. O., *November 23rd*, 1854.

"DEAR SIR,

"I have seen to-day several letters describing the state of the hospitals at Scutari. It is incom-

prehensible to me how the warning of the events immediately after the battle of Alma has not had more effect. The Government have sent out stores of all kinds. Fearing that some might have miscarried, plenary authority was sent out to Lord Stratford to spend any money to procure at any cost what was requisite, and I understand that no requisition has been made to him for anything, though the patients are without shirts and in some instances without sheets. The medical officers at Scutari have made no requisitions home. There is a kitchen without cooking apparatus. Surely the want of a cooking apparatus must have been foreseen. Stoves are being sent out from here to arrive a month hence. Surely in Constantinople some braziers or some mode of heating might have been procured.

"The hospital is now full to overflowing. It is possible, I understand, to erect, adjoining to the buildings, sheds to receive the convalescents, to leave more room for the wounded and sick. The Principal Medical Officer has full power to apply to Lord Stratford, who would instantly order the sheds to be built. A part of the barracks is not yet ceded by the Turkish General; no application is made for it. It seems as if every one, Commandant, doctors, and all, were stricken with helplessness, and our poor men are the victims of their want of method and of energy.

"All agree that the medical men are indefatigable, devoted to their work, humane, and most efficient in their vocation; but it is organisation that is wanted. Stores are sent, but cannot be found, or if found are not used, because no one knows whose business it is to open them. I earnestly hope that now that you are arrived you will introduce order and method. You have full power. If you want more orderlies and cannot get them, hire men from Constantinople, but let it be done.

"Let all offers of supplies be accepted if they are wanted; the first thing is that the sick should not want. I trust to your energy to get method and order introduced; as things are being now conducted we are disgraced and our men suffer."

MR. HERBERT TO DR. SMITH (DIRECTOR-GENERAL).

"BELGRAVE SQUARE,
"*November 23rd*, 1854.

"DEAR DR. SMITH,

"We have a budget of letters from Scutari from Mr. Bracebridge, Mr. Osborne, and Miss Nightingale. Mr. Bracebridge speaks very highly of Dr. Cumming. He says things are decidedly mending; that they have derived a great deal of assistance from *The Times* Fund in shirts and other things; that the Service medical men are indefatigable; the dressers some of them unlicked cubs. Miss Nightingale speaks very well of Dr. Menzies—zealous and humane, but wanting energy to keep the young ones to their work. Of Dr. Macgregor she speaks in unmeasured terms of praise. Miss Nightingale has got in some persons to cook, so that they now can prepare comforts in addition to the Government ration. But they were without soap, towels, scrubbing brooms, etc. They have succeeded in getting some, and are getting the patients clean and more comfortable. She says the men behave admirably, never a murmur heard, and, she adds, never a word which a lady ought not to hear.

"Now for the future. You have ordered 60,000 shirts. You have seen the requisition of this morning, which must of course be sent out by the *Army and Navy*, and by the second ship, which I hope Mr. Howell will get for you. But they are out of linen, so much is used for slings and different things, and large quantities of soap will be required. You will be the best judge how much should go, but I apprehend that in a hospital with 3,100 people in it, and more expected, a considerable number of pounds must be consumed daily. You had better send a very large quantity, also towels.

"Mrs. Herbert has received a present of some of Cropley's soap for dressing wounds (Old Montagu Street, Whitechapel), which she sends to Miss Nightingale.

"The French surgeons say we should have more iron spring beds. I think you sent 2,000; but they are very preferable to mere mattresses in cases where men cannot leave their beds or change their attitudes.

Can you send any more? Have you any more water cushions to send? They are very useful, and you can hardly send more comfort in a small space. 'Emigrants' kitchens,' from *Benham's, in Wigmore Street*, are much wanted to cook small matters in different parts of the building, and for offices. The small size is said to be the best.

"Lastly, with the prospect of more sickness and more battles, we must use every exertion to procure and send out more doctors. If you can do it, you must somehow contrive to extend the age, for the young ones are generally ill-conditioned and untrustworthy. I am not sure that those men who are only engaged temporarily ought not to be better paid than men who have the advantages of a profession secured to them.

"I am clear that Miss Nightingale is succeeding and is of great use in the hospital. I suspect that there has been a soreness which induced refusals of offers of gifts and assistance, but that it is wearing off now, and that every one is heartily engaged in his work, instead of thinking of what people say of him. The testimony to the excellence and the zeal of the greater portion of the medical staff is unanimous.

"In short, I think they have turned the corner there, but we must take care to keep them amply supplied from here with every necessary and every comfort which we can get. The consumption of everything must be enormous. When the wounded are in thousands there is no such a thing possible as over-supply.

"One of the reasons, I am told, that the French hospitals appear so well provided is that they accept gifts wherever they can get them, and shirts, lint, and a hundred other things are sent by ladies and others.

"I have written a very long letter, but I am anxious that your next two steamers should place you well ahead of the demand."

On November 28th another batch of letters from Scutari was received by Mr. Herbert of a very similar character to those of the previous week.

Greatly relieved, and satisfied that Miss Nightingale had established her position and proved that the employment of females in military hospitals was both practicable and useful, he authorised the departure

of a second party of nurses, of whom Miss M. Stanley undertook to take charge on the voyage out, it being her intention to return to England herself immediately after handing them over to Miss Nightingale.

The agreement with Miss Nightingale, that no nurse was to enter the hospital except on her recommendation, was aimed at the exclusion of troublesome outsiders, and was not regarded by Mr. Herbert as prohibiting the War Office itself from raising the numbers of the nursing staff.

All accounts showed that the number of patients in the hospitals was increasing with frightful rapidity, and if forty nurses were required for 1,500 sick, eighty did not seem too many for twice that number.

The intention thus to enlarge the nursing staff was intimated to Dr. Cumming by Mr. Herbert, who wrote that he had—

"received by yesterday's mail a very improved account of the hospitals at Scutari. I have seen a letter from Miss Nightingale speaking in high terms of the medical men. Indeed all do justice to their exertions. But they had a task put on them beyond any strength, and the confusion of the transport service at a moment of great pressure no doubt added much to their difficulties by leaving them without any certainty of regular supplies.

"Between commandant and transport service, commissariat, purveyor, etc., I suspect there is much unnecessary official form. All this, however, you will have to go into, and I hope set right.

"The authorities of the hospital have been attacked without consideration for their difficulties, and have no doubt been inclined to refuse assistance, thinking its offer conveyed an imputation. The French, I am told, are wiser, and accept for their hospitals everything which is offered to them. The first object should be to make the hospital as good and the people in it as comfortable as it is possible to do. That is the only real answer to unfounded attacks, and it is sure to extinguish them at last.

"I am full of hope now for the future. We send

out another batch of nurses (46) from Marseilles on the 6th. This will complete Miss Nightingale's staff to the full strength, I suppose, which she can manage. I hope she will be successful. I am very glad to hear that the medical authorities have received her so well. You will, I think, have seen enough of her now to know that she is thoroughly equal to her task.

"Pray recollect in your demands upon us here, whether for more men, more comforts, or more necessaries, that there is no question of pounds, shillings, and pence in such matters, but that whatever can be got *must* be got."

And on the same day he made a further effort to prevent efficiency being strangled by routine, writing to Mr. Wreford that he hoped he would not use the additional clerks sent him "in multiplying correspondence between the different departments in the hospital. This is not a moment for sticking at forms, but for facilitating the rapid and easy transaction of business. There is much mischief done to the public service by the stickling for precedence and dignity between departments."

Ten days later he thus addressed the Commandant of the Hospital, and the Purveyor-in-Chief:

MR. HERBERT TO MAJOR SILLERY.

"WAR OFFICE, *December 11th*, 1854.

"DEAR SIR,

"I have been for some time, in consequence of letters which I have seen, and reports which I have received, very anxious and very much dissatisfied as to the state of the hospital at Scutari. I believe that every effort has been made by the medical men, and I hear that you have been indefatigable in the conduct of the immediate business of your department. But there has been evidently a want of co-operation between departments, and a fear of responsibility or a timidity arising from an entire misconception of the wishes of the Government. No expense has been spared at home, and immense stores are sent out, but they are not forthcoming. Some are at Varna,

and for some inexplicable reason, they are not brought down to Scutari. When stores are in the hospital, they are not issued without forms so cumbrous as to make the issue unavailing through delay. The Purveyor's staff is said to be insufficient. The Commissariat staff is said to be insufficient, your own staff is said to be insufficient. The interpreters are insufficient. More store room is wanted. Temporary buildings are wanted. The object of the Government is, that the hospital should be made thoroughly sufficient for its purposes—that every comfort should be given to the sick. We authorised Lord Stratford to incur and sanction any expense to procure what is necessary, but nothing is asked of him. If things are wanted they must be got. You are away from England and a letter takes a month to get an answer. No reference home, therefore, is possible when time presses. If the stores are at Varna, and you can get others at Constantinople, they must be got. If you want more interpreters, you should get them—we cannot find them here, but you can find them at Constantinople. As Commandant of the hospital, it is your duty to see that no department in it is wanting. There is a story going abroad here, which, however, can scarcely be true, that the fourth side of the barrack square is wanted, but that the Turks have not been asked for it, or told that we must have it, or another; that sheds and store-rooms were about to be built, but were counter-ordered by you because the Turks will not pay for them. I do not care whether the Turks pay or not, provided it is done. The hospital is crowded in a manner dangerous to health. Temporary buildings should immediately be run up—Lord Stratford has full powers to advance any sum of money required.

"The object you should have in view is to create perfect efficiency—checking expenditure is a secondary consideration. No cost can be put for one moment in competition with the comfort and safety of the sick and wounded.

"I trust therefore you will not only act upon this yourself, but enforce the same energy upon others. If your staff is insufficient and you can augment it on the spot, do so and report it. I shall approve of your proceeding.

"If other departments require strengthening, and you are satisfied of it, and can get the additional strength on the spot, do so; but above all be ready for a fresh influx of wounded. If buildings are wanted, lose no time in applying to Lord Stratford. If sheds are wanted or store-rooms, let them be at once constructed. If the landing-place or pier wants repair or extension, let it be done. Let everything be efficient. I apprehend that Constantinople is deficient neither in wood nor carpenters, and that sheds, bed tressles, and anything of that description, can be got there without difficulty.

"I hear that Miss Nightingale has started a washing establishment outside the hospital. I am very glad to hear it. The expenses of course will be provided by the Government.

"I can only again urge, in conclusion, that every effort may be made, every necessary expenditure incurred, and every co-operation between departments insisted upon, in order that the hospital shall afford to all the sick or wounded that may be sent to it every accommodation and comfort which can be procured for them.

"Believe me, very truly yours,
"SIDNEY HERBERT."

MR. HERBERT TO MR. WREFORD.

"WAR OFFICE, *December 11th*, 1854.

"DEAR SIR,

"I hope that efforts are being made to get Scutari into a proper state. I want to have you prepared with room, accommodation, and stores for a fresh influx of sick and wounded from the Crimea, which may arrive at any moment. Have additional beds been procured? (I understand they can be made up at Constantinople in any number.) Are additional sheds and store-rooms preparing? Have you devised short and expeditious forms for issuing stores? All these I apprehend are wanted, but you must understand that we here at home cannot know or judge of what is wanted. You are on the spot, and the medical authorities, under whose orders you are placed, and yourself, must co-operate to devise the best way of meeting difficulty and deficiencies. Recollect that your

business is to promote efficiency. No cost can be put in competition with the safety and comfort of the sick. Lord Stratford has an unlimited power as to money, and the authorities of the hospital have an unlimited authority to procure all that is necessary. If additional buildings are wanted,—and they must be wanted—let them be run up at once. Constantinople is a wooden city—there can be no difficulty in getting carpenters or timber."[1]

In writing to Mr. Bracebridge, Mr. Herbert told him of the stringent orders he had given to the Commandant and Purveyor, but added that he had "small hopes of these men. I have been writing in this sense before, and in vain; but I trust there is some improvement. They are so saturated with the cheese-paring economy of forty years' peace, that there is no getting them to act up to a great occasion."

MR. HERBERT TO LORD RAGLAN.

"*December 11th*, 1854.

"MY DEAR LORD FITZROY,

"I am sorry to say that though accounts improve, yet the state of the hospitals at Scutari is far from satisfactory. Every one agrees that the medical men are admirable and their exertions above all praise, but the hospital is victimised, partly by the want of ready co-operation between departments, the irregularity of the transport service, which lets goods go backwards and forwards between Scutari and Balaklava without being unpacked at either place, and the timidity of the authorities in the hospital, who seem to avoid or fear any responsibility. . . . I have written to blow up Mr. Wreford the Purveyor, and the Commandant likewise, for not acting energetically in these things."

Though Mr. Herbert wrote in strong terms, he wrote apparently in vain. It seemed quite impossible to persuade the older members of the Commissariat

[1] Mr. Herbert was blamed by the Roebuck Committee for not transmitting these instructions through the proper official channel, Lord Raglan—then at Sebastopol!

and Purveying Departments, and almost impossible to persuade the junior ones, that saving money and leaving things undone were not their chiefest duties. They could barely credit the assurance that the Home Government would sanction what they had been taught to regard as culpable extravagance. On Christmas Day, Miss Nightingale wrote:

"Messrs. Wreford and Ward and Reade, veterans of the Spanish War, come to me for a moment's solace, trembling under responsibility and afraid of informality. On the last occasion Wreford said, when I read him parts of your letter to me of the 4th, 'This is the first time I have had it *in writing* that I was not to spare expense. I never knew that I might not be thrown overboard.'"

A few days before she had written:

"*Your* name is also continually used as a bugbear; they make a deity of cheapness, and the Secretary at War stands as synonymous here with Jupiter Tonans whose shafts end only in *brutum fulmen*. The cheeseparing system which sounds unmusical in British ears is here identified with you by the officers who carry it out. It is in vain to tell the purveyors they will get no κῦδος by this at home."

Miss Nightingale, though hotly indignant at the supineness and timidity of the Purveying Department, was, however, too clear-sighted not to perceive that they had real difficulties to encounter.

"English people," she wrote, "look on Scutari as a place with inns and hackney coaches and houses to let furnished. It required yesterday to land 25 casks of sugar, four oxen and three men for six hours, plus two requisitions, two passes, Mr. Bracebridge's two interferences, and one apology from a quartermaster for seizing the araba, received with a kind word and smile because he only did his duty. For every araba is required on military store or commissariat duty. There are no packhorses and no asses except those used by the

peasantry to attend the market 1¼ miles off. An araba consists of loose poles and planks extended between two axle trees placed on four small wheels and drawn by a yoke of weak oxen. There is not a Turkish house which is not in a fragmentary state, roof and windows pervious in all directions; there is not a room in one's quarters which does not let in the rain in showers whenever the weather is bad. We can only buy food through the Commissary, and are sometimes without food or charcoal."

In spite of all difficulties, Miss Nightingale's indomitable energy, organising capacity, and strong will effected wonders where the Purveying Department had effected nothing.

Mr. Herbert's suggestion that a General Officer should be appointed to the command at Scutari had been anticipated by Lord Raglan, who had already sent down Lord William Paulet from the Crimea to undertake that duty. To him Mr. Herbert wrote as follows:

"WAR OFFICE, *December 15th*, 1854.

"MY DEAR LORD WILLIAM,

"I am very glad to see that you are gone down to look into the state of affairs at Constantinople. You will find plenty to do, and I hope you will give a good deal of attention to the state of the hospital at Scutari. It has been a source of constant anxiety here, and though there has been much misrepresentation and exaggeration, it is impossible to deny that there has been much ground for complaint, though I believe great efforts have been made and great improvements of late.

"I believe the medical officers have been unremitting in their exertions, but there is a want of organisation and of co-operation between the departments engaged, especially, I suspect, between the transport service, the purveyors, and the medical authorities. We have sent out stores in volumes. But the bulk of them are at Varna when they are wanted at Scutari, and when they are at Scutari, what with forms and corre-

spondence, they are not produced and issued with the rapidity which is necessary in cases of emergency, which all cases nearly are. The purveyors seem to consider themselves a separate department from the medical, and do not act as they ought to do under the authority of the medical officers. The hospital is much crowded. I do not know whether the Turks have given up the fourth side of the barracks; they ought to be made to do so if they have not, and sheds or storehouses should be run up of wood. The Commandant, Major Sillery, is an excellent man, and indefatigable at his work, but he is probably timid, and will not authorise expenditure, however necessary; though he has only to ask Lord Stratford, who would sanction any expense. Again, the landing-place at Scutari is falling into ruins and ought to be repaired, but it has not been done. A better corps of bearers to carry the wounded up to the hospital is necessary, and a more liberal arrangement on the part of Admiral Boxer as to boats for landing there.

"What with engineers' departments, one thing and another, none of these things are done."

In these letters almost every point mentioned by Miss Nightingale and others, in private correspondence, is taken up, and whilst it was not assumed that every complaint made was justified, directions were given the effect of which would be to prevent the recurrence of such shortcomings if they had occurred.

The difficulty which attended the formation of a right judgment as to the actual state of things at Scutari can only be judged from a perusal of the letters addressed to Mr. Herbert from different sources equally entitled to credit, but containing reports which it was not easy to reconcile. Of these some have been already quoted.

Dr. Cumming, one of the Commissioners, and who succeeded Dr. Menzies as medical head of Scutari hospital, wrote thus to Mr. Herbert in a letter received just before Christmas:

"I think I may confidently state that great improvements have taken place here during the last month, and that many of considerable magnitude and requiring some time for completion are still going on, but no one but those on the spot, and whose duty it is to cope with them, can have anything like a correct estimate of the difficulties which attend the endeavour to make the most necessary arrangements or obtain the simplest supplies. Wood is a difficulty, charcoal is a difficulty, and washing, as yet, almost an insuperable one—and so of many more wants.

"I can assure you that there is not now a single man who has not a comfortable bed to lie on, with an ample supply of blankets and sheets; but I may remark that many soldiers have an objection to sheets, and even in hospitals at home there is often a difficulty in enforcing their use, so that persons passing along these corridors and unacquainted with this fact might suppose some of the beds were without them.

. . . . . .

"I have lived for the last four weeks in the worst part of this hospital, and although I admit that things still require amelioration, I must at the same time say, when the improvements I have alluded to are completed, there will be little else to desire. I am inclined to think that more has been done by the Medical Department than, under ordinary circumstances, could be expected from it; and no effort, as it appears to me, but by the Medical Department, has been made to procure the common necessaries for the men or ensure them a sufficiency of clothing on discharge from hospital."

. . . . . .

After less than a month's stay at Scutari, Miss Nightingale was able to report that "the supervision and stirring up of the whole machinery, generally with the full concurrence of the chief medical authorities, and the practical proof which our presence has given that Government were determined to know all they could, and do all they could" had worked wonders; that wards for 800 wounded had been repaired which

would otherwise have been left uninhabitable; that a kitchen for extra diet was in full action, with regular extra diet tables sent in by the ward surgeons; that a great deal more cleaning of wards took place, and that mops, scrubbing-brushes, brooms, and combs were given out by her when not "forced" from the purveyor; that 2,000 shirts, cotton and flannel, had been given out, and washing organised and already carried on for a week; that a lying-in hospital had been begun, and widows and soldiers' wives attended to; and that a great amount of daily dressings and attention to compound fractures were undertaken by the most competent of the nurses. But a tone of dissatisfaction and irritation showed itself conspicuously in what she wrote. She denounced Lady Stratford as useless and obstructive; declared the whole of her own staff of nurses to be incapable and useless, "except at the most eighteen" (a number which she in her next sentence reduced to *five*), to whom alone the results already obtained were to be attributed.

On the receipt of this mail, Mr. Herbert wrote to the Director-General as follows:

MR. HERBERT TO DR. SMITH.

"*December 24th*, 1854.

"DEAR DR. SMITH,

"There are several matters which require immediate consideration.

"1st. Have you yet provided yourself with, or have you in your eye, any person who would be a fit successor to your late Assistant Dr. Spence? In the present state of business and the immense pressure produced by the war in every branch of the department, it is very unadvisable to allow a place so important to remain unfilled a moment longer than is indispensable for the inquiries necessary to ensure a good appointment. In all departments in which promotion in appointments goes by selection and not by seniority,

the choice is watched with much jealousy as well as vigilance, and it is most important that the selection you make for your Assistant should be one which would stand criticism and be, on public grounds, the best that can be made. Pray think of this.

"2nd. I had a long letter yesterday from General Estcourt. He says that the two-wheeled ambulance carts sway about and are liable to upset on rough ground, and are therefore, he thinks, inferior to your four-wheeled ones, but all are useless now that the roads are become impassable, and they are borrowing French mules and panniers to carry the sick down to Balaclava. He wants similar pads and panniers sent out immediately. I do not know if you have the model here, but I have written to the Duke of Newcastle and asked him to apply to the French Government to let us have a supply if they are in stock, we undertaking to replace them, and also to send us a model.

"I will show you General Estcourt's letter when I return, also one from Dr. Cumming and one from Mr. Maxwell. It is clear that Scutari is fast getting into order, but they are full, and we must organise another hospital as soon as we can. Before, however, I go to this, I would say that all the authorities concur as to the entire failure of the system of hospital orderlies. All press for the substitution of a permanent establishment devoted to this work, and to this only. I think we should lose no time in creating such an establishment, and should immediately look out for persons who would undertake the duties of ward-masters, orderlies, etc. There is no necessity for their now being soldiers any more than there is for the purveyors and the commissariat being soldiers. Will you consider what rates of pay ought to be given, and how men should be procured? I have asked Mr. Hawes to try the mercantile houses for purveyors' clerks, issuers, etc. Cooks must also be sent out.

"3rd. I come back now to the question of additional hospital accommodation. Lord Raglan has now upwards of 10,000 sick between Sevastopol and the Bosphorus. The number is rapidly augmenting. The Duke of Newcastle writes about Smyrna, but that would only relieve us by withdrawing the convalescents from Scutari, but not on a scale which would meet the requirements of another battle or an assault,

nor even of the cholera and dysentery now prevailing. Another barrack was given up to us by the Turks at a place called Kullali, five miles up the Bosphorus, and this, if suitable, ought to be converted into an hospital as soon as possible, and medical men, purveyors, stores of all kinds, sent to it from Scutari, unless we can provide them from elsewhere. Have you any good purveyors' clerks who could be promoted to this affair? If not, we must get some one well recommended from some of our great mercantile houses.

"4th. I come now to the last question which is raised by Lord Blantyre's letter. He, though a soldier, is not, I think, aware of the extent to which the hierarchy of the medical profession in the Army would be disturbed by his proposal if fully carried out; but we may ultimately be reduced to have hospitals managed by civilians, just as we have sometimes depôts and even regiments attended by civilians. It is, however, undeniable that the evil of which he complains exists. We are filling our hospitals, '*ex necessitate rei*,' with very young assistant surgeons, and this proposed shortening of the course for the avowed purpose of giving us a quicker supply is an admission—first, that we have drained the class who will accept the acting assistant surgeons' places; and, secondly, that we are going to admit men at a younger age, and with a slender, and therefore a less complete education than we think it right to require in time of peace, when the service to be performed is far less important. There will soon be an outcry on this subject, which I should not mind if it were unfounded, but it will be a just one.

"Ten or eleven thousand sick, out of whom some three or four thousand are wounded, require and exhaust not only all the medical ability of our Army, but of the medical profession generally, and we must get the best advice and skill which can be got—so long as it is to be got. Clearly we do not do that if we exclude from our ranks all but those who are young enough or needy enough to accept an acting assistant surgeon's commission. I revert, then, to the opinion I have formerly expressed to you, that we must carry the introduction of civilians with acting commissions one step higher and take in acting surgeons. I do not see how it need interfere with the prospects of the assistant surgeons, who would still have

the promotion to surgeoncies as before, as the civilians would always continue *acting*. An acting assistant surgeon might be promoted to be an acting surgeon, and you might even promote him to be an acting deputy inspector. When the war ceases, the whole of the acting medical establishment would disappear, and you would not be burdened with a long list of men whom it would be impossible to employ. We are complaining of men standing on forms and departmental dignities, but do not let us set the example of doing the same thing; when great emergencies arise, routine should give way and vigorous measures be adopted, whether precedents exist or not. I should propose to recall on full pay men now on half pay, if there was anything to be gained by it; but I do not suppose there is, as the men are probably too old, and if one man who is too old overlooks another who is too young, they will not make a good operation between them. If you do not have recourse to acting commissions in a higher grade than assistant surgeons, we shall have our hospitals deluged with inexperienced boys. The great number of cases are not surgical, but medical, and can be as well treated by a civilian with an acting commission as an army surgeon—sometimes better; but with mere lads many precious lives will be sacrificed while they are learning their business. These acting commissions must, of course, be confined to General hospitals.

"It would be quite possible so to distribute the acting surgeons that none but acting assistants should be under them; but once it is understood that they are not interfering with the promotion of the assistants, the difficulties would, I think, soon disappear.

"I return to town on Tuesday. In the meanwhile pray think over the question of a hospital corps and the acting commission."

On the same day Mr. Herbert wrote again to Lord Raglan.

MR. HERBERT TO LORD RAGLAN.

"*December 24th*, 1854.

"I am glad to say we continue to get much better accounts from Scutari, where all is improving, although

there has been a most disgraceful want of co-operation between departments, and a great want of energy, I suspect, at the head. No one would take any responsibility. I hope you will keep Lord W. Paulet there, for I should think he would do his work well, and overrule all the petty difficulties and formalities which seem to have been too much for poor Sillery. I have written to him to get increased accommodation for your sick and wounded, and not to let the Turkish Government do, or rather undertake to do, anything which we can do for ourselves. We can afford to repair or to build all we want if the thing can only be done. I am afraid the hospital arrangements at Balaclava will have to go through the same process as at Scutari. I hear that the Commissioner of *The Times*' Fund was told in answer to his offer of assistance that 'nothing was wanted.' At Scutari they acted more wisely, and derived great benefit from his assistance in shirts, sheets, and many other things. The French, I am told, accept everything which is offered them, and so make their hospital far more comfortable than it would otherwise be. Mr. Stafford writes that they refused him admittance at Balaclava Hospital, and added that he did not wonder at it, for what he had seen at a previous visit was enough to account for the wish to conceal the state of things. He describes the sick as lying in the field hospital on the wet ground without even beds—at least, so I hear, for I have not seen his letter. I suppose this arises from the impossibility, in the absence of roads, of carrying beds up to the camp; but beds and bed tressels cannot be wanted, since any number can be made, I am told, at Constantinople. I cannot help feeling that Dr. Hall resents offers of assistance as being slurs on his preparations. The exaggerated attacks of *The Times* make him take refuge in secrecy, instead of meeting them by exertions to remedy deficiencies which must exist under the circumstances, and which are, therefore, no discredit if everything is done to repair them.

"I hope you have got a good supply of timber for huts from Constantinople. I should have thought you could get any amount in that wooden town, and carpenters, too, to cut it up and put it together. I see Lord Westmorland has sent you some huts, and a portion of ours I hope are with you by this

time. The last are, I believe, being embarked. The steamers detained them, for steamers cannot be got here for love or money. I hope your road will be made in time to bring them up, as also the clothing, which I hope is constantly arriving.

"We have better accounts from Scutari, and William Paulet is doing great good. The stupidity between departments there and the want of energy in getting things done was really beyond belief. I have had some instances reported to me which are enough to provoke the patience of a saint. Miss Nightingale luckily got some matters put straight, and I hear that Lord William has set to work to get several omissions and deficiencies rectified, and I have no doubt that all will now work well and smoothly. I make Dr. Smith continue to get surgeons wherever he can and send them out. We have twelve now ready, and shall have, I hope, a good many more in January. The last forty went by Marseilles, which the others will do likewise, as it saves much time."

I have mentioned on a previous page that, satisfied that the value of the nurses' services was proved, and fully recognised by the military and medical authorities, Mr. Herbert, in view of the greatly increased and increasing number of patients at Scutari, and acting, as he thought, on wishes implied in the letters he had received, despatched a second party of nurses to attend upon the sick and wounded there. No misgivings as to their welcome crossed his mind. Great, therefore, was his dismay when the mail, arriving on December 24th, revealed to him that the step which he had taken, as he supposed in accordance with Miss Nightingale's wishes, only incurred her most vigorous denunciation. She wrote to Mr. Herbert that he had sacrificed the cause so near her heart, that he had sacrificed her, and had sacrificed his own written word to a popular cry, that conditions were imposed on her which rendered the object for which she was employed unattainable, that the quartering of the

new arrivals was a physical impossibility, their employment a moral impossibility, and that "of course these unoccupied women would go to the devil."

Miss Stanley and her companions did not "go to the devil." On the contrary, they did angels' service both at Kullali and in the Crimea—of which more hereafter. Meanwhile, Miss Nightingale sent home her resignation, and announced that she only remained at Scutari until superseded.

At the present day we have seen a staff of over eight hundred female nurses maintained by Government for service with the Army in South Africa. To this generation, Miss Nightingale's objections seem altogether unreasonable, if not indeed well nigh unintelligible. But though expressed with needless vehemence, her apprehensions were not, as things then were, altogether groundless. She was conducting the initial stages of a great experiment, and was sensitively alive to all that might interfere with its success or affect the permanence of its results. She knew that the intrusion of female nursing into military hospitals was looked on with an unfavourable eye in many quarters, and that any indiscretion or serious mistake would be hailed with pleasure as a ground for attack, which might be made an excuse for the discontinuance of their services. This explains her great reluctance to employ a larger number of nurses at Constantinople than she could herself personally supervise, and her strenuous objection, which it is now hard to credit, to the employment of *any* female nurses whatever in the Crimea itself.

Mr. Herbert was both surprised and disappointed by the vehemence of Miss Nightingale's protest. Many men would have taken offence at its terms; most men would have urged in their own defence

the reasons which had prompted and justified their action. The course pursued by Mr. Herbert showed in a striking manner the true nobility of his character. Without argument, or the least display of temper, he at once admitted that in appointing additional nurses and sending them to the East, without previous consultation with Miss Nightingale, he had, technically at all events, failed to observe the terms of the agreement with her. He apologised for so doing, he refused to entertain any idea of her resignation, and he authorised her to send back at once to England the whole of the nurses who had gone out with Miss Stanley. It is possible that he may have foreseen that, when armed with this power, she would hesitate to incur the responsibility of using it. If so, he was right; for when a few days' reflection had cooled down her first impetuosity, Miss Nightingale herself pronounced it to be "a moral impossibility" to send away all the new arrivals. Sidney Herbert kept no copy of his letter, and I have been unable to obtain sight of the original. Those who have seen it describe it as couched in terms of such courtesy and kindliness as cannot have failed to excite some compunction in the mind of its recipient for the unmeasured invective of the letter to which it was a reply.

Meanwhile, Miss Stanley and her party were pursuing their way eastward, unconscious of the reception in store for them. They reached Constantinople on December 18th and were puzzled at being met on arrival by an order directing them to take up their abode, not at Scutari, but in an unfurnished house at Therapia.

Two days later Miss Stanley wrote to Mrs. Herbert as follows:

"Probably you know more of why we are here (Therapia) and not at Scutari than I do, for the press

of work to be done the evening we anchored in the Golden Horn was so great, there was no time to ask what did not concern our immediate movement. We *were* to come here—and it was for me to give my mind to this fact—and not to *why* we were to come.

"It was not till we were on our way up here that I heard anything, and then I could only collect vague rumours. Poor Mr. Bracebridge himself was evidently much in the dark as to details. 'The ladies do not tell me these things.'

"Of course I felt if we had been very welcome, and that all was smooth, we should have gone at once to our destination. As it was, I felt it a great relief not to be responsible for our position, and that our duty was quite clear—*i.e.* to make the best use we could of the rest we should now get, and to manage as well as we could.

"I was agreeably surprised to find that in two hours Pera could furnish the necessaries of life for thirty-two women, and that in two hours from our arrival in this unfurnished house every one had their beds up.

"I have done my utmost to keep down the expenses, consistent with giving satisfaction to the women.

"The first night there was great dissatisfaction among them, and a strong inclination to strike work. 'We are not come out to be cooks, housemaids, and washerwomen,' and they dwelt considerably on Mr. Herbert's words about equality.

"They are very like troublesome children. I think when they saw the ten ladies spending the evening in making the sheets for those who were doing household work or were sick, they were softened. The next morning I drew out a plan of work, and I spoke to them after prayers, urging mutual forbearance one to another. Since then I have heard no more complaints—all is restored to harmony."

Three days later, Miss Stanley went down to Scutari to see Miss Nightingale, of which visit she gives the following account:

"BARRACK HOSPITAL, *December 21st.*

'I came down in the steamer with Dr. Meyer, running in close along shore, and calling at every village. Summer must make a great difference; as

it is, there is great sameness—the hills are low, the villages all alike, down to the water's edge; picturesque overhanging houses, always a minaret in each village, and a cypress grove in burying-ground.

"The buildings increased in size and splendour as we neared the Golden Horn. What a curious sight watching the passers over the bridge of boats—Greeks, Turks, English! Here we hired a caique in which we crossed—rather a swell. The view of the hospital as you draw near is very fine.

"There was a heavy surf; no sick could have been landed to-day. It is a very steep pull up to the hospital, along a paved road. It was with no ordinary feelings that one looked at that pier and walked up that hill, the two places of which one had heard so much—the scenes of such intense suffering.

"It was when I turned round and looked back that I saw what Constantinople was; the grandeur, the situation, the foreground of cypresses; the whole, in short. We entered the door; we turned up the stone stairs; on the second floor we came to the corridors of sick, on low wooden stands, raised about a foot from the floor, placed about 2 feet apart, and leaving 2 or 3 feet down the middle, along which we walked. I saw nothing very bad. The atmosphere worsened as we advanced. We passed down two or three of these immense corridors, asking our way as we went. At last we came to the guard-room, another corridor, then through a door into a large busy kitchen, where stood Mrs. Margaret Williams, who seemed much pleased to see me: then a heavy curtain was raised; I went through a door, and there sat dear Flo writing on a small unpainted deal table. I never saw her looking better. She had on her black merino, trimmed with black velvet, clean linen collar and cuffs, apron, white cap with a black handkerchief tied over it; and there was Mrs. Bracebridge, looking so nice, too. I was *quite* satisfied with my welcome. It was settled at once that I was to sleep here, especially as, being post day, Flo could not attend to me till the afternoon.

"The sopha is covered with newspapers just come in by the post. I have been sitting for an hour here, having some coffee, and writing, Mrs. Clarke coming in to see what I have wanted, in spite of what I could say.

"The work this morning was the sending off General Adams's remains, and the arrangements consequent upon it.

"A stream of people every minute.

"'Please, ma'am, have you any black-edged paper?'

"'Please what can I give which would keep on his stomach; is there any arrowroot to-day for him?'

"'No; the tubs of arrowroot must be for the worst cases; we cannot spare him any, nor is there any jelly to-day; try him with some eggs, etc.'

"'Please, Mr. Gordon wishes to see Miss N. about the orders she gave him.'

"Mr. Sabine comes in for something else.

"Mr. Bracebridge in and out about General Adams and orders of various kinds."

"THERAPIA, *December 24th.*

"I am now in possession of the whole state of the case, and feel anxious to write to you about it.

"Florence showed me a copy of the letter she wrote to Mr. Herbert. I scarcely like to express an opinion to you about this. I can scarcely guess what answer will be sent.

"I most *deeply* regret the view taken of the whole affair *here*, and my whole energies are now bent to the absorption of our numbers, as far as possible, in the line of our original destination. I confess that I have got to be convinced that more nurses are not needed. If the experiment is a failure I concede the point; but if, as I am told here, and we heard at home, it is successful, I do not understand why the comfort is to be so limited.

"I grant that no *one* head can be individually responsible for such a number in such a position; but authority may be delegated to inferior heads who may be held responsible for a given number.

"Florence requested me formally, in the presence of Dr. Cumming and Mr. Bracebridge, to *succeed her at once.* I refused this most decidedly, for every reason.

"Another proposal she has made to me is to take charge of the General Hospital under her till she is superseded. This I have promised to consider, and I would willingly try to set matters straight and put Miss Emily Anderson in the way of carrying it on. With a little help I think she will be quite equal to

it. I have asked to have a house found, in which it would be possible to receive both visitors (if they are allowed) and nurses.

"I have done my best to pacify our women. To the nurses I have merely said there was no room owing to the influx of sick, and I wrote this down as the statement they were to make in their letters home. Happily, being so much out of the way, they can hear no gossip on the subject. To the ladies, who reason and ask questions, it is more difficult to give true answers, but I have strongly urged patience, and silence in their home letters."

The fame acquired by a great general in a successful war so far outshines that which can be gained by men of less note acting under him, or in co-operation with him, that achievements performed by them, which, had they stood alone, would have obtained a lasting place in history, are practically eclipsed. It was not otherwise in the campaign on the shores of the Bosphorus against disease and death. The name of Miss Nightingale has become a household word; that of Miss Stanley may be said to be now all but forgotten.

And yet Mary Stanley was no ordinary woman. Her father, Edward Stanley, Bishop of Norwich, was a man of restless activity not untinged with eccentricity, but of earnest piety, great moral courage, and unbounded benevolence. During his lifetime his daughter was his main assistant in his works of charity. After his death, her energies, till then mainly confined to Norwich, were extended to a wider sphere. She was associated with Miss Nightingale by ties of the closest intimacy, and was her enthusiastic admirer and fellow-helper.

To render what both she and Mr. Herbert supposed to be a service to the sick and to Miss Nightingale, Miss Stanley, as has been said, consented to take

charge of the second party of nurses on their journey to Constantinople. It was her intention, so soon as duties there had been assigned to her charges, to return to England at the earliest opportunity. But Miss Nightingale declined the services of the newcomers, and refused to take any oversight of them. They were not consigned to her, she said, and she "washed her hands" of them. Miss Stanley, in these circumstances, nobly sacrificed her own plans and wishes, and resolved to remain with the band she had brought out, so long as it required a head and leader. That it did require one was manifest from its composition, consisting, as it did, partly of ladies, partly of ordinary professional nurses, and including both Protestant deaconesses and Irish nuns. Without authorised employment, and under no recognised control, they would speedily have justified the sinister predictions made as to their fate.

Miss Stanley did not possess Miss Nightingale's powers of organisation or her strength of will. But in tact and sympathy she equalled if she did not excel her. Weakness resulting from ill-health rendered her incapable of much bodily exertion. Of this she was aware, lamenting her inability to carry a coal-scuttle or lift a pail of water, and it was with extreme reluctance that she found herself forced into a position which she had not contemplated, and for which she was physically ill fitted. But to her, only secondly to Miss Nightingale, belongs the credit of establishing a recognised place for female nurses in military hospitals. Indeed, without her milder influence, the reaction against the "monstrous regiment of women" (a reaction not allayed by Miss Nightingale's sharp tongue and masterful interference) might possibly have proved successful. And in spite of opposition and

denunciation she succeeded in proving two things, the possibility of which Miss Nightingale had denied. She showed that ladies could safely and with good effect be used as nurses, and that when efficient they are superior to ordinary nurses, on account of their better education and greater self-command. The result of her labours also conclusively established the fact that a much greater number of nurses than was contemplated by Miss Nightingale might be usefully employed in the hospitals, and that they were, indeed, urgently needed there.[1]

Miss Stanley and her party were at first temporarily employed at the Royal Naval Hospital at Therapia, and a little later a portion of them, under Miss Anderson, took charge of the General Hospital, while Miss Stanley was installed in the quasi-independent charge of an additional hospital at Kullali, opened on

[1] These two points are well brought out in a little volume, now forgotten, published in 1856, "English Hospitals and English Nurses: a narrative of twelve months' experience in the hospitals at Kulali and Scutari, by a Lady Volunteer." Drunkenness and immorality prevailed to a large extent among the hired nurses, 11 of whom, out of a total of 21, were dismissed within the year. "None but those who knew it," writes the authoress, "can imagine the wearing anxiety and the bitter humiliation the charge of the hired nurses brought upon us, for it should be remembered that we stood as a small body of English women in a foreign country, and that we were so far a community that the act of one disgraced all."

One of the objections urged against the employment of ladies was that they would be exposed to the shock of hearing much vile and profane language from their patients. To such vile language they had indeed to listen, but it was from the hired nurses associated with them on a footing of equality, and not from the soldiers, to whose delicacy of feeling in this respect all the ladies employed in the hospitals bore equally emphatic testimony. "Never did a word which could offend a woman's ear fall on ours. Even in the barrack yard, passing by the guard-room or entrances, where stood groups of soldiers smoking or idling, the moment we approached all coarseness was hushed; and this lasted not a week or a month, but the whole of my twelve months' residence."

January 27th. A part of her staff were, notwithstanding Miss Nightingale's protest, sent to the Crimea, where they did good service,[1] and on the opening, at a somewhat later period, of a new hospital at Smyrna, another portion of Miss Stanley's nurses was transferred to that establishment. Miss Stanley herself returned to England in May, 1855.

During the whole of November and the earlier part of December the reports from Constantinople bore testimony to marked improvement in every branch of the Hospital Administration. Defects there still were in abundance—some of them apparently irremediable—but all accounts agreed not only as to the existence of a general determination to amend what was amiss, but also to the satisfactory progress made in carrying out the reforms needed. Had the numbers treated in hospital remained at a constant figure, these measures might have sufficed to ensure their comfort and well-being. Sidney Herbert might reasonably describe himself as "full of hope," as in his letter to Dr. Cumming of November 29th he had done. But an ever-swelling tide of incoming patients swamped the hospitals, broke down their arrangements, and overtaxed their machinery.

Before the middle of December Miss Nightingale's letters had assumed a gloomier tone, and the London newspapers were inundated with communications

[1] General Estcourt wrote to Mr. Herbert (February 20th, 1855): "Our ladies here are working with a most steady enthusiasm. They watch at night; they cook comforts; they wash linen, and are full of active usefulness. I am only afraid they will do too much. You know, perhaps, Miss Shaw Stewart, one of our Belgravian ladies, is here. . . . We are indebted to you, I conceive, entirely for this wonderful movement of charity. Your letter to Miss Nightingale and her devotedness in coming were the beginning, and gave encouragement to others who probably were then longing for an opportunity."

from relatives of those in hospital at Scutari, complaining of the neglect and inefficiency prevailing there. The painful feeling thus excited was greatly increased by the publication in *The Times* of December 8th of a letter from one of the nurses employed in the Barrack Hospital, which formed the text of a leading article in the same paper on the following day, by which the public was informed that the patients at Scutari were allowed to die for want of proper food and medical comforts, the administration of which would have saved their lives, that eleven men had died in one day in the four wards under the charge of the nurse in question, and that the sick were dependent for every comfort on the bounty of *The Times* Commissioner, Mr. Macdonald. This letter and article naturally produced a great sensation. When the number of *The Times* containing it reached Constantinople, an inquiry was held by the Commission then sitting there. The writer of the letter was easily discovered, for only one nurse had employment in four wards of the hospital. She was confronted with Miss Nightingale, who denied on oath every statement of the letter, which its author herself confessed to be a tissue of exaggerations. But meanwhile it had done its work. Nearly two months elapsed between the original publication of the letter and the receipt from Constantinople of its refutation. In that interval it had no doubt held a conspicuous place among the "horrible and heart-rending" stories which formed the reason, or the excuse, for Lord John Russell's resignation.[1]

[1] The spirit of complaint did not spare even the nurses or Miss Nightingale herself, whose admission to the Hospital was denounced in letters to *The Times* on account of her supposed religious opinions—suppositions which were wholly erroneous. Nor was the prejudice born of religious intolerance wanting among the military chaplains at

During this anxious time Mr. Herbert worked day and night, devoting his whole time either to supply or anticipate the wants of the Army in the Crimea, and those of the sick and wounded at Scutari. Men who showed themselves less efficient than had been expected were replaced by other and more capable instruments. His expostulations were gradually weaning the Purveying Staff from its timidity, though, in spite of explanations, warnings, and threats, it still failed thoroughly to perform its work, much of which was practically done by Miss Nightingale, with an almost aggressive energy, which probably did not always tend to foster good feeling. The circumstances of the case fully justified her action, but Mr. Herbert was of opinion that her purveying operations were carried on too long, and carried too far. Quite unconsciously, of course, and very naturally, a sort of rivalry was set up between herself and the Purveyor. In one letter she, after relating that the Purveyor had in answer to her question told her that he did not know whether certain stores were to be had in Stamboul, or where he could procure them there, triumphantly remarks, "*I* have got all these things in Stamboul"; but it does not appear whether she informed the unfortunate Purveyor where he too could obtain the supplies which it was his duty, and not hers, to procure.

Constantinople. Miss Stanley records the following amusing incident:

"*January 5th.*

"Mr. B. [the Chaplain] complained yesterday to Miss Jebbut that very improper books had been circulated in the wards; she pressed in vain to know what they were. As I was coming away he begged for five minutes' conversation, said he was answerable for the men and what they read, and he must protest against sentiments he neither approved nor understood, and that he would fetch me the book. It was Keble's 'Christian Year,' which Miss Jebbut had lent to a sick midshipman!"

The mass of communications which Mr. Herbert received on the subject of the hospitals is enormous. Many of these letters are interesting, but it is alike impossible to insert or even to describe them here. Of his answers I have had access to but few, and, indeed, it is improbable that many of them were replied to at any length. What Mr. Herbert did was more useful and more effectual. He embodied the substance of these communications in his letters to Lord Raglan, the Commandant at Scutari, and the medical authorities. On January 1st, 1855, I find him writing to Lord William Paulet in strong terms with regard to the accumulation of stores in the Custom House at Constantinople. At the same time he suggested to the Duke of Newcastle that the advice given by him to Lord W. Paulet should be repeated in formal instructions.

MR. HERBERT TO THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLE.

"*January 3rd*, 1855.

"MY DEAR L[INCOLN],

"I think Lord William Paulet ought to have general public instructions placed on record, as well as directions conveyed in private letters. Very large powers ought to be entrusted to him, for which public reasons should be given, and the mode in which they should be exercised pointed out.

"The intervention of Lord Stratford to authorise or sanction expenditure is clearly now not only unnecessary, but a cumbrous and rather uncertain method of obtaining results which can be got at much quicker by the responsible officer whom we now have on the spot, and who is practically conversant with the wants and requirements of the service at Scutari.

"I would inform Lord W. Paulet that the Government, relying on his zeal and discretion, and on his appreciation of the urgent necessity for instant and effective measures for the relief of the sick and wounded, and for the preparation of ample accommoda-

tion for those whose arrival must be constantly expected, give him full powers to hire, adapt, or repair existing buildings, or to erect temporary buildings for the reception of patients. Additional accommodation has been spoken of at Kullali, but Lord W. should consult Dr. Cumming and the medical authorities, and either open a new hospital at Kullali, or in any other locality which may be considered advantageous and is attainable, detaching such persons from the different departments as may be entrusted to organise the new establishments, or, if thought preferable, he should erect temporary buildings in such proximity to the existing hospital as to secure the advantage of the existing establishments; or, if necessary, both these courses should be adopted. In case new buildings should be erected, the temporary hospital erected by the French in the Seraglio Gardens should be inspected, as valuable suggestions might be derived from the French experiment, but every exertion should be used to create this fresh accommodation without loss of time, as the state of the Army in the Crimea unhappily renders extensive and well-arranged accommodation urgently necessary.

"As both speed and efficiency in the arrangement or creation of these buildings is necessary, it is of the greatest importance that no application should be made to the Turkish Government to perform any part of the work, which, to be done at once and done well, must be done by ourselves.

"Arrangements are being made to send out English carpenters, sappers, and miners (whichever you think most advisable), to assist in the works which will probably be constantly carrying on, but he must not defer any part of the work till their arrival, but commence it without delay with such workmen as he can procure on the spot.

"We are given to understand here that hulks have many disadvantages as hospitals for the convalescent, whose recovery is retarded by the weariness and depression caused by constant confinement. Convalescent hospitals should therefore be prepared. Rhodes has been recommended, and Smyrna, as places suitable for such hospitals, the first having the advantage of an excellent climate and large buildings, which might be procured for such purpose, but no market

for supplies, and little facility for obtaining anything requisite for the hospital, and of which there is not a store in hand. Smyrna, on the contrary, is probably inferior in respect of climate and of accommodation, yet being a place of great trade, affording facilities for procuring stores of different kinds to a greater degree than any other place in the Levant.

"The state of the pier at which the sick and wounded are landed at Scutari requires immediate attention. I am informed that it might be so lengthened as to enable a landing to be effected in almost all weathers.

"The supply of boats is stated to be inadequate. Boats should in that case be purchased and retained for the use of the hospital, with proper crews, who, when the boats are not in use, might be employed in conveying supplies to the hospital, or at other work about the building. If boats of proper capacity for the purpose in view cannot be procured at Constantinople, application should be made to the Admiral at Malta, who has received instructions to forward some. [Communication to Sir J. Graham accordingly.]

"A sufficient number of mules or horses should be purchased for the use of the hospital for the service of the ambulance, and for bringing in supplies. Arabas should be procured with the same view.

"As regards the hospital at Scutari, there is reason to hope that much has been effected towards bringing that establishment into a state of greater efficiency.

"A laundry has been organised outside the building by the exertions and at the cost of individuals, who, however, ought not to be burdened with any expenditure on this account. All the expenses connected with this establishment must therefore be defrayed by the Government.

"It is understood that the laundry within the hospital has been useless, owing to its being filled with stores, for which surely some other store-room might be found or created.

"Dr. Smith, the head of the Army Medical Board, is sending out washing and wringing machines and some persons who will undertake the washing either in conjunction with those actually engaged or separately, as Lord William may think, after consulting the

authorities of the hospital and Miss Nightingale, to be most advantageous to the efficiency of the service. The bath-rooms and some of the kitchens have been stated to be in a similar way misappropriated, and it is left to his discretion to make whatever arrangements, after due consultation, he thinks most advisable. If it is thought right to restore these buildings to their original uses, temporary sheds will probably be required for the stores so displaced. It cannot be too much impressed that ample store room is indispensable to the orderly arrangement as well as the expeditious issue of all stores.

"The staff of the Purveying Department is said to be insufficient, and the forms of procedure so complicated and cumbrous as to interfere with the expeditious and ready issue of the articles required. It is probably owing to this that there appears to have been a deficiency in the hospital, at the time when they were wanted, of articles of which abundance existed in store.

"It is also stated that articles such as bed trestles, etc., which had been asked for at a period when there were none in store, had, upon subsequent arrival from England, remained unused, because the Purveyor had neglected the simple expedient of communicating lists of the stores newly arrived to the medical authorities, whom it is his duty to keep informed as to his means of meeting their requisitions.

"Part of this deficiency—namely, that of the number of clerks under the Purveyor—has already been in some degree met by the Secretary at War, who has sent out six additional clerks, who are already arrived at Scutari, and whom he has taken on the ground of their alleged acquaintance with mercantile business, and selected others who will shortly arrive.

"The Secretary at War is likewise about to send out Mr. Milton, a gentleman in the War Office, who has shown considerable ability in conducting an inquiry into the state of a military hospital in England, which led to great improvements in it. This gentleman will be accompanied by two intelligent clerks from his office, and will have a commission as purveyor, to enable him to act under Mr. Wreford, and give him all the assistance he can in the organisation of his

department, after which he will proceed to Balaclava on a similar errand.

"Should it, however, be Lord W.'s opinion that Mr. Wreford's age and infirmities are too great for the labour which his arduous and responsible duties entail upon him, and that his recall would, therefore, be for the advantage of the public service, his lordship should be authorised to send Mr. Wreford home, and retain Mr. Milton to execute his duties until a permanent appointment in Mr. Wreford's place can be made, unless there is any one in his department whom Lord W. thinks capable of filling it. (On second thoughts, this should be in a private, and not a public, dispatch.)

"It is reported that considerable irregularity has prevailed in the supply of fuel to the hospital; from which I infer that the commissariat established is either wanting in numbers or in the efficiency of the men of whom it is composed. Additional commissariat officers will be immediately sent out, whose services Lord W. may retain at Scutari. [Orders accordingly to Commissariat.] If, however, his lordship is of opinion that with better arrangements the general staff is sufficient, he may send on to Balaclava to be placed under the orders of Commissary-General Filder those whose services he does not require.

"Lord W. should at the same time send home without delay, any, either in the commissariat or purveying departments, who are inefficient, and therefore an obstruction to the due performance of the public service.

"It is important that Dr. Cumming should as soon as possible take charge of the hospital at Scutari in the place of Dr. Menzies. Lord W. should therefore do everything in his power to facilitate and expedite the work of the Commission on which, together with Mr. Maxwell and Dr. Laing, he is now engaged, with a view to his resuming his professional duties.

"The Commission has received orders to report to Lord W. Paulet from time to time all practical alterations which they recommend, with a view to the better organisation and working of the hospital, and his lordship, after consultation with them, should take immediate steps for the immediate introduction of such alterations as it may appear to him that it is

advisable to adopt, without waiting for the completion of their report or for reference home. Much time will thus be saved.

"I feel no doubt that Lord W. will gain much valuable information from those gentlemen, and he cannot do better than be guided by their advice, founded as it will be on an accurate knowledge of the state of the hospital, and of the causes of the evils which we seek to remedy.

"The Director-General of the Medical Board is engaged, under the directions of the Government, in the organisation of a permanent hospital staff, to supersede the use of orderlies taken from the ranks for duty in the hospital, and returned to them after a short service. It seems obvious that the hospital duty cannot be well performed by a succession of fresh and inexperienced hands, possessing no interest in the permanent well-being of the establishment. The military authorities in the Crimea having expressed their opinion to the Government, no time has been lost in attempting to remedy the deficiency, but the new system will require great care in its introduction, and must be made gradually to supersede the old one.

"Lord W. Paulet should report to Lord Raglan all his proceedings, sending copies of his reports to the War Department here. He should likewise keep Lord Raglan informed on all subjects generally which come to his knowledge, and which may be of use to him as regards the transport of men and stores, and the sending or procuring of provisions, forage, baggage, animals, etc.

"It is stated that goods to a large amount, directed either to the Army or to individual officers, are accumulated in the Turkish custom-house. If this be so, Lord W. should confer with the Admiral as to the best means of sorting and forwarding these goods. (Sir J. Graham to give corresponding directions to Admiral.)

"The Government cannot too strongly impress upon Lord W. Paulet the importance they attach to the affording of every accommodation and comfort to the sick and wounded of our Army. This is a sacred duty, for the due performance of which no exertion and no cost must be spared. Whatever is necessary for the furtherance of this object must be procured. If it can be done upon the spot, they rely

on Lord W. at once to take measures to procure it. If it can only be obtained at home, they beg he will give early notice of his wants and requirements with a view to their immediate satisfaction. Lists will be sent to him of all stores sent out for the use of the hospitals.

"I think this comprises all the heads on which instructions are required, except the composition of his own staff. Other things may occur to you. Some one in your office could turn this into a dispatch for you."

There was no relaxation of pressure on Mr. Herbert's part. Writing to Dr. Cumming on January 5th, he says:

"Pray communicate to Lord W. Paulet at once any alterations which you think necessary—without waiting for the completion of your report or for reference home. He has full powers to obtain, buy, hire, or erect whatever is necessary—and much valuable time will thus be saved."

In a letter to Lord W. Paulet on January 18th he repeats in substance his communication to the Duke of Newcastle, adding, however, a good deal.

"I understand," he says, "that you have now got a small steamer at your disposal to ply to Constantinople for provisions, vegetables, and stores of all kinds, as well as to assist in landing the sick. Is this so? I trust it is. If not, it ought to be got, if possible, whether by borrowing, hiring, or buying.

"I hear that the pier is now mended and advanced into the sea. I hope this is done solidly and effectually. They say there is plenty of stone close by; wood only gets knocked to pieces by every surf.

"I hear that you also have the wash-house or bath-house at the hospital now clear of straw and forage, and available for its proper purposes.

"We have sent out some washing and wringing machines, with men to work them. I hope you will give an impetus to the quick utilisation of these men and articles the moment they arrive.

. . . . . .

"I enter into all these details with you, because I feel convinced that unless you insist on these things, and see with your own eyes that they are carried out, nothing will be done.

. . . . . .

"You cannot put the requirements of the Army for hospital accommodation at less than treble what you now have.

"If you seek for the transfer of new buildings from the Turks, there is endless delay, and you don't get what you want or you don't get it *where* you want it.

"Your hospital staff medical commissariat purveying had to be broken up, and all is again disorganised.

"The true thing is to build where you are, unless you have a better place.

"They tell me the French temporary hospitals are very good buildings, made of wood and battened and plastered inside: each building holds fifty sick. This is the usual style of Turkish building, which they are therefore used to make. What the French have done we can do: if wards for one hundred are better than for fifty, the same construction will answer the purpose, taking care that there is sufficient height for ventilation.

"If these buildings be erected on the parade ground adjoining the barracks, you can have the new temporary hospitals served by the same staff, merely adding what is necessary for extra kitchens, washing plant, surgeries, depôts, etc., connecting them by covered ways or whatever is thought best.

"I may be quite wrong as to details. You who are on the spot will judge best with the aid of the engineers and the medical officers.

"I trust you will have anticipated all this and have begun these erections in accordance with the same suggestions which I have made before. If not, do not lose a moment in commencing. It requires no intervention of the Turkish Government. You need only at once begin.

"I judge by some answers made by the Purveyor that he never looks forward, does not anticipate future demands, does not even attempt to procure what he wants at Constantinople.

. . . . . .

"These are the main points:

"1. A thorough reformation of the whole means of disembarking the sick, for which a good solid stone pier, good boats, good means of carrying the sick up to the hospital (a covered way?) are necessary.

"2. A small steamer *very important.*

"3. A thorough reformation of the system of receiving and issuing the stores.

"4. Erection of buildings for that purpose.

"5. Re-clothing convalescents, and washing, and storing their own clothes.

"6. An extended system of cooking, so that there may be not only plenty, but served punctually and hot and in a proper state to the patients.

"7. Above and before all, *the immediate erection of additional hospitals* or wards, with everything necessary in the way of store-room, surgery, privies, etc., etc."

And he appends the following significant postscript:

"Pray recollect that you have full power to send home any one whose inefficiency is marring the public service."

LORD W. PAULET TO MR. HERBERT.

"SCUTARI, *January 7th*, 1855.

"DEAR MR. SIDNEY HERBERT,

"I beg to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated December 15th, and having now been in command at the station a month, I have made myself acquainted with what is going on in this immense hospital establishment, which requires a great deal of organisation; but the want of staff renders it a very difficult affair. The immense and constant influx of sick coming here almost prevent me putting things upon a system, whereby I might ensure economy and regularity. Since December 17th, about three weeks, we have disembarked and admitted 3,400 sick. One day we had 72 deaths and burials, but the average lately has been about 40 per diem. The men arrive with hardly any clothes, some with nothing but a blanket, and covered with vermin. There are now 4,500 sick; and above 700 just arrived, and not disembarked. We occupy a large hospital; two large

barracks, both of which are full, rooms and corridors, with a double row of beds. I have just got one of the Sultan's palaces, in which I have just put between 500 and 600 men. Another barrack (Koolalie), about five miles up the Bosphorus, is now ready for occupation, having just cleared it of Turkish soldiers, and is undergoing repairs. I have already there 240 wounded Russian prisoners, and 140 of our men to furnish a guard, orderlies, etc. I have also fitted up some rooms over a large stable, where I have nearly 100 men, and there are 400 men in a hospital at Abydos. I am going to send 500 convalescents to Corfu, Malta having been retained for a provisional battalion. The remainder of the Russian prisoners are in the arsenal at Constantinople, with the exception of one officer and 20 men here, who were too badly wounded to move. The great difficulty I have to contend with is the purveying for so many. Mr. Wreford is the chief purveyor; Mr. Ward (the second purveyor) and his wife both died of cholera a few days ago, and the remainder in that office are young and inexperienced, and the demands are so constant and extensive that he, Mr. Wreford, is unable to meet them. . . .

"Another great difficulty is the furnishing the patients with shirts, etc., but I think we shall overcome this by giving shirts for the men when in hospital, and to be kept in the hospital. When they are discharged, to furnish them with shirts for permanent use; but it is necessary to guard against the selling of the shirts by the men, as we have men of all regiments without officers to look after then. I have been corresponding with Lord Stratford de Redcliffe about Smyrna, where I sent a medical officer and a commissariat officer, who report most favourably of a large barrack, capable of holding nearly 3,000 invalids, but we can afford to send neither medical men nor purveyors from here. Everything required to fit up the hospital there might be purchased on the spot; but it will be necessary to have a good purveyor, and a good principal medical officer. The barrack, Lord S. tells me, is granted by the Turks, but not notified officially; but the sooner we occupy it the better, for I am at a loss to know where to put the sick up, unless the Admiralty would grant us a large

ship or two. We are already in occupation of a large Turkish hulk with more than 500 invalids, and a large transport with above 300; but things are improving, and those in the hospital are well taken care of.

. . . . . .

"The transport service is very slow, and the means at Admiral Boxer's disposal are too small; this renders the disembarkation of the sick very tedious, and thereby weakening the sick before they are received into hospital; and the wharf is washed away as fast as it is repaired. I have had some cots made to carry up the sick, and employ some Turkish porters to assist in carrying them. Admiral Boxer is going up to be stationed at Balaklava, and I believe Admiral Stopford is to succeed Admiral Boxer. We are much in want of boat transport; a south wind, which has been most prevalent here, causes a great difficulty in embarking or disembarking, and the boatmen (Greek) generally leave when there is much surf.

"Lord Stratford is most kind, and immediately obtains from the Sultan anything I ask; and Lady Stratford is most anxious, and indefatigable in her exertions in doing good, and giving luxuries to the sick. I really could not get on without her valuable assistance.

"I believe the miscarriage of stores is quite fearful, and the robberies of packages very serious; and generally, ships going to Balaklava from England have the stores for Scutari at the bottom of the hold.

"I am trying to organise a system of transporting baggage for the Crimea, and landing stores destined for Scutari here, by having an intelligent quartermaster, who is to live on board one of the transports, and board all ships that come in, and note down what they have on board, and put a seal on which has been granted by the Turkish Government, and arrange that the goods should go to right destination: for if they once get inside the custom-house, you never can get them again.

"The pier is in a dreadful state; but it is not possible to improve it during the winter, for it gets washed down as soon as it is repaired.

"Mr. Gordon, the engineer officer here, is very active and intelligent."

. . . . . .

The letter from Miss Nightingale was more startling in its disclosures.

MISS NIGHTINGALE TO MR. HERBERT.

"BARRACK HOSPITAL, SCUTARI,
"*January 8th*, 1855.

"DEAR MR. HERBERT,

"As the larger proportion of the Army (in which we are told that there are not 2,000 sound men)[1] is coming to hospital; as there are therefore thousands of lives at stake; as in a service where the future of the official servants is dependent upon the personal interest of one man, these cannot be expected to peril that future by getting themselves shelved as innovators, I feel that this is no time for compliments or false shame, and that you will never hear the whole truth, troublesome as it is, except from one independent of promotion.

. . . . . .

"The Commission has done nothing; probably its powers were limited to inquiry. Cumming has done nothing; Lord William Paulet has done nothing; Lord Stratford, absorbed in politics, does not know the circumstances. Lord William Paulet knows them but partially. Menzies knows them and will not tell them. Wreford knows them and is stupefied. The medical officers, if they were to betray them, would have it reported personally and professionally to their advantage.

"Lord William Paulet and Dr. Forrest, the new medical head, I see are desperate. As your official servant, you will say that I ought to have reported these things before. But I did not wish to be made a spy. I thought it better if the remedy could be brought quietly, and I thought the Commission was to bring it. But matters are worse than they were two months ago, and will be worse two months hence than they are now. The medical men are pulled up by the senior medical authorities for receiving ward furniture and food, and being purveyed for by *me*; and therefore the naughty children pretend to ignore that their requisitions go in to me, instead of to the

[1] An exaggeration. The number of actually effective men never fell below 14,000.

Purveyor, and leave me to be rebuked for over-facility.

"I subjoin (*a*) a rough estimate of what has been given out by me during *one* month, the whole at the requisition of the medical men, all of which I have by me, merely in order to substantiate the facts of the destitution of these hospitals. Since December 17th we have received 3,400 sick, and I have made no sum-total as yet of what has been done for these new comers by us, excepting for one corridor, which I enclose (*b*).

"1. First, then, the purveying is *not*—that is the whole truth—beyond bedding, bread, meat, cold water, fuel. Beyond the boiling *en masse* in the great coppers of the general kitchen, the meat is not cooked, the water is not boiled, except what is done in my subsidiary kitchens. My schedule will show what I have purveyed. I have refused to go on purveying for the third hospital, the Sultan's Serail, the demands on me there having begun with 1,200 articles, including shirts, the first night of our occupying it. I refer you to a list of what was *not* in store and to a copy of one requisition upon me sent last letter.

"2. Secondly, the extraordinary circumstances of a whole army having been ordered to abandon its kits, as was done when we landed our men before Alma, has been overlooked entirely in all our system. The fact is that *I* am now clothing the British Army. The sick were re-embarked at Balaclava for these hospitals without resuming their kits, also half naked besides. And when discharged from here, they carry off, small blame to them, even my knives and forks, shirts of course, and hospital clothing also. The men who were sent to Abydos as convalescent were sent in their hospital dresses, or they must have gone naked. The consequence is that not one single hospital dress is now left in store, and I have substituted Turkish dressing-gowns from Stamboul. Three bales in the passage are marked hospital gowns, but have not yet been sat upon. To purvey this hospital is like pouring water into a sieve, and will be, till regimental stores have been sent out from England, enough to clothe the naked and refill the kit.

"I have requisitions for *uniform trousers*, for each and all of the articles of a kit sent in to me. We

have not yet heard of boots being sent out—the men come into hospital half shod.

"In a time of such calamity, unparalleled in the history, I believe, of calamity, I have a little compassion left, even for the wretched Purveyor swamped amid demands he never expected. But I have no compassion for the men who would rather see hundreds of lives lost than waive one scruple of the official conscience.

"3. Thirdly, the hospital and army stores come out in the same vessels—and up go our stores to Balaclava, and down they never come again, or have not yet.

"4. Fourthly, the total inefficiency of the hospital orderly system as it now is. The French have a permanent system of orderlies trained for the purpose who do not re-enter the ranks. It is too late for us to organise this. But if the convalescents, being good orderlies, were not sent away to the Krimea as soon as they have learnt their work,—if the Commander-in-Chief would call upon the Commanding Officers of each regiment to select ten men from each as hospital orderlies to form a depôt here (not young soldiers, but men of good character), this would give some hope of organising an efficient corps. Above all, the class of ward-master I shall mention should be sent out from England. We require:

"(1) An effective staff of purveyors out of England, but beyond this,

"(2) *A head*, some one with authority to mash up the departments into uniform and rapid action. He may as well stay at home, unless he have power to modify the arrangement of departments made expressly by Sir C. Trevelyan with Mr. Wreford before he came away in May.

"(3) We want medical officers.

"(4) Three deputy-inspectors-general (whereas we have only one)—viz. one for barrack hospital hulk and Turkish ship, one for General Hospital, Sultan's Serail and Koulouee, if we send sick there, one for Smyrna.

"(5) Smyrna must not be medical officered or purveyed from here, or we shall be swamped at once. It is obvious from what has been said in former letters *who*, if there are two D.I.G.'s made to these hospitals, should be made D.I.G. of this Barrack Hospital, past

and present efficiency being considered. We want discharged N.C.O.'s not past the meridian of life, *not* the Ambulance Corps, who all died of delirium tremens or cholera, but the class of men employed as ward-masters of military prisons or as barrack-sergeants or hospital-sergeants of the Guards, who can be highly recommended. We want these men as ward-masters and assistant ward-masters, as stewards. They must be under the orders of the senior medical officer, removable by him; they must be well paid, so as to make it worth their while, say, 5*s.* a day 1st class, 2*s.* 6*d.* per day 2nd class; for they must be superior men, not the rabble we have now.

"N.B.—There are three ward-masters to each division of this hospital, of which there are three, containing 800 odd sick in each. The book of hospital regulations, admirable in time of peace, contains nothing for a time of war, much less a time of war like this, unexampled for calamity.

"The hospital-sergeants are of course up in the Krimea with their regiments, and we have nothing but such raw corporals or sergeants as can be spared, new to their work, to place in charge of the divisions and wards. And these, Lord Raglan complains of our keeping! We must have hospital-sergeants if there is to be the remotest hope of efficiency among the orderlies here.

"(6) The orderlies ought to be well paid, and well fed, and well housed. They are now overworked, ill-fed, and underpaid. The sickness and mortality among them is extraordinary—ten took sick in one division to-night. They have only 4*d.* a day as orderlies, additional to their pay.

"I had written a plan for the systematic organisation of these hospitals upon a principle of centralisation under which the component parts might be worked in unison. But on reconsideration, deeming so great a change impracticable during the present heavy pressure of calamities here, I refrain from forwarding it."

There was exaggeration in this last latter—exaggeration natural and pardonable, but not on that account the less mischievous. But it is clear, as well from

what has gone before as from the answer given to this letter, that these complaints would have been as carefully attended to and as effectually corrected by Mr. Herbert, had he remained in office, as those of earlier date had been. He could not do so, for a few days after they were received Lord John Russell's resignation upset the Government.

The only crumb of comfort accompanying these terrible letters was contained in a short note from Miss Stanley, who wrote:

"Let Mr. Herbert be cheered by the thought that from *all* I have heard but one opinion as to the comfort the nurses have been to the suffering men. On all other points opinions vary; on this all are unanimous.

"I am pressed for time, but I wished just to give you a hopeful word, and believe that I will act impartially and fairly.

"I am sure what has weighed most upon me here has been the thought of all the trouble to you."

On the day of the receipt of these letters Sidney Herbert dashed off a few lines in answer to Miss Nightingale:

"War Office,
"*January* 19*th*, 1855.

"My dear Miss Nightingale,

"I have only time to write a few lines by this mail, your letter of the 8th having just arrived.

"I thank you sincerely for it. The truth is fearful, but it is the truth, and I will do my utmost to meet your requirements.

"I will keep sending out issues for the Purveying Department, ward-masters', orderlies, etc., as fast as I can get them.

"The medical men must be got, and, the Army system being exhausted, I must go elsewhere. . . ."

Of all those in high places—and they were many—who were regarded with disapproval by Miss Night-

ingale, the Director-General of the Army Medical Department, Dr. Smith, perhaps best merited her censure. To his want of foresight and feeble initiative not a few of the administrative defects in the Medical Department may be traced. Sidney Herbert had been long dissatisfied by his inability to grasp the magnitude of the crisis, and irritated by his tardiness in action. At the time when the letters just quoted reached Sidney Herbert he was at issue with Dr. Smith on a point of considerable importance.

All available military surgeons had by this time been brought into employment, and it had been found necessary to entrust to civilians some part of the medical appointments in the hospitals last opened. To this arrangement, so long as it was confined to the lower ranks of the profession, Dr. Smith, Director-General of the Medical Department, had been induced under the pressure of circumstances to assent. Mr. Herbert now proposed to extend the same principle to the higher medical appointments, and to establish a hospital at Smyrna placed under the superintendence of a Military Commandant and entirely for military use, but in which the staff should consist exclusively of civilian medical officers. Both these proposals were opposed by Dr. Smith. Sidney Herbert listened to his objections, but insisted on the execution of his own plan. On January 19th he wrote as follows:

MR. HERBERT TO DR. SMITH.

"WAR OFFICE, *January 19th*, 1855.

"MY DEAR SIR,

"I have letters to-day from Lord Wm. Paulet and from Miss Nightingale. They reveal a state of things which is most discreditable to those concerned.

"They ask for 30 more surgeons for Scutari alone.

They want a complete medical staff for Kullali, and another for Smyrna, where buildings are offered us for nearly 3,000 men. We must send out beds, bedding, utensils of all kinds, stores of every description, though Lord Wm. Paulet says that Smyrna itself will produce a great deal of what is wanted. All this is comparatively easy. But we have not got the 80 or 100 surgeons we want. What is more, we cannot get them on the system hitherto pursued.

"The Army Medical Staff is exhausted. The country is now drained of the men who can be got as acting assistant surgeons. If you go on with this system you will get only raw, inexperienced boys, to whom it is impossible to trust the lives of our soldiers. Already there is complaint on this head.

"We must now look higher. You know the opinions I have pressed upon you on this subject, from which you have on professional grounds differed. When you expressed that difference there was still the possibility of acting on the Army system, aided by the introduction of civilians in the lower ranks. This is exhausted. We must now introduce civilians of higher rank, and give not only acting surgeoncies, but acting deputy inspectorships.

"I would send to take charge of Smyrna a complete staff of civilians with a gradation of acting ranks. I do not wish to exclude a simultaneous extension of the Army system, if it can be extended. You have still men at home whom you can send out, I believe: Thompson, at Woolwich, and men of that class. I wish to have your views on this without loss of time, as we must act with promptitude. Please to send me a copy of the list of stores going by *Eagle* and *Whiffly Park*, and by the sailing ships, and also what went in the *Manilla*.

"I should think we could, by sending to Marseilles, get a good deal there, with a great saving of time."

And on the 23rd, he inquired:

"Have you made sufficient preparation for the rapid increase of sick at Scutari and Constantinople? The last letters say that two new hospitals are being opened. The Government has urged on Lord W. Paulet to erect temporary buildings. Has the

Purveyor at Scutari stores to complete the new hospitals? I believe not.

"Stores, medicines, beds, furniture of all descriptions for hospital use, clothing, cooking and eating utensils, washing machinery, etc., etc., should go out for 2,000 more men. This is distinct from the Smyrna establishment.

"Let no time be lost in procuring all that is necessary.

"I enclose a list of things which has been sent to me from Scutari as a suggestion of what ought to belong to every bed, and be in constant readiness."

On the same day that Sidney Herbert wrote this letter, perhaps while he was engaged in writing it, Mr. Roebuck gave notice in the House of Commons of his intention to move for the appointment of a Committee of Inquiry into the conduct of the war. Lord John Russell, without taking any pains to learn from the Duke of Newcastle what had been done to remedy defects of organisation in the Crimea, without ever asking Mr. Herbert what was true and what was false in the published reports from Scutari, without any preliminary communication with the head of the Government, at once sent in his resignation, directly to the Queen as well as to the Prime Minister. On January 31st Lord Aberdeen's Government was overthrown, as narrated in the previous chapter, by an adverse vote of the House of Commons.

The next few days were a period of much excitement and confusion, but in the midst of the turmoil of the crisis, and the preoccupation due to the grave uncertainty he felt as to the course which he ought himself to pursue, Sidney Herbert found time to write letters to Lord W. Paulet, praising as "excellent" his division of the hospital into four parts with an organisation for each; to Dr. Smith, censuring the

appointment of Dr. Lawson to the chief medical command at Scutari; and to Miss Nightingale.

In the reconstituted Cabinet Sidney Herbert became, in accordance with his own wish, Secretary of State for the Colonies. His new office, however, did not abate his interest in his old work, which he hoped still in some measure to continue to perform. How far and for what length of time it would have been practicable for him to do this it is impossible to say, for on February 21st, as has been related in the previous chapter, he quitted the Government in the formation of which he had so recently assisted.

During the interval which elapsed between the resignation of Lord John Russell and Sidney Herbert's own retirement from the Palmerston Administration, as well as for a short subsequent period, letters from the East were still addressed to him as a Minister. Of these the most interesting and important were those which came from Lord William Paulet, Miss Nightingale, and Miss Stanley.

LORD W. PAULET TO MR. HERBERT.

"SCUTARI, *January 17th*, 1855.

"DEAR MR. SIDNEY HERBERT,

"I beg to acknowledge the receipt of your letters dated December 24th and January 1st, and am happy to say, I think the hospitals here are improving; the General Hospital is working as well as possible, and so are the detached, and I am in hopes this, the Scutari Barrack Hospital, which is much improved will soon be in as good order as the others. I found it one immense mass, too large to be systematical. I have divided it into four parts, each to have its separate kitchen and subsidiary kitchen, for cooking the extra comforts required; two of these last are already in work, and I hope to have the other two in work in a few days; there will be about 800 patients in each division, under a first-class staff-surgeon with

a certain number of assistants; and I hope to do away with the confusion that has hitherto existed, more particularly in the cooking and purveying. I have 400 patients in Koolali Barracks, besides the 240 Russian wounded prisoners, which I am trying, with the assistance of the Ambassador, to get sent to join the prisoners now in the arsenal at Constantinople. I have sent Miss Stanley up there in my boat to organise a staff of nurses, ten or a dozen; there are eight more going to Balaklava to-morrow, and, perhaps, a few to Abydos, which I am in hopes will give employment to nearly all that came out; but Miss Nightingale will not undertake more than she has at present. We have admitted about 4,000 sick since December 17th. I am preparing 500 men, in a fair state of convalescence, for Corfu, and hope to get them off in two or three days. I am also constructing a temporary building round the inside square of this barrack hospital, which will accommodate about 1,000, quite upon the French system; it will cost £7,000, but I think it will save expense in the end, as we can supply it from here, and it is better to concentrate our hospitals as much as possible; this will be finished, and I hope fit for occupation, the beginning of February.

. . . . . .

"With regard to your last letter, relative to the stores and baggage for the Army in the custom-house, and not distributed to their proper destination, it is quite true, for it is now overflowing, and I have sent Mr. F. Barker, who arrived here a few days ago as my interpreter, to look after the store and package department *entirely*. I have obtained for him the custom-house seal, and I am going to provide him with a boat; he is to board all vessels arriving, and extricate and transport all goods to their proper destination at once; he is going to clear the custom-house directly, which will be a difficult job, but he seems to understand it, and seems to enter upon it energetically, and I hope will bring to light many valuable stores that have not been forthcoming. I am trying to procure a store as a depôt, and hope to be able to carry out this much-needed operation."

. . . . . .

MR. HERBERT TO LORD W. PAULET.

"BELGRAVE SQUARE, *February 26th*, 1855.

"MY DEAR LORD WILLIAM,

"Though my connection with the Government is now virtually at an end, I still write to say my say, in answer to your last letter.

"I am very glad to hear from you so much better an account of your prospects at Scutari. But I fear you have not made allowance enough yet for an increased influx of patients from the Crimea. The sick have no chance there, and the numbers are still very great there, and though the weather may improve, and the clothing, the huts, and the reduced work may stay the increase of sickness, yet, depend upon it, there are men enough with the seeds of sickness already in them to provide a long list of fresh arrivals for many weeks to come. Add to this the resumption of active hostilities, which may send you down two or three shiploads of wounded any day. You must not, therefore, I should say, relax your efforts to augment your accommodation. To make your hospitals healthy, two out of three beds ought to be removed.

"I observe that you speak of the purveying as still the great deficiency. I cannot understand what Mr. Wreford is about. The fact of *The Times* Fund purveying at all is a condemnation of him. Not that I believe one-quarter of Mr. Macdonald's accounts of his own performances, for Miss Nightingale says he lays claim to a great deal of what the Government does. You must not confound Miss N. with *The Times* people, for she is working for the hospital, and Mr. M. for the honour and glory of his employers.

"But to go back to Mr. Wreford. It seems impossible to make him understand that the business of a purveyor is to purvey. If there is anything wanting in the hospital which is procurable at Constantinople, Mr. Wreford is the responsible and the guilty party. I hear that the French, the other day, bought up at 20*s.* all the blankets which Mr. Wreford had a little before refused at 19*s.*"

Miss Nightingale's letters present a contrast to those of Lord W. Paulet, and may be said to form their com-

plement. If Lord William dwells almost exclusively on the improvements effected, Miss Nightingale as exclusively dwells on the evils still existing. Read together, they probably convey a fairer impression of the existing state of Scutari than would be obtained from the letters of either taken alone. From those of Miss Nightingale it is impossible not to gather that evils existed, of which the Commandant was unaware or deemed inevitable. On the other hand, her reiterated and unsparing censure of every one, almost without exception, who had any part in the working of the hospital cannot be read without producing some involuntary reaction, and inspiring some doubt as to its unqualified accuracy.

It is impossible to speak in too high terms of Miss Nightingale's great qualities and equally great work, but as every medal has its reverse and every picture its shadows, it cannot be denied that these great capacities were accompanied, as they often are, especially in women, by a jealous impatience of any rival authority, and an undue intolerance of all opposition or difference of opinion. The very vehemence of zeal which enabled her to perform so much led her to exaggerate the faults of those who disagreed with her. She gave full rein to the promptings of a somewhat censorious spirit. In the whole of her voluminous correspondence with Sidney Herbert I look in vain for praise or approval of any individual, except herself, Mr. and Mrs. Bracebridge, and two doctors. Every one else, high and low, male and female, Lord Stratford, Lord Raglan, Lady Stratford, Miss Stanley, and all Miss Stanley's companions, Lord William Paulet, Dr. Smith, Dr. Hall, Dr. Cumming, Dr. Menzies, Mr. Filder, Mr. Wreford, and hosts of inferior officers and others, including all her own staff

"except about 16," are denounced with the utmost vigour of expression, not merely as inefficient but as utterly incompetent and incapable. She indeed went so far as to say—and that more than once—that she herself and five others (the Bracebridges and doctors aforesaid) were the only people who cared at all for the sick, or had done anything for their relief.

Mr. Herbert knew his correspondent well, and probably discounted her letters as containing a certain amount of exaggeration. Making every such allowance, there remained enough to show that there was both mismanagement and timidity in the administration of the hospital.

When compared with the great work she did, the blemishes to which I refer are trifles. Her unique and isolated position, the nervous tension due to the strain on the overtaxed brain, engendered irritability and censoriousness which they explain and excuse. It is with reluctance that one perceives what one would rather not see, and would prefer to veil; but in justice to Mr. Herbert this side of Miss Nightingale's character cannot be wholly ignored or forgotten. Her determination to regard Miss Stanley, not as a colleague or assistant, but as a rival, worked mischief, and caused Mr. Herbert much anxiety and pain. Strangely forgetting that she was herself the strongest proof that a lady might be an efficient nurse and a capable administrator, Miss Nightingale protested with the utmost vehemence against the employment of any lady but herself in the hospitals. Her equals they were not, and did not profess to be, but to class such women as Miss Emily Anderson and Miss Shaw Stewart with the idlers who "did nothing except run about after the doctors with

note-books in their hands" was not only unjust but absurd. When, however, passing from these personal matters, we read her masterly delineation of what the organisation of a hospital ought to be, learn how great were the difficulties she overcame, and see how widely beneficial a result has been obtained through her labours, we are lost in admiration, and only desire to forget that her great qualities were combined with some womanly weaknesses.

Miss Stanley's letters give an account of her work first as Superintendent of the General Hospital, and later of her installation as head of the nurses at Kullali, and her work there. The pictures drawn by her, both of the General Hospital and of the commencement of her work at Kullali, are remarkably vivid, and well deserve being quoted.

"*January 17th*, 1855.

". . . She [Miss Emily Anderson] finds the work [at the General Hospital] painfully interesting—such a field for labour, so few hands to do it. Last night I went her evening rounds with her. It is a solemn sight to walk through those corridors by the dim light of the lamps—at intervals stopping at the bedsides of those who were sinking, to feed them with beef-tea or jelly; such a sad sight to see these fine men in the last stage of disease—some sunk into childishness. Round the stoves were congregated the convalescents, some reading to themselves, some reading aloud. Here and there you heard the men in the adjoining beds talking over their battles or their homes. The very sight of our passing along seemed to cheer them. 'Good-night, ladies,' was heard from many a bed. Certainly those who have come out to nurse them *do* undergo hardships and privations. I am fifth in the ladies' room. The only apparatus for cooking for the men (beef-tea, etc.) and for ourselves is one small charcoal stove. We have a dirty mat on the floor, three kitchen chairs, one very small tressel table. I am writing sitting on the floor, making a table of one of the trunks."

"KULALI, *January 29th.*

"The end of our first day's work has come. The doctors have desired to have two nurses each. There are five doctors. At 10 a.m. we were called; each doctor has 125 or 130 patients. It was half-past one before we all met again in our quarters. To my great relief there were no very bad cases of frost-bite, only six very mild ones. The great majority were extreme weakness. There was nothing whatever disagreeable. As soon as we had dined, I had to go and draw the extra diets—*i.e.* take the diet roll and go to the store-room and receive all that my 130 patients required; then to make arrowroot and lemonade; then to go round and feed the men the last thing at night, two hours more. The Turkish carpenters were at work on the ante-room and the kitchen; Greek women scouring the floor. You can scarcely imagine the scene of work. The doctors were very grateful and pleasant, and we all met after our rounds in good spirits, feeling that *at last* we had got to work in good earnest. I shall go round the first day or two, and then I shall confine myself to the general direction. We want just double the number to do the present work as it ought to be done; and what are we to do when the number is doubled? The doctors are worn out, and simply say, 'With such a diet you may use your own discretion; he must be fed, get down all you can.'"

"*January 31st.*

"At 8 o'clock I was up mixing arrowroot for the men who require feeding early. I sent another nurse round the wards. I took the two first days. After breakfast I went to the upper hospital to see the rooms Captain Gordon and Major C. said I might have for the nuns. I came back to hear the despair of the doctors at the prospect of three hundred new patients —not a bed up for them, not a kitchen range. Each hour that passed we hoped they would not come, but I desired a wood fire to be lighted, and a cauldron of hot water prepared. At 12 Mr. Sabine and Mr. Macdonald came from Scutari. At 2.30 Lady Stratford came, and then Lord Napier, and then to my horror I saw two great steamers coming up and anchoring under our windows. However, here I am writing at

9 p.m., and none have been landed, I believe. A request was made to send some hands to sew up mattresses. I had to send the poor exhausted nuns, who, when they had done them, had to go their rounds and feed their people. Our own kitchen is scarcely finished yet, and you may imagine what a state of confusion our ante-room continues to be in, what with workpeople and messes of lemonade, arrowroot, beat-up eggs, rice pudding, etc., going on in every room. The doctors say that if the men recover it will be owing to the nurses, but the mortality is very great. . . . I have written to *implore* Florence to send us some more nurses. . . . As to writing for the men or reading to them, it has been out of the question, except one case. A poor man implored me to write to his mother, and I have been to him this evening and written.

"I am brought to a painful sense of my own inabilities here. I *could* not go through the nursing. I cannot stand the fatigue, and therefore I gave it up at once, and you need not fear my overworking; you know I can be prudent, and I could not nurse and overlook. I learned all I wanted in my two days' going the rounds; I cannot say enough of the tender care the nurses take of me. . . . If it was not for the thoughtful kindness of Lady Stratford I should starve, for I cannot eat the stringy meat and sour bread served out to us as rations."

I am not writing a history of the Crimean War, nor even that of the administration of the military hospitals in the East. My business is to inquire whether any blame rests on Mr. Herbert for their admitted deficiencies, and whether those deficiencies were really quite so great as they were alleged to be. My task ends where Sidney Herbert's official responsibility ceased on his retirement from office.

What is to be remarked is that the defects in the hospitals were not at the outset due to the neglect of the Government, but were, so far as they existed,

caused by the neglect of the instructions of Government by the officials on the spot. That such neglects were rectified the moment their existence was established, and that the reforms were due not to the new Government, but to that of which Sidney Herbert was a member, can also be proved, though as their effect only became visible after Lord Palmerston's installation as Premier, he gained the credit of them. If Miss Nightingale's letters are to be trusted, the progress of improvement went on, in fact, more slowly under Lord Panmure than it had done under the Duke of Newcastle and Mr. Herbert.

But though much real evil resulted from the timidity or inefficiency of those employed at Scutari, there has been great if natural exaggeration as to its extent. The highly coloured pictures of Miss Nightingale are not fully borne out by the testimony of others. Miss Stanley's letters, the tone and temper of which form a very refreshing contrast to those of Miss Nightingale, tell a different and probably a truer story. She fully recognises the humanity and efficiency of many of the medical men, the willing help of many in authority. It is antecedently improbable that Miss Nightingale and the Bracebridges were the only Abdiels in the East, and Mr. Bracebridge himself writes of others very differently from his principal.

According to Miss Nightingale, Lord Raglan, Lord William Paulet, and Sir Andrew Smith were all incapable old women, and Lord Stratford an ill-tempered and heartless old man, whom she had once "forced" into the hospital for three-quarters of an hour, but who had seen nothing and knew nothing of it. Lady Stratford was denounced as a busybody and a hindrance, for whose visits she could see no reason

except that she might say one thing while her husband did another.

In these circumstances it is not strange that there should have been some hesitation in crediting to the full the sensational accounts sent home. But however much this may have been the case, Sidney Herbert went on the safer ground of admitting the possibility of defects, and at once taking measures to remove them.

It can, I think, be clearly shown that every point to which Miss Nightingale or others called attention was carefully attended to, and that if the orders from home had been duly executed, there would have been comparatively little suffering. That they were not always attended to is true, but when this was known at home there was no hesitation shown in removing those who were incapable or untrustworthy. It may be clearly shown, too, that the reform ultimately effected was due to Herbert's initiative and action, though others got the credit of it. It was only in November that real pressure on the hospitals was felt, and the results of that pressure were only known in London in December. Every suggestion made, if not already anticipated, was thoroughly considered and almost always acted on.

During the three months which elapsed between the first arrival of unfavourable reports from the East and his own resignation, Sidney Herbert effected much—how much is in some degree shown by the following letter received by him shortly after he left office. It is one from Mr. Milton, who had been sent out to assist the Purveyor-in-Chief, and succeeded temporarily to that post on Mr. Wreford's retirement:

"I am happy to say," wrote Mr. Milton, "that the hospitals are now in a most satisfactory state. The

Purveyor's stores are amply provided in, I may almost say, everything. Scrubbing brushes and small articles of that class, which we cannot get in Constantinople, are the only items of which we are in need, and that in consequence of accidents which have delayed the vessels in which a stock is coming out. For cleanliness, sweetness of atmosphere, airiness, neatness of bedding, goodness of food—in fact, every requisite of a well-arranged hospital, irrespective of professional points, these hospitals are now perfect models, and yet all the letters I receive from London seem to indicate that the opinion there is that everything is in as bad or nearly as bad a state as in September last, when upwards of 2,000 sick and wounded men were left to be purveyed for by a purveyor and three clerks, while the Purveyor-in-Chief, who was appointed on August 25th, was being sent to his post with his staff *viâ* Gibraltar, was detained three weeks at Cowes waiting for his ship, and reached Scutari on October 13th instead of September 10th, as he might have done if the Treasury would have paid the extra cost of his passage *viâ* France."

. . . . . .

If Miss Nightingale is to be believed, hospital reform made less progress under the "vigorous" Government of Lord Palmerston than under that of his predecessor. More than a year later, in March, 1856, she wrote to Mr. Herbert that though the great diminution in the number of patients made things look better, "there is not a shadow of real improvement in system. All are just as much wedded to everything that was done in the Peninsular War as ever. We pulled this hospital through for four months. That time may, and very likely will, come again next winter, should there be another press of sick anything like the last."

On quitting the Government, Mr. Herbert addressed to Miss Nightingale the following letter:

"BELGRAVE SQUARE, *March 5th*, 1855.

"MY DEAR MISS NIGHTINGALE,

"You will long before this have seen that I am out of office altogether. I have, however, been to Panmure, and had a long talk with him, of which I will give you the result. But first I must say one or two things in explanation of matters in which I think you have been deceived or too much importance has been attached to small details which were not meant to be indications of anything. For example, as regards the latter, there is no doubt that the unwelcome batch of nurses were meant to be under your authority, and the consignment to Dr. Cumming probably arose, for I do not recollect the circumstances, from the same course being pursued with regard to the second batch as had been adopted with the first, who naturally were consigned to Cumming. At that time, moreover, these new additional and distant hospitals did not exist, and all were expecting to work with and under you.

"As regards the agreement with the R.C. sisters, if they have represented that it was not binding on them they have deceived you, as they were bound by it in the same way and to the same extent as those who went out with you. Nor do I think that they were taken *quâ* Roman Catholics, but *quâ* nurses, unless we had refused them on the ground that they were 'sisters,' which it would have been difficult to do, inasmuch as had we refused sisters we should have refused all Roman Catholics, as their work of this kind is all done through persons specially devoted to it, and by them exclusively.

"As regards the nun who has broken the rules and attempts to proselytise, she ought to be dismissed and sent home. It is the only way to work upon the others. The real mistake we made in the selection of these ladies (between ourselves) is that they are Irish. You cannot make their lax minds understand the weight of an obligation.

"Liz[1] will send you the six women. She has them all ready. The Edinburgh ones (there are no Glasgow ones) are in London. They are three in number, and Presbyterians. More were offered, but were not

[1] Mrs. Herbert.

eligible. One nurse is ready from Devonshire Square, and two others from different parts of the country. They are all well recommended, but from all she has seen of paid nurses she has no confidence in any of them as to drinking, though nothing can exceed the testimonials these have got. They will be sent to you in a week's time.

"The Smyrna Civil Hospital Staff have taken out forty nurses—half, paid nurses, half, ladies and unpaid. Dr. Meyer will, after trial, pick out the lady whom he thinks most fitted to act as head at Kullali to succeed Miss Stanley. Liz thinks it will be either Mrs. Munro, Miss Winthrop, or Miss Wear. Miss Winthrop, she thinks, would do admirably. I believe the Smyrna establishment will ultimately move to Mytilene. They are entirely independent, the doctors not being under an Inspector-General, nor even under the Army Medical Board at home. The nurses, of course, independent of you.

"I am disappointed at finding from your letter that Mr. Wreford is still in office. I was in hopes that after what I wrote to Lord W.P. he would certainly have been sent home. He is clearly incompetent. His statement to you that he had no instructions till he got my letter showed that he did not understand his position, my letter being nothing more than an urgent remonstrance with him for not obeying his instructions. The business of a purveyor is to purvey, and he is responsible that everything requisite for a hospital is there.

"I believe, from all I hear, that he and his people lean upon you, and trusting that you will supply deficiencies, and so save the credit of the hospital and their own, they simply neglect their duty.

"My advice to you, founded on what I have heard from impartial sources, is that you should altogether give up purveying. It would, of course, be necessary to give them some days' notice, but they ought to be made to do that for which they are paid, and for which ample resources are placed at their disposal, and be held responsible for any failure. I will go to the War Office and see that stringent orders, founded on past failures, are sent to them.

"This change would relieve you of an immense burden, and give you both time and rest. Your agent,

if a good one, should be made over to the Purveyor for purchasing, etc. I trust also that the Marseilles scheme will have answered, as giving an additional available market. They ought, therefore, to be able to do without you now. This, of course, would not refer to the extras which you have provided, or which have been dispensed through you. But every recognised hospital store, including clothing both for patients and convalescents, and which are authorised by the Government, ought to be provided by or through the Purveyor.

"Panmure talked this matter over with me, and quite agreed that the Purveyor ought to be forced to do his whole duty.

"2ndly. I found that his wish was to separate the different hospitals, so far as the nursing is concerned, now that there are so many and each so distant from the original establishments at Scutari, which were the only ones in existence when the first arrangements were made. He thinks this multiplication of hospitals at some miles' distance makes any real supervision from Scutari impossible, and gives you, therefore, a responsibility without corresponding powers. But he feared to make any change, lest you should think it implied a want of confidence in you, or a want of appreciation of the great services you have rendered and are rendering. Your last letter but one (February 15th) enabled me to say that you had contemplated the possibility of such an arrangement, and that at any rate I would take care to convey to you his real and sincere feelings on the matter, and I told him that you were not a person to take offence at such an arrangement, which would leave you unfettered, and with undiminished powers in the two principal hospitals which have been the theatre of your exertions, and in which you are so much interested. What is more, I feel certain that it will be by far the best arrangement for you, and relieve you of the greatest of all anxieties, namely, the responsibility for actions which are not yours, and for people in whom you have not implicit confidence, and who are too far off to be really under your supervision. You will, therefore, carry on your own system at the two hospitals at Scutari, supported by Dr. Cumming.

"We shall have three medical systems at work

side by side, and shall be able to judge by experience of their relative merits:

"1. The army medical system, recruited in the lowest ranks by civilians, with the temporary rank of assistant surgeon, as at Scutari.

"2. An entirely civil medical staff, with a civilian at the head, and no admixture of army medical officers at all, as at Smyrna.

"3. An army Inspector-General at the head, with civilians in all ranks under him—an experiment which I understand that Dr. A. Smith is anxious to try.

"We shall in the same way have three systems of nurses: yours at Scutari; the Smyrna division, consisting of ladies and paid nurses in equal proportions, without sisters (R.C.); and the Kullali system of mixed religions, conducted otherwise very much on the same plan as the Smyrna—that is, so far as I understand it, which I confess is in a very limited way.

"The civil doctors look to their nurses to do the principal work of the wards, so far as nursing is concerned, as in a London hospital, but they expect to require a larger staff. I take Miss Stanley's system to be the same. It requires delegation of duty to others, which seems to me right, because nothing can be done on any scale without it; but, on the other hand, it exposes the nurses to more temptations and greater risks, and the disadvantage has to be weighed against the advantage. No one is more capable of weighing these than yourself.

"All these changes must necessarily be prospective, as there will be no time for Panmure to write or give instructions by to-day's mail; but I write to-day in order that you may know his views, and be prepared for the change which they will make. I think they will be to your advantage, and place you on a safer and sounder footing in the hospital.

"I am writing to Lord Raglan to-day, and I will ask him to give early notice of sick being sent to you, so that there may be time for preparation; but I do not know that he can give any notice better than your experience can now give, for the influx is steady and even to a fearful degree. Lord W. Paulet cannot overbuild or over-prepare, for even if you do not

get some 2,000 wounded men any day, the crowded state of your hospitals at this moment would make additional accommodation for 3,000 or 4,000 men invaluable.

"Pray continue to write to me for anything you want, which you don't like to say to others. I will do everything I can. I shall never forget how much I owe you for all you have done."

Though Sidney Herbert's official connection with the management of the hospitals in the East had ceased, his interest in their welfare continued unabated. His correspondence with Miss Nightingale was kept up till the end of the war, and his intervention, both at the War Office and in Parliament, was often and successfully resorted to. To the end she was as unsparing of censure and complaint of all around her as at the outset.

"Among all the men here," she asks, on February 5th, 1855, "is there *one* really anxious for the good of these hospitals, *one* who is not an insincere animal at the bottom, who is not thinking of going in with the winning side, whichever that is? I do believe that of all those who have been concerned in the fate of these miserable sick, you and I and Bracebridge are the only ones who really cared for them."

It is needless to point out the exaggeration of such language, which is an uncharitable libel on many earnest and devoted men, who laid down their lives for their patients, though they may not have been large-minded enough to recognise the advantages of the "new method," and an equally unjust reflection on many noble women, animated by as pure a spirit of self-sacrifice as Miss Nightingale herself, though not possessing her powers of organisation.

On February 21st, 1856, she formulated her grievances against the Government, and asked Sidney Herbert to support them publicly by a motion in

the House of Commons for the production of the correspondence. He replied as follows:

47, BELGRAVE SQUARE, *March*, 1856.

"MY DEAR MISS NIGHTINGALE,

"After receiving your two letters I saw Colonel Lefroy and read Dr. Hall's and Mr. Fitzgerald's papers, and your statement in answer to them. I was much pleased with Colonel Lefroy, who talked sensibly, and appears to have succeeded in effecting at the War Department very much what you wish, and what Dr. Hall's proceeding rendered necessary, if you are to maintain any order or discipline among your nurses. A despatch is gone out to General Codrington defining your position as Chief of the nurses for the hospitals in the East, apparently much in the same terms as your first appointment, which was at that time notified to Lord Raglan, but which notification, not having been published, seems to have been unknown to his successor. This, I hope, will effect your object and meet your wishes. Lord Panmure objects to sending the order by telegraph, but as it is on the road out I hope the delay will not be such as to be prejudicial to you. So far one object of your letter is disposed of without any intervention from me, but I may as well add that I observed to Colonel Lefroy that, in sending you out a copy of the order to General Codrington, you ought to be told to give the necessary sub-instructions to your deputies to place themselves immediately under the orders of the P.M.O. of each hospital in which you may have placed them in charge of nurses, just as you yourself are at Scutari or elsewhere, as it would not do for a medical officer to be transmitting his directions to a nurse on the spot through you on the opposite shore of the Black Sea.

"As regards the other matter, namely, the moving in Parliament for the production of papers, I decidedly am against it as matters now stand. In the first place, your object as to the definition and promulgation of your position and authority is attained; secondly, it will always be time to produce papers in your vindication when you are attacked, and so long as there is no public attack upon you, you stand better than you would if publicly attacked and triumphantly

defended. The highest praise, and the highest proof of success which could be adduced to a mission like yours, would be that it had been carried through without producing quarrel or attack. The papers, the publication of which you suggest, would prove, first, that there is great doubt as to the value of the nurses in the eyes of the Chief Medical Officer of the Army, which, however unfounded your answer may show it to be, would have weight with many people. Then his testimony to the superiority of nuns, however unfounded, would to all time be claimed as conclusive by the Roman Catholics; a controversy would be engendered; all who have been or who think themselves offended by or slighted by you would take up the one side, and your friends the other. The Salisbury party and the Stanley party would, of course, take up the Hall and Fitzgerald views, and press their particular cases, and the public, distracted, indolent, and weary, would settle that it was a pack of women quarrelling among themselves, that it is six of one and half a dozen of the other, and that everybody is to blame all round.

"In the estimation of all thinking people, who would give themselves the trouble to inquire, those who thus assail would sink low, but the unreflecting majority would, by dividing the blame to save themselves trouble, lower you a good way towards their level.

"Your position is best so long as no disputes, discussions, or difficulties appear. The longer you can maintain things so the better. If you cannot, *i.e.* if they publish or move in Parliament (which they will not do, I think), it will then be quite time enough for you to occupy your next best position, which is, though in a quarrel, to be in the right. The House of Commons would, I think, be very indisposed to entertain anything on the matter from whatever side it might proceed, and would not be well disposed towards whoever first mooted it.

"Lastly, though your answer to Mr. Fitzgerald appears to me to be complete, as I believe it does also to the War Department, I should be sorry to see it published. And now I am going to criticise and to scold you.

"You have been overdone with your long, anxious, harassing work. You see jealousies and meannesses

all round you. You hear of one-sided, unfair, and unjust reports made of your proceedings, and of those under you. But you overrate their importance, you attribute too much motive to them, and you write upon them with an irritation and a vehemence which detracts very much from the weight which would otherwise attach to what you say. Our friend Bracebridge writes and talks about a Popish plot. I see in Fitzgerald's report nothing more than the unfair, biassed, special pleading report of a narrow-minded religionist. These are misrepresentations and annoyances which all persons in office, and you are in office, are exposed to—a single flower of a sort from which the bed of roses on which Secretaries of State repose is made. The result of your overestimating its value is that you write too warmly on it. The reader, seeing the vehemence of your language, would at once say, 'This is written under great irritation, and I must take the statements with suspicion,' and he chooses for himself what he puts aside as the result of anger, and, perhaps, puts aside just what you most rely upon in your statement.

"You should disprove Mr. Fitzgerald's assertions, not characterise them. If you satisfy the reader that his statements are unfounded, he will supply the inference that Mr. Fitzgerald is a calumniator, and his assertions libels or lies, and he will be the more likely to do so because you do not, for your calmness will have inspired him with confidence in the accuracy of your statements.

"You will have read McNeill's and Colonel Tulloch's Report. It is a signal illustration of what I mean. There is not a hard word in it, or an epithet, not an accusation, scarcely an animadversion, but the sobriety of tone has arrested the attention and conquered the confidence of the public, and they have made the necessary inferences, and pretty broad ones too. The fact is the public like to have something left to their own imagination, and are much pleased with their own sagacity when they have found out what is too obvious to be missed. It is always wise, too, in a public document to understate your case. If on examination your case proves stronger than you have stated it to be, you reap the whole advantage. If, however, any part, however slight, is shaken, the

credit of the whole is shaken with it. My moral is that you must write more calmly, and not yourself accuse or attribute motives to those whose misstatements you may disprove, and whose misconduct you may expose without either, and do it far more effectively too.

"You will pardon this long sermon, for you know why I write it, and I do not think you did yourself justice in the tone of your answer to Mr. Fitzgerald."

Miss Nightingale's later letters to Mr. Herbert abundantly prove two things, both of which are of much importance in connection with the responsibility of the Government at home, and the amount of blame to be imputed to them. They are these: First, that, free as she is with her censure, she has none for the home authorities, except indeed for sending out the second detachment of nurses, a step she denounced with a vigour which shows that she was not withheld by considerations of policy or friendship from censuring the arrangements of the Government when ground for censure in her opinion existed. On the contrary, she has nothing but praise for the orders given, and lays blame *exclusively* on the disobedience and neglect of those orders by the authorities on the spot. Secondly, that if her evidence is to be trusted, or even with the deduction from it of many grains of salt, the administration of Lord Palmerston, which is supposed to set everything to rights, was, with far less excuse, apparently just as unable to carry out its orders or overcome the passive opposition of those at Scutari as Mr. Herbert had been. I say "with far less excuse," because time was not allowed Mr. Herbert to act on the information that he was but imperfectly obeyed, whilst Lord Panmure succeeded to a full knowledge of what was defective and what was requisite.

The credit of a keen perception of the evils existing and the means of remedying them must be assigned to Florence Nightingale. The credit of recognising the practical value of her ideas and of enabling her to give practical effect to them belongs to Sidney Herbert.

It will be noticed that in this chapter I have made no mention of the hospitals in the Crimea itself. I have not done so because their administration was in no respect under Mr. Herbert's control, nor did he attempt any interference with them. There was perhaps more to complain of in their condition and management than was ever the case at Scutari—indeed, much of the mortality at Scutari was due to the condition in which the sick arrived there from Balaclava. But into an examination of that condition and its causes it is no part of my duty to enter, nor on what individuals, if blame is to be imputed, that blame should rest is it my business to inquire. My part is done when I have shown that no man could well have worked more energetically than Mr. Herbert did to ascertain and to correct whatever was amiss in the establishments really subject to his supervision.

CHAPTER XI

SESSION OF 1855

SHORTLY before the fall of Lord Aberdeen's Government the acceptance by Russia of the four points which the Allied Powers held to be the necessary basis of any treaty of peace rendered further negotiation indispensable to define their practical application, and a Conference was opened at Vienna for the purpose. These negotiations proved abortive, nor are we directly concerned with their conduct, except in so far as it affected Mr. Herbert and his position in the House of Commons and the country.

It is enough to say that while terms for carrying out the first two points, relative to the Roumanian Principalities and the free navigation of the Danube, were easily arranged, the questions raised by the third point—the cessation of Russian naval preponderance in the Black Sea—proved insoluble.

England and France proposed that this object should be attained either by limiting the number of ships to be maintained by Russia in the Black Sea, or by rendering that sea an exclusively commercial one, from which all ships of war, of whatever nation, were banished. These propositions were rejected by Russia, and an offer made by her that a certain number of ships of foreign nations should be admitted, was equally rejected by the Conference. A further

proposition to throw open the Black Sea to the ships of all nations, leaving the opening or closing of the Bosphorus entirely to the discretion of the Porte, appeared to the Austrian Government to offer a way to a satisfactory understanding. In this opinion M. Drouyn de l'Huys, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, who represented the Emperor Louis Napoleon at the Conference, and Lord John Russell, the British Plenipotentiary, both concurred, and undertook to press the acceptance of the proposal on their respective Governments. In the event of its refusal by Russia, Austria engaged to unite with the Allies in the prosecution of active hostilities.

The French Emperor was not at first disinclined to listen to the Austrian proposal, but the representations of Marshal Vaillant that to make peace without taking Sebastopol would dissatisfy the Army, coupled with the persistent entreaties of Lord Cowley that he would not run counter to the wishes of the English Cabinet, overcame his hesitation, and induced him to reject the suggestions of Austria. By the English Government they had, from the first, been decidedly disapproved.

M. Drouyn de l'Huys at once resigned his office. Lord John did not resign,[1] and after a not very strenuous effort to persuade his colleagues to accept the Austrian overtures, concurred in their rejection.

After Lord John Russell's return to England, Mr. Milner Gibson gave notice in the House of Commons of a Resolution lamenting the failure of the negotiations, and expressing an opinion that the propositions made by Russia "contain elements for renewed

[1] This is so; but it is only due to Lord John to add that he, at first, intended to resign, though he made the grave mistake of allowing himself to be persuaded not to do so.

negotiation, and may offer the means of obtaining an honourable and satisfactory peace."

This motion, if not suggested by Mr. Gladstone, was at all events warmly supported by him, and also received encouragement from the little conclave which used to meet at Argyll House, and from which on that occasion Sidney Herbert was absent. On hearing what had passed there, he expressed strong disapprobation. He wrote to Mr. Gladstone that he was in great difficulty as to Gibson's motion, which he thought most unfortunate in the interests of peace, and that he wished Grey and Gibson were at the bottom of the sea. "There is every risk of their protracting the war indefinitely. Individually, your co-operation with the Manchester School will place you further than ever from Lord Derby."

At the same time he admitted, in writing to his wife, that while he thought—

"there was every reason why Mr. Milner Gibson's motion should not have been brought forward, there could be no doubt that his position was founded on truth, for the Russians offered us better terms than we asked, and the Government ought to have closed with them, especially when our own plenipotentiary and the French approved of them."

He added that he had written to Lord Aberdeen all that occurred to him which could be said against the motion. That letter was as follows:

"WARMINSTER, *May 17th*, 1855.

"I hear that Gladstone and Graham have, with your concurrence, decided on giving their support by speech and vote to Mr. Milner Gibson's motion. This is a great weight of authority, and yet I confess it appears to me to be an ill-advised course.

"My absence has, unfortunately, prevented my hearing the reasons in favour of it, nor am I aware what course the Opposition intend to take; which

is a material element in the case. If they adopt the motion, turn out the Government, and form another on the avowed intention of at once closing with the Russian terms, that alters the whole case, and we have another and a different question to decide; but I apprehend Lord Derby's speech on the Vienna conferences is too recent for such a course as this, let alone the support of Ellenborough. We may think the Russian terms all that in fairness they could be asked to yield, and we may wish *liberare animas nostras* on that head, and disengage ourselves from the responsibility for the continuance of the war, and we may wish to criticise and blame the Government where we think blame is due. But we are bound to look further, and weigh what will be the consequences of our proceeding on Russia, on the Government here, and on the English public.

"Lord Heytesbury, who was opposed to the war from the beginning, makes a criticism on Lord Grey's motion, which, of course, equally applies to Mr. Milner Gibson's. He says, and says justly, that the effect of these divided counsels on Russia will be to raise her terms in proportion as she thinks that a strong party in England are willing for peace on any terms. Reservations in speeches will be as nothing against the fact that two or three men of the first rank in politics have declared for and voted with the Manchester school on the subject of peace. But as England cannot afford to make peace on terms worse than those she has now rejected, the end of the war will be indefinitely postponed—postponed till we can, by actual military success, re-attain the terms which have now been yielded by Russia to the apprehensions excited by the unanimity and determined attitude of the whole English nation.

"What will be the effect on the Government? It is not necessary to be very warlike as against the mere Manchester school. Their doctrines are supposed to be so extravagant as to carry with them their own refutation, but if they are joined by a few powerful men, the Government must draw fresh support from the war party, must bid higher for them, and must excite and evoke the war spirit in the people to enable them to carry it on. We shall pledge them deeper and deeper.

"But the Government are not the only people we shall pledge. We shall force a declaration from the whole British nation which they will afterwards be ashamed to retract. If we want to act on public opinion, we are too soon. The public are hurt and ashamed at the non-success of our arms. The national honour is wounded. One of two things must happen. Either there will be success, which will enable them at once to make peace on liberal terms, or there will be failure, which will teach them to close with such terms as they can get. The Manchester school have no influence on public opinion on this question of peace and war. Why? Because they talked too much. They never sympathised with the people in their indignation, which, though exaggerated, was just. They forgot that the people have flesh and blood, and they propounded theories to men who were swayed by national feeling. We, Peelites, who are called *doctrinaires*, are accused of a similar failing. We shall lose our influence for peace, when the real occasion arises, if we make ourselves its advocates in company with those who have already injured the cause by their fanaticism.

"I think the Government were wrong in not taking the Russian terms, and I would have defended them stoutly if they had. But they would have been hooted out of office. Nevertheless the prize would have been worth the price paid. We should have had a peace.

"But now, so far from getting a peace, we shall make it more impossible and more distant than before. We shall pledge the country and the Government to more violent courses, while we shall have encouraged Russia, by the sight of our divisions, to hold out for better terms—terms which an excited majority will not grant. This is what appears to me to lie on the face of the matter. I admit all that can be said against the Government for their management of the Conferences, but our object is not to show that they are wrong, but to help them to get right, not for their sakes, but for the sake of the country.

"Would you show this to Gladstone, and to Graham, if he cares to see it?

"I come up to town on Saturday morning, and shall come to no decision as to my own course till I have communicated with you, Graham, and Gladstone."

At a subsequent meeting at Argyll House he stated his intention not to vote for the motion, and to endeavour to prevent its discussion.

Mr. Gladstone, Sir James Graham, and others were already pledged to support Mr. Gibson's resolution, and in these circumstances it was thought better by Lord Aberdeen that the motion should be withdrawn, rather than that the rift among the friends of peace should be brought into glaring prominence. As it happened, the Government was also in a condition of embarrassment with regard to the motion, for in any debate upon the terms of peace it was felt that it would be equally difficult for Lord John Russell either to conceal his acquiescence in the Austrian proposal, or to avow it. When, therefore, Mr. Herbert proposed to Lord Palmerston that, in the event of an assurance being given that negotiations were still pending, an effort should be made to avert discussion, his overture was eagerly closed with.

Mr. Gladstone had expressed a general acquiescence in the expediency of postponing the discussion, but had left Argyll House before any plan for securing that postponement had been adopted. When its nature was explained to him by Mr. Herbert on the following morning, which was that of the day fixed for the debate itself, Mr. Gladstone's annoyance and dissatisfaction were extreme. He expressed his disapproval of the proposed proceedings in terms so strong as to provoke a sharp retort, followed by an equally hot rejoinder. The two friends parted in anger, and for the first time a coolness arose between them. Meantime, rumours gained currency as to Lord John Russell's willingness to make peace at Vienna, the schism in the Peelite ranks, and the negotiations for the suppression of Mr. Gibson's

motion. Though unauthenticated, it was felt that these rumours were based on truth, and the scene in the House of Commons when it met on May 21st was one of unusual animation. The House, which was said by Mr. Disraeli, in his subsequent speech, to be more completely filled than it had been for years, was excited and curious, and its curiosity was increased when it was observed that Gladstone and Herbert, though on the same bench, were not as usual seated side by side. The first order on the paper was Mr. Gibson's Resolution, but before he could move it Sidney Herbert rose and, amid a profound silence, asked Lord Palmerston whether the negotiations at Vienna had terminated? Having received an answer—in the circumstances, hardly an honest one[1]—that they had not, he announced his intention of moving the previous question if the Resolutions were pressed.

Mr. Gladstone then interposed, and urged Mr. Gibson to withdraw his motion for a season, at the same time intimating that it had been his own intention to vote for it, and his concurrence in the opinions it expressed. The withdrawal of the Resolution was further urged by Lord Harry Vane, who had promised to second it, and by Mr. Bright, as to the sincerity of whose entire agreement with Mr. Gibson's sentiments no doubt could be entertained. The allegation that the Conference was not closed and that propositions from Austria were still anticipated afforded a plausible excuse for the withdrawal of Mr. Gibson's motion, as had been arranged with him on the day before. But if this result was acceptable to the Government

[1] Hardly an honest one, for, though the Conferences were not formally closed till June 2nd all negotiations had ceased on the rejection of the Austrian proposals at the end of April.

and to Mr. Herbert, it caused disappointment to the Opposition, who desired not only to embarrass and annoy the Government, but at the same time to discredit the Peelite friends of peace by identifying them with the extreme Manchester school. In urging Mr. Gibson to persevere, Mr. Disraeli exceeded himself in venomous insinuation, while Mr. Roebuck indulged in invectives of the most extravagant character with the same purpose, but in vain. The withdrawal of the motion being agreed to by Mr. Gibson, the discussion (technically on the question of adjournment) ceased to possess interest or importance, and, after several consecutive speeches from comparatively obscure members, before a rapidly diminishing audience, finally expired in a comparatively thin house.

But though Mr. Milner Gibson's motion was withdrawn, debate on the negotiations could not be wholly suppressed. The Opposition was not disposed to forego the possibility of snatching a victory and the certainty of causing their opponents grave embarrassment, which a censure on the conduct of the Vienna Conference afforded. Mr. Disraeli immediately gave notice of a Resolution condemnatory of "the ambiguous language and uncertain conduct" of the Government. This Resolution, moved on May 24th, was defeated by a majority of 100 in favour of a colourless amendment moved by Sir F. Baring containing a simple expression of regret at the failure of the negotiations and a pledge to support the Crown in the prosecution of the war. Though Mr. Gladstone had urged the withdrawal of Mr. Gibson's motion, which he regarded as a less evil than its rejection by an overwhelming majority, in which friends of his own would be included, he had done so with reluctance, for he

believed that its terms were strictly in accordance with facts; that the negotiations were practically at an end; and that the moral effect of the debate might be favourable to the cause of peace; in all which suppositions he was abundantly justified. He was therefore glad of the opportunity afforded him, and in the course of the debate he again spoke strongly in favour of peace. He was answered by Lord John Russell, who gave no hint of his own views, and denounced the inadequacy of terms which when at Vienna he had believed, and, as he subsequently admitted, still believed—in the words of Mr. Milner Gibson's motion—to "offer the means of obtaining an honourable and satisfactory peace."

Immediately after the debate Mr. Gladstone left town for Hawarden without further communication with Mr. Herbert. A week after the debate, on May 27th, Mr. Herbert made the first advance towards reconciliation.

"We two," he wrote, "have had a quarrel for the first time in our lives. I read somewhere the other day that such differences so frequently arise from misunderstanding the events and motives from which they arise, that a misunderstanding has become the synonym for a quarrel. Between two men having respect and affection for one another a frank explanation is safest and best. I was annoyed and hurt at the arrangement made with Milner Gibson in my absence. I have no liking for the Manchester school or the men of whom it is composed, and I was not pleased to find myself, through others, but without my own consent, committed to a co-operation which is called a coalition (without reason, but still called so), and of which the whole advantage must be derived by them and all the disrepute must be reaped by us. Accidental circumstances assisted this impression on the public mind, among others Arthur Gordon's speech and vote on ballot, which threw Mr. Bright into a frenzy of delight. But for the purposes

of peace these are the very men we ought to avoid. They are damaged on the subject of peace. They are held to prefer cotton to honour—and so they do. Nobody will listen to Bright on the subject of peace. It is not that his advice is suspected, but it is known to be valueless, because he starts from a different point, and has different objects from his countrymen. On this subject he is not an Englishman. Gibson and he are, as Graham would say, *alter egos*. They are tarred with the same brush. As advocates for ending the war they are out of court, for they were against beginning it.

"It was our interest, as it appeared to me, if we are to advocate peace, to keep clear of these men. We want an honourable peace. They want peace honourable or not. They can vote for anything we wish. We cannot vote for everything they wish. Gibson, who probably cares more about Manchester and his own position than about peace or war, and thought to gain reputation by heading the movement, was just the man, next to Bright, whom it was necessary to keep in the background.

"I think Graham sees this now; Lord Aberdeen frankly admitted it to me. That was my grievance. Now for yours. I told Lord Aberdeen and Graham frankly that I could not and would not vote for Mr. Gibson's motion. I see by a note of your wife's that you are under the impression that I had taken the step of announcing my intention of moving the previous question to Palmerston, or indeed of moving it at all without the knowledge of any of our friends. Cardwell was present. I walked away from Argyll House with him. I had previously to leaving it stated my intention. Lord Aberdeen thought it a good way out of a difficulty and a danger, which he admitted. Graham did not express himself otherwise. I stated that I must ascertain whether I could get one side of the House or the other to vote for the previous question. I saw Graham next morning, told him the result, and he then thought it a good arrangement, and talked the matter over without expressing a shadow of surprise or disapproval. Lord Aberdeen later, and after he had seen you, merely expressed regret that you had not known it. I simply overlooked this at the time. You left our meeting early,

and before we had discussed the point at issue. But, so little had the fact of your departure before the discussion struck me, that I confess I never was more surprised than by your annoyance the next day, when I came to tell you what had passed.

"No one can doubt my object. You, I believe, still think the result was a bad one. I still think that we all profited very much by it. We cannot afford to get mixed up with the Manchester men, and we cannot afford, in the interests of peace, to let them get possession of the question which their advocacy is sure to damage. We cannot help their aiding us, their aid may even be useful, but it must be clear that they are aiding our opinions, and not we theirs. They cannot object to a peace because it is honourable, though we can and do object to any peace which is not honourable—which they do not. This is the whole story. I am heartily sorry that on such a subject at such a moment we should have had this difference. I believe neither of us meant to disregard the feelings or opinions of the other. I trust most earnestly that it may not leave any lasting trace on our friendship one for the other.

"Yours affectionately."

Mr. Gladstone replied:

"HAWARDEN, *May 30th*, 1855.

"With respect to the 'unpleasantness' of Monday week, my task is a very simple one, for it amounts to little more than repeating what I wrote down hastily with respect to a letter of Mrs. Herbert's. The thing I most wish you to understand is that I never dreamt of setting up any claim for myself in this matter, or of pursuing any line of action apart from Lord Aberdeen and Sir James Graham. You appear to have thought me solely or specially responsible for Milner Gibson's motion, and for the resolution to support it. I was neither. As to the motion, Graham had more to do with it than I had; for, as I afterwards learned, he amended it; as to the support, I simply deliberated and resolved in common with him and Lord A. I may add that I previously understood Cardwell to have declared to me his intention to speak and vote for the motion. All this I explain not because

I want to throw responsibility on others, but because I think I should have committed a wrong towards you if the case had stood as you, from some cause or other, have supposed.

"Again, with respect to the withdrawal of Gibson's motion, I most highly approved of it, but was entitled to none of (what I should call) the credit of it; for I scarcely ventured to hint in conversation with Gibson at the possibility of such a thing, and can by no means say that I proposed it to him; but Graham made the suggestion to Lord Aberdeen, only seconded by me, which led Gibson to agree.

"I hope, therefore, that you will see that there has been on my part no breach of duty towards you. Whether we are all three guilty jointly in such a matter is another question which I need not now enter—it is enough for me to say that I have not understood you to complain in this sense.

"Now as to the other side. My 'regret, surprise, and pain,' when you announced to me your arrangement with Lord Palmerston, were certainly so ample that they might have been drawn from the stores of Sir John Pakington; but had I believed or known that you were acting with the concurrence, however qualified, of Lord Aberdeen and Graham, however I might have differed, I should never have thought of using the language of complaint—*even* apart from your assurance that you did not advert to my being asent at the time when you introduced your project. You will therefore see, even from what I wrote last week, that after what you tell me of your communications with others, my complaint is non-existent, and if I rightly understand yours, I hope I may assume the same with respect to it.

"In matters of this kind, truth must be observed with even an especial rigour. I have therefore spoken out plainly all I have to say, and I will add that even if after explanation we differed in our views of our respective obligations, it could not alter my feelings towards you, for I should still bear in mind that I was contending with a person whose qualifications for settling any question of relative duty are in my judgment incomparably superior to my own.

"I have only further to ask that if anything on my part remains unexplained, you will state it without

hesitation. For me, in this higher point of view, the question will be as if it had never been.

"The mere difference of opinion on a question of Parliamentary tactics is altogether a different affair, and may be prosecuted or not as suits our convenience. I do not altogether adopt your view of our relations to the Manchester men as regards the question of peace and war. They have certain rights of priority which we cannot wholly overlook. Is it not something that they concur in measures which express our opinions rather than theirs, and while that is the case are we not bound to recognise them as persons entitled to be consulted? But do not take the trouble to answer.

"I suppose you have read the Administration Reform Address. It is, I think, a very poor affair.

"Your letter only came to-day."

This characteristic letter brought about the resumption of their former relations of cordial friendship and familiar intimacy; unreservedly and at once on Mr. Herbert's part. The impression made on Mr. Gladstone by the incident was not quite so quickly effaced.

The amendment of Sir F. Baring having become by its adoption the substantive motion before the House, proposals further to amend it were made by Mr. Lowe and Sir W. Heathcote, the one in a warlike, the other in a pacific sense. Their consideration was, however, adjourned until after the short Whitsuntide recess, and an animated correspondence took place between Mr. Herbert and his friends as to the course which should be adopted in Parliament with respect to them.

MR. HERBERT TO MR. GLADSTONE.

"WILTON HOUSE, *May 28th*, 1855.

"I enclose a letter from Evelyn Denison, who called on you on Saturday a few hours after you—and on me a few hours before I—left town, and his talk is as follows: He is anxious for peace; believes both

sides of the House wish for the same thing, but both afraid of public opinion, which is ignorantly running the other way. Thinks either side will end by giving peace if not prematurely pledged and committed against it. Either side therefore requires indulgence and help to keep them straight. From this he deduces that we ought to vote against Lowe, and force a division, because as he makes an affirmative war proposal, we have in negativing it an immense advantage. But he would not divide against the first part of his amendment, because he thinks it a matter of fact which, however disputable, if you look upon it as a history of motives rather than of events, yet is so much a fact that the questioning it would not be intelligible, and would bear the aspect of a determination to prove Russia in the right and ourselves in the wrong in every particular, and would thus destroy our ἦθος for peace purposes. (In this I agree.) Dividing against the second part, we should have the advantage of bringing to bear not only those who, like ourselves, are ready to declare for peace, but those who are not ready to pledge themselves to war without a term. We should thus secure a majority, which, in all practical movements, is of immense importance as influencing the subsequent conduct of so many men. Having achieved this victory, having brought the Government and the House together against a distinct war proposition, Denison wishes to stop there, and not to press Heathcote's amendment. I do not know what your views would be upon this, but I should think you would be against the latter part of it. Graham, I should guess by his repeated expression of the advantage gained by fighting the peace battle on a resolution affirmative of war, would incline to Denison's view.

"It is open to discussion. We must have a Resolution affirmative of peace sooner or later, and we have it now in Heathcote's hands, and not in Gibson's, which I think is a great advantage.

"I think our debate next week will be productive of much good. We have had but one speech yet, and the subject is one which even you cannot exhaust in one speech. We have fresh ground to open, delicate but still available with nice handling, as

regards our alliances. France does not like the war, and we must not exhaust French friendship by taxing it too heavily. Turkey herself, as well as her friendship, is well nigh exhausted. She has always had a strong Russian party, and the jealousy of this moment I take it roused more . . . by her allies than by her enemy. . . . I have written very hurriedly, for I have had to preside at a dinner of the County F.S., and time is short. Lord John, whom I saw in a cloak-room as we came away, protested that we had entirely mistaken his meaning. I was glad to hear him say so, and he should lose no time in clearing it up."

MR. GLADSTONE TO MR. HERBERT.

"HAWARDEN, *May 30th*, 1855.

"You have omitted to send me Denison's letter, but I daresay it does not add much to your statement. I will give you my opinions, such as they are; both fragmentary and, even as fragments, subject to correction.

"It seems to me that the question as to Heathcote's amendment must remain open until Lowe's is disposed of, or the course to be taken on it and the probable result in view, so I think he considers it himself. It is, however, an element of this part of the case that we virtually substituted him for Gibson, and requested Gibson to support him, so that he may fairly claim a voice in the question.

"I have some hope that Heathcote will, before we meet, ascertain more than we now know about the views of the Opposition.

"Denison proposes simply to vote with the Government (1) for Lowe's first words, (2) against his second.

"As at present advised, I strongly dissent from the first part of this proposal for the following reasons:

"(1) There is no leading statesman of whom I have so much distrust with respect to the war as Lord Palmerston; and it does not recommend a vote to me that it is to be given under his guidance.

"(2) These words, while they purport to be a recital of fact, are in reality more, and are a judgment by implication upon right, partially and obliquely condemning the Russian refusal to limit, and tacitly approving the conduct of our negotiators.

"(3) As a recital of fact they are, I think, untrue, certainly most disputable, and, therefore, not fit to be made the subject of an affirmation by Parliament.

"(4) They point to limitation as the hinge of peace and war, and it is a bad hinge.

"(5) The objection which I understood Disraeli to take is the broadest and the best, namely, that it is most unwise for the House of Commons, in any manner, to indicate or meddle with particular conditions of peace.

"These reasons seem to me more than enough for their purpose. In voting against Lowe's words we *shall*, I conceive, 'fight the peace battle on a resolution affirmative of war,' and, therefore, I admit that this involves the possibility that the Government might so treat it if beaten, and might think of dissolution, yet the answer is, can we undertake to vote with them on peace and war simply; and, if we are ever to differ, is it possible to differ on a better point than this very ill-chosen affirmation of Lowe's?

"Individually I am very much committed—for I have already declaimed against Lowe's amendment as a whole. This would, I think, at least entail on me the necessity of absenting myself if Graham and you come to the conclusion, which I hope you will not, that Lowe's first words ought to be accepted.

"I presume the Opposition will most probably vote against these words.

"Lord John's position is thoroughly false. With opinions for peace he has to make speeches for war. How *can* he be intelligible? The more debates we have, the deeper he will get—unless, indeed, he gets so deep as to feel obliged to extricate himself by a valorous act. But by all means let us have the explanation.

"I quite agree with you as to the discussion—which is in fact only just begun. The subject has got, really, to be unfolded. What do the Government mean to *do*? Do they mean to stop at limitation when Sebastopol and the Crimea are taken, which I should think may now be events not very far off? Will they be able to stop at it? And if they do, will they be a bit nearer getting it? Will not all those who say Sebastopol must fall also say there must be a covenant not to rebuild it or anything like it?

"I have no intention of going up in any case before Monday, but, unless there is a practical question to consider, I shall not go then—for the debate will last through the week, and I should gladly let a night or two of it run off.

"To save writing, without losing time, I send this through Lord Aberdeen, on its way to Wilton, and remain, etc.

"PS.—The way I look at limitation is this. If I were a Russian I do not think I could be brought to consent to it with a view to the redemption of the Crimea and liberation of the Sea of Azof, and it seems safe to give them credit for at least the same amount of feeling in such a matter. I think Lowe ought, on no account, to be permitted to withdraw or alter unless there be some change of facts to make it proper."

MR. HERBERT TO MR. GLADSTONE.

"WILTON HOUSE, *June 1st*, 1855.

"I enclose Denison's letter, which I stupidly omitted. I take Denison's state of mind fairly to represent that of the mass of those who are now inclined to peace. They are not yet ready for any very decided declaration of opinion. They want a little more sun to ripen them. The fact is, we have called upon them rather too soon. As regards Lowe's first words, I confess I feel great repugnance to opposing them. The words are true, though it may be true that the voting them implies a censure on Russia, and is meant to convey that it was through her fault that negotiations were broken off. This, as you say, is disputable, but opposing the words will have the opposite appearance—that we think that Russia was in the right and England in the wrong, which, as original parties to limitation, it would be very strong for us to say. Logically, it may be so, but even if true, which I doubt, to the full extent of the censure which the vote would convey, I should feel the same repugnance to declaring it that I should to voting that the Russians had the best of the battle of Balaclava, and showed themselves the more skilful soldiers of the two, which I believe they did.

"The vote seems to me to bear so much the aspect

of partisanship with Russia, that it would put us so thoroughly in the wrong with the public that we should lose all power of influencing them hereafter, at least on this question. However, I write, as you do, fragmentary first impressions subject to correction.

"Have you read *The Times* correspondent in yesterday's *Times* (31st) on the non-supply of water? It may, of course, cut both ways, though as long as the Russians are in possession of Inkerman they can supply the limited area of Sevastopol without difficulty from the north of the Tchernaia. Behind, they have the Katchka and Belbek and the rivulets which feed them. But all McMurdo's transport will hardly supply the besieging army over the whole Chersonese from the Tchernaia, though we have undisturbed possession of both banks.

"I confess I differ from you about military success. I long for it, and I am conscious that were I in the Cabinet the prospect of getting or not getting it would materially influence my decision as to closing with particular terms. It is not for military glory, but for something more solid, that military success would be valuable. For European England the matter may not be so important, but for Asiatic England surrounded by hostile Oriental nations with old scores to wipe off, a successful military termination of the war is important. They will neither weigh nor understand the terms of peace, but they do understand military success. It is something *occulis subjecta fidelibus*, and they do understand failure, and will greatly exaggerate its value, and act accordingly.

"The Russians are pledged to the terms which affect Germany, and those are the whole terms. They cannot, therefore, withdraw from them, and I set so little store upon the third point that I would sooner have military success without it, than apparent failure with it. I know your argument against this, but I must honestly admit, as I did at Argyll House the other day, that I share the feeling about the value of success. I think it a solid guarantee for the future, *if you can get it.* But that is my doubt, and without information which is reliable, it is difficult to form an opinion which can assume even to one's self any character better than that of hope, a guess, or a fear and a guess combined.

"I spent yesterday at our County Hospital, where a late change of dynasty through the death of the matron has produced an investigation showing great need of administrative reform. It is singular how long great mismanagement may go on, unknown and undetected, together with perfect publicity of administration. All the details of shortcomings at Scutari over again."

And the same day he wrote to Sir James Graham:

"WILTON, *June 1st*, 1855.

"MY DEAR GRAHAM,

"I have a letter to-day from Gladstone, who doubts his being in London as soon as Monday or even Tuesday, reckoning on the debate lasting the week. My expectation is that we shall divide on Tuesday. In the meantime, however, we must make up our minds as to the course to be taken upon the different amendments, which will be separately voted upon.

"I sent to Gladstone a letter from Evelyn Denison, who is anxious for peace, but likewise most anxious not to compromise its prospects by any false step. He is for fighting the battle on Lowe's motion, and on that alone, for these reasons: (1) That you will have the Government dividing against war, which is valuable. (2) That having got a majority against a warlike proposition, you had better not sacrifice that advantage by going into a very small minority for peace. He proposes further to vote for Lowe's first words if they are opposed, and against the second.

"Now, as regards the latter portion of his argument I, on the whole, agree with it. I take it first because it stands first in the order of voting. How to treat Lowe's assertion that the Conference was broken off owing to the Russians rejecting the third point, the assertion is true, but it is meant to imply censure on Russia for so rejecting. If we oppose it, we shall be held to imply censure on England for pressing or adhering to it, we having been parties to the said third point.

"It seems to me that this would have the appearance of such partisanship with Russia as would put us in the wrong, and would destroy our influence on

the question hereafter. Gladstone, however, thinks himself committed to oppose those words.

"As regards the other question, namely, the voting on Heathcote or contenting ourselves with negativing Lowe, I think we should hardly assert ourselves sufficiently were we to adopt the latter course; voting with Palmerston against Lowe after his (Palmerston's) speech hardly means anything in a peace sense. All these reflections I make as they occur to me and for consideration.

"No step should be taken without great consideration; as it is we have 'come too soon.' The strong national feeling excited has not yet cooled down to a just appreciation of the national interests. The one error of Gladstone's masterly speech was the over-statement of the argument against military success. It was philosophical and logical, but it ignored the deep-seated national military spirit. Military success, too, means more than military glory. With Asiatics it is more important than all the four points together, and we have Asiatics surrounding our Indian empire and watching this struggle with intense interest and undisguised bias, looking to see whether the Russian or the English is the invincible warrior, and ready to intrigue, plot, and fight according to the result. I frankly repeat what I admitted at Lord Aberdeen's the other day, that, were I in the Cabinet, the prospect of military success or failure would weigh very much with me in the decision at which I would arrive as to the terms and the time for peace. I believe the destruction of Sevastopol with no third point would be a more lasting guarantee than the whole third point and more, under present circumstances. I do not mean that the fact of the destruction of the fortress is so important, as the superiority in arms which it would establish. The difficulty is to know what are the prospects of a military success. The Sea of Azoff is all important; the want of water, on the other hand, seems insuperable, and while the Russians remain on the sources of the Alma, Katcha, and Belbec, the advantage seems our own."

When, after the recess, Mr. Lowe's Amendment came on for discussion, it was, after three nights' animated

debate, withdrawn, and Sir Francis Baring's Resolution unanimously adopted by the House. But during the course of the debate speeches had been made which had widened the division between the Government and the friends of peace. Mr. Gladstone, in a speech of extraordinary power, pointed out both the reasons which justified the beginning of the war and those which, now that its objects were attained, called for its close. Cobden and Bright, who had opposed the war from the beginning, had no inconsistency to explain in preaching peace. Sir James Graham urged weighty arguments in sentences singularly terse and clear; and Lord John Russell again forgot himself so far as to declare "nugatory and meagre" the very propositions he thought should have been accepted. On the third night of the debate Mr. Herbert spoke. His speech was one of his happiest oratorical efforts.

He began by disposing of the argument that to make peace before taking Sebastopol would be disgraceful. If so, why was it not made one of the four points, and what would have happened if Russia had accepted the British proposal of limitation at Vienna? Would peace have been made, or war continued for an unavowed object? He warned the House not to confound the operations of a war with the objects of a war. "The operations of war are conducted with a view to force your antagonist to agree to peace. When at war, injure her, humble her, crush her if you can. But when you contemplate peace, you stand on different ground, . . . you are dealing with those who are about to become friends. You may mistrust them, bind them, tie their hands, but do not try to humble and insult those whom you hope may become your friends."

After describing the different divisions of both the

war party and the peace party, he addressed himself to the question, "How can you who were advocates for beginning war now advocate peace?" He declared that he still thought the war justifiable. "In no spirit of levity, and not without weighty consideration, I came to the conclusion that my voice should be given in favour of a declaration of war. I justify it to myself by the magnitude of the objects we sought to obtain." He then stated those objects in detail, and said: "When you ask me how you who were for war are now for peace, I ask, 'How can we be for war when those objects are obtained or are obtainable?' Nay, I ask further, 'How can you pretend that those objects are worthless and of insufficient value for peace, and yet justify the war?'"

Meanwhile, the Committee of Inquiry had been pursuing its lengthy course. It had not justified the fears of Sir James Graham and Mr. Gladstone. It had shown no revolutionary tendency. It had provoked many inconvenient and a few dangerous disclosures, but its inquiries had not on the whole been conducted with imprudence. On the other hand, it had amply justified those who had predicted that, as regarded the conduct of military operations, the information it would elicit must necessarily be imperfect and incomplete. This was, indeed, admitted in the very first paragraph of the Report of the Committee itself. None of the military or naval chiefs, none of their Headquarter Staff, were examined by the Committee; of course, in the circumstances they could not be. They were necessarily absent in the discharge of their duties. But their place and the absence of their evidence were hardly supplied by the reflections and criticisms of company officers and subalterns, or by the gossip of travellers who had spent a few days

before Sebastopol, even though the august initials M.P. were appended to their names.

Sidney Herbert was one of the last witnesses examined. He appeared before the Committee on May 9th, and was under examination for the greater part of the day. His answers, given frankly and without hesitation, and with perfect openness and ease, produced a most favourable impression, and when he left the room it had become clear, even to the Chairman, who had commenced his interrogations with his accustomed acrimony, that whoever else was in fault, or wherever else blame might be, it did not rest on him who had toiled unremittingly and successfully to remedy defects and hinder their recurrence. When, a couple of months later, Mr. Roebuck moved a vote of censure on the Ministers of 1854, he took pains to except Mr. Herbert, of whom he said: "In his examination by the Committee, while not affecting to conceal what he had himself done, he throughout attributed to others, where he could do so, the merits of the improvements effected, and strove to shield from blame those who, if they had made mistakes, had not spared themselves, and had acted zealously and, as they thought, for the best."

It is curious to see how differently the same action may be regarded by the same people, according to the person performing it or the circumstances in which it is performed. If there was one complaint more generally or more justly made than another at this period, it was that adherence to red tape and form had largely contributed to augment the sufferings of the Army and to delay the accomplishment of reforms. But when a member of the Government actually ventured in some degree to dispense with such forms of official routine, and to infringe the

official etiquette, it was quite another matter; and Sidney Herbert was seriously taken to task by the Committee, and mildly censured in its Report, for writing directly to Major Sillery and Lord W. Paulet instead of through their chief, Lord Raglan. He admitted that strict regularity and a rigid adherence to existing forms would have required him to adopt a process by which a letter addressed to Mr. Wreford, the Purveyor at Scutari, would have been sent past Constantinople, up to the Commander-in-Chief in the Crimea, to be re-transmitted by him to Major Sillery, Commandant at Scutari, and finally delivered through him to Mr. Wreford himself; but he expressed no penitence for having in this instance, as in some others, disregarded form, precedent, and regulation, in order to save life and alleviate suffering by saving time in the transmission of orders.

At length, after sitting for more than three months, the Committee closed its inquiry. It had examined 57 witnesses, and asked 21,421 questions, but those who would have given the most important evidence of all were never examined—Lord Raglan (the Commander-in-Chief), the Staff at headquarters, Sir R. Airey, General Estcourt, the chief authorities at Scutari, Lord W. Paulet, and Miss Nightingale. From the enormous and yet inadequate mass of information before them the Committee drew up its report. A draft proposed by the Chairman was all but unanimously rejected, and that prepared by Lord Seymour taken as a basis to work upon. This Report was, on the whole, judicious and temperate. As drafted, its conclusion appeared to be that, while many mistakes had been made and errors of judgment committed, there was little that called for any expression of blame; that is to say, neither indolence,

indifference, nor carelessness could be imputed to the chief actors in the drama. The Chairman, however, moved an additional paragraph, which censured the Administration in England for having undertaken the expedition without adequate information as to the amount of the force or the strength of the fortresses to be attacked, and declared this conduct of the Administration to have been the first and chief cause of the calamities which befell our Army.

On this motion the Committee was equally divided, Lord Seymour, General Peel, Mr. Ellice, Colonel Lindsay, and Mr. Bramston voting against the proposal. The numbers being equal, the Chairman decided by his own casting vote in favour of the insertion of the paragraph. Other violent paragraphs were, however, rejected, the Chairman finding only one supporter prepared to accept them.

That sentence, however, which had been adopted by his own double vote, justified Mr. Roebuck in bringing forward a motion censuring the members of Lord Aberdeen's Administration, a censure which necessarily included the greater part of the Cabinet actually in existence. He gave notice of this motion at once.

Mr. Gladstone, writing to Mr. Herbert on June 23rd, described it as—

"a censure on the members of the late Government which would effectually blast the present one. He is consistent, and carries the proceeding of the Committee to its legitimate conclusion. I have no idea whether he will be supported by Disraeli and his friends; but I suppose it is not unlikely, and with Layard and Co. they may give him at least a respectable minority. In any case you will, I presume, come up so as to be on the ground when the motion is made. It seems to be so framed as to put the departmental question aside, and bring the battery against the whole Government, which is all very well.

"Meantime, I can hardly bring myself to think or care about it at all, so oppressive is the weight of the other and greater question. The last Protocol placed it in a new light, and showed that we could hardly go on long without a fresh debate. We have now the dark news of the failure of the assault on the Malakoff and the Redan. There can scarcely be a doubt that the loss of life has been fearful, but even this derives its sharpest sting from the reflection that the ground beneath our feet is rotten.

"Canning (a secret) is to go to India. I rejoice that he will thus be extricated. I am truly sorry for Argyll and our other friends, whose hearts are for peace. Lord Aberdeen sends me positive proof that the French consider us exclusively responsible for carrying on the war now. Montalembert tells me their estimated war expenditure is three million francs per day; I think about 42 million sterling per annum heavier than ours. By-the-bye, I was tolerably received the other day, 'the hooting party' being in a decided minority, which I am glad of as a sign, coincident with others, that the war feeling is not really violent in the country, though it is with the Press.

"My wife is at Hagley, but intends to return on Monday, and if it suits you to take us on your way to London, such an arrangement will be most agreeable to us. I do not think of moving again until the day of the motion, or the day before.

"I am grieved to feel that the House of Commons and the representative system of the country will, after all, have been the most serious losers by the events of the present year. The Executive, which has for many years been too weak, is now much weaker than ever, and under a man of Lord Palmerston's ideas it cannot become strong. Every public man is more or less damaged. The House of Commons, unable to cope with the questions before it, has had recourse to subterfuges in word and act, and will perhaps add a new one by rejecting Roebuck's motion without adopting any other. The bright side of the question is that I am sure an impression has been made in the pacific sense, though, alas! when the opportunity that offered has been miserably thrown away.

"I have no doubt your mountains are very fine, but I assure you our blossoms are by no means

contemptible. I never saw such a lavish display of Nature's wealth and glory. This is the advantage of being a cockney."

Mr. Roebuck's motion was, however, from time to time postponed, and opportunity was thus afforded for further discussion among those most affected by it, which is embodied in the following correspondence:

MR. HERBERT TO SIR JAMES GRAHAM.

"LOCH STARK COTTAGE, LAIRG, SUTHERLAND,
"*June 30th*, 1855.

"MY DEAR GRAHAM,

"I last night received the news of Roebuck's postponement—not unwelcome, as after long intervals of drought and spate the river is just getting into order, and I had got five fish out of it in the course of the day. Lord Grosvenor, however, writes me word that he doubts whether Roebuck will come on at all. He is not, however, a man to let his *telum*, when once drawn, to be *sine ictu*, his vanity and his acrimony being too strong, I think, for that. Nevertheless, as my tenure here and our future plans depend a good deal upon it, and, as I think that if he does come on I ought not to be absent, I should be very much obliged if you would let me know what are the probabilities. I presume by his postponement to a Tuesday that on the 10th there is no motion of consequence having priority over him, so that he would be sure of getting his motion on.

"I can only judge by letters and newspapers, but it seems to me that the British public are as much over-depressed at the failure at the Redan as they were unreasonably elated at the success at the Quarries and Mamelon, but despite the lessons of last year our arrogance and our consequent disappointments seem undiminished. If, however, our Army can keep its health another month, there ought to be a tangible result. The worst aspect of affairs lies in the direction of Vienna. A reduction of the Austrian Army at this moment is most significant, and releases one hand of the Czar, which has as yet been tied behind his back. I do not see what is to be done in the Baltic. When terms of peace come again to be discussed, I

suppose that Sweden, like Turkey, will be brought into the 'general equilibrium,' and that the stipulation to make no fortifications in the Aland Islands will be made to all the Powers instead of to Sweden alone. We have, I think, a great interest in this, for Russia, with her two ice-bound arsenals in the north, and her fleet kept within gates in the south, is scarcely a naval power, great as is the number of her ships; but had she free egress from the Baltic her position would be much more formidable, especially to the northern sea-bordering countries like ourselves. The Government could not do better than take a Bomarsund engagement in lieu of a Black Sea limitation, and close on Gortchakoff's offer as to the Bosphorus and Dardanelles.

"Palmerston, however, is likely, I think, so long as public opinion will back him in this country, to go on playing double or quits. In that opinion there is not much sign of change yet, but the question, 'What are we fighting for?' will soon be asked by the innumerable families whose sons are daily risking and losing their lives in this now undefined quarrel.

"I am all the better for this life here; early rising, mountain air, and complete rest, with the enjoyment of magnificent scenery and excellent sport, would set up anybody. I am afraid your life during the last three weeks has not had the same advantages, but I hope you can give a good account of yourself."

Mr. Gladstone apparently wished not to vote on the question.

"As at present advised," he wrote, "I am not disposed to give any vote on Roebuck's motion, and Lord Aberdeen seems to think this is the right course. If, however, it should be met by any evasion, then I should be very desirous to give any vote for the purpose of preventing it from being set aside. Roebuck is right on his own grounds, and has, I think, done no more in substance than justice to all parties' demands."

Sir James Graham thought differently, and—

"was prepared, like you, to go to London at a moment's notice to confront Roebuck's motion, which is ostracism

without disguise. You will know by this time from other quarters that this motion is again postponed till Tuesday se'night, the 17th. I agree with you in thinking that it will be brought forward on that day, . . . and, judging from the tone of the *Press* newspaper, which is D'Israeli's organ, I infer that every effort will be made to induce the Derbyites to support the motion, which will not only overthrow the existing Government, but which excludes from power all rivals, except such as the Administrative Reformers who figure on the boards of Drury Lane. If the Derbyites could seize office at this juncture, at the close of the session, under the cover even of such a motion as this, they are reckless of consequences, and would rejoice in the triumph of a *coup d'état* which would restore them to office, and stave off a dissolution in the hands of their adversary.

" . . . It is hard to leave such sport and such scenery as you are now enjoying, but to shrink from facing Roebuck would be discreditable; and if we are to be branded, let us be heard before the stigma is affixed; and let it be done in the face of day.

"Our prospects in the Crimea are gloomy. It is clear that serious misunderstandings had arisen between Pelissier and poor Raglan, who has been taken, perhaps in mercy, from the evil to come.[1] We have estranged Austria. Before long we shall quarrel with France, or become her humble vassal and camp-follower, and it is clear that divided command cannot lead to success in war.

"Napoleon's observation to Carnot is quite true: 'One bad general is better than two good ones'; and it remains to be seen whether Pelissier and Simson are in the latter number.

"The good men are falling fast. The deaths of Raglan and of Estcourt, of Boxer and of Christie, give rise to sad reflections; and the sickness of Pennyfather and of Codrington, with Eyre wounded and disabled, will leave us deprived of the services of our most promising officers.

" I am assured that Persigny declares that the French Emperor would have accepted the Vienna terms, if the British Government would have consented. . . .

" I quite agree with you in thinking that the Russian

[1] Lord Raglan died June 28th, 1855.

naval preponderance in the Baltic, with screw and steam power fully developed, is a far more serious matter as affecting British interest and our national safety than the independence of Turkey or Russian armaments in the Black Sea. In fact, Russia was ready to concede all that was necessary for our purpose in the East. The war is now continued because peace would have been the overthrow of the Palmerston Administration."

Mr. Herbert's opinion was very decidedly on the same side.

MR. HERBERT TO MR. GLADSTONE,

"LOCH STARK, LAIRG, *July 9th*, 1855.

"I think we all ought to vote on Roebuck's motion. If it be meant as a censure on our policy, we naturally vote in maintenance of its soundness. If a censure on ourselves, we vote on it as we should do on any vote of non-confidence. We must consider how far we are to confine ourselves to a defence of our policy and proceedings, and how far we may criticise and throw dirt on the Committee—their leading questions, their acceptance of gossip and hearsay evidence, their pursuit of any subject which promised to be condemnatory, and their sudden dropping of any which looked as if it would turn out exculpatory if followed up; their bullying, Old-Bailey tone to Dr. Menzies and the small fry contrasted with their studious civility to Newcastle, etc.; their opinion given against the policy of an expedition agreed on by France as well as ourselves; their condemnation of Dr. Hall, who is unheard; their non-examination of Mr. Wreford, seriously accused by other witnesses, and who was here in England, but not called; their departure from the evidence in some respects in their Report, and their condemnation implied of everything which, however successfully done, was a departure from routine and office forms. Read Maxwell's pamphlet. It is published at Ridgway's, and, though flippantly written, is a careful dissection of the evidence, at least as far as I have read it, for I have only had the first half of it here.

"I wish that Mr. Gibson had chosen a better day than he did for his question on Buol's circular. He

was quite right in his statement, and Lord John's case seems hopeless. All this news from the Crimea is very distressing, the number of men sick containing the flower of the commanding officers. As for Lord Raglan's death, I cannot say how much I have felt it, though if the operations are to end in failure his removal will have been a mercy to him. But he has been taken at a moment when he had so nearly lived down most of the accusations against him. I shall come south with a heavy heart.

"I saw a fine white hooded eagle yesterday soaring over our loch."

MR. HERBERT TO SIR JAMES GRAHAM.

"LOCH STARK, LAIRG, *July 8th*, 1855.

"MY DEAR GRAHAM,

"We hope to be in town on Monday the 16th, if not then by Sunday. I should like much to talk over matters with you before the debate. I presume that with three volumes of blue books with which to make wadding, the House will not have expended its ammunition till Friday night.

"Gladstone in a letter to me talks of not voting as a course to be pursued by us. I take quite the opposite view. If the vote be one of censure on a policy, we are bound to vote in defence of it; if of censure of a government, we are equally entitled to vote against a non-confidence motion.

"The public prospects are bad. The defection of Austria, the natural result of our refusing our own terms, which we practically did at the Conference, and refusing her last offer, which the *Moniteur* very awkwardly tries to explain, gives Russia a reinforcement of 200,000 men.

"Morally it breaks up the European Confederacy against Russia, and is the first inclination of the balance of opinion against us instead of for us. Clarendon in the Lords openly repudiates the four points, which is unwise. If meant as a menace to Austria, it is a folly, for if our military operations succeed, and we get better terms, the better terms must include the substance of the first, second, and fourth points, which are all that Austria cares for. If our military operations fail, it will be Russia, and not we, who will repudiate the four points.

"I shall leave this place with great regret. It has been most enjoyable, though the weather has been most unpropitious for fishing. Hot sun with east wind, and a cloudless sky, or cold west winds, are equally fatal for fish; nevertheless we have killed twenty-nine—I say we, as Mrs. Herbert claims three to her score.

"The death of old Loch is to this kingdom in Sutherlandshire what the death of Nicholas was in Russia. It was an energetic, but I believe a just, and a wise, though a stern rule, and the Duke of Sutherland will find it difficult to replace him.

"I return Lord Aberdeen's letter. I confess I did not expect the Government to offer India to Newcastle, but their excuse is a shabby one, with the disadvantage of not being true. It would not, I think, have been for Newcastle's advantage to have had the appointment. The tide of public feeling is now rather in his favour as a victim, but the bestowal of a great appointment upon him at this moment would have turned it the other way. He would certainly have accepted.

"I hope to find you in town on Monday all the better for your rest and quiet at Netherby."

But in the midst of these discussions public attention was diverted from the impending vote of censure by a highly dramatic catastrophe. It has been mentioned above (p. 430) that Lord John Russell had made, on the occasion of Mr. Disraeli's motion, a speech in which he threw the whole blame of the continuance of the war on Russia, and treated her refusal to acccept the limitation of her naval force in the Black Sea as proposed by the Allies as an absolute bar to further negotiation. His eloquence was supposed to have swelled the majority obtained by the Government on that occasion. Eager to snatch a triumph in the House of Commons, he forgot that there were others besides himself who were aware of what had passed at Vienna, and who might not be well pleased by his suppression of all reference

to the Austrian efforts to restore peace. Count Buol issued a circular explaining the proposals which he had been prepared to make, a rejection of which by Russia would have led to an immediate junction of the Austrian armies with those of the Allies, and which, if accepted by Russia, would, in the opinion of Count Buol, Lord John Russell, and M. Drouyn de l'Huys alike, have formed fair and suitable conditions of peace. This statement naturally created much excitement and was at first ridiculed by the Government organs in the Press, but on being asked in the House of Commons by Mr. Milner Gibson whether the statement were true, Lord John, with apparent *insouciance*, admitted that it was so, and avowed that he still held the opinion that peace might safely and properly have been made on the conditions referred to. It was universally felt that, holding such opinions, Lord John should have resigned when the Cabinet refused to adopt them, and that he had acted somewhat shabbily in denouncing in the House those with whom he substantially agreed. Sir E. Lytton Bulwer at once gave notice of a motion of censure. The Cabinet expressed its willingness to defend Lord John, but at the same time made it clear to him that his resignation afforded the only hope of saving the Government from defeat. On the eve of the debate, and after an intimation that the members of the House of Commons holding office but not in the Cabinet felt unable to vote against Sir E. Bulwer's motion, he resigned. No generous mind, and Sidney Herbert's was an eminently generous mind, could see without pain the humiliation of one who had filled so eminent a position, and who, in spite of many and grave faults, was a patriot, a statesman, and a man of honour. But had Mr. Herbert cherished any lurking

feelings of resentment against Lord John for his conduct in January, they would have been amply satisfied by the Nemesis of July.

Some recent apologists of Lord John Russell have endeavoured to show that he was hampered in his explanations of his conduct at Vienna by his inability to disclose the motives which had led the Emperor Louis Napoleon to reject the Austrian proposal. It is true he was not at liberty to disclose them, but this does not really excuse his action. It was the fact of the Emperor's refusal, and not the motives which inspired it, which led Lord John to agree to the continued prosecution of the war, and this fact of the Emperor's refusal was open and was notorious. If he had resigned on finding his advice disregarded, or if, having made up his mind not to resign, he had frankly stated that, although he personally thought the Austrian proposals not unacceptable, their rejection by the Emperor of the French left us, in his opinion, no option but to continue the war, he would have stood blameless. Unfortunately for his reputation he adopted a different course, suppressed all mention of the Austrian overtures, and allowed it to be supposed—indeed, argued strongly on the supposition —that the rejected scheme of Russia was the last proposal which came before the Conference.[1]

When at length Mr. Roebuck's motion came on for discussion, which it did on July 19th, the previous

[1] When the protocols of the Conference were laid before Parliament after the rupture of the negotiations, that of the last sitting at which the Austrian proposal had been made was omitted, and only published after Count Buol's circular had made its existence generally known. The reluctance of the English Government to consider this scheme is not easily explicable, especially if, as was professed, they considered it certain to be rejected, for on its rejection by Russia, Austria was pledged at once to co-operate actively with the Allies in the war.

question was moved by General Peel and carried by a large majority, in which the members of the Government voted. This was not, however, considered by Mr. Herbert or the other members of Lord Aberdeen's Cabinet not then in office to be a satisfactory mode of meeting the question, and they all voted against General Peel's motion, pressing their right to a distinct condemnation or acquittal on the charges brought by Mr. Roebuck.

Mr. Gladstone had suggested at an earlier day that the proposals for a Turkish Loan under the guarantee of England would afford a favourable opportunity for a discussion on the proceedings of the Government and the attitude of England, and a motion disapproving that Loan was accordingly made by Mr. Ricardo, and very nearly carried, the Government obtaining a majority of three only. Sidney Herbert, as usual, went into the division lobby with his friends, but also, as usual, thought them ill advised. Not that he did not agree with them as to the truth of the proposition they put forward, but he saw, as they did not, how useless and ill timed such proceedings were. On the one hand, nothing probably more commended itself to dispassionate men, if there were any, than the arguments used on that occasion by those who spoke against the Loan. They were, in truth, unanswerable. But on the other, nothing certainly did more to render the Peelites unpopular and odious. It was no use to repeat that their opposition to the vote was for the purpose of *giving* to the Turks what the Government only proposed to *lend*. The public only saw in their action a refusal to grant supplies necessary for the carrying on of the war.

Mr. Herbert was keenly alive to the impolicy of this practically useless demonstration.

"We made an error," he wrote, "in dividing on Ricardo. The warning was good, but the risk enormous, and we are, as a nation, justly sensitive as regards engagements, even bad ones, nationally made with other powers. You, however, did much to set it right on Monday. Nevertheless, among impartial people we are much condemned.

"My belief is, that in dealing with Turkey we should, if she cannot borrow on her own credit, *give* what is wanted; a creditor after all is an enemy, and our policy for years must be to keep Turkey in our guidance as far as we can. We are entering, too, into a new war, and without advantages we possessed last year in the way of alliances. This loss, if the people are determined to fight, they must make up for by additional sacrifices in men and money. The alienation of Austria is a reinforcement of 200,000 men to Russia. We must meet this by extra and new efforts.

"If the war is to be carried on at all it must be carried on effectively. So I say *give* five millions (and they will not be the last), and by the time the next bill comes in maybe the wise British public will think it worth their while to ask what they are fighting and paying for, and to please whom? And the more they are made to pay the sooner they will ask the question."

Shortly after this debate, the Session of 1854–55 came to an end. To Mr. Herbert it had been an eventful one. At its commencement he had met the House of Commons as a Minister of the Crown, and by his efforts saved the credit and secured the triumph of the Government. That in spite of complaints and shortcomings it would have equally maintained its ground in January, but for Lord John Russell's desertion, may be regarded as all but certain. Its overthrow was a bitter disappointment to Mr. Herbert, who had hoped to obtain for it, and for himself, public recognition of the efforts which had been made and which were just beginning to tell on the condition

of the Army in the East. As a friend of peace also his disappointment was not less keen, for had the Aberdeen Cabinet continued in office it can hardly be doubted that peace would have been concluded at Vienna on the terms approved by Lord John Russell and M. Drouyn de l'Huys.

The Session brought Mr. Herbert an increase of influence and reputation. Besides the brilliant success obtained by him in the debates of December, he made during its course several speeches which raised and firmly established his reputation as a first-class debater. In spite of hesitating friends and bitter opponents he had exercised a decisive influence on more than one occasion. The Crimean Committee, with whatever reluctance, had complimented him on the efficiency of the work done by him, a compliment he declined to accept at the expense of his colleagues, but which was not the less merited.

But flattering though these personal results were, the whole tenour of the Session was such as to cause him the liveliest dissatisfaction. His position he felt to be a false one—one difficult to understand, and consequently sure to be misconstrued and misrepresented. Whilst in general agreement with the Government on all questions of domestic politics, his desire for peace and his belief that it might have been effected at Vienna forbade intimate association with those who had failed to secure it, and indeed perhaps rendered him, as a lukewarm friend, more obnoxious than an avowed enemy. On the other hand, while he was not less anxious for peace than Mr. Gladstone and his friends, and agreed with them that it might have been obtained, he considered that the vehemence of their advocacy of a pacific policy was ill judged, and, indeed, did much to keep alive

the popular eagerness for the continuance of the war. But these subtle distinctions between different shades of pacific feeling were not generally understood. All who were not anxious to continue the war were lumped together as advocates of peace at any price. His difference from his old friends on a point, not of principle, but of opportuneness, made his relations with them more or less embarrassed and painful, whilst it did not shield him from sharing with them the obloquy which attached to all who refused to clamour for the further prosecution of the war after its objects had been attained. How great that obloquy was it would be difficult for this generation to believe, were it not that recent experience has shown us how freely those who venture to think a restoration of peace possible before public opinion sets in that direction are branded with the title of sympathisers with the enemy. Few calm observers would now deny that the words of Bright and Cobden, Gladstone, and Graham were words of soberness and truth, or that peace might not have been made with honour and safety at Vienna in the spring of 1855. The belief of Mr. Herbert that the prospect of peace was endangered rather than advanced by the vehemence of its advocates was shared by many of the more sober friends of peace, whose sentiments are fairly summed up in a letter written to Mrs. Herbert by Mr. Goulburn[1] about this time.

FROM MR. GOULBURN TO MRS. HERBERT.

"*June 29th.*

". . . . I very much regret Gladstone's perverseness. It is not the first occasion on which it has been manifested. I believe it to be part of his natural character, and, notwithstanding his great ability, it

[1] Sir Robert Peel's Chancellor of the Exchequer.

renders him far less useful as a statesman than he otherwise would be. He has, if I may say so, too subtle a mind. He weighs questions by themselves, without references to consequences. He presents to his own mind all that can be urged for or against the abstract question, and as soon as he fancies that there is a preponderance, however subtly discovered, he applies in support of that preponderance of opinion his unrivalled power of argument, and treating it as a matter of conscience, will not look at the incidental evils which his course of conduct may produce; still less will he regard the effect which it may have on those who are politically associated with him. It was this quality in him which made the public disparage his otherwise brilliant career as Chancellor of the Exchequer, and will, I apprehend, equally affect his future success as a statesman. It was this that made me long ago determine that Sidney, not Gladstone, should be my leader. He is not, I admit, gifted with the power of oratory which Gladstone possesses, but to very high ability he adds a fund of correct judgment which, as a useful public servant, outweighs all other considerations. I confess myself, equally with Gladstone, anxious for the restoration of peace; but strongly to press that opinion when the opinion of the House of Commons and the public are just now in favour of war—so much so that 'when I speak unto them of peace, they make them ready for battle'—is only to commit many to the support of a war policy who would, if unpledged, be brought earlier to acquiesce in reasonable pacification. But though this appears to me to be common sense, Gladstone will not view it in the same light."

Shortly before the Prorogation, Mr. Herbert, wearied in mind and body, sought a season of rest and cure at Kissingen.

END OF VOL. I

Printed by Hazell, Watson & Viney, Ld., London and Aylesbury.

It is thought that it may be of interest to some readers to see the drawings referred to on page 10; and reproductions of them, on a small scale, are consequently given on the following pages.



THE CHALLENGE.

THE STRUGGLE.



THE VICTORY.



THE CHAGRIN AND TRIUMPH.